how to fight corruption in the philippines essay

Insights and Analysis

Fighting Corruption in the Philippines: Models for Long-Term Success

May 16, 2012

By Steven Rood

The issue of corruption in the Philippines has once again hit international newspapers with reports that the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Renato Corona (currently undergoing an impeachment trial before the Philippine Senate), had dozens of dollar accounts with millions of dollars flowing through them. Of course, reports on corruption are continually in the Philippine media.

In the latest report of corruption in the Philippines, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Renato Corona, was accused of holding bank accounts with millions of unreported of dollars. Photo by Karl Grobl.

As I have quoted the Political & Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) before, “the media, even more than the courts, is the forum in which all sides try to wage their battles of defamation.”  I’ve repeatedly written about corruption , and The Asia Foundation has supported efforts to bring more clarity to the discussion – to go beyond politicized battles – most thoroughly represented in the book by Michael Johnston.

A year ago there was another impeachment case against the former ombudsman (anti-graft prosecutor) that led The Economist to ask cynically, “Progress or Payback?”  Now, one year on we are faced with the same conundrum:  Is the trial of the chief justice part of a political vendetta (since he was perceived to be protecting former President Arroyo), or just the next logical step in removing blockages to President Aquino’s successful 2010 campaign slogan, “If there’s no corruption there’s no poverty?”  The plain fact of the matter is that for those outside a small circle of decision-makers it is impossible to tell. An optimistic read could point to broader bureaucratic reforms (to which I have pointed in analyzing presidential power) while pessimists might cite PNoy’s alleged favoritism to classmates, friends, and shooting buddies.

The purpose of this blog is not to argue either the pessimistic or optimistic case. Rather, it is to try to better understand the political economy structure of corruption so as to be able to point to some directions forward.

A long-standing starting point for understanding the logic of corruption is Robert Klitgaard’s formulation : C = M + D – A (Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability).

That is, when someone has the monopoly over decisions on how to do things (hire people, contract roads, purchase supplies) and a wide range of discretion in making decisions, there is likely to be more corruption – which can be reduced by introducing accountability mechanisms like transparency of information, independent audits, and the like. Using this heuristic, the Foundation has supported partners in the Philippines working on procurement (particularly with the Departments of Education and Health), cities whose mayors wish to reduce corruption so as to be more investor-friendly, and general civil society (including business associations) efforts to increase accountability.

A recent paper introduces a considerably more complex formal model that includes a bureaucratic decision-maker, different types of clients with differing willingness and ability to pay, and variations in rules about prices, testing, and allocation of the (abstract) good being provided. A warning to fellow non-economists:  slogging through the equations and derivations can be slow. The general logic is clear and some of the implications are interesting, such as the suggestion that “red tape” is more likely in governments serving the poor since poor people have less ability to pay than what a service is worth to them (and thus are more willing to endure red tape).

In checking the formal abstract model against what is known about corruption in the real world, the authors note success stories such as those related by Klitgaard . As is the experience with our programming in the Philippines with cities or government agencies, these anti-corruption successes “all seem to involve a person at the top of each institution who was eager to implement” reforms. But then the question arises: why aren’t such examples more frequent or sustained?  Why don’t leaders pursue these reforms more often?

Politics, of course, is the answer. Repeatedly, in the Philippines it has been demonstrated that reducing bureaucratic corruption in particular agencies, or in particular cities, is possible with the cooperation of the leaders at the top and in partnership with citizens, businesses, and NGOs. But such successes do not yet seem to touch political corruption – the use of corruption to gain, keep, and exercise power as witness the “ hello garci ” scandal regarding the 2004 election in the Philippines and the continued pervasiveness of money politics. This is where the analysis of Michael Johnston is valuable in laying out the logic of “Oligarchs and Clans,” which is the political economic situation in which the Philippines finds itself. This is where corruption is the most harmful to economic growth since decisions or policies of one administration tend to be arbitrarily overturned by a subsequent one (even within presidential administrations as one faction takes over, for instance, a department and uses it as a platform for the next electoral cycle rather than technocratic policy-making).

Johnston’s medium-to-long-term prescription is rooted in the need to change the relation between citizens and their elected officials. Under Oligarchs and Clans, voters tend to reward particular favors (from purchased votes to paying health expenses) rather than effective performance in managing government and delivering service. He suggests an indicator and benchmark strategy that picks services important to people (for example, education or health), develops indicators of good performance, publishes them against benchmarks, and helps citizens hold officials accountable. In a sense, this is adding direct governmental involvement to some of the ideas involved in “social accountability.”

A recent book, The Institutional Revolution by Douglas Allen, studies the effect of better measures of performance to explain changes in institutions (such as the military) at the beginning of the industrial era in Britain (roughly 1780 to 1850). For example, purchase of offices used to be the accepted method of staffing a bureaucracy, but after time, distances, tasks, and talent became more accurately measured then meritocracy could become a viable recruitment strategy. In Allen’s historical account, the “sovereign” using benchmarks and indicators was the Crown. In the current version, Johnston is proposing to “deepen democracy” in order to empower citizens to hold government accountable against objective measurements.

Put this way, reducing both the demand for and supply of corruption can take decades. With the modern pace of politics, the campaign for the May 2013 midterm elections (regarded as rehearsal for the 2016 presidential elections) is already heating up. Necessary as it might be, designing and implementing a long-term strategy is a daunting task.

This is the seventeenth posting in the series, “A Representative Professor,” a weekly series during a teaching sabbatical at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

Steven Rood is The Asia Foundation’s country representative in the Philippines. He can be reached at [email protected] . The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

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People empowerment to decide in justice, serving as system of check and balance over the actuation of public officials by way of adopting the Grand Jury and Trial Jury Systems, is the surest means to substantially eradicate government corruption in the Philippines.

The proposed people’s initiative jury law can be browsed in the web site below:

http://www.mediafire.com/view/?rvyug033vj9x48k

The proposal is anchored on Article 2, Section 1, of the Philippine Constitution.

Marlowe Camello

Homeland, California

People empowerment to decide criminal cases in Court is required so that they can convict grafters and send them to jail. They call it the Jury System in the U.S. and has proven with great success for over 227 years now.

I drafted a people’s Jury Initiative Law patterned after the U.S. Jury law and I am looking for Anti-Graft Organizations in the Philippines to sponsor the Initiative via RA 6735. You will find the draft of this proposed law at this web site: http://mcamello.com/how-to-stop-government-corruption .

