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Moral Theory

There is much disagreement about what, exactly, constitutes a moral theory. Some of that disagreement centers on the issue of demarcating the moral from other areas of practical normativity, such as the ethical and the aesthetic. Some disagreement centers on the issue of what a moral theory’s aims and functions are. In this entry, both questions will be addressed. However, this entry is about moral theories as theories , and is not a survey of specific theories, though specific theories will be used as examples.

1.1 Common-sense Morality

1.2 contrasts between morality and other normative domains, 2.1 the tasks of moral theory, 2.2 theory construction, 3. criteria, 4. decision procedures and practical deliberation, other internet resources, related entries, 1. morality.

When philosophers engage in moral theorizing, what is it that they are doing? Very broadly, they are attempting to provide a systematic account of morality. Thus, the object of moral theorizing is morality, and, further, morality as a normative system.

At the most minimal, morality is a set of norms and principles that govern our actions with respect to each other and which are taken to have a special kind of weight or authority (Strawson 1961). More fundamentally, we can also think of morality as consisting of moral reasons, either grounded in some more basic value, or, the other way around, grounding value (Raz 1999).

It is common, also, to hold that moral norms are universal in the sense that they apply to and bind everyone in similar circumstances. The principles expressing these norms are also thought to be general , rather than specific, in that they are formulable “without the use of what would be intuitively recognized as proper names, or rigged definite descriptions” (Rawls 1979, 131). They are also commonly held to be impartial , in holding everyone to count equally.

… Common-sense is… an exercise of the judgment unaided by any Art or system of rules : such an exercise as we must necessarily employ in numberless cases of daily occurrence ; in which, having no established principles to guide us … we must needs act on the best extemporaneous conjectures we can form. He who is eminently skillful in doing this, is said to possess a superior degree of Common-Sense. (Richard Whatley, Elements of Logic , 1851, xi–xii)

“Common-Sense Morality”, as the term is used here, refers to our pre-theoretic set of moral judgments or intuitions or principles. [ 1 ] When we engage in theory construction (see below) it is these common-sense intuitions that provide a touchstone to theory evaluation. Henry Sidgwick believed that the principles of Common-Sense Morality were important in helping us understand the “first” principle or principles of morality. [ 2 ] Indeed, some theory construction explicitly appeals to puzzles in common-sense morality that need resolution – and hence, need to be addressed theoretically.

Features of commons sense morality are determined by our normal reactions to cases which in turn suggest certain normative principles or insights. For example, one feature of common-sense morality that is often remarked upon is the self/other asymmetry in morality, which manifests itself in a variety of ways in our intuitive reactions. For example, many intuitively differentiate morality from prudence in holding that morality concerns our interactions with others, whereas prudence is concerned with the well-being of the individual, from that individual’s point of view.

Also, according to our common-sense intuitions we are allowed to pursue our own important projects even if such pursuit is not “optimific” from the impartial point of view (Slote 1985). It is also considered permissible, and even admirable, for an agent to sacrifice her own good for the sake of another even though that is not optimific. However, it is impermissible, and outrageous, for an agent to similarly sacrifice the well-being of another under the same circumstances. Samuel Scheffler argued for a view in which consequentialism is altered to include agent-centered prerogatives, that is, prerogatives to not act so as to maximize the good (Scheffler 1982).

Our reactions to certain cases also seem to indicate a common-sense commitment to the moral significance of the distinction between intention and foresight, doing versus allowing, as well as the view that distance between agent and patient is morally relevant (Kamm 2007).

Philosophers writing in empirical moral psychology have been working to identify other features of common-sense morality, such as how prior moral evaluations influence how we attribute moral responsibility for actions (Alicke et. al. 2011; Knobe 2003).

What many ethicists agree upon is that common-sense is a bit of a mess. It is fairly easy to set up inconsistencies and tensions between common-sense commitments. The famous Trolley Problem thought experiments illustrate how situations which are structurally similar can elicit very different intuitions about what the morally right course of action would be (Foot 1975). We intuitively believe that it is worse to kill someone than to simply let the person die. And, indeed, we believe it is wrong to kill one person to save five others in the following scenario:

David is a great transplant surgeon. Five of his patients need new parts—one needs a heart, the others need, respectively, liver, stomach, spleen, and spinal cord—but all are of the same, relatively rare, blood-type. By chance, David learns of a healthy specimen with that very blood-type. David can take the healthy specimen's parts, killing him, and install them in his patients, saving them. Or he can refrain from taking the healthy specimen's parts, letting his patients die. (Thomson 1976, 206)

And yet, in the following scenario we intuitively view it entirely permissible, and possibly even obligatory, to kill one to save five:

Edward is the driver of a trolley, whose brakes have just failed. On the track ahead of him are five people; the banks are so steep that they will not be able to get off the track in time. The track has a spur leading off to the right, and Edward can turn the trolley onto it. Unfortunately there is one person on the right-hand track. Edward can turn the trolley, killing the one; or he can refrain from turning the trolley, killing the five. (Thomson 1976, 206).

Theorizing is supposed to help resolve those tensions in a principled way. Theory construction attempts to provide guidance in how to resolve such tensions and how to understand them.

1.2.1 Morality and Ethics

Ethics is generally understood to be the study of “living well as a human being”. This is the topic of works such as Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , in which the aim of human beings is to exemplify human excellence of character. The sense in which we understand it here is that ethics is broader than morality, and includes considerations of personal development of oneself and loved ones. This personal development is important to a life well lived, intuitively, since our very identities are centered on projects that we find important. Bernard Williams and others refer to these projects as “ground projects”. These are the sources of many of our reasons for acting. For Williams, if an agent seeks to adopt moral considerations, or be guided by them, then important ethical considerations are neglected, such as personal integrity and authenticity (Williams 1977; Wolf 1982). However, Williams has a very narrow view of what he famously termed “the morality system” (Williams 1985).

Williams lists a variety of objectionable features of the morality system, including the inescapability of moral obligations, the overridingness of moral obligation, impartiality , and the fact that in the morality system there is a push towards generalization .

There has been considerable discussion of each of these features of the morality system, and since Williams, a great deal of work on the part of standard moral theorists on how each theory addresses the considerations he raised. Williams’ critique of the morality system was part of a general criticism of moral theory in the 1980s on the grounds of its uselessness, harmfulness, and even its impossibility (Clarke 1987). This anti-theory trend was prompted by the same dissatisfaction with consequentialism and deontology that led to the resurgence of Virtue Ethics.

A major criticism of this view is that it has a very narrow view of what counts as a moral theory. Thus, some of these approaches simply rejected some features of William’s characterization of the morality system, such as impartiality. Others, however, Williams’ included, attacked the very project of moral theory. This is the ‘anti-theory’ attack on moral theorizing. For example, Annette Baier argued that morality cannot be captured in a system of rules, and this was a very popular theme amongst early virtue ethicists. On this view, moral theory which systematizes and states the moral principles that ought to guide actions is simply impossible: “Norms in the form of virtues may be essentially imprecise in some crucial ways, may be mutually referential, but not hierarchically orderable, may be essentially self-referential” (Baier 220).

Robert Louden even argued that the best construal of virtue ethics is not as an ethical theory, but as anti-theory that should not be evaluated as attempting to theorize morality at all. (Louden 1990). According to Louden, moral theories are formulated to a variety of reasons, including to provide solutions to problems, formulas for action, universal principles, etc. Louden notes that this characterization is very narrow and many would object to it, but he views anti-theory not so much as a position against any kind of moral theorizing, but simply the kind that he viewed as predominant prior to the advent of Virtue Ethics. This is a much less severe version of anti-theory as it, for example, doesn’t seem to regard weightiness or importance of moral reasons as a problem.

Some of the problems that Williams and other anti-theorists have posed for morality, based on the above characteristics, are:

Morality is too demanding and pervasive: that is, the view that moral reasons are weighty indicates that we should be giving them priority over other sorts of reasons. Further, they leach into all aspects of our lives, leaving very little morally neutral.

Morality is alienating. There are a variety of ways in which morality can be alienating. As Adrian Piper notes, morality might alienate the agent from herself or might alienate the agent from others – impartiality and universality might lead to this, for example (Piper 1987; Stocker 1976). Another way we can understand alienation is that the agent is alienated from the true justifications of her own actions – this is one way to hold that theories which opt for indirection can lead to alienation (see section 4 below).

Morality, because it is impartial, makes no room for special obligations. That is, if the right action is the one that is impartial between persons, then it does not favor the near and dear. On this picture it is difficult to account for the moral requirements that parents have towards their own children, and friends have towards each other. These requirements are, by their nature, not impartial.

Morality is committed to providing guides for action that can be captured in a set of rules or general principles. That is, morality is codifiable and the rules of morality are general.

Morality requires too much. The basic worry is that the morality system is voracious and is creeping into all aspects of our lives, to the detriment of other important values. The worry expressed by 4 takes a variety of forms. For example, some take issue with a presupposition of 4, arguing that there are no moral principles at all if we think of these principles as guiding action . Some argue that there are no moral principles that are complete, because morality is not something that is codifiable . And, even if morality was codifiable, the ‘principles’ would be extremely specific , and not qualify as principles at all.

Since Williams’ work, philosophers have tried to respond to the alienation worry by, for example, providing accounts of the ways in which a person’s reasons can guide without forming an explicit part of practical deliberation. Peter Railton, for example, argues in favor of a form of objective consequentialism, Sophisticated Consequentialism , in which the rightness of an action is a function of its actual consequences (Railton 1984). On Railton’s view, one can be a good consequentialist without being alienated from loved ones. Though not attempting to defend moral theory per se , other writers have also provided accounts of how agents can act on the basis of reasons – and thus perform morally worthy actions, even though these reasons are not explicitly articulated in their practical deliberations (Arpaly 2002; Markovits 2014). Deontologists have argued that autonomous action needn’t involve explicit invocation of, for example, the Categorical Imperative (Herman 1985). Generally, what characterizes these moves is the idea that the justifying reasons are present in some form in the agent’s psychology – they are recoverable from the agent’s psychology – but need not be explicitly articulated or invoked by the agent in acting rightly.

