singapore foreign policy essay

The Future of Singapore Foreign Policy: A Coming Grand Strategy Shift?

A closer look at what singapore's grand strategy says about the trajectory of its future approach to foreign and defense policy..

A newly-released book sets out Singapore’s grand strategy at a time of heightening domestic, regional and global challenges for one of the region’s most diplomatically active and militarily capable states.

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Official U.S. Navy file photo of Pacific Griffin 2019

“A small country must seek a maximum number of friends, while maintaining the freedom to be itself as a sovereign and independent nation. Both parts of the equation – a maximum number of friends and freedom to be ourselves - are equally important and inter-related,” Singapore’s late founding father Lee Kuan Yew said at a lecture back in 2009 in reflecting on the enduring fundamentals of Singapore’s foreign policy since its independence in 1965 1 .

Nearly a decade and a half after that speech, that equation would seem more challenging to achieve than ever . Abroad, Singapore’s top officials have warned privately and publicly that the backlash against trade, strains in regional and international institutions and the risks of bifurcation in U.S.-China competition have complicated the environment within which small states operate 2 . At home, Singapore is also preparing for a delayed transition to a new generation of leadership as it confronts issues ranging from the threat of foreign interference to refreshing its social compact 3 . Occassional inflection points, such as Singapore’s so-called “small state debate,” have also highlighted aspects of a public conversation over how the country should move forward 4 .

A new book titled Singapore’s Grand Strategy by scholar Ang Cheng Guan examines the origins, evolution and future prospects of Singapore’s foreign policy approach amid this shifting context . The book argues that Singapore’s multifaceted grand strategy since independence has centered on its survival and independence as a nation-state, which plays out in its management of ties with its neighbors, its approach to major powers as well as its policies around particular realms such as multilateralism, defense and international law 5 . The book traces this over three periods in line with its three prime ministers thus far: the Lee Kuan Yew years (1965-1990); the Goh Chok Tong years (1990-2004); and the Lee Hsien Loong years (since 2004) (see table below for a summary of key chapters and topics covered).

Periods and Select Developments in the Evolution of Singapore’s Grand Strategy

The book confronts a major question: is it possible to discern a grand strategy in Singapore’s foreign policy, and, even if it is, to what extent is it useful in assessing continuity and change in practice? This is a question that transcends Singapore, and there are different views on it even within the country. For example, Bilahari Kausikan, one of Singapore’s top ex-diplomats (whose latest book ASEAN Wonk reviewed here ), has argued that the idea of a grand strategy can downplay the prevalence of incoherence and improvisation in foreign policy practice, where apart from setting certain goals which may themselves change, “[a]ll one can do is keep a distant star in sight even as one tacks hither and thither to avoid treacherous reefs and shoals or to scoop up opportunities that might drift within reach.” 6

Singapore’s Grand Strategy makes the case for what the outlines of a “distant star” might look like for Singapore, looking at principles which it contends have been remarkably consistent since independence . Unlike some accounts that focus singularly on the role of Lee Kuan Yew, the book acknowledges the reality that Singapore’s founding father also had capable figures around him which helped shape the country’s grand strategy as well, such as Goh Keng Swee and S. Rajaratnam. It also usefully situates the argument within the global scholarship on grand strategy, which has been written about by scholars such as Hal Brands, John Lewis Gaddis, William Martel and Nina Silove 7 . This makes it a useful addition to the few books written on Singapore’s external relations to date, including those focused on foreign policy (like Bilveer Singh’s The Vulnerability of Small States Revisited or Michael Leifer’s Coping with Vulnerability ) and defense policy (such as Tim Huxley’s Defending the Lion City ) 8 .

Singapore’s Grand Strategy also offers an important reminder that amid the focus on major power competition today, variables closer to home, like domestic vulnerabilities and bilateral regional relationships, often play a more important role in shaping the country’s approach to the world . Take for instance the close U.S.-Singapore ties we see today , the origins of which began taking shape in the mid-1960s. As the book notes, Singapore’s leaders, some of whom harbored suspicions about Washington as a power and did not foreclose the possibility of closer future ties with China, came to see the United States as a useful contributor to a “non-racial balance of power” in Southeast Asia amid the country’s tensions with larger neighbors Indonesia and Malaysia; external fears that it would become a Chinese satellite state; the regional withdrawal of Britain as the traditional regional security provider; and the need for a stable regional environment for growth 9 .

Similarly, Singapore’s development of an “external economy” in the 1990s and 2000s, which saw it sign a series of free trade pacts and boost foreign investment, was partly rooted in domestic and regional realities . This included the absence of an inner hinterland, the lack of progress in economic ties with neighboring Southeast Asian states with Malaysia as well as the limitations of ASEAN which Singapore’s policymakers had realized early on 10 . For those interested in the future trajectory of Singapore’s foreign policy, the book offers a sense of where some of the key principles of its grand strategy are headed based on some key reference points (see table below).

Select Key Singapore Grand Strategy Documents and Takeaway on Future Implications

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Full speech: Five core principles of Singapore's foreign policy

Minister for Foreign Affairs Vivian Balakrishnan on Monday (July 17) spoke to 200 civil servants about the core principles of Singapore's foreign policy, in light of a recent debate on the matter concerning Singapore's status as a small state and its posture given changing geopolitics. This is the full text of his remarks.

Let me start by saying it is not by coincidence that today we are at peace, we are at peace with all our neighbours, and we have good relations with all the major powers of the world. We owe a debt of gratitude to all our leaders and diplomats, both present and the past, for this happy state of affairs.

But more recently there has been lively debate on Singapore's foreign policy, and I think this debate is especially on the part by retired officials, academics and commentators. But there is one key difference for all the people in the room here tonight. The key difference is that we are serving members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and we in this room have line responsibility for the actual conduct of foreign policy on a daily basis. What this means is that the deliberations today are not a theoretical debate, and this not an academic word spinning exercise on a lecture circuit.

Some questions that have been raised include the following: First, has Singapore overreached? Have we forgotten our permanent status as a small state in the large dangerous world and tough region? Next question, should Singapore adjust our foreign policy posture given the evolving geopolitical situation, or even because of leadership changes in Singapore? And the third question has been, has our insistence on a consistent and principled approach actually limited our flexibility, our ability to adapt to new circumstances?

These are valid questions but I believe we need to go back to first principles. The ultimate objectives for our foreign policy are first, protect our independence and sovereignty, and second, to expand opportunities for our citizens to overcome our geographic limits. These are our ultimate objectives. It's easy to state them, difficult to achieve. The existential challenge is how do we achieve these ultimate objectives, given our circumstances that we will always be a tiny city state in South East Asia and with a multi-racial population.

We must not harbour any illusions about our place in the world. History is replete with examples of failed small states. Our founding Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew always reminded us repeatedly that we have to take the world as it is, and not as we wish it to be. But that does not mean that Mr Lee advocated a 'do nothing, say nothing' posture, or that Singapore should simply surrender to our fates. As Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has recently reminded us, on issues where our national interests are at stake, we must be prepared to 'stand up and be counted'.

Some people have suggested that Singapore lay low and "suffer what we must" as a small state. On the contrary, it is precisely because we are a small state that we have to stand up and be counted when we need to do so. There is no contradiction

between a realistic appreciation of realpolitik and doing whatever it takes to protect our sovereignty, maintain and expand our relevance, and to create political and economic space for ourselves. The founding fathers of our foreign policy - Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Mr S Rajaratnam, and Dr Goh Keng Swee, and their team - understood this acutely and they formulated a few core foreign policy principles. These principles have served us well since independence but are still worth reviewing again.

CORE PRINCIPLES

What are these principles? First, Singapore needs to be a successful and vibrant economy. We need to have stable politics and we need a united society. If you think about it, if we were not successful, if we were not united and if we were not stable, we would be completely irrelevant. All of us in this room have witnessed how delegations of less successful small states are ignored at international meetings. And I am always mindful that foreigners do not speak to us because of the eloquence of our presentations or because we have the highest EQ in the room. We only merit attention because everyone knows that we come from Singapore and Singapore has made a success of itself despite our size, and that we are represented by smart, honest, serious and constructive diplomats.

Second principle- we must not become a vassal state. What this means is that we cannot be bought nor can we be bullied. And it means we must be prepared to defend our territory, our assets and our way of life. This is why we just celebrated 50 years of National Service, and we maintain at great effort a Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) that everybody takes seriously. This does not just depend on the military technology that the SAF possesses, but on the courage and resolve of our soldiers, particularly NS men, to defend what we have and to fight for what we hold dear.

Third, we aim to be a friend to all, but an enemy of none. This is especially so for our immediate neighbourhood where peace and stability in Southeast Asia are absolutely essential. Consequently, Singapore was a founding member of ASEAN and we remain a strong advocate of ASEAN unity and centrality. With the superpowers and other regional powers, our aim is to expand our relationships, both politically and economically, so that we will be relevant to them and they will find our success in their own interest. This delicate balancing act is easier in good and peaceful times, but obviously more difficult when superpowers and regional powers contend with one another. Nevertheless, our basic reflex must be and should be to aim for balance and to promote an inclusive architecture. And we must avoid taking sides, siding with one side against another. While we spare no effort to develop a wide network of relations, these relations must be based on mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and the equality of nation states, regardless of size. Diplomacy is not just about having "friendly" relations at all costs. It is about promoting friendly relations as a way to protect and advance our own important interests. We don't compromise our national interests in order to have good relations. The order matters. So when others make unreasonable demands that hurt or compromise our national interests, we need to state our position and stand our ground in a firm and principled manner.

