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BP and the Deepwater Horizon Disaster of 2010

Christina Ingersoll

Richard M. Locke

Cate Reavis

Apr 3, 2012

The explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig on April 20, 2010, resulted from a series of events and decisions involving employees of BP and its contractors. While there does not appear to be one clear culprit or reason that led to the disaster, the case explores issues of organization, information, and decision-making, as well as the ability or inability of individuals to voice their values as contributing factors.

Learning Objectives

To engage students in what it means to act ethically in today’s business world; understand that decisions are strongly influenced by broader factors such as culture, organizational design, and decision-makers’ values; and think critically about ethical dilemmas and how to voice their values in response to those dilemmas.

Appropriate for the Following Course(s) 

leadership, ethics, corporate responsibility, operations management

BP and the Deepwater Horizon Disaster of 2010 

TEACHING NOTE*

*TEACHING NOTES AND SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS ARE ONLY AVAILABLE TO EDUCATORS WHO HOLD TEACHING POSITIONS AT ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS.

• British Petroleum (B): The Deepwater Horizon explosion

The B-case highlights some of the changes Hayward had implemented since becoming CEO in 2007. After Hayward announced that BP’s top strategic priorities for 2010 were ongoing cost cutting, production growth and alternative energy, the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, triggering the largest oil spill in history. As the crisis unfolded, BP and Hayward made a number of missteps that angered the residents of the Gulf, environmental groups and politicians, including President Obama.

Communicating during a crisis, preparing a crisis message strategy.

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• British Petroleum (A): Defining a strategic vision
• British Petroleum (C): Economic and environmental sustainability?

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Five Lessons From the BP Oil Spill

by Andrew Winston

It’s very easy to pile onto BP right now. The “accident,” which may be due more to negligence, is bad enough. The company lost 11 employees — after losing 15 in a high-profile explosion at a refinery 5 years ago. The damage to the Gulf, its species, and the people who depend on it is almost incalculable. But surprisingly, it’s even easier to criticize BP’s behavior since the explosion — the company has tried hard to downplay the scale of the tragedy and it has moved slowly to stop the torrent of oil pouring into the Gulf.

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A deep dive into BP’s Deepwater Horizon Spill: a case study

Under pressure – the disaster

Considered as the biggest marine disaster in history, on April 20 th , 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico, killing 11 crew members working onsite. The rig eventually sank and damaged the pipe underneath and started to spew millions of barrels of crude oil into the gulf over the next four months. It contaminated about 400 square miles of the sea floor and 1,300 miles of shoreline of the Gulf of Mexico (DOI: 10.1002/jcaf.22306).

Search-and-rescue operations were executed on April 22 nd and within the same day, BP’s CEO Tony Hayward released a statement that they were determined to do everything to contain the oil spill and resolve the situation . When the rig capsized, BP’s initial response comprised of: 1) releasing of a small fleet of response vessels, 2) relief well planning, 3) skimming of oily surface water, 4) implementing protective boom to prevent oil from reaching the shoreline, and 5) placing chemical dispersants in the spill site to break up the oil and keep them from damaging marshes, mangroves, and beaches .

Efforts were made to seal the leaking well but were initially unsuccessful, and as a back-up, they have started drilling relief well in May. To reduce the leak, a tube tool was inserted into the ruptured riser pipe and containment cap was used to collect the oil and pump it to the gulf surface. On July 15 th , BP was able to stop the flow of oil for the first time in 87 days but was still under monitoring to ensure that the cap would stay in place. More than 2 weeks later, the US government announced that almost three-quarters of the spilled oil had been cleaned up, and on September 19 th , BP reported that the leak had been successfully and permanently plugged .

Several service providers (DOI: 10.1002/jcaf.22306) were involved in the offshore drilling operations of the Macondo well, the area of exploration where BP is operating. BP leased the rig from TransOcean, while the processes such as cementing the well and other critical functions were done by Sperry-Sun, Halliburton’s subsidiary. Other companies involved were Dril-Wuip, Oceaneering, M-I-SWACO, Cameron, and Weatherford.

Numerous investigations were held to find the root cause of the disaster, as well as the parties responsible for the damages. The BP report 2010, the Commission Report 2011 and the Joint Report 2011 concluded that the tragedy occurred due to a series of failures from the multiple parties involved in the operation. BP had been identified as the primary responsible for ensuring the safety and protection of personnel, equipment, natural resources, and the environment under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA). The other companies also shared the same accountability for violating several offshore safety regulations based on the Joint Report 2011.

It was revealed that the crisis has cost BP more than US$65 billion covering the total charges, net of reimbursements and recoveries, as well as insurance claims. However, a study (DOI: 10.1002/jcaf.22306) showed that the ultimate cost of the oil spill was twice what was reported in BP’s income statement, amounting to US$144.89 billion. The detailed computation included not just those mentioned above but also the hidden costs such as the revenue lost, unearned profit, and reputational damage. Needless to say, the spill also damaged fisheries, beaches, and coastal wetlands, including several species of birds, sea turtles, marine mammals, fishes, oysters, and other sea animals. A recent study showed that Gulf inhabitants such as brown pelican and menhaden fish have showed robust recovery while many species such as deep-sea coral, common loons, and spotted sea trout are still struggling to multiply.

The Deepwater Horizon spill also brought significant impacts to the economic activity in the surrounding communities. A research (DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-11605-7_33) revealed that the total economic costs during the period of 2010-2020 of the foregone commercial fishing revenues and recreational fishing expenditures are loss of 25,000 jobs, US$2.3 billion worth of industry output, US$1.2 billion gross regional product, US$700 million labor income, US$160 million state and local tax revenues, and US$160 million federal tax revenues.

A deep well of learnings

Oil spills are not uncommon in the Gulf of Mexico but the magnitude of impact of BP’s Deepwater Horizon had been massive that it attracted so much attention from various stakeholders, not to mention the several missteps BP took as they navigated through the whole crisis. Here is the list of some lessons learned from the accident that, in some way or another, brought lasting impact on the safety of succeeding oil operations in the industry.