One way to elaborate on this strategy is to argue that the morally good agent is one who responds to the right sorts of reasons, even though the agent can’t articulate the nature of the response (Arpaly 2002). This strategy makes no appeal to codifiable principles, and is compatible with a wide variety of approaches to developing a moral theory. It relies heavily on the concept, of course, of “reason” and “moral reason,” which many writers on moral issues take to be fundamental or basic in any case.

There has also been debate concerning the proper scope of morality, and how moral theories can address problems relating to impartiality. Kant and the classical utilitarians believed that moral reasons are impartial, what others have termed agent-neutral. Indeed, this is one point of criticism that virtue ethics has made of these two theories. One might argue that moral reasons are impartial, but that there are other reasons that successfully compete with them – reasons relating to the near and dear, for example, or one’s own ground projects. Or, one could hold that morality includes special reasons, arising from special obligations, that also morally justify our actions.

The first strategy has been pursued by Bernard Williams and other “anti-theorists”. Again, Williams argues that morality is a special system that we would be better off without (Williams 1985). In the morality system we see a special sense of “obligation” – moral obligation – which possesses certain features. For example, moral obligation is inescapable according to the morality system. A theory such as Kant’s, for example, holds that we must act in accordance with the Categorical Imperative. It is not optional. This is because morality is represented as having authority over us in ways that even demand sacrifice of our personal projects, of the very things that make our lives go well for us. This seems especially clear for Utilitarianism, which holds that we must maximize the good, and falling short of maximization is wrong . A Kantian will try to avoid this problem by appealing to obligations that are less demanding, the imperfect ones. But, as Williams points out, these are still obligations , and as such can only be overridden by other obligations. Thus, the theories also tend to present morality as pervasive in that morality creeps into every aspect of our lives, making no room for neutral decisions. For example, even decisions about what shoes to wear to work becomes a moral one:

Once the journey into more general obligations has started, we may begin to get into trouble – not just philosophical trouble, but the conscience trouble – with finding room for morally indifferent actions. I have already mentioned the possible moral conclusion that one may take some particular course of action. That means that there is nothing else I am obliged to do. But if we have accepted general and indeterminate obligations to further various moral objectives…they will be waiting to provide work for idle hands… (Williams 1985, 181)

He goes on to write that in order to get out of this problem, “…I shall need one of those fraudulent items, a duty to myself” (Williams 1985, 182). Kantian Ethics does supply this. Many find this counterintuitive, since the self/other asymmetry seems to capture the prudence/morality distinction, but Kantians such as Tom Hill, jr. have made strong cases for at least some moral duties to the self. In any case, for writers such as Williams, so much the worse for morality .

Other writers, also concerned about the problems that Williams has raised argue, instead, that morality does make room for our partial concerns and projects, such as the norms governing our relationships, and our meaningful projects. Virtue ethicists, for example, are often comfortable pointing out that morality is not thoroughly impartial because there are virtues of partiality. Being a good mother involves having a preference for the well-being of one’s own children. The mother who really is impartial would be a very bad mother, lacking in the appropriate virtues.

Another option is to hold that there are partial norms, but those partial norms are themselves justified on impartial grounds. This can be spelled out in a variety of different ways. Consider Marcia Baron’s defense of impartiality, where she notes that critics of impartiality are mistaken because they confuse levels of justification: “Critics suppose that impartialists insisting on impartiality at the level of rules or principles are committed to insisting on impartiality at the level of deciding what to do in one’s day-to-day activities” (Baron 1991). This is a mistake because impartialists can justify partial norms by appealing to impartial rules or principles. She is correct about this. Even Jeremy Bentham believed, for example, that the principle of utility ought not be applied in every case, though he mainly appealed to efficiency costs of using the principle all the time. But one can appeal to other considerations. Frank Jackson uses an analogy with predators to argue that partial norms are strategies for maximizing the good, they offer the best chance of actually doing so given our limitations (Jackson 1991). Similarly, a Kantian such as Tom Hill, jr., as Baron notes, can argue that impartiality is part of an ideal, and ought not govern our day-to-day lives (Hill 1987). Does this alienate people from others? The typical mother shows the right amount of preference for her child, let’s say, but doesn’t herself think that this is justified on the basis of promoting the good, for example. A friend visits another in the hospital and also does not view the partiality as justified by any further principles. But this is no more alienating than someone being able to make good arguments and criticize bad ones without a knowledge of inference rules. Maybe it is better to have an awareness of the underlying justification, but for some theories even that is debatable. For an objective theorist (see below) it may be that knowing the underlying justification can interfere with doing the right thing, in which case it is better not to know. For some theorists, however, such as neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists, a person is not truly virtuous without such knowledge and understanding, though Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) does not make this a requirement of right action.

Recently consequentialists have been approaching this issue through the theory of value itself, arguing that there are agent-relative forms of value. This approach is able to explain the intuitions that support partial moral norms while retaining the general structure of consequentialism (Sen 2000). Douglas Portmore, for example, argues for a form of consequentialism that he terms “commonsense consequentialism” as it is able to accommodate many of our everyday moral intuitions (Portmore 2011). He does so by arguing that (1) the deontic status of an act, whether it is right or wrong, is determined by what reasons the agent has for performing it – if an agent has a decisive reason to perform the act in question, then it is morally required. Combined with (2) a teleological view of practical reasons in which our reasons for performing an action are a function of what we have reason to prefer or desire we are led to a form of act-consequentialism but one which is open to accepting that we have reason to prefer or desire the well-being of the near and dear over others.

Though much of this is controversial, there is general agreement that moral reasons are weighty , are not egoistic – that is, to be contrasted with prudential reasons, and are concerned with issues of value [duty, fittingness].

1.2.2. Morality and Aesthetics

Moral modes of evaluation are distinct from the aesthetic in terms of their content, but also in terms of their authority. So, for example, works of art are evaluated as “beautiful” or “ugly”, and those evaluations are not generally considered as universal or as objective as moral evaluations. These distinctions between moral evaluation and aesthetic evaluation have been challenged, and are the subject of some interesting debates in metaethics on the nature of both moral and aesthetic norms and the truth-conditions of moral and aesthetic claims. But, considered intuitively, aesthetics seems at least less objective than morality.

A number of writers have noted that we need to be cognizant of the distinction between moral norms and the norms specific to other normative areas in order to avoid fallacies of evaluation, and much discussion has centered on a problem in aesthetics termed the “Moralistic Fallacy” (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000).

One challenge that the anti-theorists have raised for morality was to note that in a person’s life there will be certain norm clashes – including clashes between types of norms such as the moral and the aesthetic. It is giving too much prominence to the moral that judges a person’s life as going well relative to the fulfillment or respect of those norms. Can’t a human life go well, even when that life sacrifices morality for aesthetics?

This sort of debate has a long history in moral theory. For example, it arose as a form of criticism of G. E. Moore’s Ideal Utilitarianism, which treated beauty as an intrinsic good, and rendering trade-offs between behaving well towards others and creating beauty at least in principle justified morally (Moore 1903). But the anti-theorists do not pursue this method of accommodating the aesthetic, instead arguing that it is a separate normative realm which has its own weight and significance in human flourishing.

2. Theory and Theoretical Virtues

There is agreement that theories play some kind of systematizing role, and that one function is to examine important concepts relevant to morality and moral practice and the connections, if any, between them. For example, one very common view in the middle of the 20 th century, attributed to John Rawls, was to view moral theory as primarily interested in understanding the ‘right’ and the ‘good’ and connections between the two (Rawls). Priority claims are often a central feature in the systematizing role of moral theory. Related to this is the issue of explanatory, or theoretical, depth . That is, the deeper the explanation goes, the better.

Theories also strive for simplicity , coherence , and accuracy . The fewer epicycles the theory has to postulate the better, the parts of the theory should fit well together. For example, the theory should not contain inconsistent principles, or have inconsistent implications. The theory should cover the phenomena in question. In the case of moral theories, the phenomena in question are thought to be our considered moral intuitions or judgements. Another coherence condition involves the theory cohering with a person’s set of considered judgments, as well.

One last feature that needs stressing, particularly for moral theories, is applicability . One criticism of some normative ethical theories is that they are not applicable. For example, Virtue Ethics has been criticized for not providing an account of what our moral obligations are – appealing to what the virtuous person would do in the circumstances would seem to set a very high bar or doesn’t answer the relevant question about how we should structure laws guiding people on what their social obligations are. Similarly, objective consequentialists, who understand “right action” in terms of actual consequences have been criticized for rendering what counts as a right action in a given circumstance unknowable, and thus useless as a guide to action. Both approaches provide responses to this worry, but this supports the claim that a desideratum of a moral theory is that it be applicable.

One task (though this is somewhat controversial) of a moral theory is to give an account of right actions. Often, this will involve an explication of what counts as good – some theories then get spelled out in terms of how they approach the good, by maximizing it, producing enough of it, honoring it, etc. In addition, some theories explicate the right in terms of acting in accordance with one’s duties, or acting as a virtuous person would act. In these cases the notions of ‘duty’ and ‘virtue’ become important to the overall analysis, and one function of moral theory is to explore the systematic connections between duty or virtue and the right and the good.

Moral theories also have both substantive and formal aims. Moral theories try to provide criteria for judging actions. It might be that the criterion is simple, such as right actions maximize the good, or it may be complex, such as the right action is the one that gives adequate weight to each competing duty. Sometimes, in recognition that there is not always “the” right action, the theory simply provides an account of wrongness, or permissibility and impermissibility, which allows that a range of actions might count as “right”.

In addition to simply providing criteria for right or virtuous action, or for being a virtuous person, a given moral theory, for example, will attempt to explain why something, like an action or character trait, has a particular moral quality, such as rightness or virtuousness. Some theories view rightness as grounded in or explained by value . Some view rightness as a matter of reasons that are prior to value. In each case, to provide an explanation of the property of ‘rightness’ or ‘virtuousness’ will be to provide an account of what the grounding value is, or an account of reasons for action.

