religion wars essay

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Culture, religion, war, and peace.

• Yehonatan Abramson Yehonatan Abramson Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.44
• Published in print: 14 December 2013
• Published online: 30 November 2017

Religion and culture have historically been neglected in international relations (IR) theories and in political science more generally. It was only recently that IR began to consider the role of culture and religion in war and peace. Several main scholarly trends in the study of culture, religion, conflict, and peace can be identified, starting with the definitional problems that IR scholars had to deal with as they tried to incorporate culture and religion. The first major attempt in the IR field to understand war almost exclusively through the religious prism was that of Samuel Huntington, who in his Clash of Civilization (1993, 1996) identifies two main reasons why religion can cause war: first, religion can be considered as a primordial and immutable identity; and second, religion is a form of ideology rather than identity. The scholarly literature has also addressed themes such as religious fundamentalism and violence, the role of religious actors in international conflict, the practical use of religion and culture to promote peace via diplomacy, and engagement of religion and culture in existing peace theories such as democratic peace theory. Avenues for future research may include the relational and constantly changing aspects of religion; what, when, and how various religious interpretations receive political prominence in promoting conflict or peace; how religion can be used as an independent variable across cases; and the hidden set of assumptions that are embedded in the cultural and religion labels.

• international relations
• Samuel Huntington
• religious fundamentalism
• democratic peace theory

Introduction

Historically, international relations (IR) theories neglected ideational factors such as identity, religion, and culture. Although culture was a part of political science since Almond and Verba's seminal book in 1963 , IR's dominant schools of thought (Realism and Liberalism) overemphasized material, structural, and “objective” factors in explaining states’ behavior. Religion was ignored altogether not only in IR, but also in political science in general (Wald and Wilcox 2006 ; Bellin 2008 ). In recent years, IR began to consider the role of culture and religion. Culture as a variable appeared during the end of the Cold War together with the “constructivist turn” (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996 ; Checkel 1998 ; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001 ). Religion entered the field a decade later alongside a scholarly focus on ethnic and religious conflicts and religious-inspired terrorism (Fox 2001 :53; Philpott 2009 :184; Snyder 2011 :1).

This essay reviews the main scholarly trends in the study of culture and religion as sources for conflict and resources for peace. After a brief survey of the early works of political theorists regarding religion and war, this essay turns to review how the topic has been understood within IR. As the essay demonstrates, the attempt to deal with religion and culture as part of identity is a source of much confusion. In order to avoid confusion and reiteration of other comprehensive review essays on culture and IR (such as the essays titled “Culture and Foreign Policy Analysis” and “Nonrealist Variables: Identity and Norms in the Study of International Relations” in this work), this essay gives special focus to the topic of religion in studies of conflict and peace. In IR, religion is usually an independent variable that causes war or peace, or an intervening variable that shapes the probability of a conflict and its violent potential (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000 :644–8). Some scholars focus on what religion says, while others research what religion does; some scholars deal with religion in the individual level, while others emphasize the societal and organizational aspects of religion (Haynes 1998 ). The next section reviews the ways IR scholars define culture and religion and suggests that religion should be viewed as a part of culture. The following sections discuss the clash of civilizations debate; the relationship between fundamentalism and violence; religion as a cause of war; religion and the intensity of war; culture, religion and diplomacy with some references to cross-cultural negotiation; and culture and the democratic peace with some references to the debate regarding religion and democracy. The essay concludes with suggestions for future directions for research.

Conceptualizing Culture and Religion in IR Scholarship

Despite some exceptions, such as Adda Bozeman ( 1960 ), Jack Snyder ( 1977 ), and to some extent Robert Jervis ( 1976 ), IR scholars did not realize the importance of culture and religion to the understanding of peace and conflict until the post-Cold War era and the introduction of constructivism. The first task facing IR scholars trying to incorporate culture and religion is the task of definition. The understanding that these concepts can be rather distinct, but at the same time intrinsically connected has been a source for much confusion and contention. As this section suggests, different IR scholars treat culture and religion in different ways and sometimes use these concepts interchangeably with other concepts, such as norms, identity, and ethnicity.

The first example for such confusion exists in the writings of IR scholars from the English School, who understand religion as the main component in a society's culture. To Bozeman ( 1960 , 1971 ), for example, culture means civilization, and what dictates the mode of thinking and the normative order in a civilization is religion. Similarly, as Buzan ( 1993 :333) and Thomas ( 2005 :153–4) describe, Martin Wight argues that international societies can be formed on the basis of shared culture, but underlines the role of religion in not only promoting such peaceful unity but also holy wars. This view of religion as the core component of civilization is also shared by non-English School scholars such as Huntington ( 1996 ) and some of the authors in the volume edited by Katzenstein ( 2010 ).

While English School theorists understand culture as part of religion, the constructivist theoretical framework does the opposite. In constructivist studies, culture includes religion as well as other concepts such as identity, norms, or ideas (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996 ; Katzenstein 1996 ; Checkel 1998 ; Desch 1998 ). Cohen ( 1997 :11–12), for example, defines culture as “an acquired unique complex of attributes of a society that is subsuming every area of social life,” and we can find a similar approach in Mary Adams Trujillo et al. ( 2008 ). For others, such as Avruch ( 1998 :17) and Abu-Nimer ( 2001 :687) who draw on Theodore Schwartz's definition, culture is a less homogeneous and static concept and it “consists of the derivatives of experience, more or less organized, learned or created by the individuals of a population, including those images or encodement and their interpretations (meanings) transmitted from past generations, from contemporaries, or formed by individuals themselves.”

Subsuming religion under culture kept the concept under-theorized. It is notable that a canonical constructivist text, Alexander Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics ( 1999 ), does not include “religion” in the index (Snyder 2011 :2). An exception is Kubálková ( 2000 ), who brings religion into the study of IR through rule-oriented constructivism. However, the increasing interest in communal conflicts, such as ethno-national wars, and especially the September 11th attacks, have led to a resurgence of religion in the study of world politics (Fox 2001 :53; Philpott 2009 :184; Snyder 2011 :1).

Religion presents further definitional problems. The definition must encompass numerous but exclude from other phenomena such as ideologies or cults (Philpott 2003 ). Some of the early studies that deal with religion and international conflict, such as Ryan ( 1988 ), Azar ( 1990 ), Gurr ( 1994 ), and Gagnon ( 1994 ), consider religion to be part of a larger concept of ethnicity, or communality. Seul ( 1999 :553) tries to explain “the frequent appearance of religion as the primary cultural marker distinguishing groups in conflict,” and concludes that religion often exists “at the core of individual and group identity” (Seul 1999 :558). For Rothschild ( 1981 :86–7), however, religion is subsumed under the concept of ethnic identity. Correlation of War (COW) data uses both religion and ethnicity in measuring culture (see Henderson 1997 :661). Finally, Anthony Smith traces modern nationalism to religious origins (Smith 1999 ; see also Brubaker 2012 ).

Haynes ( 1998 ) provides a brief discussion about the definition dilemma and draws on Aquaviva while offering two sociological definitions. One sees religion as “a system of beliefs and practices related to an ultimate being, beings of the supernatural,” and the other considers religion to be what is “sacred in a society, that is, ultimate beliefs and practices which are inviolate” (Haynes 1998 : 4). The latter kind of definition is sometime referred to as ‘civil religion’ (Liebman and Don-Yiḥya 1983 ).

Toft ( 2007 :99) lists the common elements in most definitions: “a belief in a supernatural being (or beings); prayers and communication with that being; transcendent realities that might include some form of heaven, paradise, or hell; a distinction between the sacred and the profane and between ritual acts and sacred objects; a view that explains both the world as a whole and a person's proper role in it; a code of conduct in line with that world view; and a community bound by its adherence to these elements.”

On one hand, this discussion provides us some indicators to distinguish between religion and culture: the first belongs to the realm of the sacred and involves a relatively stable doctrine that connects the individual with the transcendental, while the latter belongs to the realm of the profane and involves a malleable combination of practices, customs, and expectations in relation to the society. On the other hand, religion and culture are intrinsically connected by myths, practices, and moral judgments that make religion a part of culture.

War and Peace in the Works of Religious Scholars and Political Theorists

Almost all religious texts have references to war and peace – the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament, the Quran, the Iliad and Odyssey, the Rig Veda, Mahabharata and Ramayana, Arthasastra, and so on. These references offer different treatments of war and peace. Some describe human nature as aggressive or as pursuing peace, some explain war and peace as a result of divine intervention and will, and some define the conditions in which war and peace can be achieved. Some references in sacred texts condition peace on the society's moral behavior. Other texts determine with whom, when, and how a war can be held and a peace treaty can be signed. Most of the sacred texts also have detailed historical narratives of war and peace, from which we can draw conclusions how the religion conceives war and peace. Religious figures and leaders are still creating new interpretations and commentary about peace and war, and this rich genre receives a lot of attention from scholars. In the Western world, books on Judaism and Christianity were written focusing on analyzing peace and war in the Hebrew Bible, in the New Testament, and in sermons, letters, and other external texts and exegeses (Arias 1533 ; Belli 1563 ; Benezet 1776 ; Heaton 1816 ; Dymond 1834 ). In the Muslim world, a similar attempt was made (Shaybani 1335 ; Ibn Khaldun 1377 ; Baladhuri 1866 ). This trend is still relevant in contemporary research today in Christianity (Faunce 1918 ; Barrett 1987 ; Swartley 2006 ), in Buddhism (Kraft 1992 ; Jerryson and Juergensmeyer 2010 ), in Islam (Khadduri 1940 ; Khadduri 1955 ; Kelsay and Johnson 1991 ; Abu-Nimer 2003 ; Mirbagheri 2012 ), in Judaism (Homolka and Friedlander 1994 ; Eisen 2011 ), in Hinduism (Banerjee 1988 ), and in some of them together (Jack 1968 ; Ferguson 1978 ; Smock 1992 ; Gort et al. 2002 ; Nelson-Pallmeyer 2003 ; Nan, Mampilly, and Bartoli 2012 ).