I can guide such organization, step by step, by initiative process according to the procedures of RA 6735. The “Road Map” to enact it can be read and downloaded at the following website: http://www.mediafire.com/view/4b5k93xtngu0bfb/1

Jurors for Jury Trial who report for duty will be paid the minimum wage rate per day, given free noon time meal, and paid transportation tickets to and from court.

For quick understanding of the proposed anti-graft solution, please read the one-page jury diagram in the website below: http://www.mediafire.com/view/yuwmlr0xv18d7vq/19

For a full information of the advantages of the Jury System to the Filipino people and the Philippines please download this web site: http://www.mediafire.com/view/y46cv4gd6fgi808/

You may contact me at: [email protected]

Atty. Marlowe Camello

“People empowerment to decide criminal cases in Court is required so that they can convict grafters and send them to jail. They call it the Jury System in the U.S. and has proven with great success for over 227 years now”

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Nawaz, F.; (2009) Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in the Philippines . Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer Helpdesk)

All views in this text are the author(s)’, and may differ from the U4 partner agencies’ policies.

This work is licenced under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence ( CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 )

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The Philippines: a social structure of corruption

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The anticorruption community largely views corruption as a government or development issue. But in the Philippines, corruption is a social structure. The very social bonds and social structures that are good at building civic unity and solidarity are also good at spreading and maintaining corruption, and this is why corruption is so difficult to remove. Patrons use these societal features to implement a ubiquitous social structure of corruption by means of maneuvered friendships that makes it difficult for the masses to know when a patron is acting as a friend or foe. The social structure encompasses the whole of society and corrupts the encircled government, political, and development systems as easily as it infiltrates all other segments of society. It is why oversight and sector-based anticorruption initiatives underperform, and why initiatives must pivot towards addressing this social structure.

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Anti-corruption Institutions: Some History and Theory

Corruption as a political phenomenon.

International Anti-Corruption Initiatives: a Classification of Policy Interventions

Data availability.

The author’s interview notes generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are not publicly available to help ensure confidentiality of the interviewees, but are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

Pronounced ‘leader’ in English, lider is a term used in the Philippines specifically referring to individuals (or leaders) in the community that are sought by candidates to convince the electorate to vote for that particular candidate. Liders are the individuals that perform the physical exchange of money for votes with the electorate.

A barangay is the lowest level of elected government. Each city or municipality is comprised of multiple barangays (villages).

See Appendix for a full list of respondents.

Interviews 2–3, 6, 14–16, 18–20, 22, 25, 39, 41–42, 44–50.

Utang na loob is usually translated as “debt of gratitude.” The literal translation is “debt of inside” or “internal debt.” It can also be translated as “reciprocity” or “lifelong reciprocation.”

Interviews 1,14,21,24,42–44.

The paper uses the term ‘client’ to represent the economically lower-class voters who are in clientelistic relationships with political families/candidates (patrons).

Interviews 1,14,24,42–44.

Clans are a connection of least ten extended families – usually more – where each extended family could have more than a hundred members. Clans then have a minimum of a thousand members and usually much more.

Interviews 2,5–6,9–10,14–51.

Interviews 3–6,9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.

Interviews 3–6, 9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.

Interviews 14–22,25–26,39,47–50.

Interviews 16,22,27–38.

Interviews 14,16,21,24,39,42–44.

Interviews 16,22.

Interview 22.

Interview 23.

Interviews 1,20.

Interviews 2,5,14–23,26,32–39,41,45,47–51.

Interviews 15–16,20,22.

Interviews 27–31.

Interview 24.

Interviews 2,6,10.

Interview 22–23.

Interviews 14,18,32–38.

Interviews 32–38.

Interviews 1,10,18–22,32–38,47–49,50–51.

Interviews 2–4,6,14–15,20,22,40,45–49.

Interview 16.

Interviews 2–3.

Interview 3.

Interviews 1,3–6,10,12,15,50.

Interview 15.

Interviews 2–3,6,15.

BARMM consists of the region formally known as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) plus the addition of Cotabato City and villages in northern Cotabato.

Interviews 3–4.

Interview 1.

Interview 3–4,6,10,12.

Interview 7.

Interviews 2–3,6,14–16,18–20,22,25,39,41–42,44–50.

Interviews 1,3–7,10,12,14–15.

Interviews 1,3–4,6,9–10,14,16–18,24.

Interviews 1, 3–4,6,9–10,14,16–18,24.

COMELEC is the Commission on Elections in charge of ensuring fair and free elections.

Interviews 3–4,6–7.

Interview 6.

Interviews 14–15,25–26.

Interviews 14–16,25–26,32–38.

Interviews 14–15,25–26,32–38.

Interviews 14–16,20,22–23,25–38.

Interview 21.

Interview 2.

Interview 14,21,49.

Interviews 2,16,20,22–23,27–31.

Interviews 1,2.

Interviews 52,54–59,61–64,66–67.

Interviews 6,14,16,18–19,21–23,25,50.

Interviews 3–4,18,52,54–59,61–64,66–67.

Interviews 3–4,6–8,52,54–55,56–58,61,64.

Interviews 2–3,6,14–16,18–22,25,39,41–42,44–50.

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Corruption in the Philippines: Framework and context

Citation Count

Challenging Corruption in Asia: Case Studies and a Framework for Action

Combating corruption in a "failed" state: the nigerian economic and financial crimes commission (efcc), state power and private profit: the political economy of corruption in southeast asia, putting out fires: understanding the developmental nature and roles of inmate gangs in the philippine overcrowded jails:, do migrant remittances improve the quality of government evidence from the philippines:, institutions, institutional change and economic performance, institutions, institutional change, and economic performance, corruption and growth, the political economy of the rent-seeking society, a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation., related papers (5), trending questions (2).

The paper explains how corruption in the Philippines has evolved from nepotism to smuggling, public-works contracts, debt-financed schemes, asset privatizations, and recently, underworld-related activities.

The paper discusses how corruption in the Philippines is influenced by factors such as social cohesion, economic strategies, political system, market transactions, and economic growth. It does not explicitly mention the specific effects of corruption on the political, social, and economic landscape of the Philippines.

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Combating corruption in the Philippines: an update

Author(s) : World Bank. Philippines Country Management Unit. East Asia and Pacific Regional Office (Philippines)

Organization : World Bank. Philippines Country Management Unit, East Asia and Pacific Regional Office,

Imprint : Manila, World Bank, 2001

Collation : 64 p.

Series : Pre-2003 Economic or Sector Report

Notes : Incl.bibl.