In addition, moral theories may also provide decision-procedures to employ in determining how to act rightly or virtuously, conditions on being good or virtuous, or conditions on morally appropriate practical deliberation. Thus, the theory provides substance to evaluation and reasons. However, moral theories, in virtue of providing an explanatory framework, help us see connections between criteria and decision-procedures, as well as provide other forms of systemization. Thus, moral theories will be themselves evaluated according to their theoretical virtues: simplicity, explanatory power, elegance, etc. To evaluate moral theories as theories , each needs to be evaluated in terms of how well it succeeds in achieving these theoretical goals.

There are many more specialized elements to moral theories as well. For example, a moral theory often concerns itself with features of moral psychology relevant to action and character, such as motives, intentions, emotions, and reasons responsiveness. A moral theory that incorporates consideration of consequences into the determination of moral quality, will also be concerned with issues surrounding the proper aggregation of those consequences, and the scope of the consequences to be considered.

There’s been a long history of comparing moral theories to other sorts of theories, such as scientific ones. For example, in meta-ethics one issue has to do with the nature of moral “evidence” on analogy with scientific evidence. On what Ronald Dworkin terms the “natural model” the truths of morality are discovered, just as the truths of science are (Dworkin 1977, 160). It is our considered intuitions that provide the clues to discover these moral truths, just as what is observable to us provides the evidence to discover scientific truths. He compared this model with the “constructive model” in which the intuitions themselves are features of the theory being constructed and are not analogous to observations of the external world.

Yet, even if we decide that morality lacks the same type of phenomena to be accounted for as science, morality clearly figures into our normative judgments and reactions. One might view these – our intuitions about moral cases, for example – to provide the basic data that needs to be accounted for by a theory on either model.

One way to “account for” our considered intuitions would be to debunk them. There is a long tradition of this in moral philosophy as well. When scholars provided genealogies of morality that explained our considered intuitions in terms of social or evolutionary forces that are not sensitive the truth, for example, they were debunking morality by undercutting the authority of our intuitions to provide insight into it (Nietzsche 1887 [1998], Joyce 2001, Street 2006). In this entry, however, we consider the ways in which moral theorists have constructed their accounts by taking the intuitions seriously as something to be systematized, explained, and as something that can be applied to generate the correct moral decisions or outcomes.

Along these lines, one method used in theory construction would involve the use of reflective equilibrium and inference to the best explanation. For example, one might notice an apparent inconsistency in moral judgements regarding two structurally similar cases and then try to figure out what principle or set of principles would achieve consistency between them. In this case, the theorist is trying to figure out what best explains both of those intuitions. But one also might, after thinking about principles one already accepts, or finds plausible, reject one of those intuitions on the basis of it not cohering with the rest of one’s considered views. But full theory construction will go beyond this because of the fully theoretical virtues discussed earlier. We want a systematic account that coheres well not only with itself, but with other things that we believe on the basis of good evidence.

Consider the following:

Malory has promised to take Chris grocery shopping. Unfortunately, as Malory is leaving the apartment, Sam calls with an urgent request: please come over to my house right now, my pipes have broken and I need help! Torn, Malory decides to help Sam, and thus breaks a promise to Chris.

Has Malory done the right thing? The virtuous thing? Malory has broken a promise, which is pro tanto wrong, but Sam is in an emergency and needs help right away. Even if it is clear that what Malory did was right in the circumstances, it is an interesting question as to why it is right. What can we appeal to in making these sorts of judgments? This brings to light the issue of how one morally justifies one’s actions. This is the task of understanding what the justifying reasons are for our actions. What makes an action the thing to do in the circumstances? This is the criterion of rightness (or wrongness). We will focus on the criterion of rightness, though the criterion issue comes up with other modes of moral evaluation, such as judging an action to be virtuous, or judging it to be good in some respect, even if not right. Indeed, some writers have argued that ‘morally right’ should be jettisoned from modern secular ethics, as it presupposes a conceptual framework left over from religiously based accounts which assume there is a God (Anscombe 1958). We will leave these worries aside for now, however, and focus on standard accounts of criteria.

The following are some toy examples that exhibit differing structural features for moral theories and set out different criteria:

Consequentialism . The right action is the action that produces good amongst the options open to the agent at the time of action (Singer). The most well-known version of this theory is Classical Utilitarianism, which holds that the right action promotes pleasure (Mill). Kantian Deontology . The morally worthy action is in accordance with the Categorical Imperative, which requires an agent refrain from acting in a way that fails to respect the rational nature of other persons (Kant). Rossian Deontology . The right action is the action that best accords with the fulfillment and/or non-violation of one’s prima facie duties (Ross). Contractualism . An action is morally wrong if it is an act that would be forbidden by principles that rational persons could not reasonably reject (Scanlon). Virtue Ethics . The right action is the action that a virtuous person would characteristically perform in the circumstances (Hursthouse 1999).

These principles set out the criterion or standard for evaluation of actions. They do not necessarily tell us how to perform right actions, and are not, in themselves, decision-procedures, though they can easily be turned into decision procedures, such as: you ought to try to perform the action that maximizes the good amongst the options available to you at the time of action. This might not be, and in ordinary circumstance probably isn’t, a very good decision-procedure, and would itself need to be evaluated according to the criterion set out by the theory.

These theories can be divided, roughly, into the deontological, consequentialist, and virtue ethical categories. There has been a lively debate about how, exactly, to delineate these categories. Some have held that deontological theories were just those theories that were not consequentialist. A popular conception of consequentialist theories is that they are reductionist in a particular way – that is, in virtue of reducing deontic features of actions (e.g. rightness, obligatoriness) to facts about an agent’s options and the consequences of those options (Smith 2009). If that is the case, then it seems that deontological approaches are just the ones that are not reductive in this manner. However, this fails to capture the distinctive features of many forms of virtue ethics, which are neither consequentialist nor necessarily concerned with what we ought to do , our duties as opposed to what sorts of persons we should be.

One way to distinguish consequentialist from deontological theories is in terms of how each approaches value. Philip Pettit has suggested that while consequentialist theories required promotion of value, deontological theories recommend that value be honored or respected. On each of these views, value is an important component of the theory, and theories will be partially delineated according to their theory of value. A utilitarian such as Jeremey Bentham believes that hedonism is the correct theory of value, whereas someone such as G. E. Moore, a utilitarian but a pluralist regarding value, believes that hedonism is much too narrow an account. A Kantian, on the other hand, views value as grounded in rational nature, in a will conforming to the Categorical Imperative.

Because of the systematizing function of moral theory discussed earlier, the simplest account is to be preferred and thus there is a move away from endorsing value pluralism. Of course, as intuitive pressure is put on each of the simpler alternatives, a pluralistic account of criteria for rightness and wrongness has the advantage of according best with moral intuitions.

Reasons-first philosophers will delineate the theories somewhat differently. For example, one might understand goodness as a matter of what we have reason to desire, in which case what we have reason to desire is prior to goodness rather than the other way around. Value is still an important component of the theories, it is simply that the value is grounded in reasons.

Another distinction between normative theories is that between subjective and objective versions of a type of theory. This distinction cuts across other categories. For example, there are subjective forms of all the major moral theories, and objective versions of many. An objective standard of right holds that the agent must actually meet the standard – and meeting the standard is something ‘objective’, not dependent on the agent’s psychological states – in order to count as right or virtuous. Subjective standards come in two broad forms:

• Psychology sensitive : are the justifying reasons part of the agent’s deliberative processes? Or, more weakly, are they “recoverable” from the agent’s psychology [perhaps, for example, the agent has a commitment to the values that provide the reasons].
• Evidence sensitive : the right action isn’t the one that actually meets the standard, but instead, is the action that the agent could foresee would meet that standard. [there are many different ways to spell this out, depending on the degree of evidence that is relevant: in terms of what the agent actually foresees, what is foreseeable by the agent given what the agent knows, is foreseeable by someone in possession of a reasonable amount of evidence, etc.]

Of course, these two can overlap. For theorists who are evaluational internalists , evidence-sensitivity doesn’t seem like a plausible way of spelling out the standard, except, perhaps, indirectly. The distinction frequently comes up in Consequentialism, where the Objective standard is taken to be something like: the right action is the action that actually promotes the good and the Subjective standard is something like: the right action is the action that promotes the good by the agent’s own lights (psychology sensitive) or the right action is the action that promotes the foreseeable good, given evidence available at the time of action (evidence sensitive standard). It is certainly possible for other moral standards to be objective. For example, the right action is the action that the virtuous person would perform, even though the agent does not realize it is what the virtuous agent would do in the circumstances, and even if the person with the best available evidence couldn’t realize it is what the virtuous person would do in the circumstances.

We certainly utter locutions that support both subjective and objective uses of what we ‘ought’ to do, or what is ‘right’. Frank Jackson notes this when he writes:

…we have no alternative but to recognize a whole range of oughts – what she ought to do by the light of her beliefs at the time of action, …what she ought to do by the lights of one or another onlooker who has different information on the subject, and, what is more, what she ought to do by God’s lights…that is, by the lights of one who knows what will and would happen for each and every course of action. (Jackson 1991, 471).

For Jackson, the primary ought, the primary sense of ‘rightness’ for an action, is the one that is “most immediately relevant to action” since, otherwise, we have a problem of understanding how the action is the agent’s. Thus, the subjective ‘ought’ is primary in the sense that this is the one that ethical theory should be concerned with (Jackson 1991). Each type of theorist makes use of our ordinary language intuitions to make their case. But one desideratum of a theory is that it not simply reflect those intuitions, but also provides the tools to critically analyze them. Given that our language allows for both sorts of ‘ought,’ the interesting issue becomes which, if either, has primacy in terms of actually providing the standard by which other things are evaluated? Moral theory needn’t only be concerned with what the right action is from the agent’s point of view.