Fourth, we must promote a global world order governed by the rule of law and international norms. In a system where "might is right" or the laws of the jungle prevail, small states like us have very little chance of survival. Instead, a more promising system for small states, and frankly even a better system overall for the comity of nations, is one that upholds the rights and sovereignty of all states and the rule of law. Bigger powers will still have more influence and say, but bigger powers do not get a free pass to do as they please. In exchange, they benefit from an orderly global environment, and do not have to resort to force or arms in order to get their way.

This is why Singapore has always participated actively at the United Nations, and in the formulation of international regimes and norms. We were a key player in the negotiations for the Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS) in 1982. Professor Tommy Koh still remains with us. And I'm sure that is one of your proudest achievements of your diplomatic career. We play an outsized role at the WTO, and in negotiating a web of free trade agreements at a bilateral and multilateral level. As a country where trade is 3.5 times our GDP, we must stand up for the multilateral, global trading system. And as a port at the narrow straits that ultimately connect the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean, freedom of navigation according to UNCLOS is absolutely critical to us.

More recently, we participated actively in the negotiations for the Global Agreement on Climate Change. I spent five years, several of them as a Ministerial facilitator, for what ultimately resulted in the Paris Agreement. And we did so because we are especially susceptible to climate change as a low-lying island city state. So Singapore must support a rules-based global community, promote the rule of international law and the peaceful resolution of disputes. These are fundamental priorities. They reflect our vital interests, and they affect our position in the world. We must stand up on these issues, and speak with conviction, so that people know our position. And we must actively counter the tactics of other powers who may try to influence our domestic constituencies in order to make our foreign policy better suit their interests.

Ultimately, we must be clear-minded about Singapore's long-term interests, and have the gumption to make our foreign policy decisions accordingly. During the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians were warned of the consequences they would suffer were they to give in to initial Spartan demands. Greek statesman Pericles told his fellow Athenians that if they were frightened into obedience by the initial demands of the Spartans in order to avoid war, then they would instantly have to meet a greater demand. Actually, contained in the Spartans' demand was actually a test of the Athenians' resolve. And if they give in once, they would have to give in again, and ultimately they would be enslaved. On the other hand, a firm refusal would make the Spartans clearly understand that they must treat the Athenians more as equals.

Now I know we live in a very different era and different geopolitical situation, but this lesson, this warning against appeasement remains instructive for Singapore. Whether we are dealing with a key security and economic partner or a large neighbour, Singapore has always stood firm when it comes to our own vital national interests, particularly where it impacts on sovereignty, security and the rule of law.

When the US teenager Michael Fay was sentenced to caning for vandalism, back in 1994, we upheld our court's decision, even under great pressure from the US. In 1968, to take an example further back in our history, we proceeded to hang two Indonesian marines for the bombing of MacDonald House during Konfrontasi. I want all of you to bear in mind the political and strategic circumstances in 1968. We had just been kicked out of Malaysia. The British had just announced their intention to withdraw their forces from Singapore. We were still fighting a communist insurgency. Can you imagine the guts it took for the leaders in 1968, facing such circumstances, to stand up and do the right thing?

These episodes, painful though they may be, established clear red-lines and boundaries. The message was clear: Singapore may be small, but upholding our laws and safeguarding our independence, our citizens' safety and security was of overriding importance. So we cannot afford to ever be intimidated into acquiescence. And the fact that we have consistently demonstrated this in action, put our relationships with neighbours near and far, other states big and large, on a more solid and actually stable footing.

And this is why we speak up whenever basic principles are challenged. When Russian troops took control of Crimea, Singapore strongly objected to the invasion. We expressed our view that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ukraine, and international law, had to be respected.

Which brings me to my fifth principle - that we must be a credible and consistent partner. Our views are taken seriously because countries know that we always take a long term constructive view of the issues. The bigger countries engage Singapore because we do not just tell them what they want to hear. In fact, they try harder to make Singapore take their side precisely because they know that our words mean something. We are honest brokers. We deal fairly and openly with all parties. And there is a sense of strategic predictability, which has enabled Singapore to build up trust and goodwill with our partners over the decades.

And because we are credible, Singapore has been able to play a constructive role in international affairs, at ASEAN and at the UN. We have helped to create platforms for countries with similar interests. For example, in 1992, Singapore helped establish the Forum of Small States. As a group, we've been able to foster common positions and to have a bigger voice at the United Nations. And today, the Forum of Small States has grown to 107 countries, more than half the membership of the UN.

We play a constructive role in the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). We also launched the Global Governance Group (3G), to ensure that the voices of small states are heard, and to serve as a bridge between the G20 and the larger UN membership. Our credibility has won us a seat at the table, even when our relevance is not immediately obvious. We are not the the 20th largest economy in the world, but yet we've just come back from the G20, where we got invited.

You want to take another example even further afield? When we first expressed interest in the Arctic Council, there were many who wondered what role a small equatorial country would play on Arctic matters. But rising sea levels and possibility of new shipping routes impact or potentially impact our position as a transhipment hub, and so it is useful for us to be on the Arctic Council. We have gained observer status in the Arctic Council since May 2013. And we participate actively and contribute our expertise on maritime affairs. And if anyone wants deeper insights into this, speak to MOS Sam Tan who has represented us resolutely and repeatedly on the Arctic Council.

LOOKING BEYOND

Now let's look beyond these five principles. Let me make a few observations. Small states are inconsequential unless we are able to offer a value proposition and make ourselves relevant. Singapore's economic success, our political stability and our social harmony and unity has attracted attention from others to do business with us, and to examine our developmental model. And this is why our diplomats, both those of you in this room as well as the other half of our family overseas, work so hard all over the world to find common ground and to make common cause with other states. And we search for win-win outcomes based on the principles of interdependence. For example, we have participated in major cooperation projects in Suzhou, Tianjin and Chongqing in China, Amaravati in India, Iskandar Malaysia in Johor, the Kendal Industrial Park in Semarang, Indonesia, and the multiple Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Parks. When we embarked on these projects, we contribute novel ideas and we implement our plans on a whole of government basis. And what this means is not just MFA, but our colleagues in all the other Ministries who also contribute whole heartedly into these projects.

Singapore's position today is far more secure than it was at our birth in 1965. But the challenges of small states will be perennial. They cannot be ignored, or wished away. A strong and credible SAF is an important deterrence and foreign policy begins at home. Our diplomacy is only credible, if we are able to maintain a domestic consensus on Singapore's core interests and our foreign policy priorities. And if our politics does not become fractious, or our society divided. We have safeguarded our international position by building a successful economy and a cohesive society; making clear that we always act in Singapore's interests, and not at the behest or the bidding of other states. We have been expanding our relationships with as many countries as possible, on the basis of mutual respect for all states regardless of size and on a win-win interdependence. Upholding international law has been a matter of fundamental principle for us; and being a credible and consistent partner with a long term view has given us a role to play and relevance on the international stage.

Colleagues, geopolitics will become more uncertain and unpredictable. But we need to ensure that our foreign policy positions reflect the changing strategic realities whilst we maintain our freedom, our right to be an independent nation, with our own foreign policy. We must anticipate frictions and difficulties from time to time. But our task is to maintain this whilst keeping in mind the broader relationships. Our approach as a state with independent foreign policy cannot be like that of a private company. Our state interests go far beyond the short term losses or gains of a private company. So, we have to stay nimble, be alert to dangers but seize opportunities.

But we need to also remember that some aspects remain consistent. We need to advance and protect our own interests. We must be prepared to make difficult decisions, weather the storms, if they come. We must be prepared to speak up, and if necessary, disagree with others, without being gratuitously disagreeable. We may always be a small state, but all the more reason we need the courage of our convictions and the resolution to secure the long term interests of all our citizens.

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CO15066 | Lee Kuan Yew and Singapore’s Foreign Policy: A Productive Iconoclasm

25 March 2015

Lee Kuan Yew’s mark on Singapore’s foreign policy is that of applying counterintuitive strategies to improve the island state’s international standing. In retrospect, this has ensured Singapore’s long term viability as a sovereign nation-state.

AS SINGAPORE’S first Prime Minister and the point man in negotiating decolonisation from Britain in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Lee Kuan Yew carries an aura of being one of the pioneers of the island state’s foreign policy. His political personality appears to have been directly mapped onto his steerage of foreign policy: cold unflinching appraisal of one’s circumstances, and self-reliance in designing one’s survival strategies, but only up to the point that external parties can be persuaded that it is in their conjoined interests to partner Singapore in pursuing win-win collaborations.

Lee’s autobiography reveals the profile of an energetic, enterprising young man who was confronted with a series of personal challenges in adapting to material scarcity and political brutality, especially during the Japanese Occupation. This was a key formative influence for foreign policy born of dire geopolitical and geoeconomic circumstances.

Not a normal country

Independent Singapore, bereft of a reliable hinterland constructed by the British empire, was literally perceived by its leaders as an island unto itself, surrounded by similarly decolonised but territorially larger nation-states. The initial decade of transiting from colony to independence from 1959 to 1965 was traumatic on a national level. By his own admission, Lee’s initial view that ‘island states were political jokes’ had to be reversed to achieve the impossible. His strategy for a sound foreign policy was to think unconventionally, and in word, to act as an iconoclast – a leader who sets the pace for his followers with a knack for the counterintuitive.