The war against corruption in the Philippines has taken a fresh turn with the installation of the new government in 2001. Addressing corruption was one of the new administration ' s announced priorities, but a detailed anticorruption strategy and action plan have yet to emerge. Chapter 1 discusses the nine-point approach to fighting corruption in the Philippines as proposed by the World Bank in November 1999 which comprises policy reforms and deregulation, reforming campaign finance, increasing public oversight, reforming the budget process, improving meritocracy in civil services, targeting selected agencies, enhancing sanctions, developing private sector partnerships, and supporting judicial reform. Chapter 2 discusses the widening government deficit which begun in late 1999 and the events shaping this change. Chapter 3 highlights the areas where progress was made during this time and focuses on the emergence of new initiatives. Finally, Chapter 4 addresses the new Government 's commitment.

• Anti-corruption strategies, Judiciary, Legal framework, Corporate sector, Corruption, Economic and social development, Educational management, Central administration, Finance, Budgets, Governance, Public sector
• Asia and the Pacific Philippines

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Integrity and anti-corruption in the Philippines

With rapidly growing economic and social sectors, the improvement of its justice system is key to the Philippines securing the status of a newly developed country. IDLO has been implementing a program in the Philippines to enhance the competency of prosecutors with a view to increasing the successful disposition of cases against public officials and efficiently addressing corruption.

Supported by the United States Department of State, IDLO delivered eight training workshops on case analysis, legal research and legal writing to the Office of the Ombudsman in 2016 and 2017. Held in three locations – Manila, Cebu and Davao – 244 Ombudsman lawyers participated in the training, 55% of which were female.  

Anti-corruption efforts make a difference for ordinary citizens

The training culminated in a symposium in July 2017, where IDLO convened over 100 Ombudsman lawyers as well as international experts to discuss best practices on integrity initiatives. A key theme of the symposium was the powerful impact that anti-corruption efforts can have on the lives of ordinary citizens. 

Promoting accountability for corruption

The Office of the Ombudsman in the Philippines has a constitutional mandate to hold public servants and office holders accountable and to combat public sector corruption through the investigation and prosecution of cases. But corruption remains a problem throughout the country.

... Corruption is a social malady that does not end with retribution.

Ombudsman lawyers play a key role in building the rule of law

Combatting corruption is a crucial step in boosting citizens’ confidence in the justice system. The training and symposium served not only to enhance the skills and knowledge of Ombudsman lawyers, but also to remind them of their important role in building the rule of law in the Philippines.

You - the participants in today's symposium - and your work are the key to improving accountability and limiting corrupt practices within the justice sector.

Invisible no more: Shedding light on police violence and corruption in the Philippines

The Philippines was romanticized and dubbed the “ Pearl of the Orient Seas ” by national hero and writer José Rizal due to the country’s elegant organic beauty. However, the pearl’s beauty has been tainted by increasing police brutality, accelerated in recent years.

After becoming the 16th President of the Philippines in 2016, Rodrigo Duterte was quick and adamant about carrying out a “ war on drugs ” campaign. Duterte implemented extreme measures targeting criminals and non-compliant citizens from impoverished communities to restore peace and order in the country.

In his first press conference after being elected as president, Duterte pledged to end crime, corruption, and the illegal drug trade within three to six months of being elected. However, Duterte implemented this pledge through the promotion of a new measure: “shoot-to-kill” orders.

“What I will do is urge Congress to restore [the] death penalty by hanging,” Duterte said in his first press conference. “If you resist, show violent resistance, my order to police [will be] to shoot to kill. Shoot to kill for organized crime. You heard that? Shoot to kill for every organized crime.”

Unfortunately, Duterte’s strategies to combat the issues faced by Filipinos have conditioned and emboldened the police, creating a sense of invincibility. The implications of Duterte’s extreme strategies include the manslaughter of innocent citizens and the manifestation of police corruption in the country. However, as a new president leads the country, the future of the Philippines’ criminal justice system seems committed to less violent means.

‘Shoot-To-Kill’

Duterte’s shoot-to-kill orders evolved dangerously, putting more innocent Filipino lives at risk and perpetuating the human rights crisis in the country. The global COVID-19 pandemic was not a barrier to Duterte’s anti-crime operations.

Amidst the pandemic, the government implemented an “ Enhanced Community Quarantine ” (ECQ) for the country’s capital, Manila, as well as the entire island of Luzon in an effort to mitigate the spread of the virus. During the lockdown, Filipinos were confined in their homes, transportation was suspended, food and health services were regulated, and uniformed personnel patrolled the streets to enforce strict quarantine measures.

During the ECQ, the government did not fulfill its promises as residents did not receive relief support. On April 1, 2020, frustration from community members erupted into political demonstrations in the streets of San Roque, Quezon City. Advocates and protestors asked for answers from the government in regard to their promised supplies and food aid.

Duterte’s response? “ Shoot them dead .”

In a televised address on the same day as the protests, Duterte ordered the police and military to shoot troublemakers if they felt their lives were in danger. “My orders are to the police and military, also village officials, that if there is trouble or the situation arises that people fight and your lives are on the line, shoot them dead,” Duterte said.

According to the World Population Review’s most recent annual data, the Philippines is the country with the world’s highest number of police killings, with over 6,000 between 2016 and 2021.

As of February 2022, based on the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency’s (PDEA) Real Numbers PH data , since Duterte took office in 2016, the government implemented 229,868 operations against illegal drugs, which resulted in the arrest of a total of 331,694 suspects. Beyond this, according to the PDEA, the total number of killings during anti-drug operations reached 6,235.

In November 2021, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project published a comprehensive database of the Philippines revealing that since 2016, at least 7,742 civilians have been killed in anti-drug raids, which is approximately 25 percent higher than the figure issued by the government.

As described by Eliza Romero, a coordinator for the Malaya Movement , a US-based alliance that advocates for human rights, freedom, and democracy in the Philippines, Duterte’s fierce rhetoric has given an invitation to vigilante and extrajudicial violence among the community.

“The shoot-to-kill order will just encourage more extrajudicial killings and vigilantism,” Romero said in an interview with Foreign Policy. “It will give private citizens and barangay [village] captains impunity to commit more human rights violations with the protection of the law while normalizing carnage.”

Behind every number is a real person—whose story has been invisible and whose life has been reduced by police officers who one day decided to target an innocent victim; a brother or sister; a son or daughter; a husband or wife; a father or mother.

Karla A., daughter of Renato A. who was killed in December 2016, recounts her experiences after losing her father at the age of 10, stating in an interview with the Human Rights Watch (HRW), “I was there when it happened when my papa was shot. I saw everything, how my papa was shot. … Our happy family is gone. We don’t have anyone to call father now. We want to be with him, but we can’t anymore.”