Political philosophy also includes religion in its scholarship. Religion, God, and faith exist in the writings of Hobbes, Machiavelli, Grotius, Rousseau, Locke, Kant, and other early Western political thinkers. All of them considered religion to be an inherent part of life and society that had to be accounted for in political analysis. Some perceived religion as a moral and ethical guideline for individuals and society, and some debated whether religion is an obstacle for government and society or an integral part of it. The relationship between religion and political life remains a vibrant subject of debate to this day (Eisenach 1981 ; Beiner 1993 ; Martinich 2003 ; De Vries 2003 ). Despite the richness of the contributions of religious scholars and of philosophers, these works have not yet offered a scientific theory regarding the role that religion plays in war and peace.

Religion and Conflict: The Clash of Civilization Debate

The first major attempt in the IR field to understand war almost exclusively through the religious prism was that of Samuel Huntington in his well-known article and book Clash of Civilization ( 1993 , 1996 ). Huntington, rejecting Francis Fukuyama's notion of the “End of History,” divides the world into seven or eight major civilizations that are fundamentally different from each other “by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion” (Huntington 1993 :25). Instead of the traditional territorial nation-states, Huntington recognizes a world comprised of various identities that are not necessarily delineated by national boundaries. He argues that the end of the Cold War and the ideological battle between the West and the East will be replaced by a battle of civilizations, which is the broadest category of identification for individuals and is mainly determined by religious beliefs. More specifically, Huntington predicts that the main civilizational conflict will be between the Islamic civilization and the Judeo-Christian Western civilization, due to conflictual history from both sides, a large gap in values, the rise of Islamic extremists and fundamentalism, and a clash of identities as a result of Muslim immigration.

In sum, Huntington's view clarifies two main reasons why religion can cause war. First, religion can be considered as a primordial and immutable identity. The Manichean perception of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ that religion provides is a main source of conflict (Dark 2000 :4–5, 11). Second, globalization, which folds within it rapid economic development and an increase in interactions between individual groups, creates a clash between traditional customs and Western modernity (Fox 1997 :3; Thomas 2000 :5). The desire of other civilizations to maintain their core values and traditions, and to prevent the domination of Western culture lead Huntington to claim that civilizational differences will be the main source of future wars (Huntington 1993 :29–31, 40).

Huntington's thesis received a lot of interest in scholarly and political discourse, and his thesis was tested and criticized from many angles. Ajami ( 1993 ), Bartley ( 1993 ), and Weeks ( 1993 ), for example, argue that states are still the main actors in the international system and that the English-Western secular modern force is more powerful than Huntington thinks. Kirkpatrick ( 1993 ) claims that intra-civilizational conflicts are more common than inter-civilizational conflicts. Others, such as Tipson ( 1997 ), Pfaff ( 1997 ), and Said ( 2001 ), criticize Huntington's facts and methodology (for more comprehensive reviews of the clash of civilization debate see O'Hagan 1995 ; Fox and Sandler 2004 ; Fox 2005 ). Katzenstein ( 2010 ) rejects Huntington's conception of civilizations as homogeneous in favor of a pluralistic view recognizing internal diversity. Katzenstein ( 2010 ) further questions the Huntingtonian “clash” with the evident capacity for inter-and trans-civilizational encounters.

Scholars have also made quantitative attempts to test Huntington's theory. Russett, Oneal, and Cox ( 2000 ) examine inter-state wars between 1950 and 1992 and conclude that realist and liberal variables provide better explanations of these conflicts than civilizational factors. Henderson and Tucker ( 2001 ) examine international wars between 1816 and 1992 and find no connection between civilization membership and international wars. In addition, Henderson and Tucker find that conflicts within civilizations are more likely than conflicts between civilizations. More recent attempts also do not find support for the clash of civilization thesis (Chiozza 2002 ; Ben-Yehuda 2003 ; Bolks and Stoll 2003 ; Fox 2004 ; Henderson 2005 ). However, Henderson's ( 1997 :663) findings suggest that “the greater the religious dissimilarity between states, the greater the likelihood of war.” Similarly, Roeder ( 2003 ) examines ethnopolitical conflicts and finds support for Huntington's thesis. Fox, James, and Li ( 2009 ) bring a different angle to the clash of civilizations debate in examining international interventions on behalf of the same ethno-religious group in another state. Although they focus only on conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, their findings show that Muslim states are more likely to intervene on behalf of other Muslim minorities. Moreover, ethnic conflicts with a religious dimension seem more likely to attract intervention than other ethnic conflicts.

Another view of religion as a cause of war sees religion as a form of ideology rather than identity. In this kind of approach, the emphasis is not on how clashing religious identities create conflict, but rather how religious ideas shape worldviews that justify or are consistent with conflict (see also Desch 1998 ). According to Beker ( 2008 ), for example, the Jewish notion of the “chosen people” has fueled many ideological conflicts between Jews and non-Jews. He further demonstrates how the battle over “chosenness” is evident in modern anti-Semitic discourse. Khadduri ( 1955 ) makes an analogous point with the concepts of dar al-harb (territory of war) and dar al-Islam (territory of Islam) in Islamic laws of war. Similarly, in examining Chinese thought and culture and their influence on Ming strategy towards the Mongols, Johnston ( 1995 :xi) finds that the non-militant ideas usually associated with Confucianism may be “inaccurate, misleading, or plainly wrong.” Juergensmeyer ( 2003 ) focuses on ideas that affect “cultures of violence.” Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims, Sikhs, and others, Juergensmeyer claims, share a worldview of cosmic war between darkness and light (Juergensmeyer 2003 :13, 35). Because religious ideology is a defined non-negotiable set of rules, resolving a religious dispute peacefully is harder than with other disputes (Dark 2000 :1–2).

Religious Fundamentalism and Violence

The relationship between religious worldviews and war leads us to religious fundamentalism and violence. Of special note is the five-volume work by Marty and Appleby ( 1991 –5) that encompasses different approaches and case studies related to fundamentalism. Marty and Appleby ( 1992 :34) define fundamentalism as “a distinctive tendency – a habit of mind and a pattern of behavior – found within modern religious communities and embodied in certain representative individuals and movements … a religious way of being that manifests itself as a strategy by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group.” They recount the ideological extremism in social, political, and structural conditions, such as social deprivation, repressive regimes, reaction to secularization, and economic crises. Marty and Appleby argue that religious ideas are not the goal for the fundamentalists, but rather they use religion as a means to achieve political ends. Fundamentalists use “old doctrines, subtly lift them from their original context … and employ them as ideological weapons against a hostile world” (Marty and Appleby 1991 :826). Fundamentalism, in this view, is a religious backlash against secular rule (see also Tibi 1999 ). Juergensmeyer ( 1993 ) shares this view but opposes labeling this religious fervor as fundamentalism due to the accusatory and ambiguous meanings of the term.

Eisenstadt ( 1999 ) agrees with Marty and Appleby that “contemporary” fundamentalist movements are thoroughly modern movements, but disagrees with the link they draw between religious force and fundamentalism. For Eisenstadt, contemporary fundamentalist movements rest on the same universal, utopian, totalistic, and secular claims of modernity that the Jacobins and the communist revolutions were based upon but “promulgate anti-modern or anti-Enlightenment ideologies” (Eisenstadt 1999 :1). The direction which a fundamentalist movement takes depends on its civilization, the political and social circumstances surrounding the movement, and the international setting (Eisenstadt 1999 ). Reviews of religious fundamentalism and violence include Gill ( 2001 ) and Ozzano ( 2009 ).

Religious Actors and International Conflict

Scholarship has gone beyond the clash of civilizations debate and the study of fundamentalism to explore further questions about how and under what conditions religion leads to war. One approach has been to consider individual values and mindsets in the lists of factors that affect decision making by leaders, including decisions about war. Brecher ( 1972 ), Jervis ( 1976 ), and Fisher ( 1997 ) focus on culture, while Fox ( 2001 ), Sandal and James ( 2010 ), and Warner and Walker ( 2011 ) focus specifically on religion. On the collective level, society's core values, conceptions, and assumptions about the world and the enemy can influence foreign policy outcomes (Booth 1979 ; Hudson and Vore 1995 ; Reeves 2004 ). Religious beliefs should not be dismissed as irrational or marginal, but should be included in the strategic calculations of leaders and states (Toft 2007 :129).

Religious affinities on the collective level are not confined to traditional territorial state boundaries. Transnational religious actors are another good example of the role of religion in conflict. Religious terrorist groups that have cells in different countries can initiate a conflict between states, and global riots can result from injury to religious sentiment, as in the Danish caricature case (Dark 2000 :5–10; Fox 2001 :67–9; Haynes 2001 ). These kinds of conflicts can be international, when religious diaspora is engaged in the conflict, or remain domestic (civil wars). Fox and Sandler show how local wars can capture the interest of members of transnational religious groups due to the possible involvement of holy sites (Fox and Sandler 2004 :63–82). Even without direct participation in violence, religious transnational movements and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) participate in global conflict by lobbying or protesting in order to encourage a state to intervene in a distant war between ethno-religious minorities (Fox, James and Li 2009 ).

Religion may also have an indirect effect on war since it can be used as a tool to mobilize people and to enhance legitimacy (Fox 2001 :65–7; Haynes 2004 :456; Snyder 2011 :11). This does not necessarily mean that political leaders actually hold religious beliefs but that such beliefs serve them in accomplishing their political interests. This view holds that the recent global resurgence of religion in various societies occurs as a result of instrumental use of religion by political elites (Fox 1997 :4; Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000 :643–6).