In his own reflections in 2011, following three decades as Prime Minister, then Senior Minister and Minister Mentor, he emphasised the need for Singaporeans to grasp foreign affairs: ‘I’m concerned that Singaporeans assume that Singapore is a normal country, that we can be compared to Denmark or New Zealand or even Liechtenstein or Luxembourg. We are in a turbulent region. If we do not have a government and a people that differentiate themselves from the rest of the neighbourhood in a positive way and can defend ourselves, Singapore will cease to exist. It’s not the view of just my generation but also those who have come into Defence, Foreign Affairs Ministries and those who have studied the position’.

Already in 1966, he was urging students at the then University of Singapore to aspire to bigger dreams in their careers. This would add value to Singapore by enticing the world to take interest in its industry, development, standards of living and sometimes, sheer intellectual insights. He went on to argue that once the great powers and Asian states planted intellectual, scientific and commercial stakes in the island state, Singapore’s fundamental security would be assured indefinitely.

In this sense, Lee shared with his friend and PAP comrade, S. Rajaratnam, an affinity for global imagination – Singapore could literally treat the world as its hinterland if its people and their technical skills were capable of servicing the world’s niche requirements in banking, telecommunications, R&D and indeed diplomacy.

Lee the Philosopher of Foreign Policy

As Lee would have it, international affairs were all about leadership and the making of either good or bad decisions. In a less publicised speech at the Australian Institute of International Affairs, he set out the view that ‘“International Affairs” is as old as the subject of man…[T]he essential quality of man has never altered. You can read the Peloponnesian Wars, you can read the Three Kingdoms of the Chinese classics, and there’s nothing new which a human situation can devise. The motivations of human behaviour have always been there. The manifestations of the motivations whether they are greed, envy, ambition, greatness, generosity, charity, inevitably end in a conflict of power positions. And how that conflict is resolved depends upon the accident of the individuals in charge of a particular tribe or nation at a given time.’

On hindsight, this was more than a fitting epitaph for the first prime minister of the Republic of Singapore. It was a statement of a belief in the possibilities of forging one’s own destiny. We call it today the Singapore Dream of peace and stability, folded into the SG50 milestone of progress and prosperity. Singapore’s foreign policy under Lee’s astute sense was certainly man-made.

Lee’s approach to foreign policy has always been guided by a quixotic mixture of principles of anxiety, nationalistic zeal, and an earnest attempt to dovetail the national interest with some universalist principles circulating in the international order. These compass points have not been clearly prioritised for ostensible reasons of bureaucratic and diplomatic flexibility, and therein lies Lee’s talent for discerning the best path forward for Singaporean foreign policy.

Correct outcomes, not political correctness

Although Lee has never publicly referred to his role in forcing a decision on any particular foreign policy issue, he has never shied away from suggesting that his personal diplomatic heft has enabled him to convey national messages directly to his opposite numbers in foreign governments. The tone of his remarks on relations with China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the United States and Vietnam in his memoirs suggests that his presence as the authoritative decision maker mattered to foreign perceptions of who could effectively steer policies for Singapore.

As Singaporeans and the world mourn the passing of a giant of twentieth century Asian politics, we will do well not to forget that Lee Kuan Yew was never one to entertain political correctness. He was more concerned with producing correct outcomes even amidst the vagaries in international politics. Perhaps the final reflection should be reserved for Lee’s views on something as controversial as the US intervention in Iraq early in the 21st century.

Despite American dismay over their post-invasion quagmire in rebuilding Iraq in 2003-2012, Lee encouraged the US to complete their mission, notwithstanding his government’s initial disapproval of George W. Bush’s invasion plans, since fundamentalist Islamic terrorists in Southeast Asia and elsewhere would take heart from an outright American withdrawal.

The erstwhile US Ambassador to Singapore conceded a grudging respect for Lee’s sagacity in a confidential cable in 2006 under the subheading ‘Welcoming the United States, but not our politics’. This is Lee Kuan Yew the successful iconoclast.

About the Author

Alan Chong is Associate Professor of International Relations at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He has just published a study in an academic journal comparing Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad as exemplars of authoritative decision makers in foreign policy. This is the third in the series on the Legacy of Lee Kuan Yew.

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Respect for National Sovereignty

Singapore seeks to develop a wide network of friends based on the principles of mutual respect, sovereignty and the equality of states, regardless of size. We aim to be a friend to all and an enemy to none, but will uphold our principles and defend our national interests as an independent and sovereign nation.

Support for Rules-based Multilateral System

Singapore’s survival is best served by a rules-based multilateral system, which upholds the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence. Adherence to international law offers better protection for small states like Singapore. Singapore therefore strongly supports core principles such as the non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, and non-interference in a country’s internal affairs, all of which are enshrined in the UN Charter. Similarly, we must speak out against violations of such principles when they occur.

Building Overlapping Circles of Friends

Singapore actively engages and seeks to make common cause with as many countries as possible to forge overlapping circles of friends, so that they all have a stake in the peace, stability and development of our region, and can create a stable balance of power in the Asia Pacific. This provides small countries like Singapore with more room for manoeuvre.

We start with building an open, inclusive and rules-based ASEAN-centred regional architecture.

Beyond our immediate neighbourhood, Singapore works with other partners around the world to advance our shared interests and address common challenges. For example, we co-founded the Forum of Small States (FOSS), which has proven to be a valuable platform for informal exchange and mutual support, capacity-building and technical cooperation among its 108 small state members.

Creating Political and Economic Space for Singapore

As a small country, Singapore is vulnerable to international developments and trends. For us to maintain our place in the world, we must continue to be successful as a country and economy. We also need to make ourselves relevant to the world by identifying new opportunities and areas of cooperation, sharing our experiences and providing capacity building for developing countries.

Hence, Singapore must remain nimble and adaptable to global trends and developments, and strive to be an active and constructive player internationally.

Rallying Domestic Support and Unity for Our Foreign Policy Decisions

Foreign policy begins at home. Singapore’s foreign policy is for Singaporeans to decide.

Our first and most important line of defence is a vigilant and well-informed citizenry that understands the geostrategic forces at play and our national interests.

Building Up Our Own Defence

Singapore’s existence as an independent and sovereign country is not guaranteed and cannot be taken for granted. The Ukraine-Russia war and rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait have shown that military conflicts may still arise. We must never lose the ability to defend ourselves. We cannot and should not outsource our national security and be dependent on others for our protection.

It is therefore crucial that Singapore maintains a strong and credible armed force to serve as a vital bulwark in our external relations and foreign policy.

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What is Singapore’s Foreign Policy?

Topic of Study [For H1 History Students]: Section B: Essay Writing Theme II: Cold War in Asia [1945-1991] – Singapore’s Foreign Policy during the Cold War

“We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” — Lord Palmerston, House of Commons, 1 March 1848

What is a ‘foreign policy’? It refers to a set of strategies employed by the state to protect its domestic and international interests. A ‘foreign policy’ affects the state’s interactions with other states. Ultimately, the policy is implemented to safeguard national interests.

Foreign policies can involve the use of aggressive (military force) or non-coercive means (diplomacy). Also, these policies can also be carried out through engagement with other states in addressing a common challenge, such as regional security threats.

Singapore’s foreign policy: A summary There are two key foreign policy theories that are covered the A Level H1 History syllabus: Survival and Realism.

1. Survival One key ideology that shaped Singapore’s foreign policy is the concept of survival. Following the sudden Separation that led to Singapore’s independence in 1965, the government had to deal with political threats and economic challenges.

Amidst the Cold War context, the rise of Communist insurgencies was a common concern that affected the political stability of Southeast Asian nations. In Singapore, the government was challenged by the Barisan Sosialis .

As for the economic viewpoint, the People’s Action Party (PAP) took the first step towards modernisation by embarking on state-led industrialisation. In particular, the government aimed to establish strong trade ties with other countries, including Great Powers like the USA.

The historical roots of Singapore’s political ideology of survival lie in the events following the country’s ejection from Malaysia in 1965. Survival in both political and economic terms for newly independent Singapore was a very real issue for the PAP Government. The government in the period 1965-67 was involved in an intense, often violent struggle, for power against the Barisan Sosialis and the communists. …In terms of economic policy, the survival ideology is linked with the concept of the “global city” first proposed in 1972 by Singapore Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam. This concept suggests that if Singapore is to survive, it must establish a relationship of interdependence in the rapidly expanding global economic system . An excerpt from “SINGAPORE: Reconciling the Survival Ideology with the Achievement Concept” by Lee Boon-Hiok [from the Southeast Asian Affairs 1978 ]

2. Realism Realism describes the notion that states should act according to their best interest. From a realist’s perspective, the world is in a constant state of anarchy. Individuals are inherently egoistic and will do anything to pursue power. As such, states should protect their interests through means like the development of an independent defence force as well as the conduct of diplomacy.

Singapore’s interpretation of such a concept and practice was spelled out by Lee Hsien Loong in the same speech as follows: This policy depends on the competing interests of several big powers in a region, rather than on linking the nation’s fortunes to one overbearing partner. The big powers can keep one another in check and will prevent any one of them from dominating the entire region, and so allow small states to survive in the interstices between them. It is not a foolproof method, as the equilibrium is a dynamic and possibly unstable one, and may be upset if one power changes course and withdraws. Nor can a small state manipulate the big powers with impunity. The most it can hope to do is to influence their policies in its favour. An excerpt from “ Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability ” by Michael Leifer

More importantly, Singapore did not rely solely on the goodwill of external powers to manage security challenges. Its emphasis on regionalism and multilateralism was also another vital channel, seen in terms of Singapore’s diplomatic role in ASEAN and the United Nations.