Emboldening the Police

Duterte’s enforcement measures to achieve public order put innocent citizens in a battle they have already lost. What is worse is that Duterte not only normalized but justified the killing of innocent citizens. Duterte assured the police impunity , stating that he would not only protect them from human rights abuses but ultimately pardon them if ever they are convicted for carrying out his anti-drug campaigns. This leads to the intensification of corruption within police departments in the country.

Duterte’s shoot-to-kill orders have not shown mercy to victims as he has always been in favor of the police. He never failed to show support for the police in carrying out his campaigns in his public and televised addresses. For instance, Duterte gave orders to Bureau of Customs Commissioner Rey Leonardo Guerrero stating that “Drugs are still flowing in. I'd like you to kill there [in communities]… anyway, I'll back you up and you won't get jailed. If it's drugs, you shoot and kill. That’s the arrangement,” Duterte said .

Duterte’s vow to protect the police results in police officers feeling emboldened and invincible. Police officers who have followed Duterte’s orders are promoted through the ranks. Police officers are not held accountable for the deaths of innocent civilians; the country’s own President pardons them. On top of this, police officers are falsifying evidence to justify unlawful killings and avoid legal repercussions.

The HRW published a report titled “‘License to Kill’: Philippine Police Killings in Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs,” which analyzed a total of 24 incidents that led to 32 deaths, involving Philippine National Police (PNP) personnel between October 2016 and January 2017. The report concluded that police officers would falsely claim self-defense to justify these killings.

To further strengthen their claims, police officers would plant guns, spent ammunition, and drug packets next to the bodies of victims. In turn, the victims would seem more guilty of being part of drug-related activities. Other times, police officers would work closely with masked gunmen to carry out these extrajudicial killings. In other words, police officers have succeeded in rooting their endeavors in deceit.

Fortunately, there have been instances where some police officers were legally prosecuted in police killings. Three police officers were found guilty of murdering a 17-year-old teenager in 2017, the first conviction of officers ever since Duterte launched his war on drugs.

A Look Into the Future

The Philippines as the “Pearl of the Orient Seas” has lost its luster due to the many problems that the nation continues to face—one of the most prominent ones is Duterte’s explicit abuse of police power. Similar to how pearls lose their glow when not provided with the care it needs, the integrity of police officers has dried out and become yellowed over time due to the government’s complicity.

Time and time again, Duterte has remained an instigator in instances relating to police brutality in the country. Luckily, the Philippines can combat pearl discoloration through the implementation of robust policies that would ensure increased transparency within police departments.

Freshly elected Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. makes the restoration of the yellowed pearl an achievable goal. At the 121st Police Service anniversary celebration held at Camp General Rafael T. Crame in Quezon City—the national headquarters of the PNP—Marcos Jr. brings an opportunity for redemption. Aside from calling the PNP officers “vanguards of peace,” Marcos Jr. urged them to continue serving the community with integrity in order to restore public confidence.

“The use of force must always be reasonable, justifiable, and only undertaken when necessary. Execution of authority must be fair, it must be impartial,” Marcos Jr. said . “It must be devoid of favoritism and discrimination, regardless of race, gender, social economic status, political affiliation, [and] religious belief. It is only then that you can effectively sustain with great respect and wide support the authority that you possess as uniformed servicemen of the Republic.”

Beyond this, Marcos Jr. highlighted his hope for reforming the police system under the leadership of newly installed PNP Chief Police General Rodolfo Azurin Jr. Moreover, Marcos Jr.’s aspirations to increase accountability within police departments will be complemented by Azurin Jr.’s launching of a peace and security framework titled “MKK=K” or “Malasakit + Kaayusan + Kapayapaan = Kaunlaran” which translates to policies founded on “the combination of care, order and peace shall equate to progress.”

On the other hand, it is understandable if Filipino citizens and human rights activists have lost hope for the possibility of achieving meaningful progress in reforming the broken police system. Marcos Jr. is the son of Ferdinand Marcos Sr. , an ousted dictator who infamously declared martial law in the country, and Filipinos are still navigating the trauma of the Marcos era 50 years later.

Currently, Marcos Jr. pledges to continue the campaign against illegal drugs but with an emphasis on drug prevention and rehabilitation . Under this new framework, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) implemented a program dubbed “Buhay Ingatan, Droga’y Ayawan (Value Life, Shun Drugs)” which aims to address the root of the problem by suppressing the demand for illegal drugs. According to DILG Secretary Benjamin ‘Benhur’ Abalos Jr., the initiative needs support and solidarity from all sectors of the community in order to ensure its effectiveness.

Simultaneously, Marcos Jr. has no intention to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) on their investigation of the country’s drug war killings. Based on the ICC ’s official website, their purpose “is intended to complement, not to replace, national criminal systems; it prosecutes cases only when States do not are unwilling or unable to do so genuinely.” However, Marcos Jr. stated in an interview that “The ICC, very simply, is supposed to take action when a country no longer has a functioning judiciary… That condition does not exist in the Philippines. So I do not see what role the ICC will play in the Philippines.”

Nearly five months into Marcos Jr.’s administration, the University of the Philippines’ Dahas Project revealed that 152 people have died in anti-drug police raids as of Nov. 30. The report further disclosed that the drug casualties under Marcos Jr. “[are] exceeding the 149 killings recorded during the final six months of the Duterte government. During the first half of the year under Duterte, the average daily rate was 0.8. So far under Marcos, the rate stands at one per day.”

In the Philippines, police officers have repeatedly assumed the roles of prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner. HRW Deputy Director for Asia Phil Robertson points out shortcomings in Marcos Jr.’s campaigns describing that “Using a drug rehabilitation approach means little when police and mystery gunmen are still executing suspected drug users and dealers. Law enforcers should receive clear orders to stop the ‘drug war’ enforcement once and for all.” The only way to effectively mitigate police killings in the Philippines is by abandoning violent and punitive measures against illegal drugs.

Ultimately, despite these obstacles, the yellowed pearl can still brighten. Under new leadership for both the national government and police department, the Philippines may embark on a journey of reconstruction and rehabilitation. In this process, the hope is to finally shed light on the issue of police violence in the country, implement fruitful solutions to combat the problem and advocate for innocent victims who might have felt invisible in their battle against police brutality. Once the light has been restored, the Philippines can finally live up to its billing as the beautiful and pure “Pearl of the Orient Seas”.

Laurinne Jamie Eugenio

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A look at how corruption works in the Philippines

The Philippines is perceived to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Of 180 countries, the Philippines ranked 116 in terms of being least corrupt. This means that the country is almost on the top one-third of the most corrupt countries, based on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International.