There are three possibilities:

• neither has primacy
• the subjective has primacy
• the objective has primacy

First off we need to understand what we mean by “primacy”. Again, for Frank Jackson, the primary sense of ‘right’ or ‘ought’ is subjective, since what we care about is the ‘right’ that refers to an inward story, the story of our agency, so to speak. On this view, the objective and subjective senses may have no relationship to each other at all, and which counts as primary simply depends upon our interests. However, the issue that concerns us here is whether or not one sense can be accounted for in terms of the other. Option 1 holds that there is no explanatory connection. That is not as theoretically satisfying. Option 2 holds either there really is no meaningful objective sense, just the subjective sense, or the objective sense is understood in terms of the subjective.

Let’s look at the objective locution again “He did the right thing, but he didn’t know it at the time (or he had no way of knowing it at the time)”. Perhaps all this means is “He did what someone with all the facts and correct set of values would have judged right by their own lights” – this would be extensionally the same as “He performed the action with the best actual consequences”. This is certainly a possible account of what objective right means which makes use of a subjective standard. But it violates the spirit of the subjective standard, since it ties rightness neither to the psychology of the agent, or the evidence that is actually available to the agent. For that reason, it seems more natural to opt for 3. An advantage of this option is that gives us a nice, unified account regarding the connection between the objective and the subjective. Subjective standards, then, are standards of praise and blame, which are themselves evaluable according to the objective standard. Over time, people are in a position to tell whether or not a standard actually works in a given type of context. Or, perhaps it turns out that there are several standards of blame that differ in terms of severity. For example, if someone acts negligently a sensible case can be made that the person is blameworthy but not as blameworthy as if they had acted intentionally.

As to the worry that the objective standard doesn’t provide action guidance, the objective theorist can hold that action guidance is provided by the subjective standards of praise/blameworthiness. Further, the standard itself can provide what we need for action guidance through normative review (Driver 2012). Normative review is a retrospective look at what does in fact meet the standard, and under what circumstances.

Now, consider a virtue ethical example. The right action is the action that is the actual action that a virtuous person would perform characteristically, in the circumstances, rather than the action that the agent believes is the one the virtuous person would perform. Then we evaluate an agent’s “v-rules” in terms of how close they meet the virtuous ideal.

Another function of moral theory is to provide a decision procedure for people to follow so as to best insure they perform right actions. Indeed, some writers, such as R. M. Hare hold action guidance to be the function of the moral principles of the theory (Hare 1965). This raises the question of what considerations are relevant to the content of such principles – for example, should the principles be formulated taking into account the epistemic limitations of most human beings? The requirement that moral principles be action guiding is what Holly Smith terms the “Useability Demand”: “…an acceptable moral principle must be useable for guiding moral decisions…” (Smith 2020, 11). Smith enumerates different forms satisfaction of this demand can take, and notes that how one spells out a principle in order to meet the demand will depend upon how the moral theorist views moral success. For example, whether or not success is achieved in virtue of simply making the right decision or if, in addition to making the right decision, the agent must also have successful follow-through on that decision.

There has been enormous debate on the issue of what is involved in following a rule or principle, and some skepticism that this is in fact what we are doing when we take ourselves to be following a rule. (Kripke 1982) Some virtue theorists believe that it is moral perception that actually does the guiding, and that a virtuous person is able to perceive what is morally relevant and act accordingly (McDowell 1979).

As discussed earlier in the section on criteria, however, this is also controversial in that some theorists believe that decision procedures themselves are not of fundamental significance. Again, objective consequentialist who believes that the fundamental task of theory is to establish a criterion for right argues that decision procedures will themselves be established and evaluated on the basis of how well they get us to actually achieving the right. Thus, the decision-procedures are derivative. Others, such as subjective consequentialists, will argue that the decision-procedures specify the criterion in the sense that following the decision-procedure itself is sufficient for meeting the criterion. For example, an objective consequentialist will hold that the right action maximizes the good, whereas the subjective consequentialist might hold that the right action is to try to maximize the good, whether or not one actually achieves it (Mason 2003 and 2019). Following the decision-procedure itself, then, is the criterion.

The distinction between criterion and decision-procedure has been acknowledged and discussed at least since Sidgwick, though it was also mentioned by earlier ethicists. This distinction allows ethical theories to avoid wildly implausible implications. For example, if the standard that the theory recommends is ‘promote the good’ it would be a mistake to think that ‘promote the good’ needs to be part of the agent’s deliberation. The consequentialist might say that, instead, it is an empirical issue as to what the theory is going to recommend as a decision-procedure, and that recommendation could vary from context to context. There will surely be circumstances in which it would be best to think in terms of meeting the standard itself, but again that is an empirical issue. Likewise, it is open to a Virtue Ethicist to hold that the right action is the one the virtuous agent would perform in the circumstances, but also hold that the agent’s deliberative processes need not make reference to the standard. Pretty much all theories will want to make some space between the standard and the decision-procedure in order to avoid a requirement that agent’s must think in terms of the correct standard, in order to act rightly, or even act with moral worth. There is a distinction to be made between doing the right thing, and doing the right thing for the right reasons . Doing the right thing for the right reasons makes the action a morally worthy one, as it exhibits a good quality of the will. It is possible for a theory to hold that the ‘good will’ is one that understands the underlying justification of an action, but that seems overly demanding. If consequentialism is the correct theory, then demanding that people must explicitly act intentionally to maximize the good would result in fewer morally worthy actions than seems plausible. The ‘for the right reasons’ must be understood as allowing for no explicit invocation of the true justifying standard.

This has led to the development of theories that advocate indirection. First, we need to distinguish two ways that indirection figures into moral philosophy.

• Indirection in evaluation of right action.
• Indirection in that the theory does not necessarily advocate the necessity of aiming for the right action.

To use Utilitarianism as an example again, Rule Utilitarianism is an example of the first sort of indirection (Hooker 2000), Sophisticated Consequentialism is an example of the second sort of indirection (Railton 1984). One might hold that some versions of Aristotelian Virtue ethics, such as Rosalind Hursthouse’s version, also are of the first type, since right action is understood in terms of virtue. One could imagine an indirect consequentialist view with a similar structure: the right action is the action that the virtuous person would perform, where virtue is understood as a trait conducive to the good, instead of by appeal to an Aristotelian notion of human flourishing.

The second sort relies on the standard/decision-procedure distinction. Railton argues that personal relationships are good for people, and explicitly trying to maximize the good is not a part of our relationship norms, so it is likely good that we develop dispositions to focus on and pay special attention to our loved ones. The account is open to the possibility that people who don’t believe in consequentialism have another way of deciding how to act that is correlated with promotion of the good. If the criteria a theory sets out need not be fulfilled by the agent guiding herself with the reasons set out by the criteria, then it is termed self-effacing . When a theory is self-effacing, it has the problem of alienating a person from the justification of her own actions. A middle ground, which is closer to Railton’s view, holds that the correct justification is a kind of “touchstone” to the morally good person – consulted periodically for self-regulation, but not taken explicitly into consideration in our ordinary, day-to-day lives. In this way, the theory would not be utterly self-effacing and the agent would still understand the moral basis for her own actions.

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Unit 4: How One Should Live

An Introduction to Kant’s Moral Theory

Heather Wilburn, Ph.D.

Morally speaking, Kant is a deontologist; from the Greek, this is the science of duties. For Kant, morality is not defined by the consequences of our actions, our emotions, or an external factor. Morality is defined by duties and one’s action is moral if it is an act motivated by duty.

According to Kant the only thing that is good in itself is the “good will.” The will is what drives our actions and grounds the intention of our act. It is good when it acts from duty. To clarify, Kant thinks the good will is the only thing that is intrinsically valuable. If we think about the other goods and things that we value, such are not good without qualification. For example, we value knowledge, but such can be used to commit atrocities in the world, so knowledge is good sometimes. The same can be said of courage. We value courage, but a suicide bomber also exhibits courage. So, courage can only be good sometimes. We can think of other examples as well. This leads Kant to claim that the good will is the only thing good without qualification–or the only thing that is intrinsically good. Accordingly, the will is a good will provided it acts from duty.

Kant recognizes that it is difficult to determine one’s intentions, so he makes a distinction between acting in conformity with duty and acting from duty. To illustrate this distinction, let’s take the example of three young men who see an elderly woman needing help across the street. Man A decides he will help the woman across the street because if he didn’t he would feel guilty all day. Man B decides he will help the woman across the street because he recognizes her as his neighbor, Mrs. Wilson and Mrs. Wilson makes the best cookies in the neighborhood. So, Man B helps her because he reasons that he will be rewarded. Man C decides he will help the woman across the street because it is the right thing to do; he understands that he has a moral obligation to help others in need when he can.

The results of all three individuals are the same–the woman is helped across the street. If we were looking at this from a utilitarian perspective, all three of the young men would be morally praiseworthy because in all three cases, happiness or well-being is increased (or pain is relieved). However, for Kant, only one of the young men’s actions have moral worth and it is Man C; he understands what his moral duty is and he acts from it. The other two act only in conformity with duty–they are driven by some other goal or desire aside from duty itself.

Duties are principles that guide our actions. Duties are imperatives in the sense that they tell us what to do. Kant recognizes that there are different types of imperatives in his distinction between a hypothetical and a categorical imperative. An imperative is essentially a ought; something I ought to do. Hypothetical imperatives are the oughts that direct my actions provided I have certain goals or interests. In fact, these oughts are entirely dependent upon my goals or interests. For example, if I want to be a good basketball player I ought to practice free throws or if I want to go to law school I ought to take a logic class. If I change my goal and decide to be a baseball player or a welder instead then my oughts may also change. Hypothetical imperatives have nothing to do with morality. However a categorical imperative does not depend upon my desires or wants. These are necessary and always binding and are the oughts that determine what our moral duties are. Even if I don’t want to help the elderly person across the street, if I have a duty to do so, my ought is binding. We should all be familiar enough with feeling we must do something even if we’d rather do something else.

Kant’s moral theory has three formulas for the categorical imperative. So, if you’re facing a moral dilemma you must determine whether or not your action is permissible according to the formulas. Simply put, think of the formulas as tests that have to be passed in order for a principle or act to be moral.