The question of whether religion is the cause of a conflict, or just a tool or a dimension of it was addressed in several quantitative studies. Gurr ( 1993 ) uses the Minorities at Risk data to examine mobilization and collective action in “communal conflicts.” His findings indicate that an essential basis for mobilization is a sense of group identity. Gurr measures group identity by using six indicators including religion, ethnicity, and social customs. Fox ( 1997 , 2002 ) tries to isolate conflicts between groups from different religions. Using the same data as Gurr, Fox concludes that in such cases “religious issues play, at most, a marginal role” (Fox 1997 :16). Henderson, however, using Correlates of War data, concludes that “cultural difference, especially in the case of religion, is positively associated with war” (Henderson 1997 :666). Durward and Marsden ( 2009 ) offer a more nuanced and developed understanding of how religious beliefs, discourses, and practices are politicized and used to trigger conflicts, justify military interventions, and facilitate resolutions.

Religion and the Intensity of War

Another trend in the study of religion and war asks whether religious conflicts are more violent than other conflicts and if some religions are more prone to use more violence than others. Fox and Sandler ( 2004 ), using Minorities at Risk data, conclude that “religious conflicts … are consistently more violent than nonreligious conflicts.” A study by Pearce ( 2005 ) using a different data set supports this conclusion.

As for the relationship between a specific religion and violence, Pearce's ( 2005 :349) results show that Judaism and Hinduism are more violence prone, but this may be due to a small number of cases. Fox and Sandler's ( 2004 :132) results demonstrate “conflicts involving Islamic groups are more violent than conflicts not involving Islamic groups,” and conflicts within the Islamic civilization “are slightly more violent” than conflicts between civilizations. Due to the fact that there are many Muslim states, but only one Jewish state and one Hindu state that are each experiencing protracted conflict, it is still unclear whether specific religions are more violent than others, or whether it is a false image created by the uneven numbers of religious groups. The finding that Islamists were involved in 81 percent of the religious civil wars between 1940 and 2000 led Toft ( 2007 ) to eventually conclude that “overlapping historical, geographical, and, in particular, structural factors account for Islam's higher representation in religious civil wars.” More importantly, her theory suggests that religious aspects are an instrument by political elites for gaining more legitimacy in order to survive, or to achieve another objective (Toft 2007 :97–8, 128).

The degree of religious violence does not have to be related to a specific religion, but rather to the type of regime or degree of state power. Thomas ( 2000 :14–15) suggests that the appeal for religious ideas grows larger especially in weak states. Fox ( 1997 ) shows an increase in religious discrimination and grievance in autocratic states compared with democratic regimes. When a transition to democracy happens, the chances of such communal violence rise due to the diminishing power of the regime and an ease of autocratic repression (Gurr 1994 ).

Culture, Religion, and Diplomacy

Scholars have also been interested in the practical use of religion and culture to promote peace. Discussing culture specifically, Kevin Avruch ( 1998 ) suggests that culture is a significant variable in conflict resolution as each negotiator comes with his or her own subculture (class, region, ethnicity, and more). In contrast, Zartman ( 1993 :17) gives culture little substantive significance and argues that it is as relevant as the breakfast the negotiators ate. Fisher ( 1980 ) and Cohen ( 1997 ) occupy the middle ground suggesting that culture matters together with other variables. For a good introductory review regarding these approaches, see Ramsbotham, Miall, and Woodhouse ( 2011 ).

Cultural gaps may involve language barriers, create problems of interpretation, and disrupt the transfer of information (Gulliver 1979 ; Fisher 1980 ; Faure and Rubin 1993 ; Cohen 1997 ; Berton et al. 1999 ). The dichotomy, made by Hall ( 1976 ) between high-context cultures and low-context cultures, is useful in explaining these cultural obstacles in international negotiation. High-context cultures are generally associated with collective societies in which communication is less verbal and more indirect, emphasizing the context in which things are said and done. High-context cultures require communicators to pay attention to nuances and body language. Consequently, those from such cultures are more sensitive socially, they try to please their audience, and they see great importance in small talk and group consensus. Low-context cultures, on the other hand, are individualistic in character, and communication is direct and with a clear message. Accuracy in the written or spoken word is very important in low-context culture, and less attention is paid to context, body language, and facial expressions (Cohen 1997 ; Rubinstein 2003 ). When two societies from the two different types of culture meet around the negotiation table, potential pitfalls are evident. This line of research has specific practical implications. The US Institute of Peace published a series of works analyzing different negotiating styles and behaviors to equip negotiators with a better understanding of cultural differences. Examples include Wittes ( 2005 ), Solomon and Quinney ( 2010 ), and Schaffer and Schaffer ( 2011 ).

As for structure and the process of negotiation, culture can play an important role in the degree of trust between the sides, which can define negotiation strategy and whether there is a need for mediation. These factors can also influence the size of the delegations, the different roles within the delegation, the degree of unity within the delegation, negotiating procedures, seating arrangements, and public announcements (Berton et al. 1999 :3–5).

This vast literature regarding culture and diplomacy has little to say about religion. As former United States Secretary of State and international relations scholar Madeleine Albright confesses, diplomacy, conflict resolution, negotiation, and peace were all conceptualized in secular terms with no room for religion and faith prior to the terror attacks of September 11th (Albright 2006 :8–9). Indeed, most of the IR studies on culture and diplomatic practices to promote peace were written during the 1980s and 1990s. Only after September 11th did religion and faith become a primary topic.

Many scholars agree that the same power that religion has in inciting conflicts can also be used to promote peace (Gopin 1997 ; Appleby 2000 ; Broadhead and Keown 2007 ). Some works continue the trajectory of previous studies on cross-cultural negotiation and focus on a specific religion. In the case of Islam, Alon ( 2000 ), Alon and Brett ( 2007 ), and Pely ( 2010 ) focus on Muslim perceptions of conflict resolution, values of honor, and the institutional mechanism of sulha (reconciliation). Other studies consider how peace can be achieved with an emphasis on shared religious values, such as empathy, forgiveness, mercy, compassion and the Golden Rule to “do unto others as you would have them do unto you” (Gopin 1997 ; Gopin 2001 ; Cilliers 2002 ; Carter and Smith 2004 ). Similarly, Albright ( 2006 :73) mentions the religious notion that “we are all created in the image of God” as a common ground. Shore ( 2009 :2) shows how “Christianity played a central role in South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” and how values of forgiveness and justice were important in South Africa's peaceful transition to democracy. Similarly, Gopin ( 2002 ) argues that in the Israeli-Palestinian case, the marginalization of religious aspects was crucial in the failure of the Oslo agreement. He adds that by putting religion in the middle of the reconciliation process, and with dialogues between key religious figures from both sides, peace in the Middle East can be achieved.

While traditional realpolitik diplomacy has had difficulties coping with religion-inspired conflicts, non-state actors, such as religious leaders and members of religious NGOs, had more success in promoting peace in different forms – whether peacemaking, peacebuilding, peace enforcing, or peace keeping (Little 2006 :102). Cynthia Sampson ( 1997 ) overviews the various roles and methodologies used by religious-motivated institutional actors in the process of peacebuilding. She provides manifold examples of conflict intervention by religious institutional actors that advocate (such as during the Rhodesian war of independence), intermediate (such as in the 1972 Sudanese peace process), observe (such as during the 1991 Zambian elections), and educate (such as in Northern Ireland). Appleby ( 2000 ) offers a similar approach focusing on religious actors and their roles.

The vast examples of religious involvement in peacebuilding have led Johnston and Sampson ( 1997 ) and Johnston ( 2003 ) to conceptualize this type of diplomacy as “faith-based diplomacy,” which takes place through track II channels (the informal and unofficial negotiations). In general, the Catholic Church receives more scholarly attention than other religious institutions in mediating disputes. Examples include the 1968–89 internal dispute in Bolivia (Klaiber 1993 ) and the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile (Garrett 1985 ; Lindsley 1987 ; Laudy 2000 ). Bartoli's analyses of the reconciliation process in Mozambique specify how religion plays a role in conflict resolution. He demonstrates that religion does not replace or transform the political process of negotiation, but rather provides motivation, organizational capacities, legitimacy, and flexibility (Bartoli 2001 , 2005 ; see also Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011 ).

The volume edited by David Little ( 2007 ) offers a different perspective that focuses on individual religious figures, rather than institutions, as peacemakers. Examples from El Salvador, Israel/Palestine, Kosovo, Northern Ireland, and Sudan highlight the grassroots efforts by religious individuals to promote peace. Using religious texts, rituals, and networks these individuals increase global attention, help find common ground, provide moral justification, and facilitate face-to-face communication between the warring sides (see also Smock 2008 ; for more on the topic of diplomacy and religion see “Diplomacy and Religion”).

Recently, there is a growing interest in challenging the secularist assumptions of United States foreign policy. Hurd ( 2008 ), for example, demonstrates that the perceived separation between religious and secular political authorities is a result of a political process and is socially constructed. By identifying two trajectories of secularism – a laicist one and a Judeo-Christian one – she shows how religion and secularism were never apart. Thus, instead of characterizing religion as a threat, diplomats and decision makers should realize that there are various political representations and interpretations of religion and should make more room for non-Western forms of politics (Hurd 2007 ). From a different perspective, Farr ( 2008 ) calls for rejecting the American narrow version of religious freedom that focuses on humanitarian violations in favor of a more tolerant and broader version that builds and encourages different versions of religious freedom in different regimes. Philpott ( 2013 :31) supports Farr's conclusions by highlighting how religious freedom is a “critical enabler of peace.”

Culture, Religion, and the Democratic Peace

Another research theme in IR tries to engage religion and culture in existing peace theories. The main example is democratic peace theory, by which liberal democracies tend not to fight each other. One of the explanations for democratic peace argues that shared cultures, values, and norms favoring compromise and peaceful solutions lead liberal democracies to solve disputes peacefully (Maoz and Russett 1993 ). But the traditional cultural explanation for democratic peace focuses on political culture and not on other elements such as ethnicity, language, and religion. Henderson ( 1998 ) tests the theory with those elements included and concludes that religious similarities within democratic dyads decrease the likelihood of war, while ethnic and lingual similarities increase this likelihood.