• Never learning enough from previous mistakes. In a high-risk business like oil-drilling, it is expected that large companies such as BP would have anticipated negative events in many of its operations. Even more so when there had been several accidents that happened prior the major oil spill. In 2005, BP’s refinery in Texas City exploded and their Thunder Horse rig in the same gulf got into an accident. In the following year, BP’s pipeline leaked in Prudhoe Bay. It was reported that BP was still paying for the violations in these previous disasters when the Deepwater Horizon spill happened .
• Culture of safety must be embraced by the whole industry. The disaster showed how neither the industry, nor the governments were prepared for risks involved in oil exploration. The investigations revealed how failures in following procedures to mitigate risks, and loose coordination among operators and regulatory bodies led to this disaster. It is important for organizations to understand that regulations are for their benefit, and it can provide level playing field for all stakeholders, especially during a crisis. In addition, regulations must be well-enforced, and penalties must be tantamount to the damages incurred in a disaster. Lax safety enforcement for the part of Minerals Management Service (MMS), the regulating body for offshore oil drilling, was found in the investigations. In fact, in the report released by the General Accountability Office (GAO), MMS showed a series of inconsistencies and omissions in their National Environmental Policy Act analyses and was described to lack organization, guidance, technical expertise, and qualified personnel .
• Plans must be prepared and reviewed to the highest standard possible. BP had MMS-approved Gulf Oil Spill Response Plan that detailed cleanup equipment and techniques, surface containment methods, and the use of chemical dispersants while missing out the more important parts of preventing or stopping a blowout. It was later found that BP’s response plan was written by the same contractor that prepared the plans for other oil companies such as ExxonMobil, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and Shell Oil. Congressional inquiry described the plans as “cookie-cutter” that similar errors were found in some of the companies’ response plan . Furthermore, BP received a categorical exclusion for exploration plan for Macondo Prospect, allowing them to drill without preparing detailed site-specific environmental assessment based on the outdated assumption that “the impacts from the common operations are expected to be negligible to non-existent…”.
• Ensure that Business Continuity Plan includes third-party agreement. Several subcontractors involved in the Deepwater Horizon operations had made the already complex nature of the business even more complicated. Complex risks may arise from third party contractors and their capability to continue their operations. This is why it is important that critical suppliers must have Business Continuity Management arrangement in place. Furthermore, a robust action plans as part of collective response among suppliers in case of a disruption must be included in their contractual obligations. Had the employees well-informed of their responsibilities and safety actions, the death of 11 crew members would have been prevented. Had BP and its contractors have pre-arrangement contracts that included BCM, they would have not blamed each other and engaged in multi-billion dollar litigation after the accident.
• Communication is an integral aspect of crisis management. BP has become a textbook example of how not to handle public relations. Several studies evaluating BP’s actions in terms of crisis communication have been published following the major incident. Below is a quick rundown of both weaknesses and strengths of BP’s campaign (DOI: 10.1080/13527266.2018.1559218).

Digging deeper

Initially, BP’s several mishaps in managing the disaster making it easy for environmentalists, politicians, media, and other concerned individuals to paint the company as uncaring and greedy organization that cares for profits more than anything else . When the rig exploded and oil spill happened, BP was quick to shift the blame to TransOcean through their official statements, and the former CEO Hayward’s media interview. He said: “ This wasn’t our accident. This was a drilling rig operated by another company. It was their people, their systems, their processes. We are responsible not for the accident, but we are responsible for the oil and for dealing with it and cleaning the situation up.”

Lack of concern for the victims was also seen by many when there were reports that BP asked the cleanup workers and those who were affected by the spill to sign a waiver that would limit BP’s liability. This was during the ironic time that BP reported their 135% first quarter profit of $5.6 billion. The company also failed to be transparent, hindering people to build confidence and trust that they were on top of the situation early on. For example, the initial estimate of the leak was only 1,000 barrels per day, increased it to 5,000 barrel per day after more than a week, then later submitted a figure of 100,000 barrels per day to the Congress for investigation.

Lastly, former CEO Tony Hayward’s statements and actions attracted a lot of negative attention. In an interview with The Times of London, he mentioned that some victims would try to scam them for profit (Ibid) “I could give you lots of examples. This is America – come on. We’re going to have lots of illegitimate claims. We all know that.” Furthermore, he tried to downplay the damage caused by the accident by saying “ the Gulf of Mexico is a very big ocean. The amount of volume of oil and dispersant we are putting into it is tiny in relation to the total water volume.” He was also recorded saying in front of many reporters, “The first thing to say is I’m sorry. We’re sorry for the massive disruption it’s caused their lives. There’s no one who wants this over more than I do. I would like my life back.” He was later seen on a yacht off the Isle of Wight, 2 days after testifying before Congress.

The reputation repair

As BP struggled to find solution to stop the oil spill and its dwindling reputation, its share price and credit rating also grappled. The shareholder value of BP plummeted by 55% after the incident, from US$59.48 per share on April 19 th , 2010 to US$27 per share on June 25 th , 2010 . Furthermore, Fitch cut its credit rating from AA to BBB after US politicians demanded US$20 billion deposits in an escrow account to fund the damage claims for the oil spill as the agency was concerned about the ratio between long-term and near-term cost payments would become skewed towards the near-term cost . However, the meeting of BP’s executives with Obama in June was considered a turning point. BP’s Chairman Carl-Henric Svanberg told Obama: “ Our boat is keeling over right now. We’re not taking on water but we’re not far away. If you and the administration can be supportive going forward, that would help us do the right thing.” Obama responded that it is the country’s interest for the company to remain strong and viable to be able to fulfill its commitments . It was on this meeting that BP agreed to fund the US$20 billion escrow account, which investors received positively .

In the same month, BP hired Purple Strategies, a public affairs firm run by a Democratic and a Republican strategist, for its US campaign, alongside Anne Womack Kolton, a former US Energy Department official, to manage its US media relations. The new strategy team was able to showcase what BP had been doing for those affected by the crisis. Television, radio, and print campaign featured BP workers and Gulf Coast locals, volunteers, and BP officials. They were able to put faces on the real and human stories related to the incident. After the leak was plugged, they expanded the communication strategies to image-building by highlighting how BP was helping the Gulf Coast residents to get back to business as usual. They created two major campaigns – “Voices from the Gulf” and “My Gulf”.

Voices from the Gulf: Mississippi Fishermen

Voices from the Gulf: Louisiana’s Restaurant Owners

Voices from the Gulf: Florida Business Owners

My Gulf: Dawn Moliterno – Walton Tourism Development

My Gulf: New Orleans, Louisiana – Cooking the Perfect Gumbo

My Gulf: Josephine, Alabama: Shrimpin’ with Papa Roy

Another unprecedented albeit necessary decision happened in the following month, Tony Hayward, whose gaffes had enraged a lot of Americans, announced that he was stepping down as CEO and would be replaced in October by Bob Dudley, a Mississippi native who was in charge of BP’s clean-up response .

A year of change – the post crisis phase

Changing leadership amidst the crisis was a pivotal step for BP to redirect its direction through the crisis. Bob Dudley’s first tasks as the CEO were: 1) securing the company’s finances, 2) ensuring the safety of BP’s operations worldwide, and 3) restoring the environment of the Gulf Coast . He needed to sell BP’s oil and gas assets quickly, including their prized assets such as the Texas City refinery, Gulf of Mexico oilfields and Russian joint venture , and also do forward sale oil to safeguard BP’s future while meeting its commitment to the Gulf.

Guided by his principle of “value over volume”, Dudley cut the number of BP-operated upstream installation by 50%, the number of wells by more than 30%, and oil and gas reserves by 10%. In addition, he formed a new global Safety and Operational Risk team to instill the culture of safety in the company . Apart from the operation and culture, he mentioned in an interview that capital allocation and decision-making were also reformed . BP became “ inclusive, and modern place to work where leaders were encouraged to listen to the quietest voices in the room ”.

BP’s support to its business partners and people during the crisis did not wane but even strengthened. Dudley found that while several of BP’s partners such as banks were pulling away, there were some partners that were supportive and willing to help. Moreover, he also felt the need to rebuild the confidence of their employees in their company as he was worried that competitors might try to hire their talent away .