Through Singapore’s consistent lobbying efforts at the United Nations General Assembly, the government was successful in publicise the Cambodian conflict at the international level.

Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs distinguished itself as a diplomatic dynamo during the course of the Cambodian conflict. The advocacy, lobbying and drafting skills of its officials were employed to great effect within the United Nations against Vietnam and its client government in Phnom Penh. For example, the declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea held at the UN in 1981 was drafted by Singapore’s delegation. Singapore’s diplomatic success was accomplished through playing on the political sensibilities of states that had been alarmed by the example of a government despatching its army across an internationally recognised boundary to remove an incumbent administration recognised at the United Nations and replacing it with another of its own manufacture. An excerpt from “ Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability ” by Michael Leifer

What can we learn from this article? Consider the following question: – Assess the view that Singapore’s foreign policy was largely shaped by Realism.

Join our JC History Tuition and learn more about Singapore’s foreign policy in response to the Second and Third Indochina Wars.

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Foreign Policy

Singapore's foreign policy.

The fundamental principles of Singapore’s foreign policy are as follows:

As a small state, Singapore has no illusions about the state of our region or the world.
Singapore must always maintain a credible and deterrent military defence as the fundamental underpinning for an effective foreign policy;
Singapore must promote and work for good relations with our immediate neighbours in all spheres;
Singapore stands by its friends who have stood with it in times of need;
Singapore is fully committed to the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN);
Singapore will work to maintain a secure and peaceful environment in and around Southeast Asia, especially the Asia Pacific region;
Singapore will continue to work for the maintenance of a free and open multilateral trading system;
Singapore is ready to trade with any state for mutual benefit and maintain an open market economy;
Singapore will support and be active in international organisations such as the United Nations (UN).

Singapore-Thailand Relations

Singapore and Thailand enjoy warm and friendly relations. Bilateral cooperation covers a wide range of areas from economic to defence, education and tourism. Both countries are committed to developing the Singapore-Thailand Enhanced Partnership (STEP) Programme. STEP enables the two countries to leverage on each others’ strengths and harness the synergies between Singapore and Thailand for mutual benefits. Singapore remains a major trading partner as well as a leading investor in Thailand. Bilateral co-operation in education is excellent and Singapore provides various scholarships at secondary, pre-university and tertiary levels for Thai students to study in Singapore. At a regional level, Singapore and Thailand work closely in many regional and multilateral fora including ASEAN, APEC and ASEM.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a ministry of the Government of Singapore responsible for conducting and managing diplomatic relations between Singapore and other countries and regions.

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World Scientific Series on Singapore's 50 Years of Nation-Building

Perspectives on the security of singapore.

Edited by:
Barry Desker ( S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU, Singapore ) and
Cheng Guan Ang ( S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU, Singapore )
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Description
Supplementary

Perspectives on the Security of Singapore: The First 50 Years explores the security of Singapore in the last 50 years and its possible trajectories into the future. This volume brings together the diverse perspectives of a team of academics with different expertise, ranging from history to political science to security studies with a common interest in Singapore. The book is further boosted by the recollections of key civil servants involved with foreign affairs and defence, such as S R Nathan, Peter Ho, Bilahari Kausikan and Philip Yeo.

Sample Chapter(s) Chapter 1: Introduction (72 KB)

Introduction
Singapore's Conception of Security (Ang Cheng Guan)
National Security and Singapore: An Assessment (Norman Vasu and Bernard Loo)
Deliquescent Security Threats: Singapore in the Era of Hyper-Globalisation (Alan Chong)
Singapore and Global Governance: Free-Rider or Responsible Stakeholder? (Tan See Seng)
The Challenge of Strategic Intelligence for the Singapore Armed Forces (Kwa Chong Guan)
Desecuritisation and after Desecuritisation: The Water Issue in Singapore–Malaysia Relations (S R Joey Long)
Singapore's Security in the Context of Singapore–Malaysia–Indonesia Relations (Bilveer Singh)
Singapore's Relations with Malaysia and Indonesia (Theophilus Kwek and Joseph Chinyong Liow)
International Missions of the Singapore Armed Forces: How Far Would You Go? (Katie Tan and Ong Weichong)
Why the FPDA Still Matters to Singapore (Ralf Emmers)
Singapore in ASEAN's Quest toward a Security Community (Mely Caballero-Anthony)
Singapore and the Great Powers (Khong Yuen Foong)
The Changing Terrorist Threat Landscape in Singapore (Rohan Gunaratna)
Managing Religious Diversity in Singapore: Context and Challenges (Mohammad Alami Musa and Mohamed Imran Mohamed Taib)
Personal Reminiscences
Safeguarding Singapore's Security: Defence and Diplomacy (S R Nathan)
Organising for National Security — The Singapore Experience (Peter Ho)
Pragmatic Adaptation, Not Grand Strategy, Shaped Singapore Foreign Policy (Bilahari Kausikan)
Dr Goh Keng Swee and the Building of Singapore's Defence Industrial Capability (Philip Yeo)
Conclusion: Strategic Certainties Facing Singapore in 2065 (Barry Desker)
This is possibly the first scholarly collective effort/book on the subject of security of Singapore
The contributors are academics within (and associated with) the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), the only school cum think-tank that specialises in security issues in Singapore
The contributors include former top civil servants who played a significant role in the shaping and conduct of Singapore's foreign and defence policies

Type on 03/03/2015

Updated contents on 14/05/15

Updated price on 21/05/15

Updated contents on 15/06/15

Updated pp, SC & MBK S$ price on 18/06/15

Book received on 22/7/2015

Updated contents & pp on 23/7/2015

FRONT MATTER

Barry Desker and
Cheng Guan Ang
Pages: i–xvi

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_fmatter

About the Contributors
Pages: xvii–xxi

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0001

This collection of essays is specially prepared to mark the 50 th anniversary of Singapore's independence. The unifying theme is “Singapore's Security” in its broadest sense and dimension. Written by scholars and associates of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), the book explores security issues and concerns of the nation-state over the last 50 years with a closing chapter that looks into the future. The book showcases the range of expertise in the School which at its inception as the then-Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) in July 1996 was funded by the Ministry of Defence with the aim of developing proficiency in understanding the evolving conception of security and its implications for Singapore in the post-Cold War world. IDSS has, since January 2007, evolved into the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies but remains an integral component of the School. The School is named after Singapore's first Foreign Minister, Mr S. Rajaratnam, and appropriately so, given that foreign policy and defence are very much two sides of the same coin…

Chapter 1: Singapore's Conception of Security

Pages: 3–19

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0002

This chapter attempts to describe and contextualise Singapore's conception of security as articulated by its political leadership from 1965 to the present based on a number of key speeches, parliamentary debates and writings over the last 50 years which, in the view of this author, are worth revisiting and remembering. It shows that Singapore's security as conceived by its political leaders has been consistent throughout the last 50 years. From very early on, their understanding of the concept of security has been comprehensive and not narrowly conceived as just physical or territorial security and the use of force, although in Singapore's formative years, that was the immediate concern…

Chapter 2: National Security and Singapore: An Assessment

Norman Vasu and
Bernard Loo
Pages: 21–43

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0003

Understanding National Security
Singapore's National Security: Drivers and Passengers of Change
Assessing Singapore's National Security

Chapter 3: Deliquescent Security Threats: Singapore in the Era of Hyper-Globalisation

Pages: 45–64

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0004

Singapore's security paradigm in the 2000s is an experiment in progress. Pre-existing doctrines expressed as extensions of deterrence or of locking down homeland security are increasingly anachronistic, even if the government of Singapore maintains that they are not irrelevant. Instead, this chapter proposes that Singapore has entered the phase of deliquescent security. What is to be protected and the source of the threat are both mobile and existential, even embedded in the design of taken-for-granted flows of labour, tourism, trade, finance and information. The object and referent of security under globalising conditions are therefore liquid; they dissolve, or exist in a latent state, until ignited by a confluence of flows that challenge the very essence of a Singaporean national identity. This is what I label the deliquescent security paradigm. Incidentally, it can only come into existence following the cumulative effects of conventional external security and domestic security against revolutionary subversion. Conventional external security presupposes a visible and deterrable enemy, armed with tanks, aircraft and a recognisable army threatening to cross one's borders with impunity. If the enemy attacks one's territory with non-uniformed “volunteers” and agents provocateur hidden in legitimate political parties and other social organisations, then deterrence fails to address the root of the threat. As Richard Clutterbuck put it in one of the earliest studies of Singapore's domestic security contextualised during the Cold War, the threat was revolution from within. It was a Leninist stratagem: “an attempt to gain control of student and labour organisations and of a leading political party…; the process being assisted by strikes, student demonstrations and riots.” Clutterbuck also correctly appraised Singapore's mostly urban context for domestic security: “City people live from week to week, relying for next week's food on work, wages and a continuing system of wholesale and retail distribution; they also fear the failure of public services, such as water, sewerage, electric power and transport; they therefore have a vested interest in law and order; faced by chaos and a choice between two claimants to power, they will rally to the one which gives them most confidence of a return to normal life — as the Bolsheviks did in Petrograd in 1917.” The point about urban destabilisation is relevant to this chapter in the sense that by 1965, given the successive waves of urbanisation of the transient population fostered by British colonialism, the nascent Singaporean population has gradually evolved the desire for a multifaceted security that transcends the mere protection of borders. Even during the Cold War, as Clutterbuck pointedly suggests, there was already a yearning for system security, supply security, occupational security and governmental legitimacy. The communists were a viable rival to the People's Action Party (PAP) government insofar as they were promising the mostly urban population stability in their lives and a secure identity in living in a modernising city-state.