Formula one states that we ought to act in a way such that the maxim, or principle, of our act can be willed a universal law. If your maxim cannot be universalized then that act is morally off limits. For example, if I am considering stealing a loaf of bread, I have to ask myself if my maxim can be made a universal law. This would look something like this: Is it okay for all people to steal all the time? The answer is no; the maxim itself would be self-defeating because if everyone stole all the time there would be no private property and stealing would no longer be possible.

The second formula states that we ought to treat humanity (self and others) as an end and never as a mere means. Essentially, this entails that I treat all persons with respect and dignity; I help others achieve their goals when possible, and I avoid using them as tools or objects to further my own goals. For Kant, since humans have the capacity for autonomy and rationality, it is crucial that we treat humans with respect and dignity.

The third formula states that we act on principles that could be accepted within a community of other rational agents. The third formula, “the kingdom of ends,” moves us from the individual level to the social level.

In brief, Kant’s moral philosophy focuses on fairness and the value of the individual. His method rests on our ability to reason, our autonomy (i.e. our ability to give ourselves moral law and govern our own lives), and logical consistency. He also offers an objective sense of morality in the form of absolute duties–duties that are binding regardless of our desires, goals, or outcomes.

An Introduction to Kant's Moral Theory Copyright © 2020 by Heather Wilburn, Ph.D. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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Essays in Moral Skepticism

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Moral skepticism is the view that there is no such thing as moral knowledge. One form of skepticism (error theory) holds that moral judgments are all false. Another holds that moral judgments are unjustified (and perhaps unjustifiable). This book examines facets of the many debates over moral skepticism: usually in a sympathetic tone and sometimes in the spirit of confident promotion. The collection is divided into three parts. Chapters of the first part deal with aspects of the metaethical debate over the error-theoretic view of morality. Part two discusses the evolution of morality, both as an empirical hypothesis and as playing a supportive role in establishing the skeptical thesis that moral judgments lack justification. The final part of the collection consists of chapters discussing moral projectivism and moral fictionalism. This collection follows the development of ideas over the period of a decade, and presents a coherent and nuanced picture of modern moral skepticism.

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University of Notre Dame

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

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Essays in Moral Skepticism

Richard Joyce, Essays in Moral Skepticism , Oxford University Press, 2016, 274pp., $74.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198754879.

Reviewed by Jack Woods, University of Leeds

Richard Joyce is best known for his articulation and defense of the moral error theory, for his particular brand of moral fictionalism, and for his part (along with Sharon Street) in popularizing evolution-based debunking arguments against various moral realisms. This book is proof that these achievements unite into a compelling take on moral thought, talk, and the justification thereof. The collection is divided into three parts, corresponding roughly to these three claims to fame, though the essays often cross these section divisions. The two new contributions are an essay revisiting evolutionary debunking arguments in the light of recent developments and a useful summary introduction to the three themes of the book. Even though eleven of the twelve essays are reprinted, collection in one volume is useful given how much of it was previously published in other volumes and special collections.

The first section, on moral error theory, illustrates the usefulness of collecting this work together. Chapter 1, "Expressivism, Motivational Internalism, and Hume," lays out the relationship between Joyce's error-theory and non-cognitivism. Roughly, his view is that moral judgments have cognitive content, like ordinary judgments about mid-sized dry goods, but our moral assertions nevertheless also express conative non-cognitive content. We might think of this as a V-shaped expressivist view of moral assertion: as a matter of convention, our moral assertions express both cognitive content and non-cognitive content. Truth and falsity apply to the former -- and since there ain't no (instantiated) moral properties, moral assertions are typically false -- whereas our motivational states and much of the function of moral discourse are systematically connected to the latter. It is an initially attractive package since it allows us to (a) maintain the common sense view that moral judgments are to be glossed with non-moral descriptive judgments, while (b) recognizing and, in a sense, legitimating a deep connection between moral assertions and our conative and affective states.

Whether the initial attraction of this package persists on inspection is another question. One of Joyce's central motivations for the expressivist portion of his view is the putative incoherence of a moral assertion that is conjoined with a denial of being in the relevant conative state:

Hitler was evil; but I subscribe to no normative standard that condemns him or his actions.

This, though, doesn't feel incoherent in the same way Moore-paradoxical constructions like:

Nazim Hikmet was a poet revolutionary, but I don't believe he was

do, at least when I force myself to hear "subscribe" in an expressivist-friendly way. I worry that insofar as this example feels incoherent, it is because "subscription to a normative standard" typically indicates belief talk, not expression talk (2014: footnote 16 and objection 6). In its most humdrum usage, we subscribe to theories and views, which is (at least usually) a kind of belief-like endorsement of descriptive content. And "evil" feels pragmatically connected with condemnation -- we usually don't believe people to be evil if we do not condemn their actions. So it is difficult to avoid hearing the above as "Hitler was evil, but I don't believe he was". More generally, I have argued that analogous, but more explicitly non-cognitive constructions simply aren't incoherent in the same way as paradigmatic Moore-paradoxical constructions. This puts pressure on the idea that expression of non-cognitive content is (partially) constitutive of competent moral assertion.

That there is a constitutive connection between moral assertion and cognitive content like belief is rather more plausible (as Joyce notes). Given that:

Hitler was evil, but I don't believe it

is flagrantly incoherent in exactly the same way as ordinary instances of Moore's paradox, expressivists need find room for belief talk. This is a lesson many recent expressivists have taken on board. This situation suggests that motivation for a Joyce-style expressivism/error-theory package will not come from arguments like the above, but rather from careful study of the overall theoretical virtues and vices of the package. As we should expect.

Chapter 2, "Morality, Schmorality," launches an investigation into the functional role of morality on the back of an analysis of whether it's bad to be bad. Joyce argues that if all (reasonable) pretenders to morality turn out to be schmoralities -- if they fail to serve the intended functional role of morality -- then we ought to be error theorists. This raises important questions about the costs of error-theory; after all, we want the functional role of morality served somehow . Joyce suggests that we might turn to a form of fictionalism here, fleshing out the common thought that we ought to carry on with our moral practices even in the wake of widespread error. He tempers this suggestion by arguing that whether or not this is the right path -- whether it is good to pretend to believe in the good -- itself depends on empirical facts about psychological feasibility and pragmatic utility (this theme is revisited later the collection.)

The complementary third chapter, "The Accidental Error Theorist," suggests that many contemporary naturalistic accounts of moral properties slip into error theory unwittingly by potentially inhuman theorizing. That is, they postulate properties which fit reality only under the presumption of implausible restrictions on what kind of beings we are. Response-dependent and sentimentalist accounts posit generic properties, such as a general disposition to feel resentment upon certain coarsely described stimuli, which we probably don't possess. For example, it is extremely implausible that we are always disposed to feel resentment in the face of unkindness; it is somewhat implausible that we are typically disposed to feel it.

Ideal observer theories and contractualist accounts, on the other hand, neglect the fact that we humans come in varieties far askew from the bourgeois moral and doxastic norm theorists in these traditions typically start with. These positions thus tend to either succumb to the temptation to cheat by building a substantive moral constraint into their account or, alternatively, attempt increasingly fraught rationalizations of counterexamples in terms of failures of information or affect. In short, many roads to error theory are paved with empirical plausibility; starting from a compelling analysis of what moral properties are, we may end up accepting it as the correct analysis of moral properties and rejecting that so-analyzed moral properties are ever instantiated.

The final essay of this section, "Metaethical Pluralism", ties these themes all together. Joyce argues that given the widespread disagreement in philosophical accounts of assertion and value, there may be no decisive reason to favor cognitivism over non-cognitivism, nor any decisive reason to favor moral naturalism over moral skepticism. The most compelling aspect of this argument is the explicit attention paid to the payoff between interpretational issues, and context-relative pragmatic concerns. The conclusion, that it might very well be that there is no decisive answer to which view is right and, more importantly, no decisive answer to which view we ought to take, strikes me as compelling. This ecumenism might seem a step back for Joyce, but I don't read it that way.

Rather, I read it as a welcome two-part shift. First, a shift away from the view that we will find sufficient grounds for error theory in explicating our moral thought and talk. Second, a shift towards treating empirical issues, such as psychological tractability and pragmatic payoff, modulated by the standpoint we start from, as an important but not decisive factor in whether we should accept an error theory or a revisionary moral naturalism. The upshot is a type of theoretical maturity: we can go on with which view we like, while recognizing that we do so by making decisions about our concepts which were not already forced. Recognizing that we could have gone another way, we might occasionally usefully flirt with the road not taken.

Turning to the second section, my competence lies entirely with the second pair of essays (chapters 7 and 8), which address moral debunking arguments. Debunking arguments argue for some skeptical position about moral judgments -- they're all false, they're all unjustified, etc. -- on the basis of an explanation of our possession of our moral beliefs that is entirely independent of the truth of our moral judgments. For example, many have argued that telling an evolutionary story about how we came to have the moral beliefs we have somehow undermines taking our moral beliefs to be accurate or justified (Street 2006, Joyce 2006). These two chapters counter the pervasive mistake of thinking that debunking arguments establish a strong version of a moral skepticism absent the addition of substantive epistemological theses which close the gap between the modest skeptical position "Theory T (currently) lacks justification" and the extreme skeptical position "Theory T is unjustifiable."

The discussion is sensible, compelling, and rich. For example, one brief footnote (7 of chapter 7) recaps a back and forth between Joyce and Justin Clarke-Doane while making the crucial point that usefulness-oriented explanations of our beliefs in certain facts, like mathematics, may (and, as I argue in my (forthcoming), typically do) require their truth, immunizing them from debunking skepticism. This chapter strikes me as one of the more important contributions of the volume. It pulls the teeth of a number of confusions about debunking, such as the idea that compelling debunking arguments require specifically evolutionary genealogical premises. It is slightly regrettable that Joyce does not here engage directly with the recent argument that evolutionary premises are the only interesting bit of the current fascination with debunking (Vavova 2014). This, however, is only a minor quibble. I hope this chapter, the only one not previously published, is widely read and thoroughly absorbed.