The oil company remained committed to environmental restoration. They provided up to US$1 billion for restoring natural resources that were impacted by the accident. In addition, BP has allocated US$500 million for a decade of support to independent research designed to provide better understanding of the Gulf ecosystem and industry. With the help of experts in high-hazard sectors such as nuclear energy, chemicals and the military, BP strengthened their operational risk function. Furthermore, they were able to design and prepare a capping stack that can be used in case another leak in deep water happens .

BP: A year of change

Rising above pressure

The post-crisis organizational reform was able to regain the investors’ trust as shown by the share price increase from June 29 th , 2010. Although the share has not gone back to its pre-oil spill crisis price at around US$60, it did not go below US$27 until the COVID-19 pandemic hit.

BP strengthened its finances after the crisis by cutting costs to reduce breakeven point while improving oil production . In 2017, Moody’s increased BP’s credit rating for the first time in 19 years citing the company’s resilience to oil price volatility and increased clarity in terms of the remaining cash payments related to the US$20 billion Deepwater Horizon settlement .

BP continued to acquire various projects including those that focus on natural gas such as shale gas production from about 200 wells in Oman , the natural gas production at Atoll gas field in Egypt , and several American oil and shale projects bought from mining firm BHP, its first major US investment since the oil spill ,  among others. Although only a small fraction of their total spending, BP started investing in renewable energy at around US$400 million a year. They invested in startup firms like Freewire, which possesses a technology that allow charging electric vehicles faster. It also acquired Chargemaster, UK’s biggest network of EV charging stations, as well as 43% share of Lightsource, Europe’s largest solar development firm . Like other oil companies, BP received several criticisms for doing inadequate efforts to reduce carbon emissions and increase renewable energy, especially that between 2016 and 2019, BP expanded its oil and gas production by 20% .

In 2020, BP announced that it aims to become a net-zero emissions company by 2050 or sooner. It revealed their commitment to a 10-fold increase in low-carbon investment or an estimate of US$5 billion per year, and a 20-fold increase in renewable generating capacity to 50 gigawatts . Headed by the current CEO Bernard Looney, who succeeded Dudley in February 2020, the oil giant plans US$25 billion in fossil-fuel asset sales by 2025, with US$15 billions of which has already been liquidated by unloading the Oman deal, oil and gas field in Alaska and the North Sea, and BP’s entire petrochemical operation . Although the company does not expect profits from its clean-energy business such as solar, EV-charging, and wind ventures until 2025, Looney continues to spend on renewable energy.

The Final Cap

To keep its commitment to meet its obligations in the Gulf of Mexico in spite of almost losing its whole business to the accident is praiseworthy; to move forward, learn its lessons, and transform into a better organization is even more admirable; but nothing can beat a well-prepared company that can prevent a crisis to happen, or at least mitigate the risks. The BP’s Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill is a great example of how return on investment of robust emergency response and business continuity programs can worth priceless.

In addition, the accident showed us that the most critical aspect of crisis leadership is clear and trustworthy communication. The goal of communicating during a crisis is not to lessen the uncertainty but to acknowledge it and the fear that comes with it. Transparency, honesty, and empathy are always the best policy.

If you liked this case study, you might also want to read this one .

Author: Lucil Aguada

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Business Continuity and Crisis Management Consultants

Crisis Management Case Study: Deepwater Horizon

April 5, 2022 By //  by  Bryan Strawser

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was truly a crisis. Unfortunately, it was also handled in one of the worse ways possible. When a crisis occurs, management and communication become some of the largest and most significant issues. In this particular case, BP failed in both of those areas. It’s important to look at how this occurred and why in order to have a better understanding of the event and its aftermath. Additionally, determining ways to avoid the issue in the future and better manage the next crisis is a valuable part of learning lessons from the Deepwater Horizon spill, so the risk of another spill and its resulting damage can be reduced. Here is everything you need to know about this event and the lack of proper crisis management from BP at the time it occurred.

A Summary of the Situation

On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil platform exploded in the Gulf of Mexico. The resulting spill was deemed to be among history’s worst environmental disasters. In addition to the damage inflicted on the planet, eleven workers died in the explosion. Nearly five million barrels of crude oil entered the Gulf before the leak created by the explosion was stopped, and there have been suggestions that the local environment was irreparably harmed by the oil. While some of the oil was cleaned up or contained, much of it made its way into areas where cleaning wasn’t easy or where containment was not really an option. Due to the way oil spreads and the amount of it being released in the spill, collecting all of it and restoring the environment was not really possible.

Additionally, the oil-coated fish, birds, and other animals, and made it more difficult for businesses in communities along the Gulf Coast to survive due to the dip in tourism the spill created. But the problem wasn’t just in what actually happened. It was also in how BP handled the explosion, the leak in the Gulf that went on for far too long, and what the public was being told about the event and the efforts to clean it up. Through a series of missteps and poor choices, BP not only made the situation more complicated but also added to the damage that was being done. Before it was over, BP would be chastised by environmental groups and many others for the decisions made immediately after the explosion took place and in the days and weeks following it, while the leak continued.

BP Failed at Crisis Management

While the explosion, loss of life, and immediate impact of the spill were all devastating, it was what BP did after that which became the subject of discussion and frustration for a lot of people. There was a distinct lack of leadership right from the beginning, and gas stations around the country that carried the BP branding changed their names. They did not want the association with the company and were seeing their sales drop based on the way people felt about BP and the choices the company had made. The lacking leadership was not the only problem the company had, though. It also showed a strong lack of compassion during a time when compassion could have been its greatest asset. The company missed an amazing opportunity to make things right.

Instead of making it right, BP allowed oil to pour into the Gulf of Mexico without really doing anything about it for weeks. There were some failed “attempts” to cap the spill, but it seemed that these were half-hearted, at best. They really failed to get to the heart of what would have helped improve the situation, and what would have addressed the concerns of the public, as well. Among the most obvious gaffes was the realization that BP had not planned for crisis management in any way. It was as though the company assumed a serious problem like the Deepwater Horizon explosion and resulting oil spill could not, or would not, happen to them, so there was no point in “wasting” any time or money being ready for it. When it happened, they clearly were not ready.

There were two facets to BP’s lack of readiness. The first had to do with the health and safety of their workers and the environment, while the second was related to their public image. The company had slashed PR budgets and also cut costs where government relations were concerned, in order to reduce overhead. But that only worked as long as nothing went wrong. When a catastrophe like Deepwater Horizon occurred, there was no plan in place to save the company’s reputation. At the same time, the company had not put any money into crisis management, either, so the ways to handle environmental and worker impacts were not funded or even considered. Both areas were in serious need of correction, which would have been far easier before the oil spill occurred.

It is generally not good practice for a company to have a major disaster and then choose to hire a crisis management firm to address the fallout. Most large companies have these firms already available to them and plans in place for potential problems. Since BP did not have any of that at the time, they had to start from scratch on what they were going to do and say. That delay cost the company significantly, because of the heavy environmental damage and perceived lack of compassion the company displayed in the days and weeks after the Deepwater Horizon explosion. As millions of gallons of oil poured into the Gulf of Mexico, the company seemed to take its time doing anything at all about the issue. That did not sit well with the majority of people in the country.