Chapter 4: Singapore and Global Governance: Free-Rider or Responsible Stakeholder?

See Seng Tan
Pages: 65–86

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0005

The notion that Singapore “punches above its weight” has become commonplace. Reportedly boasting the highest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the world today and projected to maintain its pole position up till 2050, Singapore's economic success and its strategies to ensure its success have invited accusations that the city-state has continually reaped the benefits of global governance but contributed little to it. For example, Singapore's ostensible efforts at “leapfrogging” and transcending the ASEAN region — its “dual track” approach of negotiating multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) is the offending instance in question — have led critics to dismiss Singapore as a “free-rider” in global governance. A similar charge has been made concerning “Singaporisation,” a convenient label for critics in regard to the form of “assertive regionalism” that has purportedly been adopted by pro-independence parties in the Basque and Catalan parts of Spain. Fairly or otherwise, some Europeanists see such enthusiasm for the (as they see it) Singapore model of preferential economic regionalism as evidence of the lack of “real political responsibility” in post-crisis Europe…

Chapter 5: The Challenge of Strategic Intelligence for the Singapore Armed Forces

Chong Guan Kwa
Pages: 87–102

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0006

Singapore was born by constitutional fiat on 9 August 1965 as a defenceless city-state vulnerable to external predatory powers in a rough neighbourhood beset by wars and communist insurgencies. Facing the prospect of the withdrawal of British armed forces from east of Suez, particularly from their bases in Singapore, and uneasy at the prospect of being dependent on the Malaysian armed forces for its protection, Singapore embarked on an accelerated build-up of its own armed capability, with the help of Israeli advisers and experts from Commonwealth countries. That build-up, including the enlistment and training of National Servicemen to provide the mind and muscle of the nascent army, proceeded at a sharp pace under the leadership of Dr Goh Keng Swee, the first Defence Minister…

Chapter 6: Desecuritisation and after Desecuritisation: The Water Issue in Singapore–Malaysia Relations

S. R. Joey Long
Pages: 103–120

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0007

On 16 November 1970, the Singaporean government dispatched a sharply worded memorandum to the Malaysian government. The diplomatic note remonstrated against Kuala Lumpur's delay in informing the Asian Development Bank (ADB) that Malaysia would back Singapore's plans to enhance the capacity of the reservoirs in Johor to supply more water to the island. Singapore had in April 1968 sought the bank's support to develop a reservoir in Kranji and to expand the water works in Johor. Under the terms of the 1962 water agreement signed between the government of Johor and the city council of Singapore (an arrangement incidentally guaranteed by the 1965 Separation Agreement), Singapore was entitled to extract up to 250 million gallons of raw water daily from the Johor River. By the late 1960s, Singapore was drawing some 30 million gallons per day from the Johor river, and planned to extract more to meet the needs of its people and expanding industries. A loan from the ADB would permit Singapore to expand the existing waterworks in Johor and pump more water to the island. But the bank would only agree to release the funds if the Malaysian government endorsed the proposal. Dragging their feet, the federal and Johor authorities in Malaysia were ostensibly “disinclined to let Singapore make off with water that the developments round Johore Bahru might need”. The Malaysians were also miffed that the Singaporean government had apparently submitted its plans to the ADB without first consulting them…

Chapter 7: Singapore's Security in the Context of Singapore–Malaysia–Indonesia Relations

Bilveer Singh
Pages: 121–134

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0008

Ties That Bind and Unbind — The Key Determinants
Challenges in the Singapore–Malaysia–Indonesia Relationships
Singapore–Malaysia–Indonesia: The Elusive Peace Dividend and Rising Insecurity
The Road Ahead

Chapter 8: Singapore's Relations with Malaysia and Indonesia

Theophilus Kwek and
Joseph Chinyong Liow
Pages: 135–151

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0009

The Malay word for “neighbourhood”, kejiranan , not only implies a geographical “quarter” or “precinct” but also, in a more communal sense, an interdependent society of individuals and interests. Singapore's immediate neighbourhood, held together by both history and proximity, contains three states whose relations have been complex at best, and contentious at worst. From the — political and personal — tumult of separation, through the violence of Konfrontasi and the trials of early cooperation, the intrigues which have shaped the attitudes of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia toward each other are often murky to their own inhabitants and impervious to the outside observer. Yet, in addition to hosting the world's highest cargo traffic in their ports, the three form the core of many new security initiatives in the Asian-Pacific region, and front a region of increasing political salience in today's world…

Chapter 9: International Missions of the Singapore Armed Forces: How Far Would You Go?

Katie Tan and
Weichong Ong
Pages: 153–172

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0010

Deploying around the World to Protect Our Home
Challenges in Sustaining Commitment to OOTW
International Missions — “Not a Soldier's Job, but Only a Soldier Can Do It”
HADR: Finding a Regional Response and Niche Role
Trends Analysis

Chapter 10: Why the FPDA Still Matters to Singapore

Ralf Emmers
Pages: 173–187

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0011

History of the FPDA
The FPDA's Continuing Relevance to Singapore

Chapter 11: Singapore in ASEAN's Quest toward a Security Community

Mely Caballero-Anthony
Pages: 189–205

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0012

Singapore in ASEAN's Quest of Building Regional Peace and Security
ASEAN's Turn to Multilateralism: Charting Relations with Major Powers
Moving ASEAN Political and Security Cooperation to a Higher Plane

Chapter 12: Singapore and the Great Powers

Yuen Foong Khong
Pages: 207–228

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0013

A common refrain in Singapore's foreign policy towards the great powers — confined to the United States (US) and China in this essay — is that it does not want to choose between them. Singapore is far from alone in articulating this strategic preference: many of its ASEAN and Asian-Pacific neighbours, including US military allies such as Australia and Thailand, have voiced similar inclinations. This essay seeks to probe a little deeper into the “not wanting to choose” discourse to make three related points. First, I argue that Singapore has already chosen; it made a choice early on — in favour of the US — soon after the British withdrawal East of Suez. Second, I suggest that that choice has served Singapore well. Third, I argue that the dilemma Singapore faces after 15 years of a very successful foreign policy (vis-à-vis the great powers) is whether to stick with America, or gravitate towards China, given the shifting power distribution in Asia. Singapore's actions in recent years suggest that it continues to strongly favour America when it comes to military security; on the economic and political-diplomatic fronts, however, it appears to be more even-handed in engaging the US and China. We conclude with an observation: the fact that Singapore is a Chinese-majority state, constrains, rather than facilitates, how far it can move towards the China bandwagon.

Chapter 13: The Changing Terrorist Threat Landscape in Singapore

Rohan Gunaratna
Pages: 229–252

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0014

The Context
Al-Qaeda-Centric Threat — Phase One
Al-Qaeda-Centric Threat — Phase Two
IS-Centric Threat — Phase One
IS-Centric Threat — Phase Two
State and Societal Response

Chapter 14: Managing Religious Diversity in Singapore: Context and Challenges

Mohammad Alami Musa and
Mohamed Imran Mohamed Taib
Pages: 253–276

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0015

The Early Years, 1965–1980: Religion as a Partner in Building Social Cohesion
The Period of Religious Resurgence, 1980–1990: Religion as Potential Conflict
Rapid Globalising Phase, 1990s Onwards: Economic Imperatives as a Driving Force
Post-9/11: Global Conflicts and Security Issues

Part 2: Personal Reminiscences

Chapter 15: safeguarding singapore's security: defence and diplomacy.