Chapter 8, "Irrealism and the Genealogy of Morals," continues the project of undermining vulgar takes on debunking skepticism. In particular, it reminds us that we often need to answer substantive epistemological questions, such as "when is it reasonable to move from the absence of evidence to the evidence of absence" in order to move from reasonable premises like "we lack grounds to believe in explanatorily impotent facts" to stronger premises like "we have grounds to disbelieve in explanatorily impotent facts." As Joyce points out, much of the philosophical action concerns these epistemological bridging principles.

The remainder of the essay asks whether we can run skeptical worries, analogous to evolutionary debunking arguments, against non-cognitivist views. The answer, both the right one and Joyce's, seems to be "yes." Drawing on the plausible idea that even conative and affective states like liking and disliking are conditioned by substantive appropriateness conditions, Joyce sketches some prima facie cases where we might undermine these by considerations similar to those deployed by debunkers against moral cognitivists. This seems a fruitful area to be pursued in future work by Joyce and others.

The final section takes up questions about projectivism and fictionalism. It opens with an analysis of the claim, famous from Hume and somewhat developed in Mackie (1977), that we project affective reactions, like our disgust at cruelty, onto the events and agents themselves, treating these psychological reactions as worldly properties. This is analogous to the (slightly) less contentious claim that we project our (psychological) impressions of color onto worldly objects, treating colors as worldly properties. Mackie uses projectivism to support his view that there really are no worldly moral properties, just as we might use color projectivism to support the view that there are no worldly color properties. In both cases the actual support provided by projectivism is nowise clear. A bit of thought shows that both moral and color projectivism are clearly compatible with realism about moral and color properties.

The interesting question is whether there are compelling abductive arguments for moral skepticism that moral projectivism supports. Joyce explores two possibilities, both due to Mackie, and locates the role projectivism plays in each. He finds that Mackie's earlier and more prima facie compelling argument suffers from dialectical sloppiness. It first uses projectivism as a tie-breaker fact arbitrating between conservativism about moral beliefs and conservativism about naturalistic beliefs. It then uses projectivism as itself an argument for the bizarreness of moral properties. But the bizarreness of moral properties is used to support conservativism about naturalistic beliefs. Joyce's reconstruction of Mackie's sloppiness strikes me as plausible, though I wish he had addressed whether we could rejigger Mackie's argument to avoid the circularity.

What Joyce really thinks is that Mackie should have provided empirical support for moral projectivism before using it as a tiebreaker. Chapter 10 explores this, arguing that minimal projectivism, the view that "we experience moral wrongness as an objective feature of the world", can and should be interpreted as an empirical hypothesis. What will come out of testing this hypothesis is an open question, but if we could justify it empirically, we could then feed it back into Mackie's argument above to produce a compelling (though hardly bulletproof) argument for moral skepticism. In this sense, at least, we can answer Joyce's coy closing question about whether minimal moral projectivism is interesting once made empirically tractable: yes, definitely.

The final two essays discuss fictionalism, first moral, then psychological. Joyce has a vivid sense of the limitations and advantages of such views and a wicked eye for where the real problems for them lie. The last essay, which I will not address in depth, claims psychological fictionalism is more problematic than moral fictionalism, but still salvageable. It does excellent work in undermining overly pat "how could we believe it?" arguments against both fictionalism and eliminativism about folk psychology.

Chapter 11, "Moral Fictionalism," develops Joyce's favored brand of fictionalism and defends it from a number of worries. His moral fictionalism is revolutionary (we're not already pretending, but we should start pretending) and game-oriented (we pretend to morally assert, we don't assert of the moral pretense). Fictionalizing is claimed to be a reasonable thing to do in our day-to-day lives when we find ourselves, in our more critical moments, disavowing moral facts. The set-up strikes me as slightly strange, especially given Joyce's claim that the notion of a critical moment doesn't involve significant idealization. Taking our actual critical moments as indicative of what we really believe strikes me as problematic since our critical "classroom" moments are still governed by social pressure and confounds. Years in academia have trained me to not take seminar or classroom discussion as indicative of what people really believe. So I worry about Joyce's starting point, even though I find the general approach reasonable.

There are a number of other immediate worries, such as whether "pretending to assert" is really what we do when we speak as sophisticated skeptics in a vulgar world. I reckon 'no', though I also reckon that Joyce could have said "non-committal assertion in line with and governed by the rules of the moral fiction" instead and avoided this sort of objection. Putting that aside, pretend assertion raises other interesting worries. Contrast pretend promises: pretend promises, insofar as they have uptake, are still promises. We can cross our fingers behind our back all we like, we've still promised, goddamn it. Is pretend assertion likewise still assertion?

The answer depends on whether we take assertion to be publicly governed (like promises) or not. Joyce writes suggestively that we need not take moral fictionalists, when fictionalizing, as liars or, alternatively, we could take them as blameless. I would have liked to see Joyce's take on whether we have asserted at all, in the sense of being committed to what we have said, when we pretend assert. After all, few of us are fictionalists, and rare perverse linguistic intentions don't typically determine meaning or commitment.

Joyce closes by asking whether it is in our interest to be moral fictionalists. This, like so many of the questions Joyce raises, is largely an empirical cum psychological question. And one that Joyce suggests might be answered by a focus on the role of particular unexamined moral beliefs (precommitments) in reinforcing useful behavioral patterns. Our "precommitment" to morality might help stave off weakness of will, for example. This strikes me as plausible, not only for moral fictionalists, but also for various forms of moral conventionalism. One final worry is whether Joyce has overly narrowed his focus by treating eliminativism and fictionalism as the only responses to moral error theory. Moving to a small-m moral conventionalism (or relativism, if you prefer) once we've seen that our moral beliefs don't track objective reality strikes me as equi-reasonable. It is not clear that we would lose much of the desired effect on our behavior since, after all, formal norms like those of etiquette also stave off weakness of will: they're certainly "real", we're precommited to them, and yet we hardly pretend they're objective in the way suggested by moral fictionalism.

As any review that closes on a list of questions like this indicates, Joyce's book is an interesting, occasionally frustrating, massively stimulating read. The delicate contours of moral error theory, skepticisms, and related territory are mapped out here better than anywhere else. Moreover, Joyce does not skip the hard questions, while being unafraid to leave the reader hungry for more answers. It would be good reading for anyone with a passing interest. It is essential reading for anyone with anything more. Even though the essays are largely previously published, they mesh together into a cloud of views, questions, lunges and dodges that are best read together. This volume is a rare and welcome case of a collection of an author's previous work being much more than the sum of its parts.

Joyce, Richard (2006). The Evolution of Morality . MIT Press.

Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong . Penguin Books.

Street, Sharon (2006). "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value." Philosophical Studies 127 (1): 109-166.

Vavova, Katia (2014). "Debunking Evolutionary Debunking." Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9: 76-101.

Woods, Jack (2014). "Expressivism and Moore's Paradox." Philosophers' Imprint 14 (5): 1-12.

Woods, Jack (2016). "Mathematics, Morality, and Self‐Effacement." Noûs 50 (4).

Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development: Understanding Ethical Growth in Individuals

This essay about Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development explores the stages of ethical maturation. It begins with the “Preconventional Level” in childhood, where moral understanding is based on self-interest and authority. It moves through the “Conventional Level” of adolescence, dominated by social conformity, and reaches the “Postconventional Level,” where personal principles and justice guide moral reasoning. The essay also critiques the theory’s cultural limitations and emphasizes the diversity of moral growth.

How it works

Embarking on an odyssey through the intricate labyrinth of ethical maturation, we delve into the profound insights unveiled by Lawrence Kohlberg’s pioneering exploration of moral development. With each twist and turn of the human psyche, Kohlberg’s theory unfurls a rich tapestry woven from the intricate interplay of cognition, societal dynamics, and individual moral compass.

Our journey begins in the innocent realms of childhood, where moral reasoning takes its fledgling steps within the “Preconventional Level.” Here, the moral landscape is painted with broad strokes of self-interest and deference to authority, as young minds grapple with the rudimentary concepts of right and wrong.

Fear of reprisal and the allure of rewards serve as guiding stars in this nascent stage of moral cognition.

As our voyage progresses, we navigate the turbulent waters of adolescence, where the “Conventional Level” casts its imposing shadow. Amidst the swirling currents of societal expectations, moral judgments are shaped by the gravitational pull of conformity and social acceptance. Peer influence whispers its seductive melodies, steering the moral compass toward the shores of amiable relationships and the preservation of social order.

Yet, beyond the confines of convention lies the uncharted expanse of the “Postconventional Level,” where individual principles emerge as guiding constellations in the moral firmament. Here, the moral landscape undergoes a transformative shift, revealing the nuanced contours of social contracts and individual rights. Against the backdrop of shifting societal values, individuals grapple with the delicate equilibrium between personal liberties and the common good, guided by the luminous beacons of justice, equity, and human rights.

At the zenith of moral ascent stands Stage 6, where universal principles cast their radiant glow upon the path ahead. In this rarified realm, individuals transcend the constraints of societal norms, embracing self-fashioned ethical precepts imbued with the eternal resonance of truth. With hearts ablaze with conviction, they confront the bastions of injustice and oppression, heralding a new epoch of compassion and human dignity.

Yet, amidst the brilliance of Kohlberg’s theory, shadows linger, casting doubt upon its universal validity. Critics raise their voices, highlighting the theory’s cultural blind spots and its reliance on hypothetical moral quandaries. They caution against the temptation to oversimplify the complex tapestry of moral development, urging a nuanced appreciation of the kaleidoscopic diversity of human experience.

And so, as we embark on this voyage through the labyrinth of ethical growth, let us navigate with humility and open-mindedness, mindful of the intricate mosaic of human morality. For in the crucible of moral evolution, diversity flourishes, enriching the fabric of human existence with its multifaceted hues. And though the journey may be fraught with challenges and uncertainties, let us embrace it with courage and conviction, guided by the timeless wisdom distilled within the pages of Kohlberg’s magnum opus.

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Moral Obligation: The Main Theories Essay

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Introduction

Reasons for and against a moral duty.