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You’ll learn what it is, why it’s important for your organization, how to prepare for a crisis, how to respond when a crisis happens, and how to recover and learn from a crisis after it is over. We’ll also provide some perspective on where to learn more about crisis management.

Ultimate Guide to Crisis Management

Communications — Where BP Really Went Wrong

It was not just in the way the company handled the Deepwater Horizon event that was a real problem, though. It was also in the way the company talked about the event. The CEO of BP, Tony Hayward, was quoted as saying, “There’s no one who wants this thing over more than I do. You know, I’d like my life back.” His insensitivity to the people who had lost their lives and the others who had their lives damaged or disrupted due to the oil spill was talked about for some time. Even if the CEO felt that way, which would be understandable due to the stress of everything taking place, he should have focused his public statements on the tragedy of the people who died, and all the serious environmental impacts of the Deepwater Horizon incident caused, instead of himself.

Hayward received significant backlash for his comments and the ways he seemed to ignore or misunderstand the gravity of the issue around him. He was also quoted as saying there would be minimal impact on the Gulf, and talked about his sympathy for the “small people” who lived along the coast. Naturally, people who lived and worked in the area did not take kindly to Hayward, who appeared to think of himself as being far above most “normal” people. The lack of planning for crisis communications really affected BP the longer the situation went on without public information being provided to those who were worried about their health, their jobs, and their local environment. Even when crisis planning help was offered, BP was slow to take the offerers up on that option.

While BP did eventually launch an ad campaign in an effort to communicate with the public about how they would clean up the spill and restore the environment, that was met with a lot of skepticism given the company’s tone-deaf response to concerns up to that point. Additionally, the ad campaign cost the company $50 million, which could have been used for clean-up efforts. A far less expensive campaign would have been enough, and the biggest focus should have been on getting the work done, instead of telling people that the work would get done. It was six weeks after the Deepwater Horizon exploded before these ads even began to air, showing that BP did not seem to see that time was of the essence, or take the future of the Gulf Coast seriously.

US Government Actions Led to Big Company Changes

The fines BP received for their damage to the environment and careless response to it were unprecedented. There was a fine of $5.5 billion for violations of the Clean Water Act and another $8.8 billion penalty for the damages to natural resources. Those were only the fines and penalties levied by the EPA and did not take into account all the other lawsuits that came about from environmental damage, business harm, and loss of life. Between 2012 and 2015, there were a lot of different settlements between the US government and BP or BP’s partners, based on lawsuits and assessed penalties. Most of those settlements were in the millions of dollars. But the biggest impact was not to BP’s bottom line. Instead, it was really to their reputation and branding.

In 2018, BP re-emerged from all the trauma it had been dealing with as a stronger and leaner company. Robert Dudley had taken over from Hayward and was committed to re-inventing the company so it could remain viable. Now, BP is not the big-name it once was. But it is a strong company that is smaller and more compact than before. It was forced to sell off millions in assets to pay the fines and lawsuits resulting from the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon and the resulting 87 days that un-capped well pumped oil into the Gulf of Mexico. There were times when it was questionable as to whether the company would survive at all. But it did, and it seems as though lessons have been learned from the way it failed to handle one of the biggest environmental disasters of all time.

Lessons Learned From the Oil Spill

There are several takeaways to be considered from the Deepwater Horizon incident. While these are likely lessons that BP has learned the hard way, they are also lessons that any company can use to have a better understanding of crisis management and how it should be handled. The most important thing to remember about crisis management is that it needs to be fully and completely in place before a crisis occurs. Waiting until it happens and then hoping to get quick, quality help with it is just not realistic for the majority of companies. Instead, every company should have a fully planned and functional crisis management plan in place that is periodically reviewed and updated. That plan should include PR, which is one of the areas where BP had the most trouble.

About Bryan Strawser

Bryan Strawser is Founder, Principal, and Chief Executive at Bryghtpath LLC, a strategic advisory firm he founded in 2014. He has more than twenty-five years of experience in the areas of, business continuity, disaster recovery, crisis management, enterprise risk, intelligence, and crisis communications.

At Bryghtpath, Bryan leads a team of experts that offer strategic counsel and support to the world’s leading brands, public sector agencies, and nonprofit organizations to strategically navigate uncertainty and disruption.

Learn more about Bryan at this link .

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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill

Download the PDF

Cause Mapping Example:

The Deepwater Horizon oil rig was in the final stages of exploratory drilling at the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico when disaster struck. On April 20, 2010, the rig exploded, killing 11 workers and forcing the evacuation of the rig. It quickly became clear that the emergency measures taken prior to evacuation had not sealed the well and that great amounts of oil were leaking into the Gulf of Mexico.

Immediately, plans were developed to stop the oil leaking from the well while attempting to avoid anything that might cause the leak to expand. This delicate balancing act – and a host of other factors from a hurricane to political wrangling – meant that it would take nearly 3 months before the leak was stopped, and nearly 5 months before the well was declared effectively dead.

The months between the beginning and end of the leak were defined by contingency plan after contingency plan. We’ll examine this incident closer to look at what happens when your original solution doesn’t solve the problem.

We’ll use the Cause Mapping process to provide an analysis of the issues related to the Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill. The Cause Mapping method utilizes three steps: 1) Define the problem, 2) Conduct the analysis and 3) Identify the best solutions. Each step will be discussed below.

Step 1. Define the Problem

The first step of the Cause Mapping approach is to define the problem by asking the four questions: What is the problem? When did it happen? Where did it happen? And how did it impact the goals? One person may say that the problem was the well blowout. Another person might say that the problem was the explosion on the rig, and a third person could say that the problem was the worker fatalities. We can write down these three “problems” on the first line. In the Cause Mapping methodology the facilitator anticipates that the group may disagree so all three responses are written down. There is no need to spend time debating the problem. The magnitude of this incident is defined by the impact to the goals.

The second question is the “When?” which is the date and time of the incident. When captures the timing of the issue and also has a line for what was different or unusual in this occurrence. The question of what was different is fundamental in any investigation. On the Deepwater Horizon issue we capture the date as April 20, 2010 and the time of 9:49 PM when the first explosion occurred. An important difference was confusing test pressure results.

In an investigation there can be several pieces of information that need to be captured when specifying the location. At a minimum the physical/geographic location and the process should be captured. The physical location is where geographically the incident happened. In this case, the incident occurred in Macondo Prospect in the Gulf of Mexico on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig. At the time of the explosion, the rig was performing the final phase of drilling an exploratory well.

Step 2. Identify the Causes (The Analysis)

The amount of detail provided in an analysis must be adequate to determine effective solutions in reducing the impacts to the goals. In the case of Deepwater Horizon, the immediate solutions focused on stopping the oil flow out of the damaged riser. The rig itself capsized and sank, and will not be used again.

During the course of the internal investigation, eight key findings were identified.  These eight key findings can be addressed in a Cause Map with a higher level of detail.  To view a PDF showing the eight key findings, click here or on the button above.