The connection between peaceful behavior and regime type led scholars to examine the connection between specific religions and democracy as a way to better understand the conditions for democracy and presumably for peace. After Huntington's theory and the events of September 11th, Western scholars tested Bernard Lewis’ hypothesis that Islamic religion conflicts with democracy (Midlarsky 1998 :486). This topic was researched from different angles. Some argue that Muslim resistance to modernity is an obstacle to democracy (Sivan 1990 ); some argue that lack of sufficient economic development holds back democracy; others claim that the possession of oil and the concept of the ‘rentier state’ hinder democracy (Ross 2001 ; Fish 2002 ); and some claim that the ideas grounded in Islamic thought and religion are incompatible with democracy (Huntington 1984 ; Lewis 1996 ). On the other hand, Esposito and Piscatori ( 1991 ) and Esposito and Voll ( 1996 ) argue that Islam is not necessarily hostile to democracy, and urge us to remember that Islam, like democracy, has a variety of interpretations, meanings, and political practices. Midlarsky ( 1998 ) tries to test the relationship between Islam and democracy using a political rights index (measuring procedural democracy) and an index of liberal democracy (measuring liberal freedoms). He finds that Islam, measured by the percentage of population that is Muslim, has a negative correlation with liberal freedoms but does not necessarily rule out democratic procedure. Recently, Hunter and Malik ( 2005 ) offer an antithesis to this view and demonstrate how military, colonial, international economic, and domestic economic factors prevented the creation of a civil society that is crucial for democracy. Sonn and McDaniel's chapter in the same book demonstrates how modern Islamic thought is quite similar to Western values, including rationality and tolerance.

Future Research

In the study of war and peace, religion long played a marginal role. Both sacred texts and Western canonical philosophical works contain religious references to war and peace, but none of the main theoretical works in IR address religion. Since the end of the Cold War and the growing attention to ethnic conflicts, new interests in culture and religion emerged. Scholars first explored the interplay of culture, war, and peace focusing on decision making, negotiation, national character, and the cultural construction of friends and foes. Then, as a result of the growing attention to ethnic conflict and terrorism, there was a resurgence of interest in religion in IR scholarship. Treated both as a central component of social identity and as an overarching ideology, religious international violence is understood by some scholars as a reaction to global population flows, modernization processes, and secularization.

Religion, as a social phenomenon, is also able to help us understand the growing power of actors outside the traditional boundaries of the state. Transnational actors that share religious beliefs with each other can pursue different, and sometimes contradictory, goals from those of the nation-state. Such actors can ignite conflicts, but can also help in mediating negotiations and promoting peace. Diplomats have learned to use key religious figures in their reconciliation attempts and they try to emphasize common values and diminish differences between religions.

The rediscovery of religion in IR scholarship has produced many studies that try to theorize the role of religion in conflict and peace. Thus far, these studies treat religion either as a political tool used by agents for their own interests or as an essentialist ideological scheme that informs actors’ behavior. Future research may focus on the relational and constantly changing aspects of religion and show what, when, and how various religious interpretations receive political prominence in promoting conflict or peace. Moreover, IR scholarship could use more theorization of how religion can be used as an independent variable across cases. How can one compare the religious passions animating the Crusades, with the religious passions during the Thirty Years War, or with modern fundamentalist terrorism? The definitional problems, mentioned earlier, provide difficulties in that regard.

A new way to look in more depth at religious and cultural elements of international politics is to use them as interpretive tools. Culture can be conceptualized as the “practices of meaning-making,” and thus open an opportunity to investigate the ways in which meanings are created within a society (Wedeen 2002 ). For example, examining political rhetoric can help us understand how meanings become inscribed within a society and how changes in rhetoric can lead to changes in foreign policy (Krebs and Jackson 2007 ; Krebs and Lobasz 2007 ). Another beneficial way to engage the elusive concepts of culture and religion is to trace the hidden set of assumptions that are embedded in the cultural and religion labels. What does “democracy” or “freedom” mean to different cultural or religious groups? What types of behavior are expected from a negotiator who is labeled Muslim or Buddhist and how does it affect the negotiation process? Moreover, how does popular representation of different religions shape these hidden assumptions?

IR literature will probably continue to engage culture and religion in its research, but in order to develop the field and avoid academic stagnation, it is important to enable scientific pluralism that will force us to reconsider how we treat religion and culture. A deeper understanding of different religions and cultures will open our understanding of the different “worlds” within “our world” and will identify the values that drive these worlds.

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Renée Marlin-Bennett for her valuable guidance and comments, and Andrew Mark Bennett for his meticulous assistance.

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Links to Digital Materials

Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs. At http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/ , accessed August 21, 2013 . The Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, based at Georgetown University, is an educational and a research center for the study of religion in relation to various international phenomena, such as globalization, human rights, ethnics of war, negotiation, and more. The website also includes data regarding international religious freedom.

The Institute for Cultural Diplomacy (ICD). At http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/index.php?en , accessed August 21, 2013 . The ICD is an international NGO whose main goal is to enhance the intercultural relations between peoples and areas in the world. The ICD offers reports and publications researching various aspects of cultural diplomacy – definitions, efforts, implementation, and future directions. The institute combines academic development of the field with practical programs and educational resources.

Minorities at Risk (MAR). At http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ , accessed August 21, 2013 . The MAR project, located at University of Maryland, collects data regarding active conflict between communal groups. Among other variables, the MAR data measures religious characteristics of the conflicting groups.

Religions and Ethics in the Making of War and Peace Project. At http://relwar.org/ , accessed August 21, 2013 . The project on Religion and Ethnics in the Making of War and Peace, based at the University of Edinburgh, is an academic and practical forum to discuss the relationship between military and religious ethics. The publication section includes several articles on that topic.

Religions for Peace. At http://religionsforpeace.org/ , accessed August 21, 2013 . Religion for Peace was founded in 1970 as a coalition of representatives from the world's major religions dedicated to promote peace. The website offers guides and resources aimed to help religious leaders decrease violence and encourage development and peace.

United States Institute of Peace. At http://www.usip.org/ , accessed August 21, 2013 . Beside various books dealing with negotiation styles of different cultures, the United States Institute of Peace offers panels, initiatives, reports, and other publications dealing both with culture and religion in diplomacy and in war.

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Andrew Holt, Ph.D.

History, religion, and academia.

The Myth of Religion as the Cause of Most Wars

The following essay, by Andrew Holt, is republished from John D. Hosler ‘s edited volume, Seven Myths of Military History (Hackett, 2022). It is provided here with both the permission of Professor Hosler and Hackett Publishing . Thoughtful feedback and comments are welcome and can be emailed directly to the author at [email protected].

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Chapter 1. War and the Divine: Is Religion the Cause of Most Wars?

Andrew Holt

“It is somewhat trite, but nevertheless sadly true, to say that more wars have been waged, more people killed, and these days more evil perpetrated in the name of religion than by any other institutional force in human history.”

—Richard Kimball [1]

To uproarious laughter, the late comedian and social critic George Carlin once condemned God as the cause of the “bloodiest and most brutal wars” ever fought, which were “all based on religious hatred.” He stated that millions have died simply because “God told” Hindus, Muslims, Jews, and Christians it would be a “good idea” for them to kill each other. Carlin’s comedy routine, entitled “Kill for God!” has received rave reviews by its viewers for being “brilliant” and “spot on,” with one anonymous fan confirming that religion is “by far the single biggest cause of human deaths.” [2]

To be clear, it is not modern military historians who claim religion is the cause of most wars, but rather many prominent intellectuals, scientists, academics, and politicians, often with far greater influence over popular cultural assumptions than professional historians, who have popularized such claims. In a 2006 interview, the neuroscientist and cultural commentator Sam Harris stated, “If I could wave a magic wand and get rid of either rape or religion, I would not hesitate to get rid of religion. I think more people are dying as a result of our religious myths than as a result of any other ideology.” [3] The Oxford University evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins claimed in 2003 that religion is the “principal label, and the most dangerous one,” by which human divisions occur, contributing to “wars, murders and terrorist attacks.” [4]

Prominent American politicians have commented similarly. Richard Nixon argued in 1983 that the “bloodiest wars in history have been religious wars.” [5] Perhaps unknowingly, Nixon was following his predecessor George Washington, who remarked in a 1792 letter that “religious controversies are always productive of more acrimony and irreconcilable hatreds than those which spring from any other cause.” [6] That Washington held such views in the late eighteenth century is not surprising, given the rationalist spirit of his social class and times. Some of his contemporaries equally expressed their concern over the propensity for violence among traditional religious believers. Thomas Paine is perhaps most notable in this regard. In The Age of Reason he argued that “the most detestable wickedness, the most horrid cruelties, and the greatest miseries, that have afflicted the human race have had their origin in this thing called revelation, or revealed religion. It has been . . . the most destructive to . . . the peace and happiness of man.” [7]

Paine’s views reflect a particular strain of thought that emerged in a slightly earlier period of the European eighteenth century, which many persons then and now have referred to as the “Enlightenment.” While intellectuals of the period tended to emphasize religious toleration, many also wrote harshly about the negative social effects of traditional religion. Such concerns undoubtedly reflected the fact that they were writing in the wake of the so-called age of religious wars, during which Catholics and Protestants engaged in lengthy and destructive conflicts including, most notably, the French Wars of Religion (1562–98), the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48), and the English Civil War (1642–51). [8]

None can challenge the claim that religion has often inspired or motivated violence, but has it truly been, as Harris claims, the “most prolific” source? Are, or were, religious wars, as Nixon wrote, the “bloodiest” sort of wars? Is it true that “more wars have been waged” and “more people killed” because of religion than any other institutional force, as Richard Kimball claims in the quotation that begins this essay?