Moral responsibility is a state of deserving praise, punishment, blame or reward for an omission or act according to an individual’s moral obligation. According to morality, helping others is prosocial behaviour, one of the central pillars of morality. Generally, people view helping others as a moral right and responsibility. However, such responsibilities also have limits. Deciding what can be morally obligatory is one of the essential concerns in ethics. As such, we have the moral right to decline or accept what we can do with our time and money regarding helping others.

As virtue ethics dictates, we have the moral right to act right and become complete persons; I agree with this. Our best moral action would be assisting others and becoming virtuous. It is hard to teach people how to become virtuous. Conversely, it would be impossible for one to ignore an injured person for humanity’s sake. Advocating for moral advancement means that you understand the reasons behind your moral deeds. We assist others by bettering ourselves, bringing the truth to the notion that humans have a moral obligation to assist a person. On the contrary, moral obligation is imperious. Philanthropy improves the world since it is a good thing, though not a requirement. One’s task should be doing the right thing and improving oneself but others first. Regardless, I support that acting morally is essential for a perfect world as moral obligation is subservient rather than imperative.

People Are Humans

First, people deserve to be helped when the capability is available. In modern society, philosophy stresses how much people need to be supported. Cooperation is another necessary element that is very pronounced. People with a goal of optimization need to help others for a logical course of action. A better world is only liveable, wonderful, and better when we can help each other. For instance, we can only do unto others what we expect to be done to us. For example, if a hungry man deserves food, helping them eat will be appropriate rather than making them feel unwanted in the community. This person might help in another way besides time and money.

On the contrary, humanism, hedonism, and hatred are vital for a healthy human consciousness. At times, one can decline being put in bed since they do not want to, while others can feel the urge to kill. At times, you can break people’s hearts, while other times, your heart will be broken; while creating and denying needs, there is no way around it, and no one is obligated towards it. No one owes the world, children, men or women, anything. According to Hobbes, we all deserve to be helped, liked, and given back to society, even if selfless acts are selfish (Kraynak, 2019). However, there should not be an obligation written anyway that demand that.

Consequentialism

Secondly, consequentialism stipulates that we have a moral duty to do as much good for others as we can with our time and money. According to the theory, morality depends on producing the appropriate kinds of overall consequences (Card & Smith, 2020). Widespread consequences are anything that action brings about, inclusive of itself. We need to reduce overall suffering by helping others reduce their suffering in the universe. The theory also mentions that we must provide the best and most helpful to a more significant number of individuals to minimize suffering. For instance, $30 to an affluent individual is less valuable than $30 to an impoverished person. If a wealthy individual contributes that amount, it helps reduce suffering than when they could not (Card & Smith, 2020). On the contrary, nobody is morally obligated to reduce suffering to the world since the moral obligation is not an existing rule. A feeling of guilt pushes one to donate or give to charity.

Virtue Ethics

Thirdly, virtue ethics instigate our moral duty to give our time and money to others. In moral philosophy, virtue ethics is a broad term of theories that show one is doing a duty or acts to bring about good consequences (Proctor, 2019). Virtue theorists can offer advice such as acting virtuous as a certain person would act in a similar situation. Virtue theories take inspiration from Aristotle, who mentioned that someone with ideal character traits could be declared virtuous. Such traits are driven by internal natural tendencies that are nurtured. They become stable once established. For instance, one can be kind through innumerable situations in their lifetime due to character but not wanting to maximize utility or gain favours. Moreover, they could be doing their duty. According to virtue ethics, humans become complete when they act righteously but seem vacuous (Proctor, 2019).

As such, the best moral action we can take for ourselves is to help others by becoming virtuous. On the contrary, we are all selfish, according to Rawls (Said & Nurhayati, 2021). Things we do are for personal benefit. By acting according to virtue ethics, we do not attain more virtuous components but obtain something. Moreover, things we do are for personal fulfillment. Thus, doing something for yourself is not virtuous.

Finally, empathy is an ultimate virtue that stipulates we have the moral obligation to help others with our time and money. We can understand other people by acting through empathy (Behler & Berry, 2022). Empathy is the ability to understand and share feelings with another person. Emotion researchers describe this feeling as coupled with imagining what other people might be thinking or feeling. Empathizing with others’ needs helps us understand their pain, making us obligated to help them. For instance, one can empathize with others by smiling and talking about a troubling issue to remember an individual’s name. Moreover, giving people full attention during meetings and being curious about their interests and life, offering constructive feedback are ways one can help with their time.

On the contrary, the argument about empathy distinguishes between understanding and obligation. If a person understands another’s pain, it creates a moral obligation (Behler & Berry, 2022). Thus, it is not necessary for they have to be helped but understood. Others can develop a compelling meaning or understanding but are not morally obligated to it. This logic is flawed since it leaves an individual to understand and assist what they are acting upon to fix what they understand about the other individual’s problems. Thus, the overall objective would not be accomplished by placing the power to define relevant terms for every person. This becomes counterproductive since it would cause more harm than good. One can never truly understand whether or not the need is appropriate or if any assistance would be meaningful. As such, having a moral obligation to assist becomes useless.

We have a moral duty to do as much good for others as possible and have the right to do what we have with our money and time. Virtue ethics, consequentialism, and empathy are some theories that support moral obligation. In addition, humans deserve to be helped when in need if the capability is available. In my opinion, we should choose to be morally obligated and help people with our time and money to reduce the amount of suffering across the globe.

Behler, A. M. C., & Berry, D. R. (2022). Closing the empathy gap: A narrative review of the measurement and reduction of parochial empathy . Social and Personality Psychology Compass , e12701. Web.

Card, D., & Smith, N. A. (2020). On consequentialism and fairness . Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence , 3 , 34. Web.

Kraynak, R. (2019). History and modernity in the thought of Thomas Hobbes. In History and Modernity in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes . Cornell University Press. Web.

Proctor, C. (2019). Virtue ethics in psychotherapy: A systematic review of the literature. International Journal of Existential Positive Psychology , 8 (1), 1-22.

Said, M. Y., & Nurhayati, Y. (2021). A review on Rawls theory of justice. International Journal of Law, Environment, and Natural Resources , 1 (1), 29-36. Web.

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Essay on Moral Philosophy

Students are often asked to write an essay on Moral Philosophy in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Moral Philosophy

What is moral philosophy.

Moral philosophy is thinking about what is right and wrong. It’s like a guide for making good choices. People who study this are called philosophers. They ask big questions about how we should live and treat others.

Important Ideas in Moral Philosophy

There are many ideas in moral philosophy. Some say we should act in ways that bring the most happiness. Others believe we should follow strict rules, like always telling the truth, no matter what.

Making Decisions

When we make decisions, moral philosophy can help us choose the best action. It’s not just about following rules, but thinking carefully about how our choices affect others.

Different Cultures, Different Morals

What’s right in one culture might be wrong in another. Moral philosophy helps us understand these differences. It teaches us to be open-minded and respectful to everyone’s views.

Why It Matters

Moral philosophy matters because it shapes our world. It influences laws, schools, and how we get along with each other. It helps us build a world where everyone can live well and happily.

250 Words Essay on Moral Philosophy

Moral philosophy is about thinking hard on what is right and what is wrong. It is like a big map that guides people on how to be good and how to choose the right path in life. This subject asks questions like “What should I do?” and “How should I live?” to help everyone understand how to act well.

Right and Wrong

One big part of moral philosophy is figuring out what is right and what is wrong. It is not always easy, because different people and cultures might have their own ideas. For example, sharing might be seen as good, while stealing is seen as bad. Moral philosophers try to find rules that can apply to everyone, no matter where they are from.

Good Habits

Moral philosophy also talks about virtues, which are good habits. Being honest, brave, and kind are all examples of virtues. These are like muscles – the more you use them, the stronger they get. By practicing good habits, people can become better at being good.

Choices Matter

Every day, people make choices. Some are small, like what to eat for breakfast, and some are big, like helping a friend in trouble. Moral philosophy teaches that every choice can matter and that thinking about the reasons behind our choices is important.

Why Study Moral Philosophy?

Studying moral philosophy is important because it helps people understand how to make the world a better place. It teaches that what we do affects others and that being good is not just about following rules, but about caring for each other. By learning moral philosophy, students can grow up to make wise, kind choices in life.

500 Words Essay on Moral Philosophy

Moral philosophy is a part of philosophy that asks big questions about what is right and wrong. It is like a guide that helps people decide how to act in a good way. Think of it as a map for behavior, showing us which paths are good to take and which ones we should avoid.

Good vs. Bad

One of the main things moral philosophy looks at is the difference between good and bad actions. For example, sharing your toys with a friend is seen as a good thing because it makes both of you happy. On the other hand, taking something that doesn’t belong to you is considered bad because it can hurt others. Moral philosophy tries to explain why some things are good and others are bad.

Rules and Choices

Moral philosophy also talks about rules that many people agree on, like telling the truth and being fair. These rules can help us make choices that are good for everyone. But sometimes, it’s hard to know what the best choice is. That’s when we have to think carefully and use what we know about right and wrong to decide.

Different Views

People from different places or with different beliefs might have their own ideas about what is right and wrong. This is because what we think is good or bad can be shaped by our families, our friends, and the society we live in. Moral philosophy helps us understand these different views and why people might not always agree.

You might wonder why we need to study moral philosophy. It’s important because it helps us live together peacefully. When we understand what is right and wrong, we can make better choices that help us get along with others. It also makes us think about how our actions affect other people and the world around us.

Thinking for Ourselves

Even though moral philosophy can give us some answers, it also encourages us to think for ourselves. We can learn from others, but in the end, we have to decide what we believe is right. This means asking questions, listening to our hearts, and sometimes even standing up for what we think is good, even if it’s not easy.

Moral philosophy is like a compass that helps us navigate through life’s choices. It’s not just about following rules; it’s about understanding why those rules are there and thinking about how our actions affect others. By learning about moral philosophy, we can grow into thoughtful and caring people who make the world a better place, one good choice at a time.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

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Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development

Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Verywell / Bailey Mariner

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Kohlberg's theory of moral development is a theory that focuses on how children develop morality and moral reasoning. Kohlberg's theory suggests that moral development occurs in a series of six stages and that moral logic is primarily focused on seeking and maintaining justice.