Step 3. Select the Best Solutions (Reduce the Risk)

Once the Cause Map is built to a sufficient level of detail with supporting evidence the solutions step can be started. The Cause Map is used to identify all the possible solutions for given issue so that the best solutions can be selected. The possible solutions can also provide backup plans in case the initial solutions selected didn’t work, as happened in this case.

Response, recovery and investigation into the Deepwater Horizon incident continues. Some of the specifics may never be known as the evidence required is lost with the rig and the workers who were killed. The reminders of the tragedy will remain, and hopefully the lessons learned will be applied to other incidents to ensure that safety is maximized in difficult environments in the future.

Click on “Download PDF” above to download a PDF showing the Root Cause Analysis Investigation.

The information used to make this Cause Map was obtained from: A Hole at the Bottom of the Sea: The Race to Kill the BP Oil Gusher by Joel Achenbach Internal Accident investigation Report CSB Investigation on the Macondo Blowout and Explosion Deepwater Horizon Study Group’s Final Report on the Investigation of the Macondo Well Blowout

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• Corpus ID: 32038581

Crisis communication failures: The BP Case Study

• Published 1 March 2013
• Business, Environmental Science

28 Citations

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Industrial and Commercial Training

ISSN : 0019-7858

Article publication date: 30 September 2013

Every unexpected and sudden event (crisis) operates as a threat for an organization's reputation. British Petroleum (BP) came face to face with a crisis on 20 April 2010 when an explosion in the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig caused a huge oil spillage in the Gulf of Mexico. The present case study aims to describe BP's serious communication mistakes with its stakeholders managing a serious hit to BP's reputation.

Design/methodology/approach

The present case study attempts to provide a detailed outline of BP's communication failures by conducting in-depth investigation of secondary data (newspapers, audiovisual material, social network sites).

BP's crisis communication was a weak link in its crisis management strategy. The lessons to learn are various, both for practitioners and researchers. Practitioners should learn from the leadership, culture and public relations (PR) mistakes made by BP and avoid them in a crisis of their organisation. They should select those strategies that foster their organization's strengths and correct its weaknesses in order to take advantage of external opportunities and counter external threats.

Originality/value

This study could be a valuable asset in communication literature, since BP's PR strategies during this oil spill have not been studied extensively. The communications solutions BP took during the crisis were examined and certain strategies BP should have followed in order to avoid its failed PR plan are suggested, which can help both practitioners and researchers to learn from BP's mistakes and give more attention to communication strategies, which are of critical essence to all crises.

• Social media
• British Petroleum
• Crisis communication
• Public relations

Acknowledgements

Aikaterini Valvi's research is supported by a scholarship from the School of Business, Economics and Informatics, Birkbeck, University of London, UK.

C. Valvi, A. and C. Fragkos, K. (2013), "Crisis communication strategies: a case of British Petroleum", Industrial and Commercial Training , Vol. 45 No. 7, pp. 383-391. https://doi.org/10.1108/ICT-04-2013-0026

Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2013, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

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Crisis Management: British Petroleum Company Case Study

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• As a source of information (ensure proper referencing)
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Executive Summary

Problem statement, data analysis, key decision criteria, alternatives analysis, recommendations, action and implementation plan, works cited.

This paper reveals the case study that focuses on the explosion which happened on the Deepwater Horizon seven years ago. It was claimed to be one of the greatest disasters that led to human deaths and oil spills that affected the ecosystem adversely. Professionals argued whether the fact that British Petroleum failed to ensure safety and appropriate crisis management was the main reason for the accident. This view is analyzed in the addressed in the paper. It is also discussed how the company could have responded to the explosion and why.

One of the most critical oil spill disasters related to the petroleum industry took place in April seven years ago. It occurred on a drilling rig owned by the largest company that operates within oilfield services and deals with offshore drilling, Transocean Ltd. The explosion on the Deepwater Horizon led to eleven deaths and oil leaks, resulting in enormous damages not only to human lives but also to the environment, economy, and tourism. As a consequence, British Petroleum (BP) had to deal with the biggest oil spill and financial losses at the same time. What is more, its reputation was negatively affected. Even though the company couldn’t predict the explosion and prevent it, proper behavior in the framework of crisis management could have had positive influences on the observed outcomes (Ingersoll et al. 2).

BP spends much effort trying to overcome issues related to reputation damage. Still, it is only one of the consequences of the main problem. To improve the situation, the company started up a communication machine, but experts questioned its effectiveness. Thus, professionals wondered whether BP maintained crisis management properly or failed to do it. In this way, the problem was what BP should have done to enhance its crisis management and communication. Even though the company had other issues as well, this one turned out to be the most critical because it affected almost all the company’s operations directly or indirectly. It influences the company’s income, the source of competitive advantage, customer satisfaction and loyalty, the morale of employees, and strategic directions. In addition to that, it is connected with the way BP could have improved its performance and repair reputation to overcome financial losses and become competitive again.

BP had experienced crises before the explosion that happened in 2010. For example, Wolf and Mejri emphasize the fact that it neglected safety several times (51). For example, in the middle of the 20th century, one of the oil rigs that belonged to BP collapsed, and more than ten people died. In 2005, a similar situation repeated and fifteen employees died in the fire while more than 150 of them were injured. Back then, the organization was charged, but recent events showed that it did not start paying expected attention to safety.

The oil spill was caused by the gas explosion. The very disaster started can be traced back to April 19 when the well reached more than 12,000 ft below the seafloor. The company used 51 barrels of cement, but this number was not enough to ensure a required seal. During drilling, mud was lost to the reservoir as expected but then it was pumped into tanks. However, seawater was lighter than mud and that there was not enough cement to balance the flow of gas, so it went in the drilling fluid. There are almost no doubts that the supervisors were aware of this situation, as the photo reveals that a diverter line was affected (see Exh. 1). The volume of mud continued to increase, and the recorder failed to reveal the data appropriately. However, professionals did not stop pumping at that time. When they did, the pit volume decreased at first, but it remained the same the next time and even continued to increase. The extreme pressure led to the blowout, the gas shot the water out and exploded.

This situation reveals that BP did not make the required emphasis on the value of safety when training its personnel. It was more critical for the supervisors to fulfill the task they had instead of implementing measures needed to avoid possible danger. BP’s response to the crisis is not efficient.

In this way, it is also possible to claim that the population that was greatly affected by this accident included those workers who performed their duties on the Deepwater Horizon. In addition to that, the management team was affected because it had to deal with the consequences of the explosion. It was critical to resolving problems connected with organizational performance. The families of those who died that day were also influenced by the disaster because they lost a person who supported them. The company’s partners could have become less willing to cooperate with it because of the possibility to be negatively affected by BP’s reputation. Even the representatives of the general public had to reconsider their attitudes and loyalty.

To improve the situation, BP followed the decision of the federal government. It got engaged in the clean-up and paid attention to those people who were affected by the disaster itself or its indirect influences. The organization focused on health, safety, and welfare. It was involved in the economic recovery of those industries that were affected by the oil spill, including tourism and seafood (Ernst and Young).