According to CPI, the Philippines scored a total of 33 points out of 100. Even as far back as 2012, it has fluctuated around the same CPI score, with the highest score being 38 points in 2014 and the lowest being 33 points in 2021 and 2022. To further contextualize how low it scored, the regional average CPI score for the Asia-Pacific region is 45, with zero as highly corrupt. And of the 31 countries and territories in the region, the Philippines placed 22nd (tied with Mongolia).

It must be noted, however, that CPI measures perceptions of corruption and is not necessarily the reality of the state of corruption. CPI reflects the views of experts or surveys of business people on a number of corrupt behavior in the public sector (such as bribery, diversion of public funds, nepotism in the civil service, use of public office for private gain, etc.). CPI also measures the available mechanisms to prevent corruption, such as enforcement mechanisms, effective prosecution of corrupt officials, red tape, laws on adequate financial disclosure and legal protection for whistleblowers.

These data are taken from other international organizations, such as the World Bank, World Economic Forum, private consulting companies and think tanks.

Of course, measuring actual corruption is quite difficult, especially as it involves under-the-table activities that are only discovered when they are prosecuted, like in the case of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, which was estimated to be up to $10 billion based on now-deleted Guinness World Records and cited as the “biggest robbery of a government.” Nevertheless, there still exists a correlation between corruption and corruption perceptions.

4 Syndromes

Corruption does not come in a single form as well. In a 2007 study, Michael Johnston, a political scientist and professor emeritus at Colgate University in the United States, studied four syndromes (categories) of corruption that were predominant in Asia, citing Japan, Korea, China and the Philippines as prime examples of each category.

The first category is Influence Market Corruption, wherein politicians peddle their influence to provide connections to other people, essentially serving as middlemen. The second category is Elite Cartel Corruption, wherein there exist networks of elites that may collude to protect their economic and political advantages. The third form of corruption is the Official Mogul Corruption, wherein economic moguls (or their clients) are usually the top political figures and face few constraints from the state or their competitors.

Finally, there is the form of corruption that the Philippines is familiar with. Oligarch-and-Clan Corruption is present in countries with major political and economic liberalization and weak institutions. Corruption of this kind has been characterized by Johnston as having “disorderly, sometimes violent scramble among contending oligarchs seeking to parlay personal resources into wealth and power.” Other than the Philippines, corruption in Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka falls under the same syndrome.

In the Philippines, Oligarch-and-Clan Corruption manifests itself in the political system. As Johnston noted, in this kind of corruption, there is difficulty in determining what is public and what is private (i.e., who is a politician and who is an entrepreneur). Oligarchs attempt to use their power for their private benefit or the benefit of their families. From the Aquinos, Binays, Dutertes, Roxases and, most notoriously, the Marcoses, the Philippines is no stranger to political families. In a 2017 chart by Todd Cabrera Lucero, he traced the lineage of Philippine presidents and noted them to be either related by affinity or consanguinity.

Corruption in the Philippines by oligarch families is not unheard of. In fact, the most notable case of corruption in the Philippines was committed by an oligarchic family—the Marcos family. The extent of the wealth stolen by former dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. and his wife has been well-documented. In fact, several Supreme Court cases clearly show the extent of the wealth that the Marcoses had stolen.

In an Oligarch-and-Clan system of corruption, oligarchs will also leverage whatever governmental authority they have to their advantage. Going back to the Marcos example, despite their convictions, the Marcoses have managed to weasel their way back into power, with Ferdinand Marcos Jr. becoming the 17th President despite his conviction for tax violation. Several politicians have also been convicted of graft and corruption (or have at least been hounded by allegations of corruption) and still remain in politics. As observed by Johnston in his article, though Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos are the popular images of corruption in the Philippines, he also noted other entrenched oligarchs throughout the country.

Finally, factions also tend to be “unstable and poorly disciplined.” The term “balimbing” is often thrown around in local politics but, more than that, the Philippines is also familiar with politically-motivated violence and disorder.

All these features are characteristics of Oligarch-and-Clan corruption, where these oligarchic families continue to hold power and politicians exploit their positions to enrich themselves or their families.

Corruption, no matter what kind, needs to be curbed. It results in loss of government money, which could have been used to boost the economy and help ordinary citizens, especially those from the lower income sectors.

According to the 2007 study, the Office of the Ombudsman had, in 1999, pegged losses arising from corruption at P100 million daily, whereas the World Bank estimates the losses at one-fifth of the national government budget. For relatively more updated figures, former Deputy Ombudsman Cyril Ramos claimed that the Philippines had lost a total of P1.4 trillion in 2017 and 2018. These estimates are in line with the World Bank estimates of one-fifth (or 20 percent) of the national budget.

So grave is the adverse effect of corruption that the international community recognized it as an international crime under the United Nations Convention Against Corruption where perpetual disqualification of convicted officials is recommended.

But the question stands: can corruption be eradicated in developing countries like the Philippines? Many Philippine presidents promised to end corruption in their political campaigning, but none has achieved it so far. If the government truly wants to end corruption, it must implement policies directed against corruption, such as lifting the bank secrecy law, prosecuting and punishing corrupt officials, increasing government transparency and more. INQ

This is part of the author’s presentation at DPI 543 Corruption: Finding It and Fixing It course at Harvard Kennedy School, where he is MPA/Mason fellow.

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This article reflects the personal opinion of the author and not the official stand of the Management Association of the Philippines or MAP. He is a member of MAP Tax Committee and MAP Ease of Doing Business Committee, co-chair of Paying Taxes on Ease of Doing Business Task Force and chief tax advisor of Asian Consulting Group. Feedback at [email protected] and [email protected] .

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How to Find a Solution to Corruption in the Philippines

• BusinessMirror
• July 26, 2022
• 2 minute read

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Cause of corruption in the philippines, effects of corruption in the philippines, solution for corruption in the philippines, corruption, morality, and inclusivity, how to stop corruption in the philippines.

Corruption in the Philippines has been an accepted truth for many years. When running for a position, many politicians use the concept of being “clean” to separate themselves from the corrupt ones. However, politicians are just one of the many causes of corruption here in the Philippines.

Commonly associated with the act of giving or asking for money or bribes to win contracts or favors, for abusing political powers and diverting public funds, corruption is a common problem in all countries, developed or developing. One could truly say that corruption is a cancer of society. Indeed, even Pope Francis has called it a “gangrene of the people.”

From the everyday traffic enforcers to established institutions, corruption seems to be a mainstay here in the Philippines. These corrupt practices negatively impact economic growth as it deters investments too. In recent years, the adverse effects of the long-term corruption the country has been experiencing is felt more.