Interestingly, these claims—often confidently asserted—that “more” wars have been waged and “more” people killed as a result of religion, can only be substantiated by an accounting of all major wars of which we have historical knowledge and both a means of separating the “religious” wars from other types of wars and counting the bodies. Such a list is destined to be incomplete and open to debate for many reasons, not least of which is the ambiguity surrounding many human conflicts. Was, for example, the English Civil War primarily a struggle over parliamentary rights vis-à-vis royal absolutism, or was it driven by a deep religious divide? Or was it both? Regardless of these pitfalls and uncertainties, such an accounting, no matter its imperfections, that seeks to understand the causes of particular wars and the degree of their lethality is possible. It is only with such an accounting that one can determine if religion is, indeed, the cause of most wars.

To most historians, this may seem an impossible task, with insurmountable methodological problems. Nevertheless, the critics cited here—neither specialists on warfare in any era nor trained historians—assume an ability to do this. Indeed, there is no other basis for making their claims without these assumptions.

The critics cited thus far do not provide such an accounting. Kimball and Harris imply that their claims are transparently obvious. For Kimball, religious ideologies and commitments are “indisputably central factors” in the “escalation of violence and evil around the world.” [9] He states that this “evidence is readily available,” after which he cites not data but the headlines of seven newspaper stories about contemporary religious violence. [10]

Yet this is anecdotal evidence. Moreover, alternative causality is dispensed with, as when Harris rejects out of hand the notion that the Hindu-Muslim conflict has political or economic roots. [11] Furthermore, neither author endeavors to sift through history’s wars in order to make even a rough estimate of how many were primarily motivated by religious considerations, much less offering a method for how one distinguishes “religious” wars from all other types of wars. And neither acknowledges a basic proposition that all historians would accept: that most, if not all, wars are driven by multiple factors. At what point does a preponderance of religious factors, however they might be defined, outweigh secular motives or goals allowing for a war to be categorized as a “religious” war? The critics cited here appear to consider such questions and modes of inquiry irrelevant.

Of course, one could reasonably argue that firmly distinguishing between religious and nonreligious wars is so impossible that any effort to count and categorize all known wars in this manner is doomed to failure. Indeed, as I prepared this essay, I spoke with multiple historians who all inquired how one could possibly accomplish such a task, with some intonating it is not possible due to the complexity of warfare, which is almost always based on multiple causes and motivations. If this is true—that it is essentially impossible to distinguish “religious” wars from other types of war, much less provide accurate casualty figures for all wars ancient to modern—then the debate is over: there can be no basis to the argument that the former is the most frequent cause of war and/or the bloodiest type of human conflict. In sum, Harris, Kimball, and others would have zero basis for their claims. Likewise, those who seek to refute their charges would be unable to offer anything even approaching quantifiable evidence to support their objections. Game over.

But let us not fall prey to defeatism. Complexity and ambiguity pervade historical research and are elements in every conclusion reached by every historian. With that in mind, let us dare to hazard a definition of religious warfare.

Defining “Religious Warfare”

In attempting to define religious warfare, it first seems worthwhile to consider the origin of the term “religion.” In its earliest Ciceronian sense, the Latin word religio meant to have respect or regard for the gods, as demonstrated by the performance of obligatory rites in veneration of them. [12] Although a critic of Roman religion, Augustine of Hippo (d. 430) adapted the term in such a way that it could be uniquely applied to a Christian understanding of and relationship to the sacred. For Augustine, religio meant worship, the actions by which one renders praise to God, but he also sought to separate what he understood to be true worship from false worship. [13]

Yet while many in the West think of religion as worship centered around a god or gods, accompanied by adherence to theological doctrines and rituals, such a definition fails to embrace the totality of the worldwide religious experience, both past and present. Definitions evolve and change, and modern scholars of religion have come to accept a broader definition of religion, one that phenomenologists who specialize in comparative religion now generally embrace, which sees “religion” as any spiritual or pragmatic connection with a transcendental Other. This Other could include gods (or God), sacred forces, a supreme cosmic spirit, or even a universal law, like Buddhist Dharma. [14] Consequently, if “religion” represents belief in the Divine and reverence for the Other—and these beliefs influence the thoughts, morality, and deeds of believers—then it follows that “religious wars” are those conflicts in which religious belief or devotion plays a key role in the motivation of most of their originators and/or participants.

The oft-cited Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously argued that all wars are political. [15] Yet when religious motivations influence political goals, it becomes trickier to determine to what degree religion is the inspiration for a conflict. Must both sides in a conflict have religious motivations for it to be considered a “religious” war, or is one side sufficient? At what point do economic concerns, for example, outweigh religious concerns so that one would no longer consider a war “religious”? What if a war begins as religious but ends as an overtly political conflict, as was the case with the Thirty Years’ War? Those who make the claim that religion is the most prominent cause of violence or warfare never seem to bother with such details, yet they, nevertheless, obviously define “religious wars” broadly enough to support them.

To be clear, few would object to the proposition that religion or religious motivation often inspire violence. Many examples of religiously inspired warfare are to be found in the histories of the ancient Near East, Greco-Roman antiquity, Europe, the Far East, India, the Americas, and sub-Saharan Africa by members of various religions. Spanning the ancient to modern worlds, Mesopotamians, Chinese, Indians, Europeans, Arabs, Persians, Turks, Aztecs, and many others have embraced religious beliefs that at times led to, justified, or encouraged violence or warfare, sometimes resulting in a massive loss of human life. Yet the aforementioned critics of religious violence do not claim that religion sometimes inspires violence or warfare. If this were the case, then their claims would be noncontroversial. Instead, they claim that, more than any other factor, religious faith has led to more war throughout history and across all cultures.

If one is willing to hazard a definition of religious warfare, as I have just done, that allows for the distinct categorization of religious and nonreligious wars, then some data can be developed that might help us to evaluate these charges in a manner that is more systematic and logical than simply saying, “Your criticism of religion as the cause of most wars and bloodshed is without foundation.” As demonstrated in the remainder of this chapter, some have been willing to provide such a twofold analysis, namely to categorize wars as “religious” or otherwise and to provide death estimates for various wars. Such data are not supportive of the claims of Kimball et al. To the contrary, the only data currently available on these topics suggest that the popular claim that religion is the cause of “more” wars than anything else . . . is a myth.

Religious War by the Numbers

Charles Phillips and Alan Axelrod’s three-volume Encyclopedia of Wars includes an analysis of 1,763 wars covering the worldwide span of human history. It has become an influential reference in the popular sphere, often cited by persons seeking to define specific wars as religious or otherwise. [16] In their lengthy index entry on “religious wars, Phillips and Axelrod do not explain their classification methodology. They only provide clues in their limited commentary on the concept of religious wars in their introduction, where they seem to suggest that religion was often used as a sort of cover for premodern wars that resulted from more mundane causes, including territorial, ethnic, and economic concerns. [17] Yet each war they list in the index under the category “religious wars” contains clear references to its religious nature or features, providing an apparent justification for its classification as such. [18]

What, then, did Phillips and Axelrod find? Interestingly, of 1,763 wars they list only 121 entries fall under the heading “religious wars.” In one case, two wars are considered in a single entry (“Sixth and Seventh Wars of Religion”), bringing their total to 122. [19] Thus, only 6.9 percent of the wars they considered are classified as religious wars. [20] One presumes they see the remaining 93.1 percent as primarily wars that took shape due to other factors, such as geopolitics, economic rivalry, and ethnic divisions. One may certainly quibble over the omission of some wars from Phillips and Axelrod’s list, but it would take a lot of quibbling to get to the point where religious wars represent the majority (882 out of 1,763) of the wars they count and consider. They also list other categories of warfare that have higher totals than religion. Under the heading of “colonial wars,” they list 161 wars. [21] After cross-referencing both lists, one finds that Phillips and Axelrod only list two wars in both the “colonial” and “religious” categories, suggesting that they have made every effort to categorize these wars based on their primary causes, as they interpret them, rather than secondary ones. [22] Consequently, based on the total numbers presented by Phillips and Axelrod in each category, one could argue that imperialist ideologies, regardless of the latent religiosity that occasionally colors such endeavors, have historically and collectively been the primary inspiration of more wars than explicitly religious ideologies.

Again, historians could certainly look at Phillips and Axelrod’s list of religious wars and criticize the omission of many and the inclusion of some. Indeed, in my rough accounting of the 1,763 wars they list in their encyclopedia, I would likely come up with a figure of religious wars that, perhaps, doubled theirs. Other historians may arrive at still different figures, both lesser and greater, based on how they choose to categorize “religious wars.” Yet it seems highly unlikely that any historian would look at the 1,763 wars considered in the Encyclopedia of Wars and determine that a majority of them were primarily religious. If someone were to attempt to provide such a systematic accounting, their efforts would, indeed, be interesting to consider here, but nobody besides Phillips and Axelrod seems to have been bothered.

In a similar way, Matthew White, a self-described “atrocitologist,” is sometimes cited by those comparing religious wars to nonreligious wars. His 2012 book purports to list the one hundred greatest atrocities in human history, based on total deaths. [23] Although a popular-history writer, White’s work was favorably reviewed in the New York Times and has won academic acclaim in some quarters, with Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker dubbing it, in a complimentary foreword, “the most comprehensive, disinterested and statistically nuanced estimates available.” [24] Historians, as well, have praised White’s efforts. Harvard University professor of history Charles S. Maier, in the same New York Times review, praised White for trying to arrive at “the best figures” and not being, like most historians when it comes to this type of research, “afraid to get his hands dirty.” [25]

White is clear and upfront about both his methodology and the controversial nature of his statistics. He notes, for example, on the first page of his introduction, “Let’s get something out of the way right now. Everything you are about to read is disputed. . . . There is no atrocity in history that every person in the world agrees on.” [26] His methodology, as described in the Times review, is simple and transparent. He gathers all of the death estimates he can find for an event, with all data on his website available for public review, throws out the highest and lowest numbers, and then calculates the median, “arriving at what he acknowledges is often just an informed guess.” [27] Yet, White’s “informed guesses” appear to be the best ones currently available.