S. R. Nathan
Pages: 279–283

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0016

Singapore has enjoyed peace and security the past 50 years of its independence. From being virtually defenceless when we separated from Malaysia on 9 August 1965, Singapore has been able to build its armed forces comprising a full-fledged Army, seagoing Navy and modern air force, comprising 45,000 to 50,000 well-trained and equipped soldiers, sailors and airmen, with over 250,000 reservists who can be mobilised in short order. Looking back at the growth and development of our small island nation from a third world entrepot port to a first world global trading hub and financial centre, I believe we succeeded in doing so because we had been able to build up our defence capability in tandem with our economic development, while pursuing a foreign policy that sought a maximum number of friends and maintaining the freedom to be ourselves as an independent nation…

Chapter 16: Organising for National Security — The Singapore Experience

Pages: 285–294

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0017

Pre-Independence Focus on Internal Security
Post-Independence Focus on External Defence
The Early Phase — The Ministry of Interior and Defence
The British Military Withdrawal
MID No Longer Fit for Purpose
Beyond Military Defence — Total Defence
The Whole-of-Government Approach in National Security
Beyond Total Defence — Total Security
Challenges of the Whole-of-Government Approach
The Rise of Transnational Terrorism
Organising to Confront Transnational Terrorism
Organisation for National Security with the Rise of Transnational Terrorism
Organising for Black Swans
Establishing the National Security Coordination Secretariat
Resilience and Strategic Surprise
The Use of Technology to Enhance Organisation

Chapter 17: Pragmatic Adaptation, Not Grand Strategy, Shaped Singapore Foreign Policy

Bilahari Kausikan
Pages: 295–307

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0018

Seeking Security through Diplomacy
Cold War Conflict and Diplomacy
Absurd Diplomacy
Regional Security Approaches
Significance of ARF
SEANWFZ and Right of Reservation
Post-Cold War Security Challenge
A Symmetrical Naval Equation
Impact of China's Re-Emergence

Chapter 18: Dr Goh Keng Swee and the Building of Singapore's Defence Industrial Capability: A First-Person Account of the Early Challenges in Building the Republic's Defence Industry

Pages: 309–316

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0019

I have largely been associated with the Economic Development Board (EDB). Few people, however, know that I actually began my career with the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF). In this, I am very fortunate to have worked with Dr Goh Keng Swee, the man who built the economy and the defence capability of Singapore. Indeed, it all started with Dr Goh. A tribute by the Defence Science Organisation (DSO) in 2002 describes him accurately as the architect, engineer and hand-craftsman of modern Singapore. He transformed Singapore of the 1960s into today's gleaming, ultra-modern capital of industry, finance, commerce and communications. But Dr Goh also felt that economic confidence and progress were built on a nation's ability to provide security and defence for its people. He projected that future outcomes would depend on the capability of a national service (NS) force, well-trained and equipped with the most advanced technology of the day. Starting from scratch, Dr Goh built an army, navy and air force capable of achieving national security and deterring a wide range of threats. This was the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF)…

Conclusion: Strategic Certainties Facing Singapore in 2065

Barry Desker
Pages: 317–329

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_0020

This article attempts to look at Singapore in 2065, after 100 years of independence. Crystal ball gazing is a testing task. Our projections of trends even five or 10 years into the future involve weighing the influence of different alternative courses of action and an assessment of the most likely developments. The further down the road we go, the more we move away from describing the world as we know it today. What is striking is how much our imaginations are prisoners of the present. Even though we want to look beyond today and aim to conceive of a world which will unfold in the years ahead, we are shaped by our memories and experiences. Linear projections are common. We struggle to grapple with the possibility of discontinuities, of changes which break existing moulds. At the same time, our natural optimism leads us to plot a future which highlights Singapore's role at the forefront of nation-states, a beacon of economic growth, social development and political stability. When we discuss the possibility of changes, the tendency is to think in terms of incremental shifts. Few consider the possibility of paradigm shifts, which should not be ignored.

BACK MATTER

https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814689342_bmatter

World Scientific Series on Singapore's 50 Years of Nation-Building: Forthcoming (continued from page ii)

Ambassador Barry Desker is Distinguished Fellow and Bakrie Professor of Southeast Asia Policy at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is a Member of the Presidential Council for Minority Rights, Singapore and a Member of the Board of Directors of the Lee Kuan Yew Exchange Fellowship. He was CEO of the Singapore Trade Development Board (1994–2000) and was Singapore's Ambassador to Indonesia (1986–1993). He was the founding Dean of RSIS (2007–2014) and was Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (2000–2014). A President's Scholar, he was educated at the University of Singapore, University of London and Cornell University. He was awarded an honorary doctorate by Warwick University in 2012 and by the University of Exeter in 2013.

Ang Cheng Guan is presently Head of Graduate Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is the author of Vietnamese Communist Relations with China and the Second Indo-China Conflict, 1956–1962 (Jefferson: MacFarland, 1997; reprinted in paperback, 2012); The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists' Perspective (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002; paperback 2006); its sequel, Ending the Vietnam War: The Vietnamese Communists' Perspective (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004; paperback 2006); Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War (London: Routledge, 2010); Lee Kuan Yew's Strategic Thought (London: Routledge, 2013); and Singapore, ASEAN and the Cambodia Conflict, 1979–1991 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2013). He was a Gerald R Ford Foundation Research Grant Award recipient (Fall 2005), Fulbright Singapore Researcher award recipient (2006–2007) and a Woodrow Wilson Public Policy Scholar (2006–2007). He is currently working on two book projects — Southeast Asia and the Cold War, 1945–1991: An International History and its sequel, Southeast Asia and the Post-Cold War: The First Thirty Years .

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Laura Díaz-Esteve, The Singapore Free Press and the War of 1898 in the Philippines, Diplomatic History , Volume 48, Issue 4, September 2024, Pages 573–598, https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhae037

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Essay: Salman Rushdie’s Next Act

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Salman Rushdie’s Next Act

In his life-affirming memoir “knife,” the writer shows how society must respond to untrammeled hatred..

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It was more than 33 years after the Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had issued a fatwa, or Islamic legal ruling, condemning Salman Rushdie to death when the novelist was attacked by a deluded man. This man had not read the novel The Satanic Verses , which had so offended the ayatollah and prompted the fatwa. Nor had Khomeini, who had been smarting under the humiliation of an Iran-Iraq truce and sought to divert the attention of angry Iranians by singling out the book, which he said insulted Islam.

On Aug. 12, 2022, Rushdie was at a literary festival in Chautauqua, a calm retreat in upstate New York. That morning, he was meant to be speaking with Henry Reese, the founder of City of Asylum , a project in Pittsburgh that offers refuge to writers fleeing persecution. Rushdie had helped raise funds when the project launched in 2004. The tranquil surroundings in 2022 symbolized the project’s central idea: a place where writers can be at peace, safe from harm, so they might reflect and write again without fear.

In a mere 27 seconds—the time it takes to read a Shakespearean sonnet, as Rushdie points out in his hauntingly engrossing, sobering, and ultimately life-affirming new memoir, Knife —the man (who Rushdie does not name in the book) rushed toward Rushdie and plunged a knife all over his body, more than a dozen times, severing his tendons and nerves in his left hand. Rushdie lay sprawling on the ground, still conscious. His life was saved, foremost, by Reese (who also took blows and was injured), a doctor who rushed to the site, and other emergency responders who tried to stop the flow of blood.

A long process of recovery followed, permanently altering Rushdie’s life. The attacker had managed to pierce Rushdie’s right eye, destroying its optic nerve; slashed Rushdie’s neck; and wounded other organs. But he had missed vital veins and arteries—only because he did not know how to kill.

Rushdie has spent his life rebelling against the idea that people can be killed for their thought. He has challenged those with power—politicians or religious leaders—and been a persistent and outspoken champion of free speech. Freedom to imagine, think, write, doubt, disagree, challenge, hold one’s own, be irreverent, laugh, ridicule, rejoice, celebrate: These are the foundational principles of his thinking, work, and life.

Rushdie, photographed in his home in London, circa 1988. Horst Tappe/Getty Images

In the process, Rushdie has ended up defending even those who have later profoundly disagreed with him. He has supported the freedom of those who wish him ill. He is in the public eye, but he has not spoken out to court publicity or limelight; rather, he reminds us why we must keep the light shining on the idea of liberty (because darker forces want to snuff it out) and that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. In his earlier memoir, Joseph Anton , published in 2012, Rushdie wrote about himself in the third person, saying he was aware that defending freedom was a battle that could cost his life: “Is the thing for which you are fighting worth losing your life for? And he had found it possible to answer YES. He was prepared to die if dying became necessary for what Carmen Callil had called ‘a bloody book’.”

During his many years in hiding, there had been undisclosed attempts on his life. Hitoshi Igarashi, the Japanese translator of The Satanic Verses and a scholar of Islamic art, had been murdered; Ettore Capriolo, the Italian translator of The Satanic Verses , was stabbed but survived; and William Nygaard, the book’s Norwegian publisher, was shot. As Rushdie recently recounted in an interview, when he reached out to Nygaard to apologize, Nygaard said: “Salman, don’t apologize. I’m a grown-up. I knew that I wanted to publish The Satanic Verses , and I’m very happy that I did …. Guess what. I’ve just ordered a very large reprint.”

As Rushdie writes in this new memoir, one of his worst nightmares is losing his eyesight; in the attack, he lost one eye. Long before the attack, he had written the manuscript of his 2023 novel, Victory City (his 16th book since the fatwa), in which the protagonist is blinded on orders of an enraged ruler. As Rushdie recovered at home, he was gripped with nightmarish visions of the Duke of Gloucester being blinded in King Lear and the opening sequence of the Luis Buñuel movie An Andalusian Dog , in which a cloud drifting across the moon becomes a razor blade slicing an eye.

Knife , which came out earlier this year, tells in excruciating detail the pain Rushdie endured after the attack. The real hero of the book is Rushdie’s wife, Rachel Eliza Griffiths, whose courage, affirmation, support, and love helped him recover. Courage, Ernest Hemingway wrote, is grace under pressure; Rushdie has shown that courage leads to triumph, for it shows defiant will in the face of violence. Rushdie’s remarkable genius—of word associations; of astonishing memory recalling stories from myths, literature, and history; of playfulness—remains undiminished.

In this reflective memoir, Rushdie writes how in late summer 2022 he felt he had forewarning of the attack. A few nights before the attempt on his life, he dreamt about a man with a spear attacking him. But nightmares must not intrude on reality, Rushdie believed. And yet, that morning he saw a frenzied man race towards him. As Rushdie recalls in the book, his first thought was: “So it is you. Here you are.” And then: “Why now? Really? It’s been so long. Why now, after all these years?”