Corruption in the Philippines, most unfortunately, has become a staple issue–one that seems to have no solution. The belief that politics is evil is further enforced by just how widespread it is. But why is corruption so widespread in the country?

The short answer is that there is a severe lack of transparency and accountability in the country. This is further worsened by monopoly on products and services. Coupled together, corruption becomes ever-present from a micro (such as small individual bribes in a private corporation) to macro-level (like the more problematic judicial corruption in the Philippines ).

In fact, if we take a closer look we see many forms of corruption present in the Philippines.

The principal forms of corruption are extortion and bribery. Extortion happens when, say, a public officer explicitly demands or broadly hints for a payment in exchange for something he can grant. Bribery is the other side of the coin, and it is the one who seeks the favor who offers money.  Often this practice is called SOP or “facilitation.” This is achieved through the so-called envelope.

With money and gifts, one can buy deals, contracts and favors. Such payments, for example, can “encourage” a purchasing officer to buy one product instead of another. It can also convince a politician or a bureaucrat to award a contract, or to approve an administrative rule (such as building permits), or to release public funds to fictitious non-governmental organizations.

These bribe-taking incidents are also common among lesser public servants such as traffic enforcers. Many people have repeatedly reported being victimized at least once by a traffic enforcer for “swerving” (incidentally, there is no such offense in the law). When people try to argue their case without this knowledge, most enforcers would relent and say that they would not issue a ticket with the implicit understanding of a bribe. Corruption more easily spreads when there are opportunities, when risk is minimal in comparison to benefits obtained. In many cases, this happens when people have enormous autonomy to approve contracts to the bribe-giver.

Corruption has many adverse effects on a state, most of which are especially felt economically.

First and foremost, it is a known deterrent to various investments because it can negatively affect assessments on the risks and returns associated with an investment. This is the reason we started the project “Integrity for Jobs”, creating Integrity Circles in LGUs that are committed to ethical operations.

Additionally, corruption will direct talent away from productive activities toward rent-seeking activities. More important, while corruption affects the whole economy, it seems to target the poor. It hurts the poor as it introduces costs and benefits that create a bias against the poor; corruption can causally be linked to the worsening of income distribution.

The question of how to prevent corruption in the Philippines is always present, but the best way to answer it is by understanding its root causes.

Corruption flourishes when someone has monopoly power over a product or service and has discretion to decide how much to receive, and where accountability and transparency are weak. Incompetence and corruption are also closely linked together. So, to fight corruption, we—and that includes all of us—must reduce monopoly power, reduce discretion and increase accountability in many ways.

Reducing monopoly power means enabling competition; in this context we are so happy that the Philippines has competition legislation in place and has the Philippine Competition Commission (PCC) to implement the law. However, it would be great if the PCC would be allowed to do its job without court interference, in the interest of removing monopolies/duopolies so that corruption can be properly addressed, reduced and finally eliminated.

Limiting discretion means clarifying the rules of the game and making them available to everyone. This includes putting government contracts and procurement plans online, creating online manuals on what is required to obtain a permit, build a house, start a business and so forth. Making sources like these available deter corruption as it makes it easier to cross check these processes and ensure that everything is in order.

Finally approving the freedom of information (FOI) bills in both Houses of Congress would be another big step in the right direction. We have been talking about the FOI for too long already. In fact, it is arguable that corruption cases, such as Philhealth corruption , could have certainly been avoided if the FOI bill was already approved.

Another example for reducing discretion: Simplify the tax code, make it simpler to understand and thereby reduce discretion of BIR employees. This is how we can lessen corruption from private entities, as well as tax evasion. A clearer set of taxation laws helps people recognize what they need to contribute and potentially where their taxes should go as well.

Enhancing accountability means many things, and creative leaders in the government and the private sector use a remarkable variety of methods. One way to improve accountability is to improve the measurement of performance. Another method is listening and learning from businesses and from citizens. This includes mechanisms for public complaints, but it goes beyond the reporting of individual instances of abuse of corrupt systems.

Accountability is also increased by inviting outsiders to audit, monitor and evaluate. This is exactly the reason we created Integrity Circles as one of the main avenues to address accountability, transparency and integrity. We did this in the Integrity for Jobs (I4J) project, a project co-funded by the European Commission and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. We started with nine LGUs and are happy to announce that 60 LGUs are now part of this endeavor. Allow me to add that Integrity Circles are composed of people working in the LGU, being involved in business, and representing civil society (in many cases the Church). But let’s not forget the press; the media can be and should be an important source of accountability.

What about ethics and morality? Corruption has always been linked to dishonesty and “dirtiness”. In fact, one of the most prevalent effects of corruption in the Philippines is giving fuel to the belief that politics is inherently dirty.

Successful leaders in the government and the private sector must set a good example. As mentioned above, the key to fighting corruption are better systems that provide better incentives for imperfect human beings to perform in the public interest—and to avoid corruption.

Often it is said that corruption is unavoidable, that it is common practice, that those who refuse are ridiculed as “religious” or “scrupulous” or “holier than thou.” As many give in to it, a state of permissiveness arises. Integrity becomes harder to fulfill, especially when one is confronted with issues like career advancement, breaks in life, and earning of income, unless one is firmly rooted on solid principles and has been nurtured in an upright manner.

Corruption cannot be tackled without a strong civic society. The population must have powers to challenge politicians, bureaucrats and erring company managers. Governments must agree to introduce transparency in their operations and allow information to flow freely. The Right to Information Act in India that allows citizens to demand information from bureaucrats has given much hope to activists in India. In the Philippines the Freedom of Information bills are not moving in Congress.

Barriers to participation in the economic life of a society must be removed. Corruption has its losers—the population at large and those who are denied participation in economic activity. When those who are hurt by corruption are allowed to voice their discontent, the chances of a decline in corruption increase.

Considering how ingrained corruption is in the country, finding the answers to this question can be quite difficult.

There are many studies concerning corruption, which tells us that it is a common phenomenon globally. Finding a solution to corruption in the Philippines will undoubtedly take time and it will take both institutional and cultural changes to enact it well. However, on a micro-level, staying morally upright is one of the best ways to combat the ever-growing corruption.

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Here are 10 ways to fight corruption

Robert hunja.