Like Phillips and Axelrod, White also categorizes and provides a list under the heading “Religious Conflict.” [28] He notes that it is “impossible” to find a “common cause” in the various atrocities he considers, and that they can often fall under multiple headings. For example, White lists “Cromwell’s Invasion of Ireland” under the categories of both “Religious Conflict” and “Ethnic Cleansing.” [29] Yet even allowing for this, White lists only eleven atrocities that fall under the heading of “Religious Conflict.” He provides insights into how he arrived at his list in a section of his work subtitled “Religious Killing,” while pointing out that “no war is 100 percent religious (or 100 percent anything) in motivation, but we can’t duck the fact that some conflicts involve more religion than others.” [30]

In an attempt to solve a problem we have already noted here, White then asks how we can decide if “religion is the real cause of a conflict and not just a convenient cover story?” [31] In response, he lists three primary principles that cumulatively address this question. The first is when “the only difference between the two sides is religion,” for which he cites examples of people who look alike, speak the same languages, and live in the same communities yet engage in conflict over what can only be ascribed to religious differences. This would include Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. The second is an ability to describe a conflict without reference to religion or religious trappings. For this, he gives the example of the US Civil War, which he notes certainly had religious elements, but can also be described in a detailed history without ever referencing those elements. White argues this would be impossible, for example, in writing a history of the crusades. Finally, the third is when the parties themselves declare religious motives. Here White notes that “we should at least consider the possibility that they are telling the truth,” especially if there are not other significant potential reasons. [32]

With these rules in mind, White lists eleven atrocities from the one hundred that he classifies as “Religious Conflicts”: Taiping Rebellion, Thirty Years’ War, Mahdi’s Revolt, Crusades, [33] French Wars of Religion War in the Sudan Albigensian Crusade, Panthay Rebellion, Hui Rebellion, Partition of India, and Cromwell’s Invasion of Ireland. [34] Thus, according to White’s study, only 11 percent of the one hundred worst atrocities in history can be attributed, in some major part, to religion, with 89 percent primarily attributable to some other cause. Yet there are other atrocities in White’s book that seem to deserve to be grouped under a more general heading of religiously inspired atrocities, even if they do not meet his definition of “conflict.” These include the Roman gladiatorial games and Aztec human sacrifice, both of which White categorized separately under “Human Sacrifice.” [35] If we add these two atrocities to the eleven listed under religious conflict, this would bring the total of the one hundred greatest atrocities, based on White’s death estimates, attributed primarily to religious motivations (a broader category than just “conflicts”) up to thirteen, or only 13 percent.

A final breakdown, depending on how one evaluates White’s work, is therefore as follows: 11/100 (or 11 percent) of the worst atrocities in history can be ascribed to “Religious Conflict,” and 13/100 (or 13 percent) of the worst atrocities in history can be ascribed to “Religious Conflict” or “Human Sacrifice.” Although these percentages are higher than Phillips and Axelrod’s more comprehensive findings (6.9 percent), none supports the claim that religion has been and remains the cause of most wars. Indeed, “Hegemonial War,” a category that White defines as similar countries fighting “over who’s number 1,” and “Failed State” conflicts, involving the collapse of a central government and the division of lands among warlords that results from the civil war that follows, individually account for more of the “worst atrocities” on his list than “Religious Conflict.” [36]

Again, one may quibble about White’s categories, arguing that he omitted some significant wars and instances of mass violence or incorrectly included others, but it seems highly unlikely that any historian reviewing White’s list of the one hundred greatest atrocities in history would see a majority of them as primarily religious. An alternative accounting would be welcome for consideration here, but nobody else has offered one, certainly none of the prominent voices proclaiming religion as the cause of the “bloodiest” wars.

Steven Pinker has provided his own rankings, based largely on White’s research, of the twenty-one worst wars or atrocities based on death tolls in his widely reviewed 2011 book, Better Angels . [37] His list includes the following: Second World War, reign of Mao Zedong, Mongol conquests, An Lushan Revolt, fall of the Ming dynasty, Taiping Rebellion, annihilation of the American Indians, rule of Joseph Stalin, Mideast slave trade, Atlantic slave trade, rule of Tamerlane, British rule of India, World War I, Russian Civil War, fall of Rome, Congo Free State, Thirty Years’ War, Russia’s Time of Troubles, Napoleonic Wars, Chinese Civil War, and the French Wars of Religion. Pinker then provides a unique perspective by factoring in population differences at the times such events occurred. While Pinker lists 55,000,000 deaths resulting from World War II in the mid-twentieth century and only 36,000,000 for the An Lushan Revolt in mid-eighth-century China, he then uses population estimates to adjust the rankings per capita between the different periods. [38] Using this “mid-twentieth-century equivalent,” he finds that the An Lushan Revolt would move from fourth place to first place on his list with a mid-twentieth-century equivalent of 429,000,000 deaths, far surpassing World War II. [39]

While Pinker singles out religious conflicts/events in neither his ranking based on total deaths nor his population-adjusted rankings, it is interesting to note that religious conflicts appear to play a minor role in both. Only three of the conflicts would clearly seem to qualify as primarily religious conflicts or religiously inspired events: the Taiping Rebellion, the Thirty-Years’ War, and the French Wars of Religion, resulting in only 14.2 percent of the twenty-one worst atrocities in history as referenced by Pinker. It is worth pointing out that at least four of the twenty-one atrocities listed by Pinker could be attributed not to religion but rather Marxist efforts to establish or develop communist states, including the reign of Mao Zedong, the reign of Stalin, the Russian Civil War, and the Chinese Civil War, equaling 19 percent of the total. Consequently, one could argue that Marxism is a greater cause of violence and atrocities in Pinker’s study than religion!

The numbers, therefore, as provided by our three major studies to enumerate history’s most violent wars and conflicts, break down as follows: 6.9 percent of Phillips and Axelrod’s 1,763 historical wars were religious conflicts; 13 percent of White’s 100 worst atrocities in history can be ascribed to “Religious Conflict” or “Human Sacrifice”; and 14.2 percent of Pinker’s 21 worst atrocities in history were religiously inspired. Thus, our only existing quantitative analyses suggest that religious motivations inspire only a relatively small percentage of all conflicts. Moreover, there seem to be other causes or motivations that have inspired more wars or atrocities than religion.

Distinguishing Religious Wars from Secular Wars

One can disagree with such an approach in considering to what degree religion was the cause of a particular conflict. Such disagreements among historians are not surprising. War is messy, after all, and conflicts usually emerge from a complex mix of factors that might incorporate economic, political, ethnic, and religious concerns on one or both sides.

William T. Cavanaugh, a theologian and professor of Catholic studies at DePaul University, has considered the issue of defining and distinguishing religious warfare from other types of conflict in a highly influential 2009 book. Cavanaugh argues that various scholars have made “indefensible assumptions about what does and does not count as religion.” [40] He considers the claims of nine scholars who have suggested that “religion is particularly prone to violence” based on arguments that religion is, among other things, absolutist, divisive, and/or irrational. [41] He rejects their respective arguments, noting that “they all suffer from the same defect: the inability to find a convincing way to separate religious violence from secular violence.” [42] Indeed, as Cavanaugh argues, secular violence is often motivated by similar degrees of absolutism, division, and irrationality, but in nonreligious forms.

Among the scholars that Cavanaugh considers is Charles Kimball. He argues that Kimball’s book (which, incidentally, was chosen by Publishers Weekly as the top book on religion in 2002) “suffers” from its inability to “distinguish the religious from the secular.” [43] Kimball postulates that there are various “warning signs” that religion could turn evil. Among such warning signs, for example, are calls for blind obedience and the belief that the end justifies the means. Cavanaugh argues in rebuttal that all of the warning signs offered by Kimball could equally apply to nationalism or nationalist ideologies. Concerning Kimball’s claim about blind obedience as a marker of religious conflict, for example, Cavanaugh points out that “obedience is institutionalized” in the US military, as there is no allowance for “selective conscientious objection.” [44] Yet Cavanaugh appears most dismissive of the claim that the end justifies the means is uniquely associated with religious conflict, noting that the history of modern conflict is “full of evidence” that demonstrates how secular states have embraced such a view. Among such evidence, he references “the vaporization of innocent civilians in Hiroshima” and “the practice of torture by over a third of the world’s nation states, including many democracies.” [45]

To be clear, Cavanaugh is not rejecting the notion that religion can sometimes inspire violence. Instead, he is arguing that Kimball’s efforts to clearly distinguish religious violence as somehow worse than secular violence, and more prone to fanaticism, are unconvincing.

Similarly, Cavanaugh also challenges the claims of sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer, who argues that “religion seems to be connected with violence virtually everywhere,” perpetually and across all religious traditions. [46] Juergensmeyer, like Kimball, makes sharp distinctions between religious and secular violence, highlighting what he claims are significant differences. These include, for example, the notion that religious violence is “accompanied by strong claims of moral justification and enduring absolutism” as a result of the intense religious conviction of those carrying it out. [47] In response, Cavanaugh points out how secular warfare is often “couched in the strongest rhetoric of moral justification and historical duty,” citing, for example, Operation Infinite Justice, the US military’s initial name for the post-9/11 war in Afghanistan. [48] In another example, Juergensmeyer argues that secular conflicts are briefer, concluding within the lifetimes of the combatants, whereas religious conflicts can last for hundreds of years. [49] Cavanaugh objects by noting that, “Juergensmeyer himself says that US leaders have given every indication that the ‘war against terror’ will stretch indefinitely into the future” and that this war “seems so absolute and unyielding on both sides.” [50] To this one might also cite the examples of the so-called Hundred Years’ War, lasting from 1337 to 1453, as well as the Second Hundred Years’ War, lasting from 1689 to 1815, both of which have traditionally been interpreted, and rightly so, as secular conflicts rather than religious ones.