The questions Rushdie had—Why now? Why after all these years?—are not rhetorical. Born in India’s most cosmopolitan city, then known as Bombay, Rushdie went on to make polyglot London his home. But at the turn of the millennium, with the fatwa clipping his wings and continued uncharitable and churlish criticism of his writing, he decided to leave London for New York, the international city with a mind of its own. Rushdie wanted to remake himself, to leave life under the shadow of the fatwa, which often made it seem as if he had written only one book.

For those of us who grew up in post-independence India, and particularly those from Bombay, Rushdie’s novel Midnight’s Children made many of us feel English was our language, as well. We could do it, too; it was not an alien language. We too owned it.

I first met Rushdie in 1983, on his first visit to India after he won the Booker Prize for Midnight’s Children . (I’ve interviewed him several times since, reviewed his works, and in recent years been in conversations with him at literary festivals.) Many of us were appalled when, in 1988, India became the first country in the world to effectively ban The Satanic Verses by preventing its import; its Indian publisher, meanwhile, decided not to publish it. At the time, I worked at the magazine India Today and wrote among the earliest editorials criticizing that profoundly illiberal act by the Indian government.

The Satanic Verses is easily among the most imaginative novels of all time. It is about hybridity, migration, and our divided selves—where angels take on the garb of devils, and devils can deceive and appear angelic. It is multilayered. It is about two men landing in Britain from an exploded jet, one of whom is an actor who loses his mind and imagines the birth of a great religion. In the hallucination the protagonist imagines listening to divine voices and later rejects some verses as inspired by the Satan. This is from an episode from Islamic history and ripe with speculative possibilities. What kind of an idea are you, the protagonist asks in the novel, “Are you the kind that compromises, does deals, accommodates itself to society, aims to find a niche, to survive; or are you the cussed, bloody-minded, ramrod-backed type of damnfool notion that would rather break than sway with the breeze? – The kind that will almost certainly, ninety-nine times out of hundred, be smashed to bits; but, the hundredth time, will change the world.”

Rushdie persists, and remains important, because of that spirit of defiance. The Satanic Verses celebrated the migrant, the marginalized, the one cast on an alien shore forced to adopt new norms. The migrant blended into the city and changed it, though the city remained “visible but unseen.” He had to transform himself, and in that confused state it became difficult to distinguish between history and myth, between fact and lies, between certainty and doubt.

The fatwa was the ultimate test. Rushdie could change himself and write different kinds of books—safer, simpler, offering comfort. He could become less of an artist, scared into submission, avoiding risks. Or he could write angry books seeking revenge. Both approaches would have distracted him from the path he had chosen, that of a storyteller. “One of the greatest acts of will that I’ve ever performed in my life was to try and not let my writing be knocked off track [by the fatwa],” he said recently.

The British government offered Rushdie protection after the fatwa was issued, and some of his closest friends—Ian McEwan, Christopher Hitchens, James Fenton, Martin Amis, and others—defended him. But many other public figures, including John le Carré, John Berger, Germaine Greer, Hugh Trevor-Roper, then-Prince Charles, and Jimmy Carter, all felt Rushdie was somehow wrong; that he had overstepped the mark, and that offending the faith was simply not done.

Rushdie was active on issues of race in Britain, speaking out for racial equality and joining anti-racism campaigns during the tumultuous 1970s when the right wing National Front party began marching through British cities, inspired by Winston Churchill’s opposition of migration from Caribbean countries in the 1950s and Conservative parliamentarian Enoch Powell’s speech warning of “ rivers of blood ” if uncontrolled migration from former colonies continued. When graffiti saying “KBW,” or “Keep Britain White,” began to appear in immigrant neighborhoods, Rushdie spoke up. But after the fatwa, many of the people he supported also wanted him prosecuted, and some were burning The Satanic Verses in British towns.

From left to right: American authors Susan Sontag, Gay Talese, E. L. Doctorow, and Norman Mailer are seated among a group of people at Writers in Support of Salman Rushdie in New York City on Feb. 22, 1989. Sara Krulwich/New York Times Co./Getty Images

As Rushdie puts it in Joseph Anton : “He needed to understand that there were people who would never love him. No matter how carefully he explained his work or clarified his intentions in creating it, they would not love him. The unreasoning mind, driven by the doubt-free absolutes of faith, could not be convinced by reason. Those who had demonized him would never say, ‘Oh, look, he’s not a demon after all.’ … He needed, now, to be clear of what he was fighting for. Freedom of speech, freedom of the imagination, freedom from fear, and the beautiful, ancient art of which he was privileged to be a practitioner. Also skepticism, irreverence, doubt, satire, comedy, and unholy glee. He would never again flinch from the defense of these things.”

In Knife , there is a section where Rushdie imagines a conversation with the failed assassin, who tells Rushdie: “You are hated by two billion people …. You must feel like a worm. Beneath all your smart talk, you know you are less than a worm. To be crushed beneath our heel.” It hurt Rushdie that India, where he was born, was the first country to restrict The Satanic Verses , and that India’s Hindu nationalist leadership had nothing substantial to say about the attack on Rushdie in 2022. Rushdie didn’t have anything good to say about Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s politics either—in speeches, in a short piece he wrote for an anthology I co-edited when India turned 75, and most importantly in Victory City , which was published after the attack and is a love letter to the pluralist India getting lost in the Modi era.

Victory City , published in early 2023, tells the story of Pampa Kampana and the city she creates, Bisnaga. Bisnaga is a corrupted way to pronounce Vijaynagara (“city of victory”), a real city-empire in southern India between the 14th and 16th centuries. As a girl, Pampa Kampana saw her mother burn herself, and a goddess gave her divine powers and a curse: She was to fight to protect women from being burned and would live a long time. She was to see both the success and failure of her mission, because what is life, if not victory and defeat? The narrative she writes is appropriately called Jayaparajaya , or “victory and defeat.”

By spraying magical seeds on the ground, Pampa created Bisnaga and lived for 247 years—a period approximating the length of the Vijayanagara empire, and also, as Judith Shulevitz noted in the Atlantic , coinciding with the length of time from 1776, the year the United States declared independence, to 2023, the year of the novel’s publication. Pampa Kampana’s vision—tolerance, women’s rights, equality—coincided with the liberal instincts of India’s founding fathers, which the Modi administration seems so determined to overturn. Victory City ends: “While they lived, they were victors, or vanquished, or both. Now they are neither. … I myself am nothing now. All that remains is this city of words. Words are the only victors.”

Augustus expelled Ovid, but Ovid’s poetry survived. Joseph Stalin sent Osip Mandelstam to the Gulag, but Mandelstam’s verses remain; Stalin’s deeds only record Soviet darkness. Francisco Franco’s fascists killed Federico García Lorca, but his works are recalled around the world; Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn outlived the Soviet Union, and Liu Xiaobo will be remembered long after Xi Jinping is forgotten. Words outlive tyrants.

Writers gather to read selected works of Rushdie, one week after he was stabbed, during a rally to show solidarity for free expression outside the New York Public Library in New York City on Aug. 19, 2022. Timothy A. Clary/AFP via Getty Images

In 2000, Rushdie came to the United States. He wanted to live his life, enjoy his liberty, and pursue happiness. He succeeded, although his early days in New York weren’t easy. Some people would balk being near him, and he thought the only way he could stop that was by behaving as if he were not scared. He had to show them that there was nothing to be scared about. As the years passed, not only was it possible to see Rushdie at art galleries, parties, restaurants, or walking in a park or strolling on a sidewalk, he continued to speak for liberty. As Knife shows, through love, and Griffiths, his wife, he discovered happiness. It is not easy to write about happiness. Rushdie cites the French writer Henry de Montherlant: “Happiness writes in white ink on white pages.” Easy to experience, difficult to describe.

Rushdie speaks on stage at the 2023 PEN America Literary Gala at the American Museum of Natural History in New York City on May 18, 2023. Cindy Ord/Getty Images

Rushdie fought for the freedom of thought and the freedom to speak long before he wrote his first novel, Grimus , in 1975. He was involved with the literary and human rights society English PEN and later was president of PEN America. He helped setting up Reese’s City of Asylum project, and with enlightened European activists he supported the formation of the International Cities of Refuge Network , a coalition of 86 cities in Europe and the Americas that has provided temporary refuge to more than 200 writers and artists from around the world. He has unfailingly helped writers seeking help— supporting Taslima Nasrin of Bangladesh, who was hounded by fundamentalists, and honoring the slain cartoonists of the satirical French magazine Charlie Hebdo . As former chair of the Writers in Prison Committee at PEN International, on a few occasions I had to reach out to Rushdie to seek a statement from him, or some intervention or other help, to help a writer in distress. He responded promptly and unflinchingly.

But being firm in his commitment to freedom of expression does not make Rushdie stubborn. He has reflected on the spread of the internet and its profusion of voices and what they can mean. The internet lets lies travel fast and wide (including those with sinister consequences, such as election denial or questioning the effectiveness of science and vaccines). In a conversation I had with him and the German writer Carolin Emcke in 2021, Rushdie reflected on European restrictions on lies and propaganda and whether they could be effective in stopping the spread of hate speech. “One has to distinguish between hate speech and falsehood,” he said, “and the speech with which we disagree. We have to somehow find that line.”