In the framework of crisis management and communication, the organization faced a range of difficulties because its personnel did not know how to cope with issues that occur while operating. The company and its management team did not provide any guidance that can be used when facing an ethical issue and trying to decide whether to continue performing to fulfill the most critical goals or to focus on how potential disaster can be avoided. What is more, BP had an opportunity to resort to its previous experiences and to develop a plan that can be used to prevent the next possible crisis. In this way, BP also had a chance to avoid additional expenses. However, being responsible for numerous issues, the company had to pay more than $5 billion in 2010 and provide more than $50 million to health organizations (Wolf and Mejri 80).

There were different ways in which the problem could have been addressed. The company could have reacted to the disaster, and its consequences ignored it, or claim it to be not a BP’s mistake. Still, it would have been advantageous if the organization developed a crisis management plan for its employees to follow in any situation that might affect safety anyway.

Trying to identify which alternative to following, BP should have thought of the way each of them dealt with the issues observed by the organization. Thus, attention should have been paid to the possibility to restore the reputation and enhance financial performance. All in all, it can be presupposed that it would have been better for the company to respond to the disaster immediately because in this way it could have improved the situation better than other options.

BP could have reacted to the oil blowout, claiming that it was an accident. The organization could have tried to make its stakeholders believe that there had been no sights of an issue that might have led to the explosion. In this way, BP could have made others believe in its innocence and ensured that it had done its best while operating. As a result, the company would have lost a relatively small part of its clients. However, some partners and customers might start thinking that BP is not experienced enough and that its performance is poor so that it is better not to cooperate with it. Still, proving gross negligence, the organization had an opportunity to avoid expenditures connected with the necessity to support the ecosystem.

BP might have tried to claim that the disaster happened because of other parties. If it had conducted some research to collect information that can prove at least some errors made by other organizations, BP would have been able to make them compensate the affected people. In this way, the company would not only save its money but also improve its reputation, attracting clients back. Still, this option would have entailed a range of ethical issues.

Finally, BP could have resorted to the third alternative. It could have reacted to the explosion immediately, accepting its fault for the inability to ensure safety. The company should have interacted with other professionals to develop a range of initiatives that were likely to reduce negative influences provided on the ecosystem. They should have maintained research and developed a long-term plan to enhance the environment and provide full payment for those people who were affected. In addition to that, BP should have focused on the possibility to advertise seafood and tourism industries that were negatively affected by the explosion. All in all, this initiative could have been the most appropriate one because it addressed all critical issues and avoided ethical dilemmas.

To respond to disasters appropriately, BP needs to develop a working crisis management plan that can be resorted to by the staff members who face critical situations. Considering the discussed case, the organization should create an infrastructure that can be utilized to deal with possible leaks. It should be based on deep-sea oil wells that are used by BP. With the help of the absorbent wall, the company is likely to prevent further issues of this kind.

It will be a great advantage for BP to gather an emergency response team. This group of professionals should patrol that wall and ensure its efficiency. Needless to say, that such a team is to contain well-experienced professionals who have all required theoretical knowledge and skills that can be used in practice.

In the framework of crisis communication, the company should pay much attention to its stakeholders. Transparency should be discussed as a tool to attract clients and restore their loyalty. BP should take responsibility for all those issues that occurred due to the mistakes it made and the inability to ensure safety. Even sincere apologies may be enough to improve the situation greatly. In this way, the company should hire a spokesperson who can easily get in touch with numerous clients.

The company should also reconsider the use of social media because it has already proved to be a great type of communication that can be approached without any significant issues. Unlike a personal website, social media allows the company to avoid constant reconsideration of the discussed disaster, and negative feedback regarding it is also likely to be reduced in this way.

Finally, the organization may consider the possibility to develop some kind of disaster website so that if some crisis occurs, professionals have an opportunity to reach it and inform the population regarding the possibility of crises (McMasters).

• To implement changes, following the results of data analysis, it can be claimed that BP should have done the following:
• Collect the oil that was spilled during the disaster;
• Address experts in the sphere to develop the most advantageous solution initiatives;
• Point out the way BP would respond to the consequences;
• Establish trust-based relations with stakeholders, sharing information about the accident;
• Cooperate with the government to minimalize negative influences on other industries;
• Provide compensations to families of those employees who died;
• Gather a group of professionals to focus on such issues;
• Improve safety standards;
• Provide training;
• Enhance security system;
• Promote tourism;
• Develop initiatives to improve the ecosystem.

Exh. 1: A Gas Flare Coming from a Diverter Line (Aeberman)

Aeberman. “What Caused the Deepwater Horizon Disaster?” The Oil Drum , 2010, Web.

Ernst and Young. “Deepwater Horizon Accident and Response.” BP , 2014, Web.

Ingersoll, Christina, et al. BP and the Deepwater Horizon Disaster of 2010 , 2012, Web.

McMasters, Michael. “Analysis of Situation/Background.” LinkedIn , 2015, Web.

Mejri, Mohamed, and Mohamed Mejri. “Crisis Management: Lessons Learnt from the BP Deepwater Horizon Spill Oil.” Business Management and Strategy , vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 67-90.

Wolf, Daniel, and Mohamed Mejri. “Crisis Communication Failures: The BP Case Study.” Management Journal , vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 48-56.

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IvyPanda. (2020, November 16). Crisis Management: British Petroleum Company. https://ivypanda.com/essays/british-petroleum-companys-crisis-management-case/

"Crisis Management: British Petroleum Company." IvyPanda , 16 Nov. 2020, ivypanda.com/essays/british-petroleum-companys-crisis-management-case/.

IvyPanda . (2020) 'Crisis Management: British Petroleum Company'. 16 November.

IvyPanda . 2020. "Crisis Management: British Petroleum Company." November 16, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/british-petroleum-companys-crisis-management-case/.

1. IvyPanda . "Crisis Management: British Petroleum Company." November 16, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/british-petroleum-companys-crisis-management-case/.

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Live teaching case: BP’s decision to adjust its climate change targets

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Andrew Hoffman and Jerry Davis

Roula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.

In 2020, the British energy group BP pledged to decarbonise its portfolio, cutting oil and gas production by 40 per cent from 2019 levels by 2030 and channelling billions of dollars into wind and solar projects.

Then, in February 2023, the company stunned observers by retreating from these lofty goals — promising shareholders it would invest heavily into oil and gas projects and recalibrating its oil and gas reduction goal from 40 per cent to 25 per cent by the end of the decade.

This decision will increase investment in the production of fossil fuels for the rest of the decade by about $1bn per year, beyond previous plans. And it was announced shortly after the company — in line with its competitors — reported record annual profits: $27.7bn for 2022, almost double the adjusted profit of 2021.

Scientists say the world needs to cut greenhouse gas emissions by about 45 per cent by 2030. This is in order to have any hope of meeting the climate change targets in the 2015 Paris Agreement: to keep global average temperatures to no more than 1.5-2°C above pre-industrial levels.

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That will require the reduction, or even elimination, of emissions from fossil fuels.

What does BP’s renewed emphasis on oil and gas imply for the private sector’s ability to transition to more sustainable fuels voluntarily?