4. It’s not 1999: Use the power of technology to build dynamic and continuous exchanges between key stakeholders: government, citizens, business, civil society groups, media, academia etc.   5. Deliver the goods: Invest in institutions and policy – sustainable improvement in how a government delivers services is only possible if the people in these institutions endorse sensible rules and practices that allow for change while making the best use of tested traditions and legacies – imported models often do not work.   6. Get incentives right: Align anti-corruption measures with market, behavioral, and social forces. Adopting integrity standards is a smart business decision, especially for companies interested in doing business with the World Bank Group and other development partners.   7. Sanctions matter:  Punishing corruption is a vital component of any effective anti-corruption effort.   8. Act globally and locally:  Keep citizens engaged on corruption at local, national, international and global levels – in line with the scale and scope of corruption. Make use of the architecture that has been developed and the platforms that exist for engagement.   9. Build capacity for those who need it most: Countries that  suffer from chronic fragility, conflict and violence– are often the ones that have the fewest internal resources to combat corruption. Identify ways to leverage international resources to support and sustain good governance.   10. Learn by doing: Any good  strategy must be continually monitored  and evaluated to make sure it can be easily adapted as  situations on the ground change. What are other ways we could fight corruption? Tell us in the comments. 

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‘Significant decliner’ PH drops two places in 2021 Corruption Perception Index

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This is AI generated summarization, which may have errors. For context, always refer to the full article.

JUSTICE. Progressive groups call for justice for activists killed during a crackdown in Calabrzon in March 2021.

Rappler file

MANILA, Philippines – The Philippines dropped two places in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index , its second under the coronavirus pandemic. 

The country ranked 117 out of 180 countries and territories in the index, a drop of two places from its rank in 2020 , during the first year of the pandemic. Its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) was 33, a one point dip from the previous year. 

Transparency International is a global organization with national chapters in more than 100 countries and a goal to “end the injustice of corruption” in all fields of life – from business to government. The last two editions of the index, said Transparency International “reveals that corruption levels remain at a standstill worldwide.” 

“Despite commitments on paper, 131 countries have made no significant progress against corruption over the last decade, and this year 27 countries are at a historic low in their CPI score. Meanwhile, human rights and democracy across the world are under assault,” said the organization.

“Ensuring basic rights and freedoms means there is less space for corruption to go unchallenged,” it added. 

Who we’re ranked with 

Right beside the Philippines in the list are Algeria, Egypt, Zambia, and Nepal, all with a 33/100 score in the index. Thirty-three is the Philippines’ lowest score on the index since 2012. 

The CPI is used to measure how corrupt is a country’s public sector, based on experts and businesspeople. The data, in turn, comes from 3 data sources that draws from 13 different corruption surveys and assessments. “These data sources are collected by a variety of reputable institutions, including the World Bank and the World Economic Forum,” said Transparency International. 

The higher your CPI, the better – 100 means a country is perceived to be clean while 0 means you’re seen as highly corrupt. As reference, Denmark, Finland, and New Zealand topped the rankings with a score of 88. South Sudan, in strife despite the signing of a 2018 peace deal, was at the bottom of the list with a score of 11. 

The data they use to measure the CPI, said Transparency International, covers the following: 

• Diversion of public funds
• Officials using their public office for private gain without facing consequences
• Ability of governments to contain corruption in the public sector
• Excessive red tape in the public sector which may increase opportunities for corruption
• Nepotistic appointments in the civil service
• Laws ensuring that public officials must disclose their finances and potential conflicts of interest
• Legal protection for people who report cases of bribery and corruption
• State capture by narrow vested interests
• Access to information on public affairs/government activities

The Philippines, Transparency International noted, was a “significant decliner,” having gone down 5 points since 2014.

“Since the election of Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines has also seen a sharp decline in freedom of association and freedom of expression, making it harder to speak up about corruption. In 2020, it was the country with the second highest number of murdered human rights defenders, with a total of 25 deaths,” said the report. 

In 2021, activists, human rights defenders fight to survive under Duterte

Regional rankings, rise of populism 

Little has changed in the Asia Pacific region from the year prior , with countries getting an average score of 45 – the same as 2020. Asia Pacific is home to 3 countries that recorded among the lowest scores in the list: Cambodia (23), Afghanistan (16) and North Korea (16). The most populous countries or biggest economies – China (45), India (40), Indonesia (38), Pakistan (28), and Bangladesh (26) – also had low scores in the index. 

‘A concerning trend across some of these nations is a weakening of anti-corruption institutions or, in some cases, absence of an agency to coordinate action against corruption,” the organization noted. 

The report also noted that “little has changed” despite the rise of mass movements against corruption in Asia. “Public outrage has instead been co-opted by strongmen – in the form of populist leaders in democratic countries and authoritarians elsewhere,” the organization said. 

“From India to the Philippines (33) to China, such leaders have been able to portray themselves as more effective than state institutions and win mandates to gain and stay in power. However, only a few of these countries have managed to make progress in controlling corruption and these gains remain fragile. Furthermore, in most countries, corruption is spreading through severe restrictions on the very civil liberties – like freedom of association and speech – which allowed people to take to the streets and call for action,” it added. 

LIST: Everything you need to know about the Pharmally pandemic deals scandal

The pandemic has also “opened a door to corruption and repression,” said the organziation, higlighting the importance of checks and balances alongside the rollout of economic recovery plans. “Wrongdoing in emergency procurement has led to price inflating, the theft of medical supplies and sales of counterfeit medicines and materials. This left many citizens more vulnerable to COVID-19 – and almost certainly cost lives,” it said. 

Pandemic protocols, said the report, have also been used as an “excuse” to quiet down criticism or even to adopt “authoritarian approaches,” such as in Papua New Guinea and Fiji, the report said. – Rappler.com 

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Bishop, parish priest allegedly scuffle inside Tondo church

A bishop and a priest were caught in an alleged fight inside an office that was caught on video, but the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) said the incident was a misunderstanding between the two clergymen. According to Chino Gaston’s exclusive report in "24 Oras" on Wednesday, the altercation happened inside the St. Joseph Parish in Gagalingan, Tondo, Manila. 

“Nabigla ako kasi talagang sinakal ako dito na napakahigpit,” said Valeza. (I was surprised because he choked me very tightly.) “Sabi nya sa 'kin, ‘Hindi may decision na, lumayas ka na dito’,” Valeza added. “Parang mayroong nag-petition letter laban sa akin kaya sabi ko bigay niyo sa amin yung petition letter, because it is our right.” 

([The bishop] told me that a decision has already been made and I must leave… I believe someone wrote a petition letter against me and I asked for a copy of the letter because it’s our right.)

CCTV footage also showed  a woman parishioner trying to intervene, with Tobias pushing her away during the scuffle.