Rushdie has discovered outrageous statements attributed to him spread far and wide on the internet, reappearing despite his periodic, strenuous, and exasperated denials of the attributions. In a 2020 story he wrote in the New Yorker , “The Old Man in the Piazza,” he showed that Manichaean divide of false binaries is crowding out nuance and arguments.

Rushdie is also dismayed by the way the progressive world has ceded the battle of free speech to the unscrupulous right. In Knife , He writes of progressives’ priorities evolving, wherein “protecting the rights and sensibilities of groups perceived as vulnerable would take precedence over freedom of speech, which the Nobel laureate Elias Canetti had called ‘the tongue set free.’” The right, Rushdie writes, has “a new social agenda, one that sounded a lot like an old one: authoritarianism, backed up by unscrupulous media, big money, complicit politicians, and corrupt judges”—far away from the ideas of freedom Rushdie understood, of Thomas Paine, of the Enlightenment, of John Stuart Mill.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (left) speaks with Rushdie and his wife, Rachel Eliza Griffiths, in Berlin on May 16. Guido Bergmann/Bundesregierung via Getty Images

One question Rushdie reflects on in Knife is: What to do with the gift of time he now has, thanks to extraordinary love from his family and close friends and the exceptional skills of the medical professionals who treated him? He would like nothing better than to be what he has wished to be—the writer in a room making things up and writing those stories. Once, Rushdie did not think he would write about the attack, but his agent and friend Andrew Wylie was convinced that he would. In Knife , Rushdie explains his change of heart: “To write would be my way of owning what happened, taking charge of it, making it mine, refusing to be a mere victim. I would answer violence with art.”

Salman Rushdie’s life, ideas, literature, and beliefs have been steadfast in upholding love over hate, truth over falsehoods, doubt over certainty, defiance over compliance, and art over noise. Joseph Anton was written in the third person, as if Rushdie was looking at himself by stepping outside that experience—of the fatwa—and leaving it behind him. With Knife , he has returned center-stage with a singular account in the first person.

Rushdie loves comics; when he joined social media, he doffed his proverbial hat to Popeye the Sailor and wrote, “I yam what I yam.” And so he is.

Salil Tripathi is a writer based in New York. He is the author of The Colonel Who Would Not Repent: The Bangladesh War and Its Unquiet Legacy , and he is working on a book about the Gujaratis.

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Tommy Koh also played an important role in facilitating the upgrade of Singapore-China relations, as described in Lye Liang Fook's essay. Koh "toiled behind the scenes to create the right conditions for the leaders of Singapore and China to meet" in the 1970s and 1980s when diplomatic ties were not yet established between the two ...
Singapore's Foreign Policy: Unique Features
One hallmark of Singapore's foreign policy is that, although a state, we are not passive. On the contrary, we are hyper-proactive. Small states, like small boys, are expected to be silent, passive compliant. Small states are seldom given a seat at the top Small states are seldom consulted by the big states. They are usually told what to do by ...
The Future of Singapore Foreign Policy: A Coming Grand Strategy Shift?
Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. Oct 25, 2023. ∙ Paid. A newly-released book sets out Singapore's grand strategy at a time of heightening domestic, regional and global challenges for one of the region's most diplomatically active and militarily capable states. WonkCount: 1,955 words (~ 9 minutes)
Full speech: Five core principles of Singapore's foreign policy
https://str.sg/3QUG. Minister for Foreign Affairs Vivian Balakrishnan on Monday (July 17) spoke to 200 civil servants about the core principles of Singapore's foreign policy, in light of a recent ...
Singapore and the Worldview of Lee Kuan Yew
As Lee is so influential in the making of Singapore's foreign policy - indeed one cannot miss the echoes of Lee's thinking in every single foreign policy speech and interview given by the ...
CO15066
Synopsis Lee Kuan Yew's mark on Singapore's foreign policy is that of applying counterintuitive strategies to improve the island state's international standing. In retrospect, this has ensured Singapore's long term viability as a sovereign nation-state. Commentary AS SINGAPORE'S first Prime Minister and the point man in negotiating decolonisation from Britain in the late 1950s and
Singapore's foreign policy: beyond realism
I argue that 'smallness' defined by material deficiency, used to justify realist strategies, holds increasing discrepancies in describing outcomes and behavior formation in foreign policy. Both 'smallness' and the process of 'othering' are normative rather than static, creating a disjuncture between rhetoric and policy.
Singapore's Foreign Policy
Singapore's Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order reaffirms that Acharya is always worth reading." Richard Stubbs McMaster University, Canada "This book of original essays challenges dominant explanations of Singapore's foreign policy, offering a nuanced portrait of the core ideas underpinning its policy strategies. ...
Foreign relations of Singapore
The main themes of Singapore's foreign policy: [12] [13] Formative Years (1965-1970s): In the early years after independence, Singapore faced numerous challenges, including the need to establish its sovereignty and secure its survival. Its foreign policy focused on seeking recognition and building diplomatic relations with other countries.
#TIL Singapore's Core Foreign Policy Principles
29 MAR 2022. #TIL that in 2017, Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan held a townhall meeting, after an unusually heated debate broke out among Singapore's luminaries on how we should conduct ourselves as a small state in a dangerous world. In his speech, Dr Balakrishnan pointed out that unlike "retired officials, academics ...
Our Fundamentals
Foreign policy begins at home. Singapore's foreign policy is for Singaporeans to decide. Our first and most important line of defence is a vigilant and well-informed citizenry that understands the geostrategic forces at play and our national interests. Building Up Our Own Defence. Singapore's existence as an independent and sovereign ...
An Evolving Foreign Policy: Current Trends and Patterns in Singapore's
Related Papers. Balancing on Shifting Sand: Perspectives on Singapore's Strategic Engagements with the Major Powers in the Asia-Pacific. 2008 • ... (2007, pp. 4-5) Singapore's Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order, it is stressed that the island-state upholds the belief that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plays a ...
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore
Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan during the Committee of Supply Debates, 29 February 2024. 29 February 2024. Mr Chairman, 1 Thank you for all the contributions, questions, and suggestions from Members of Parliament. Again this year, I was struck by the fact that the speeches from Opposition, Nominated, and PAP ...
Singapore Is Not An Island
Essays on Singapore's Foreign Policy As a small country in Southeast Asia seeking to survive and prosper, Singapore cannot be ordinary. It must be extraordinary. Herein lies the central challenge for Singapore in every area, including foreign policy. This book is a compilation of essays and public speeches by Bilahari Kausikan over the last 25 ...
Singapore foreign policy
Photo Essays; Podcasts; Videos; Magazine. August 2024 ... Singapore foreign policy . Singapore's Role as a Neutral Interpreter of China to the West By Walter Woon. If the growing West-China ...
Singapore's Strategic Foreign Policy in Navigating Global Challenges
Amidst global uncertainties, Singapore's tailored foreign policy ensures national interest protection through law adherence, partnerships, and a rules-based order. In the face of ever-changing global dynamics, Singapore, a compact sovereign city-state, has crafted a nuanced and strategic foreign policy to protect its national interests and ensure its sovereignty and future prosperity. With ...
Essay on Singapore Foreign Policy
Words: 456. Page: 1. This essay sample was donated by a student to help the academic community. Papers provided by EduBirdie writers usually outdo students' samples. Cite this essay. Download. I have chosen to cover the fifth core principle of Singapore's foreign policy, "We must be a credible and consistent partner" in my essay.
What is Singapore's Foreign Policy?
One key ideology that shaped Singapore's foreign policy is the concept of survival. Following the sudden Separation that led to Singapore's independence in 1965, the government had to deal with political threats and economic challenges. Amidst the Cold War context, the rise of Communist insurgencies was a common concern that affected the ...
Singapore's Foreign Policy, 1965-1968
The Minister of Foreign Affairs "The Premises of Our Foreign Policy" A Radio Broadcast, April 5, 1968. Singapore became an independent sovereign state on August 9, 1965 It may be alleged that to attempt an analysis of a country's. foreign policy only three years after its independence is premature.
Singapore Foreign Policy Research Papers
Less discussed perhaps is the exercise of Singapore's foreign policy, despite its critical role in sustaining the Little Red Dot's status as an important player on the global stage. This paper analyses Singapore's post-independence foreign policy as an aspect of governance and presents two distinct points.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore
The fundamental principles of Singapore's foreign policy are as follows: As a small state, Singapore has no illusions about the state of our region or the world. Singapore must always maintain a credible and deterrent military defence as the fundamental underpinning for an effective foreign policy; Singapore must promote and work for good ...
SFP mid-term essay
12 Pages • Essays / Projects • Year Uploaded: 2023. This essay focuses on SG's foreign policy and relations with Indonesia. It was one of 2 essay questions that I had picked to write on
Perspectives on the Security of Singapore
This collection of essays is specially prepared to mark the 50 th anniversary of Singapore's independence. The unifying theme is "Singapore's Security" in its broadest sense and dimension. ... A common refrain in Singapore's foreign policy towards the great powers — confined to the United States (US) and China in this essay — is that it ...
Singapore Free Press and the War of 1898 in the Philippines
The Singapore Free Press and the War of 1898 in the Philippines * - 24 Hours access EUR €39.00 GBP £34.00
Salman Rushdie's Next Act
On Aug. 12, 2022, Rushdie was at a literary festival in Chautauqua, a calm retreat in upstate New York. That morning, he was meant to be speaking with Henry Reese, the founder of City of Asylum, a ...