Read these two FT articles, explore the background, and discuss the questions that follow:

BP slows oil and gas retreat after record $28bn profit

What Big Oil’s bumper profits mean for the energy transition

BP (formerly British Petroleum) has long staked a claim as one of the leaders of the fossil fuel industry in tackling climate change. In March 2002, its CEO declared in a speech at Stanford that BP would now mean “Beyond Petroleum.” Yet its journey has been fraught. In 2006, a damaged BP pipeline caused one of the largest oil spills in Alaska’s history and, in 2010, it was behind the Deepwater Horizon disaster, unleashing the largest oil spill in history. BP quietly shed its “Beyond Petroleum” branding and many of its renewable assets.

In 2020, the company recommitted to decarbonisation goals, adopting aggressive targets for 2030. It appeared that “Beyond Petroleum” was back. But oil and gas prices surged in the wake of the Ukraine war. Brent crude, the international oil benchmark, averaged $101 per barrel in 2022, more than double its price in 2020. Natural gas prices also soared, largely because Russia cut off supplies to Europe.  

BPs chief executive Bernard Looney defended its latest reversal, stating that “The conversation three or four years ago was somewhat singular around cleaner energy, lower-carbon energy. Today, there is much more conversation about energy security, energy affordability.” In another interview, he added: “We have to invest in today’s energy system, and the reality is that today’s energy system is predominantly an oil and gas system. And that needs investment.” 

Anja-Isabel Dotzenrath, BP’s executive vice-president for gas and low-carbon energy, said the increased capital expenditure demonstrated the group’s continued commitment to rolling out 50 gigawatts of renewable power by 2030. She said BP will maintain a long-term ambition to reach net zero emissions by 2050, and to use 50 per cent of investment on low-carbon businesses by 2030 — an amount similar to that of oil and gas. But the company will adopt a sharper focus on businesses closer to BP’s strengths, like charging points for electric vehicles, cleaner fuels derived from plants, and biofuels from landfill.

BP is not alone in its objectives of reducing carbon emissions. Other large fossil-fuel companies have made similar pledges. But critics remain sceptical because these pledges are not binding and do not include complete and absolute reductions of scope 3 emissions (those emitted when oil, gasoline and diesel oil are burnt, which comprise up to 90 per cent of an oil company’s carbon footprint). 

These companies’ “net zero” policies do not mean they will no longer produce and sell fossil fuels. Instead, they plan to rely on either offsetting schemes, like tree planting, or carbon capture and sequestration technologies, which are not yet market ready, in the hope of reducing or eliminating net emissions.

To some critics, the objective for any fossil-fuel company to achieve actual net zero, including downstream scope 3 emissions for those in its supply chain, is an existential threat, especially if it is to be achieved in time to meet the Paris Agreement targets.

How do we make sense of these developments?  Here are some questions to choose from for guiding discussion.

Why do you think BP made the decision to pull back on decarbonisation?

i) Does it represent a lack of sincerity on the part of BP in making its earlier targets?  

ii) Does it represent a lack of foresight in making its earlier targets? The stated need in 2023 to focus on today’s energy system of oil and gas was also true in 2020 when Looney decided instead to shrink the company’s fossil fuel footprint dramatically. Was the company unprepared for the sharp rise in oil prices? If so, what should we think of its revised projections for economic growth through fossil-fuel production?

iii) Is the pressure from shareholders just too much to maintain any kind of serious carbon reduction goals? The valuation of companies like BP and Shell, which have embraced climate-friendly investments in renewable energy, have substantially lagged behind those of their American rivals ExxonMobil and Chevron, which have largely stuck to producing oil and gas.

iv) Is BP focusing on the wrong shareholders?  Some investors loved the February strategy shift. BP shares surged more than 7.5 per cent, the largest one-day jump in more than two years, and hit their highest mark in almost four years three days later, gaining around 17 per cent. Others were not pleased. Half of BP’s top ten institutional shareholders are members of Climate Action 100+, a large group of institutional investors focused on climate action and responsible for more than $68tn in assets under management. The group supported BP’s earlier climate commitments just nine months ago and are voicing concerns over BPs pivot.

v) Do recent financial challenges for the company require a reassessment of its climate commitments? The war in Ukraine might be seen as a “black swan” event for global energy markets. As a result of the war, BP exited its 19.75 per cent stake in Rosneft (roughly $14bn), the oil company controlled by the Russian government, in February 2022. This write-off followed the disastrous Gulf of Mexico Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 which, by some estimates, cost BP and its partners $71bn over 10 years.

What were the viable alternatives, and what might have pointed BP in another direction?

What does BP’s decision say about the ability of shareholder owned for-profit companies to steer towards decarbonisation?

What does BP’s decision say about our ability as a global society to wean ourselves off fossil fuels and address the climate change challenge?

Optional extra background reading (note the reader comments):

Could Shell follow BP?

BP: Looney leans in to a longer runoff for oil

Why BP’s Bernard Looney changed his tune

Big Oil’s big profits need to be spent wisely

BP’s shift leaves a bigger question on credibility than climate

BP defends transition strategy after curbing retreat from oil and gas

BP: No longer ‘Beyond Petroleum’. Again.

Andrew Hoffman and Jerry Davis are professors at University of Michigan Ross School of Business

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Case Study: British Petroleum and Corporate Social Responsibility

British Petroleum known today as BP Amoco is a petroleum industry based in London. It is recognized as one of the top four oil and petroleum companies throughout the world. The company started in 1901 when William Knox D’Arcy was given the permission by the Shah of Persia to explore the land for oil and founded one in May 1908. Because of this discovery, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was established so as to expose these findings. The company has grown gradually because of this as World War I is happening; the British Government shows intense interest to the company which became the source of fuel oil of Royal Navy during WWI. In 1917, the war gives permission to the British Government to have full control of the company and named it British Petroleum. The company has continued to become one of the largest oil companies in Europe and because the company wanted to expand its market, BP merged wit the American Oil Company (AMOCO).

Today, the company operated in more than 100 states in 6 continents including China. The main goal of this company is to drill and find oil. The major activities of BP Amoco is exploration and production of natural gas and crude oil; refining or decontamination, marketing, supply and transportation and production and marketing or petrochemicals. In addition, the company also engaged itself in solar power. The strategic use technology and strategic management can be considered as a factor for this achievement. The company also acquires Burmah Castrol and Atlantic Richfield Corporation (Arco) and has been able to launch a combined global branding. The company offers products and services which are divided into three categories; on the roads which include fuels and stations, fuel cards, Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG), lubricants, roadside assistance and route planners, for the home which consists of products like LPG, online store and solar and renewable; and for business which include air BP, Bitumen, BP Marine, BP open books, BP shipping, petrochemicals, power, natural gas, lubricants liquified natural gas (LNG) and LPG, fuels, fuel cards and solar and renewable. In order to easily reach their customers, BP also uses the internet through its website.

Corporate Social Responsibility of British Petroleum

A facet of corporate social responsibility is the company’s responsibility in the preservation and care of the environment . Oil companies, particularly the British Petroleum have battled issues coming out against them in relation to environmental issues. In fact, some environmental organisations have expressed dismay over the indiscriminate company performance of BP that resulted to harm in the environment. In August 1991, based on its analysis of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) toxic release inventory data for 1990, the Washington, D.C.- based public interest group Citizen Action named BP among the top 10 polluters in the United States. The findings brought out by environmental agencies and concerned environmentalist groups have caused the firm to take measures regarding the issue.