Here we discuss how Kohlberg developed his theory of moral development and the six stages he identified as part of this process. We also share some critiques of Kohlberg's theory, many of which suggest that it may be biased based on the limited demographics of the subjects studied.

Test Your Knowledge

At the end of this article, take a fast and free pop quiz to see how much you've learned about Kohlberg's theory.

What Is Moral Development?

Moral development is the process by which people develop the distinction between right and wrong (morality) and engage in reasoning between the two (moral reasoning).

How do people develop morality? This question has fascinated parents, religious leaders, and philosophers for ages, but moral development has also become a hot-button issue in psychology and education. Do parental or societal influences play a greater role in moral development? Do all kids develop morality in similar ways?

American psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg developed one of the best-known theories exploring some of these basic questions. His work modified and expanded upon Jean Piaget's previous work but was more centered on explaining how children develop moral reasoning.

Kohlberg extended Piaget's theory, proposing that moral development is a continual process that occurs throughout the lifespan. Kohlberg's theory outlines six stages of moral development within three different levels.

In recent years, Kohlberg's theory has been criticized as being Western-centric with a bias toward men (he primarily used male research subjects) and for having a narrow worldview based on upper-middle-class value systems and perspectives.

How Kohlberg Developed His Theory

Kohlberg based his theory on a series of moral dilemmas presented to his study subjects. Participants were also interviewed to determine the reasoning behind their judgments in each scenario.

One example was "Heinz Steals the Drug." In this scenario, a woman has cancer and her doctors believe only one drug might save her. This drug had been discovered by a local pharmacist and he was able to make it for $200 per dose and sell it for $2,000 per dose. The woman's husband, Heinz, could only raise $1,000 to buy the drug.

He tried to negotiate with the pharmacist for a lower price or to be extended credit to pay for it over time. But the pharmacist refused to sell it for any less or to accept partial payments. Rebuffed, Heinz instead broke into the pharmacy and stole the drug to save his wife. Kohlberg asked, "Should the husband have done that?"

Kohlberg was not interested so much in the answer to whether Heinz was wrong or right but in the reasoning for each participant's decision. He then classified their reasoning into the stages of his theory of moral development.

Stages of Moral Development

Kohlberg's theory is broken down into three primary levels. At each level of moral development, there are two stages. Similar to how Piaget believed that not all people reach the highest levels of cognitive development, Kohlberg believed not everyone progresses to the highest stages of moral development.

Level 1. Preconventional Morality

Preconventional morality is the earliest period of moral development. It lasts until around the age of 9. At this age, children's decisions are primarily shaped by the expectations of adults and the consequences of breaking the rules. There are two stages within this level:

• Stage 1 (Obedience and Punishment) : The earliest stages of moral development, obedience and punishment are especially common in young children, but adults are also capable of expressing this type of reasoning. According to Kohlberg, people at this stage see rules as fixed and absolute. Obeying the rules is important because it is a way to avoid punishment.
• Stage 2 (Individualism and Exchange) : At the individualism and exchange stage of moral development, children account for individual points of view and judge actions based on how they serve individual needs. In the Heinz dilemma, children argued that the best course of action was the choice that best served Heinz’s needs. Reciprocity is possible at this point in moral development, but only if it serves one's own interests.

Level 2. Conventional Morality

The next period of moral development is marked by the acceptance of social rules regarding what is good and moral. During this time, adolescents and adults internalize the moral standards they have learned from their role models and from society.

This period also focuses on the acceptance of authority and conforming to the norms of the group. There are two stages at this level of morality:

• Stage 3 (Developing Good Interpersonal Relationships) : Often referred to as the "good boy-good girl" orientation, this stage of the interpersonal relationship of moral development is focused on living up to social expectations and roles . There is an emphasis on conformity , being "nice," and consideration of how choices influence relationships.
• Stage 4 (Maintaining Social Order) : This stage is focused on ensuring that social order is maintained. At this stage of moral development, people begin to consider society as a whole when making judgments. The focus is on maintaining law and order by following the rules, doing one’s duty, and respecting authority.

Level 3. Postconventional Morality

At this level of moral development, people develop an understanding of abstract principles of morality. The two stages at this level are:

• Stage 5 (Social Contract and Individual Rights ): The ideas of a social contract and individual rights cause people in the next stage to begin to account for the differing values, opinions, and beliefs of other people. Rules of law are important for maintaining a society, but members of the society should agree upon these standards.
• Stage 6 (Universal Principles) : Kohlberg’s final level of moral reasoning is based on universal ethical principles and abstract reasoning. At this stage, people follow these internalized principles of justice, even if they conflict with laws and rules.

Kohlberg believed that only a relatively small percentage of people ever reach the post-conventional stages (around 10 to 15%). One analysis found that while stages one to four could be seen as universal in populations throughout the world, the fifth and sixth stages were extremely rare in all populations.

Applications for Kohlberg's Theory

Understanding Kohlberg's theory of moral development is important in that it can help parents guide their children as they develop their moral character. Parents with younger children might work on rule obeyance, for instance, whereas they might teach older children about social expectations.

Teachers and other educators can also apply Kohlberg's theory in the classroom, providing additional moral guidance. A kindergarten teacher could help enhance moral development by setting clear rules for the classroom, and the consequences for violating them. This helps kids at stage one of moral development.

A teacher in high school might focus more on the development that occurs in stage three (developing good interpersonal relationships) and stage four (maintaining social order). This could be accomplished by having the students take part in setting the rules to be followed in the classroom, giving them a better idea of the reasoning behind these rules.

Criticisms for Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development

Kohlberg's theory played an important role in the development of moral psychology. While the theory has been highly influential, aspects of the theory have been critiqued for a number of reasons:

• Moral reasoning does not equal moral behavior : Kohlberg's theory is concerned with moral thinking, but there is a big difference between knowing what we ought to do versus our actual actions. Moral reasoning, therefore, may not lead to moral behavior.
• Overemphasizes justice : Critics have pointed out that Kohlberg's theory of moral development overemphasizes the concept of justice when making moral choices. Factors such as compassion, caring, and other interpersonal feelings may play an important part in moral reasoning.
• Cultural bias : Individualist cultures emphasize personal rights, while collectivist cultures stress the importance of society and community. Eastern, collectivist cultures may have different moral outlooks that Kohlberg's theory does not take into account.
• Age bias : Most of his subjects were children under the age of 16 who obviously had no experience with marriage. The Heinz dilemma may have been too abstract for these children to understand, and a scenario more applicable to their everyday concerns might have led to different results.
• Gender bias : Kohlberg's critics, including Carol Gilligan, have suggested that Kohlberg's theory was gender-biased since all of the subjects in his sample were male. Kohlberg believed that women tended to remain at the third level of moral development because they place a stronger emphasis on things such as social relationships and the welfare of others.

Gilligan instead suggested that Kohlberg's theory overemphasizes concepts such as justice and does not adequately address moral reasoning founded on the principles and ethics of caring and concern for others.

Other Theories of Moral Development

Kohlberg isn't the only psychologist to theorize how we develop morally. There are several other theories of moral development.

Piaget's Theory of Moral Development

Kohlberg's theory is an expansion of Piaget's theory of moral development. Piaget described a three-stage process of moral development:

• Stage 1 : The child is more concerned with developing and mastering their motor and social skills, with no general concern about morality.
• Stage 2 : The child develops unconditional respect both for authority figures and the rules in existence.
• Stage 3 : The child starts to see rules as being arbitrary, also considering an actor's intentions when judging whether an act or behavior is moral or immoral.

Kohlberg expanded on this theory to include more stages in the process. Additionally, Kohlberg believed that the final stage is rarely achieved by individuals whereas Piaget's stages of moral development are common to all.

Moral Foundations Theory

Proposed by Jonathan Haidt, Craig Joseph, and Jesse Graham, the moral foundations theory is based on three morality principles:

• Intuition develops before strategic reasoning . Put another way, our reaction comes first, which is then followed by rationalization.
• Morality involves more than harm and fairness . Contained within this second principle are a variety of considerations related to morality. It includes: care vs. harm, liberty vs. oppression, fairness vs. cheating, loyalty vs. betrayal , authority vs. subversion, and sanctity vs. degradation.
• Morality can both bind groups and blind individuals . When people are part of a group, they will tend to adopt that group's same value systems. They may also sacrifice their own morals for the group's benefit.

While Kohlberg's theory is primarily focused on help vs. harm, moral foundations theory encompasses several more dimensions of morality. However, this theory also fails to explain the "rules" people use when determining what is best for society.

Normative Theories of Moral Behavior

Several other theories exist that attempt to explain the development of morality , specifically in relation to social justice. Some fall into the category of transcendental institutionalist, which involves trying to create "perfect justice." Others are realization-focused, concentrating more on removing injustices.

One theory falling into the second category is social choice theory. Social choice theory is a collection of models that seek to explain how individuals can use their input (their preferences) to impact society as a whole. An example of this is voting, which allows the majority to decide what is "right" and "wrong."

See how much you've learned (or maybe already knew!) about Kohlberg's theory of moral development with this quick, free pop quiz.

While Kohlberg's theory of moral development has been criticized, the theory played an important role in the emergence of the field of moral psychology. Researchers continue to explore how moral reasoning develops and changes through life as well as the universality of these stages. Understanding these stages offers helpful insights into the ways that both children and adults make moral choices and how moral thinking may influence decisions and behaviors.

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Govrin A. From ethics of care to psychology of care: Reconnecting ethics of care to contemporary moral psychology .  Front Psychol . 2014;5:1135. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01135

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Kohlberg L, Essays On Moral Development . Harper & Row; 1985.

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Gibbs J.  Moral Development And Reality . 4th ed. Oxford University Press; 2019.

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Dubas KM, Dubas SM, Mehta R. Theories of justice and moral behavior . J Legal Ethical Regulatory Issues . 2014;17(2):17-35.

By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

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