Cavanaugh does not confine himself to refuting only Kimball’s and Juergensmeyer’s arguments. He critiques the positions of several other scholars who have made similar claims about religion, emphasizing their presumed inability to define religious wars or violence in a way that cannot also be applied to secular institutions or ideologies. He further argues that modern distinctions between religious violence and other types of violence “are part of a broader Enlightenment narrative that has invented a dichotomy between the religious and the secular. . .” that frames religious violence as “irrational and dangerous” in comparison to various forms of secular violence. [51] He then rejects the notion, convincingly, I think, that religious ideologies are inherently “more inclined toward violence” than secular ideologies or institutions, arguing that distinctions between the two have not been properly established by the scholars who make such claims. [52]

Secular Ideologies as a Type of Religion?

Another problem is that people often define religion and its essential qualities quite differently. Some scholars even debate whether or not nationalism, Marxism, liberalism, or intersectionality are essentially religious in nature as a result of varying demands for philosophical and political “orthodoxy” from adherents to the worldviews promoted by these ideologies. Yet the definition of religion provided earlier in this essay, based on the earliest meanings of the term, centered on belief in, respect for, and devotion to a transcendental Other, obviously excludes secular ideologies from qualifying as “religions.” Moreover, modern adherents of the major faiths, which include Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, among others, who embrace the Divine as a mover of historical events and the afterlife, in some form, as a reality, would see such secular ideologies, devoid of any emphasis on the sacred or the Divine, as something very different from how they define religion.

Similarly, Marxist governments, as well, have generally embraced atheism and typically rejected any associations of their beliefs with religion. Karl Marx himself disparaged “religion” as the “opium of the people,” serving only as a palliative that those in power offered to mask the suffering of the proletariat and, thereby, harmfully preventing the oppressed from perceiving the oppression that was the cause of their pain. [53] Marx did not see his conclusions, which he based on his study of history, economics, and government, as a faith or “religion.” To his mind, his insight was scientific truth, not empty belief, and he understood it to be a rational and true alternative to the irrational illusion of religion.

Consequently, while some may classify certain secular ideologies as essentially religious, when claiming that religion is the cause of more wars than anything else critics like Harris or Dawkins certainly do not. They are not, after all, referring to secular atheists or agnostics (like themselves), progressives, or Marxists, as the cause of most wars or violence, but rather those who are inspired to acts of war because of their belief in the Divine.

Secular Ideologies and Violence

As noted at the beginning of this essay, Kimball argues that “more people” have been killed in the name of religion “than by any other institutional force in human history.” [54] Yet other ideologies appear to have proven far deadlier (and in a shorter amount of time) than religiously inspired conflict. Consider the comments of Sam Harris, who devotes a portion of his introductory chapter in The End of Faith to the collective horrors and atrocities that have resulted from historic Hindu-Muslim animosity and highlights political efforts to accommodate Hindu-Muslim religious divisions through the establishment of the modern nations of Pakistan and India. Harris then asks, “When will we realize that the concessions we have made to faith in our political discourse have prevented us from even speaking about, much less uprooting, the most prolific source of violence in our history?” [55]

Concerning Harris’s suggestion that “concessions” in our “political discourse” to religious faith have been the main obstacle to reducing violence from its “most prolific” source (religious faith), it is worth noting that there has, indeed, been a political discourse that not only refused to make concessions to religious faith, particularly Christianity, but also outright attacked it—communism. [56] Indeed, the communist government of the Soviet Union initially attacked Christianity as a source of all evils, destroying churches and persecuting clergy during the 1920s, as it sought to uproot , to borrow Harris’s term, Christianity from Soviet society. Yet this did not stop violence in the Soviet Union or hinder the extensive Soviet promotion of revolutionary conflicts around the world. To the contrary, the twentieth century is grimly notable for the deaths of, so it has been estimated, nearly one hundred million people by communist governments. [57] Some estimates run even higher. R. J. Rummel, for example, studied governments responsible for mass killings of their own citizens, a phenomenon he called “democide.” [58] He attributed far higher numbers of deaths to the reigns of Mao or Stalin than did Pinker or White: seventy-three million to Mao (vs. forty), and thirty-eight million to Stalin (vs. twenty). [59] Similarly, in White’s statistical breakdown, by cause, of the deaths attributed to the one hundred greatest historic atrocities, multiple categories rank higher than religion. Of White’s estimated 455 million collective victims of these atrocities, he calculates that about 47 million were due to religion, or only around 10 percent of the total. [60] In contrast, White estimates that communist ideology is responsible for 67 million deaths, or nearly 15 percent of the total. [61]

As I have tried to make clear throughout this essay, none of what I have written here is meant to imply that religions are always, or even typically, peaceful, or that members of various religious faiths cannot exhibit the same degree of violence as those otherwise motivated. Religious peoples are often willing to engage in warfare. To the contrary, my argument is that claims that religious wars are more violent and greater in number than other types have no empirical evidence to support them. Such arguments are wholly anecdotal, which almost certainly explains why professional historians have not embraced them. Available quantitative analyses of history’s wars in this regard, as flawed as they are, point in a different direction: that religious conflicts are but a relatively modest percentage of the total and that other causes or ideological motivations have inspired as much or more conflict than religion. Thus, until new data are collected that demonstrate otherwise, the claim that religion is the greatest cause of war is an unsubstantiated myth.

[1] Richard Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil: Five Warning Signs (New York: Harper, 2002), 1.

[2] George Carlin, “Kill for God,” YouTube, accessed January 16, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WEi3Gaptaas .

[3] Bethany Saltman, “The Temple of Reason: Sam Harris on How Religion Puts the World at Risk,” The Sun , September 2006.

[4] Richard Dawkins, A Devil’s Chaplain: Reflections on Hopes, Lies, Science, and Love (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003), 158.

[5] Richard M. Nixon, Real Peace: A Strategy for the West (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983), 14.

[6] George Washington to Edward Newenham, June 22, 1792,” National Archives Founders Online, accessed January 16, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-10-02-0324 .

[7] Thomas Paine, The Age of Reason, Part the Second: Being an Investigation of True and Fabulous Theology (London: R. Carlisle, 1818), 82.

[8] See Richard S. Dunn, The Age of Religious Wars: 1559–1689 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), ix; and Philippe Buc, Holy War, Martyrdom, and Terror: Christianity, Violence, and the West (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 29–36.

[9] Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil , 4.

[10] Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil , 4.

[11] Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), 27.

[12] Cicero, De Natura Deorum Academia , trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), XLII.112–13. On religio , see Clifford Ando, The Matter of the Gods: Religion and the Roman Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 1–6; William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 60–69.

[13] Cavanaugh, Myth of Religious Violence ,63; Ando, Matter of the Gods ,4–5.

[14] Alfred J. Andrea and Andrew Holt, Sanctified Violence: Holy War in World History (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2021), 1.

[15] Carl von Clausewitz, On War , ed. and trans. M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), I.1.24–27: “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means”; “a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means”; and, consequently, “all wars can be considered acts of policy.”

[16] Encyclopedia of Wars ,ed. C. Phillips and A. Axelrod, 3 vols.(New York: Facts on File, 2005), III:1484–85. Commentators citing the Encyclopedia of Wars in this manner include the Huffington Post , Christian apologetics groups, such as the Christian Apologetics and Research Ministry (CARM), and the libertarian political/social commentator Theodore Beale, more commonly known as Vox Day. See Vox Day, The Irrational Atheist: Dissecting the Unholy Trinity of Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens (Dallas: Benbella, 2008), 103–6; Robin Schumacher, “The Myth That Religion Is the 1# Cause of War,” CARM: Christian Apologetics and Research Ministry, accessed March 13, 2019, https://carm.org/religion-cause-war ; and Alan Lurie, “Is Religion the Cause of Most Wars?” Huffington Post , April 10, 2012.

[17] Encyclopedia of Wars ,I:xxii–xxiii.

[18] In their entry titled “Charlemagne’s War against the Saxons,” e.g., Phillips and Axelrod refer to the effort to convert the Saxons to Christianity as one of Charlemagne’s “major” objectives and describe his success. See Encyclopedia of Wars , I:307–8.

[19] The common figure ascribed by various sources to the Encyclopedia of Wars is slightly different, usually listing 123 religious wars. See, e.g., Bruce Sheiman, An Atheist Defends Religion: Why Humanity Is Better Off with Religion Than without It (New York: Alpha, 2009), 117.