Two years after Lord John Browne took over the BP administration, the firm rolled out a new marketing strategy that involved emphasis on environmental responsibility . In 1997, the British Petroleum supported the Kyoto Protocol , a worldwide agreement that seeks to prevent global warming by reducing greenhouse emissions. The company has been able to conduct subsequent efforts in order to minimize their business’ impact to the natural environment. These include the provision of cleaner burning fuels, the reduction of emissions, eliminating bribery or facilitation payments as well as political. All activities of the company has been publicized to make the society aware of their business operations. This is done to maintain trust among stakeholders. These moves in the part of the British Petroleum, however were still questioned for their real intention, specifically the question will it make the world in a sustainable energy revolution, through the beyond petroleum movement, or will it be content to gain more profit because of the exploitation of an increasingly taxed planet

Having been able to realize their corporate social responsibilities, the British petroleum has been able to solve the issue and attempt to have an enormous reinvention in 2000. The main goal of this reinvention is to alter the perception the people regarding BP in terms of its business operation and its role in the society. This reinvention is also a part of the adherence of the company to their social responsibilities and which costs $200 million. British petroleum was the first oil industry which started to address the issue of global climate change. It can be said that the corporate social responsibility challenge for the British petroleum has been threefold. The first one is to the challenge of translating the social responsibility commitment into an efficient and consistent approach in the global market. The next is to be able to meld the BP its subsidiaries like Arco and Amoco to social investments and the last is to satisfy and meet the external expectations from the society. These CSR commitment has been strengthened through the changes or reinvention mentioned above which include their advertisement of the “Beyond Petroleum”.

In doing and meeting their organisational goal of being committed to social responsibilities, the company had been able to conduct rigorous planning with more than 130 fully functions Business Units. In this regard, each of the each of the Business Units has largely autonomous business operations with its own identity, history, imperatives and relationships.

The Corporate social responsibility strategy of BP has also been able to give importance to three performance measures which include the social, environmental and financial which are known as the triple bottom line. The commitment of the BP with their social responsibility ensures that wherever they operation, their activities should be able to establish economic benefits and opportunities by enhancing the quality of life of individually, specifically those who are directly influenced by the company. The CSR commitment of the British Petroleum focuses on five aspects which include the employee relationships, ethical conducts, health safety and environmental performance, financial aspect and control. In order to ensure that they are able to get affiliated with different international and global organisations for Human rights such as the United Nations, US-UK Voluntary Principles and others, for the labor relationships they follow the standards of the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy and for environmental accountabilities they are linked with the GHG emissions reduction, ISO14000 and Clean Fuels Programs.

Just like British Petroleum, other organisations are also able to adhere to the concept of being socially responsible and THE CO-OP is never an exemption. The corporate social responsibility of this company works in various stakeholders such as individual members, employees, customers, corporate members, suppliers, the wider community, and the cooperative members. In doing so, the company has provide community investment of £7.3m, which is equal to 3.2% pre-tax profit, up from 2.5% in year 2003.

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Predicting Rock Fracture Toughness Using a KOA-BP Neural Network: A Case Study from Five Provinces in China

• Original Paper
• Published: 26 September 2024

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• Zehang Wang 1 ,
• Shuaishuai Niu 1 ,
• Xuedong Luo 1 ,
• Bingzhen Yu 1 &
• Zikang Zhou 1  

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Rock fracture toughness (RFT) is one of the most critical indicators in rock mechanics and is used to determine how fractures propagate in processes such as hydraulic fracturing, rock blasting, tunnel excavation, geothermal energy extraction, and CO 2 sequestration. Determining this fracture toughness on the basis of various rock parameters is an ongoing research area. Previous studies have established simple regression relationships between fracture toughness and individual parameters, achieving varying degrees of success. However, these models are often based on specific rocks and locations, with input parameters selected through intuitive judgment rather than quantitative analysis, leading to a lack of broad acceptance. In this study, a Kepler optimization algorithm (KOA)-optimized BP algorithm was utilized alongside four unoptimized machine learning algorithms and one empirical formula to predict fracture toughness from a set of common geomechanical parameters. Unlike many previous studies, the normalized mutual information (NMI) method was employed in this study to analyze the sensitivity of these parameters to RFT and assess their importance to the model. Quantitative analysis identified 8 parameters—R, B, S, α, T, UCS, Cc, and ν—out of the fifteen potential input parameters as having the highest correlation with fracture toughness, addressing the previous issue of parameter selection on the basis of intuition rather than statistical analysis. This study developed a KOA-BP neural network model as a powerful tool for predicting rock fracture toughness, integrating 3 essential modules. The data processing module normalizes and partitions the dataset to ensure consistency. The KOA optimization module employs the Kepler Optimization Algorithm to iteratively optimize the weights and biases of the BP neural network, addressing challenges such as premature convergence and parameter sensitivity. Lastly, the BP neural network module performs forward propagation and backpropagation to iteratively improve prediction accuracy. The synergy of these modules significantly enhances the model’s predictive performance, demonstrating its superiority over traditional methods in terms of error reduction, goodness of fit, and accuracy. The database for this study was established using granite, mudstone, sandstone, and gypsum, resulting in a KOA-BP model that effectively forecasts the fracture toughness of these 4 rock types. To validate the model’s effectiveness, the dataset was divided into 2 groups: one for training the predictive model and the other for testing its performance. The prediction results were analyzed via 4 metrics—the RMSE, MAPE, R2, and a10. The findings showed that all the machine learning models outperformed the empirical formula. However, the KOA-optimized BP algorithm constructed the best predictive model, demonstrating the strongest performance in predictions. As shown in Table  2 , the KOA-BP model achieved an RMSE of 0.100, MAPE of 10.81%, R2 of 0.943, and a10 of 0.525 in the test set. These results provide strong evidence of the model’s superiority in predicting rock fracture toughness.

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Acknowledgements

The work described herein is fully supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 41572281 and 42072309). Special thanks are owed to Faculty of Engineering, China University of Geosciences (Wuhan) for sharing their test devices to make this project possible.

This research was funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 42072309 and 41572281).

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Faculty of Engineering, China University of Geosciences (Wuhan), No. 388, Lumo Road, Wuhan, 430074, Hubei, China

Zehang Wang, Yu Lei, Shuaishuai Niu, Xuedong Luo, Bingzhen Yu & Zikang Zhou

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Conceptualization, methodology, writing—original draft preparation: [Zehang Wang]. Writing—original draft preparation, formal analysis and investigation: [Yu Lei]. Methodology, funding acquisition, supervision: [Xuedong Luo]. Writing—review and editing: [Shuaishuai Niu] and [Bingzhen Yu].

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Wang, Z., Lei, Y., Niu, S. et al. Predicting Rock Fracture Toughness Using a KOA-BP Neural Network: A Case Study from Five Provinces in China. Geotech Geol Eng (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10706-024-02960-9

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Received : 06 July 2024

Accepted : 15 September 2024

Published : 26 September 2024

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s10706-024-02960-9

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