GMA Integrated News tried to reach out to Tobias, but the Archdiocese of Manila spoke on his behalf. The archdiocese admitted that there was no proper turnover of the parish which led to the commotion. But it clarified that Tobias was just trying to pacify Valeza and did not mean to harm him. “Ayun na nga parang nagwawala si Father Al. Parang hindi naman siya sinakal, parang pina-pacify siya ni Bishop,  pero the interpretation was sinasakal,” said Fr. Reginald Malicdem, Vicar General, Archdiocese of Manila.

(It seemed that Father Al was in a rage. He was not really choked, but he was being pacified by the Bishop but he interpreted it that he was being choked.) The report said Valeza was ousted from the parish after he failed to comply with Manila Archbishop Cardinal Jose Advincula’s order for him in the past two years to undergo counseling due to his "unstable personality".

“Meron kasing history of defiance si Father Al. Before in-assign ni Cardinal si Father Al doon sa parish, may kundisyon na binigay si Cardinal, you have to undergo some renewal program to help his personality,” said Malicdem. (Father Al has a history of defiance. Before he was assigned to the parish by the Cardinal with the condition that he must undergo some renewal program to help his personality.) The report said Valeza’s removal was not related to the corruption allegations within the Catholic Church. —Vince Ferreras/RF, GMA Integrated News

A shock election result in India humbles Narendra Modi

Instead of strongman rule an uncertain era of coalition government beckons.

Editor’s note (June 5th): This article has been updated with the final election results.

A HEAD OF THE general election that concluded on June 1st Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, was expected to romp home. His charisma, combined with an emphasis on infrastructure development, welfare payments to the poorest and a polarising Hindu nationalism, looked unbeatable. Mr Modi exuded a confidence that matched those predictions. He claimed that his Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) and its allies would win upwards of 400 seats in the 543-seat parliament.

Final results from the vote count on June 4th revealed that Mr Modi’s alliance fell well below that target. The BJP and its allies won 292 seats, compared with the opposition’s 234. The BJP itself lost 63 seats compared with the last election in 2019, ending with a tally of 240, down from 303 in 2019. Crucially, that means that it will rely on its alliance partners to control parliament (272 seats are needed for a majority). The spectacle of the Modi machine faltering has shocked the public, the political world and financial markets: the country’s benchmark share index fell by 6%. 

The electoral surprise follows a deeply divisive campaign. From the start, opposition politicians and other critics had bemoaned the lack of a level playing field in the election. Opposition politicians were jailed on corruption charges that they called politically motivated. Congress, the main opposition party, said its bank accounts were frozen, hindering campaigning. Meanwhile Mr Modi used at times stridently anti-Muslim campaign rhetoric. All of this may have been motivated by worries about diminishing support for the BJP .

The biggest upset turned out to be the giant northern state of Uttar Pradesh ( UP ) in the BJP ’s Hindi-speaking heartland. In 2019 the BJP won 62 of the state’s 80 seats. This time that tally fell to 33, with a vote swing of 9% away from the BJP and its allies. Thirty-seven seats went to the left-wing Samajwadi Party, which is a member of the opposition alliance and focused on the rights of lower-caste groups and religious minorities. The constituencies lost by the BJP include Faizabad, home to the city of Ayodhya, where Mr Modi inaugurated a large new Hindu temple in January. The temple occupies the spot where a mob of Hindu nationalists demolished an ancient mosque in 1992.

The BJP also suffered large losses in Rajasthan and in Maharashtra, a rich industrial state in the west that is home to Mumbai, India’s business capital. The seats it lost there mostly went to Congress, which nearly doubled its national seat count to 99, compared with 52 in 2019.

What went wrong for the BJP ? Its overall vote share across India stayed more or less the same as in 2019, at around 37%. The party also managed to make some small gains in the south and east, where it had not previously been able to make inroads. Yet its losses in critical areas like UP mean that its power in parliament is set to plummet. A sense that the economy is not delivering for ordinary people may have been a big factor: despite strong growth figures, voters cited inflation and unemployment as concerns. The upsets in UP and Rajasthan may reflect worries among members of lower castes that the BJP might roll back affirmative-action policies. The opposition had tapped into such fears, emphasising Mr Modi’s closeness to oligarchs and claiming that the BJP might remove constitutional protections for lower-caste groups and religious minorities. Critically the prime minister’s once all-powerful personal appeal has dimmed and has been unable to make up for these concerns.

For India three big questions now loom. First, can the BJP form a stable government? The answer is, probably. The BJP will still be by far the biggest party in parliament, with more than twice as many seats as Congress. Unless there is a major rebellion within the party, Mr Modi is likely to be able to continue as prime minister. He will have to strike deals with two of his alliance partners, Telugu Desam and Janata Dal (United), two regional parties from the southern state of Andhra Pradesh and the eastern state of Bihar, respectively. Their leaders, Chandrababu Naidu and Nitish Kumar, will now emerge as kingmakers and attempt to extract favours from the BJP on appointments, benefits for their states and policy. Both are already being courted by the opposition alliance. Mr Kumar, in particular, is notorious for switching sides , presenting a particular risk. Yet given the BJP ’s deep pockets, Mr Modi may also be able to entice parties away from the opposition to shore up his alliance.

The second question is how, once it is formed, that government might operate. Mr Modi’s favoured style is strongman executive rule with little debate in the cabinet or parliament. Now he will have to negotiate and make compromises. That will complicate policymaking, particularly a 100-day agenda that was expected to implement a currently stalled set of labour reforms and revamp policies intended to boost the manufacturing industry, including the government’s flagship industrial-subsidy scheme . Mr Modi may now feel he needs to pay more attention to the immediate economic needs of groups whose votes his party failed to win by unleashing a new wave of welfare schemes. A fear of less predictable policymaking, fewer reforms and a welfare splurge explains the stockmarket fall.

The final question is how the surprise result changes India in the long run. The idea of Mr Modi ruling for another ten years is now far less likely given his personal brand has dimmed, with the result that the succession question will loom large. While short-term economic policy making may deteriorate, over time a more open style of politics could be helpful. Many of the changes most needed by India’s economy—including reforms to land acquisition, the power sector and agriculture—require co-operation with state governments and politically important social groups like farmers. India’s reforms in the early-1990s and 2000s were made by coalition governments.

There is a danger that the disappointed leader may choose to double down on his more authoritarian tendencies and amplify his polarising religious rhetoric. All the same the fear that India might inexorably evolve towards a more autocratic form of government has receded: the BJP has failed to win enough seats to ram through constitutional changes; the opposition parties have been given a new lease of life; and debate and dissent will be reinvigorated. That may be the most lasting consequence of the 2024 general election. ■

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