[20] Phillips and Axelrod’s list, reordered chronologically here, includes the following: First, Second, Third, and Fourth Sacred Wars (spanning 595 to 336 BCE); Roman-Persian Wars (421–22 and 441); Visigothic-Frankish War; Mecca-Medina War; Byzantine-Muslim Wars (633–42, 645–56, 668–79, 698–718, 739, 741–52, 778–83, 797–98, 803–9, 830–41, 851–63, 871–85, 960–76, and 995–99); Arab conquest of Carthage; revolt in Ravenna; First and Second Iconoclastic Wars, Charlemagne’s invasion of Northern Spain; revolt of Muqanna; Charlemagne’s War against the Saxons; Khurramites’ revolt; Paulician War; Spanish Christian-Muslim Wars (912–28, 977–97, 1001–31, 1172–1212, 1230–48, and 1481–92); German Civil War (1077–1106); Castilian conquest of Toledo; Almohad conquest of Muslim Spain; Spanish conquests in North Africa (1090–91); First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Crusades (spanning 1095–1272); Crusader-Turkish Wars (spanning 1100–1146 and 1272–91); Aragonese-Castilian War; Wars of the Lombard League; Saladin’s Holy War; Aragonese-French War (1209–13); Albigensian Crusade; Danish-Estonian War; Luccan-Florentine War; Crusade of Nicopolis; Portuguese-Moroccan Wars (1458–71 and 1578); War of the Monks; Bohemian Civil War (1465–71); Bohemian-Hungarian War (1468–78); Siege of Granada; Persian Civil War (1500–1503); Vijayanagar Wars; Anglo-Scottish War; Turko-Persian Wars (1514–17 and 1743–47); Counts’ War; Schmalkaldic War; Scottish uprising against Mary of Guise; First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Wars of Religion (spanning 1562 to 1598); Javanese invasion of Malacca; Bohemian-Palatine War; Thirty Years’ War; First, Second, and Third Bernese Revolts (spanning 1621 to 1629); Swedish War; Shimabara Revolt (1637–38); First and Second Bishops Wars; Maryland’s Religious War; Transylvania-Hapsburg War; Portuguese-Omani Wars in East Africa; First Villmergen War; Covenanters’ Rebellions (1666, 1679, and 1685); Rajput Rebellion against Aurangzeb; Camisard Rebellion; Second Villmergen War; Brabant Revolution; Vellore Mutiny; Great Java War; Padri War; Irish Tithe War; War of the Sonderbund; Crimean War; Tukulor-French Wars; Mountain Meadows Massacre; Serbo-Turkish War; Russo-Turkish War (1877–78); Ugandan Religious Wars; Ghost Dance War; Holy Wars of the “Mad Mullah”; raids of the Black Hundreds; Mexican insurrections; Indian Civil War; Bosnian War; and US War on Terrorism.

[21] Encyclopedia of Wars , III.1447–48.

[22] The two wars listed in both the “colonial wars” and “religious wars” categories by Phillips and Axelrod are the Tukulor-French Wars and the Vellore Mutiny, nineteenth-century conflicts involving a complex mix of potential religious and colonial/territorial causes that may have proven too difficult for the authors to categorize under one primary cause. See Encyclopedia of Wars , III.1158–59 and 1243.

[23] Matthew White, The Great Big Book of Horrible Things: The Definitive Chronicle of History’s 100 Worst Atrocities (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012).

[24] Jennifer Schuessler, “Ranking History’s Atrocities by Counting the Corpses,” New York Times , November 8, 2011.

[25] Schuessler, “Ranking History’s Atrocities.”

[26] White, Great Big Book of Horrible Things , xiii.

[27] Schuessler, “Ranking History’s Atrocities.” For White’s figures, see “Death Tolls across History,” Necrometrics, accessed March 15, 2019, https://necrometrics.com/ .

[28] White, Great Big Book of Horrible Things , 544.

[29] White, Great Big Book of Horrible Things , 544–45.

[30] White, Great Big Book of Horrible Things , 544 and 107–8.

[31] White, Great Big Book of Horrible Things , 107.

[32] White, Great Big Book of Horrible Things , 107–8.

[33] Presumably, only the crusades that took place in the East.

[34] White, Great Big Book of Horrible Things , 544.

[35] White, Great Big Book of Horrible Things , 548. One could argue that Mesoamerican human sacrifice is more correct, as even societies like the Maya appear to have performed it, even if apparently on a lesser scale. The scale of Aztec human sacrifice—from only 150 sacrificial victims to 250,000 per year—is a debate; see Matthew Restall’s book When Montezuma Met Cortés: The True Story of the Meeting that Changed History (New York: Ecco, 2018), 85–95.

[36] White, Great Big Book of Horrible Things , 543–44.

[37] Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Penguin, 2011), 195. His categorizations are often problematic, as reflected in his consideration of the “Fall of Rome” as an “atrocity.”

[38] Pinker draws his figure of 36,000,000 for the An Lushan Rebellion from White, Great Big Book of Horrible Things , 93. White notes, “The census taken in China in the year 754 recorded a population of 52,880,488. After ten years of civil war, the census of 764 found only 16,900,000 people in China. What happened to 36 million people? Is a loss of two-thirds in one decade even possible? Perhaps. Peasants often lived at the very edge of starvation, so the slightest disruption could cause a massive die off, particularly if they depended on large irrigation systems. . . . [Moreover] many authorities quote these numbers with a minimum of doubt.”

[39] Pinker, Better Angels , 195.

[40] Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence , 4.

[41] Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence , 15–56. In addition to Kimball, he considers the academic arguments of John Hick, Richard Wentz, Martin Marty, Mark Juergensmeyer, David C. Rapoport, Bhikhu Parekh, R. Scott Appleby, and Charles Selengut.

[42] Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence , 8.

[43] Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence , 21–24.

[44] Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence , 23.

[45] Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence , 24.

[46] Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence , 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), xi.

[47] Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God , 220.

[48] Cavanaugh, Myth of Religious Violence ,32.

[49] Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God , 158.

[50] Cavanaugh, Myth of Religious Violence ,32.

[51] Cavanaugh, Myth of Religious Violence , 4.

[52] Cavanaugh, Myth of Religious Violence , 5.

[53] Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right , ” trans. A. Jolin and J. O’Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 131.

[54] Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil ,1.

[55] Harris, The End of Faith , 26–27.

[56] Special thanks to Professor Florin Curta of the University of Florida for drawing my attention to this point in a private conversation.

[57] Stéphane Courtois et al., The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression , trans. J. Murphy and M. Kramer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 4.

[58] R. J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994), 36–38.

[59] Rummel revised his figures in 2005; see Andrew Holt, “The 20th Century’s Bloodiest ‘Megamurderers’ According to Prof. R. J. Rummel,” apholt.com, accessed January 16, 2019, https://apholt.com/2018/11/15/the-20th-centurys-bloodiest-megamurderers-according-to-prof-r-j-rummel/ .

[60] White, Great Big Book of Horrible Things , 554; in a footnote, he offers, “A friend once wondered aloud how much suffering in history has been caused by religious fanaticism, and I was able to confidently tell her 10 percent, based on this number.”

[61] White, Great Big Book of Horrible Things , 554.

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Religion and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict: Cause, Consequence, and Cure

Mohamed Galal Mostafa is a former Egyptian diplomat, and currently a researcher at the Heller School for Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is driven by several factors: ethnic, national, historical, and religious. This brief essay focuses on the religious dimension of the conflict, which both historical and recent events suggest lies at its core. That much is almost a truism. What is less often appreciated, however, is how much religion impacts the identity of actors implicated in this conflict, the practical issues at stake, and the relevant policies and attitudes -- even of non-religious participants on both sides. It follows that religion must also be part of any real solution to this tragic and protracted conflict, in ways a concluding paragraph will very briefly outline.

Why is religion at the core of this conflict?

Several religious factors pertinent to Islam and Judaism dictate the role of religion as the main factor in the conflict, notably including the sanctity of holy sites and the apocalyptic narratives of both religions, which are detrimental to any potential for lasting peace between the two sides. Extreme religious Zionists in Israel increasingly see themselves as guardians and definers of the how the Jewish state should be, and are very stringent when it comes to any concessions to the Arabs. On the other hand, Islamist groups in Palestine and elsewhere in the Islamic world advocate the necessity of liberating the “holy” territories and sites for religious reasons, and preach violence and hatred against Israel and the Jewish people.

Religion-based rumors propagated by extremists in the media and social media about the hidden religious agendas of the other side exacerbate these tensions. Examples include rumors about a “Jewish Plan” to destroy al Aqsa mosque and build the Jewish third temple on its remnants, and, on the other side rumors that Muslims hold the annihilation of Jews at the core of their belief.

In addition, worsening socio-economic conditions in the Arab and Islamic world contribute to the growth of religious radicalism, pushing a larger percentage of youth towards fanaticism, and religion-inspired politics.

The advent of the Arab spring, ironically, also posed a threat to Arab-Israeli peace, as previously stable regimes were often challenged by extreme political views. A prominent example was the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, who after succeeding to the presidency in 2012, threatened to compromise the peace agreement with Israel based on their religious ideology – even if they did not immediately tear up the treaty.

Practical Consequences O n Negotiations

If we take a closer look at the permanent status issues – borders, security, mutual recognition, refugees, the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and the issue of authority over Jerusalem -- we find that the last two are directly linked to the faiths of Jewish people and Muslim people around the world. The original ownership and authority over Jerusalem are highly contested due to the presence of holy sites for Christians, Jews, and Muslims in the city. This conflict is also deeply rooted in history, in which Jerusalem has been attacked fifty-two times, captured and recaptured forty-four times, besieged twenty-three times, and destroyed twice. The city was ruled by the Ancient Egyptians, the Canaanites, the Israelites, the Greeks, the Romans, the Persians, Byzantines, the Islamic Caliphates, the Crusaders, the Ottomans, and finally the British, before its division into Israeli and Jordanian sectors from 1948 to 1967.

In Jewish and Biblical history, Jerusalem was the capital of the Kingdom of Israel during the reign of King David. It is also home to the Temple Mount, and the Western Wall, both highly sanctified sites in Judaism. In Islamic history, the city was the first Muslim Qiblah (the direction which Muslims face during their prayer). It is also the place where Prophet Muhammad’s Isra’ and Mi'raj (bringing forward and ascension to heaven, also called the night journey) ensued according to the Qur’an.

Thus the sanctity of Jerusalem resonates among many Muslims around the world, not just Palestinians. Reactions in the Arab and the Islamic world to the recent violence in Gaza and the West Bank after the U.S. decision to relocate the embassy to Jerusalem suggest that many view this issue mainly in a religious light. The narratives on social media platforms and the media in general in those countries usually included references to religion, even among seemingly secular people.

The issue of West Bank settlements, too, has a religious aspect. It concerns the physical restoration of the biblical land of Israel before the return of the Messiah, something central to the beliefs of some orthodox Jews. They continue to settle the West Bank to fulfill this prophecy, clashing with the local Palestinians.

On the other hand, according to fundamentalist schools of Islam, at the end of days, the whole land of Israel and Palestine should be under Islamic rule. Prophecies surrounding this issue are deeply rooted in some versions of the Hadith (traditional sayings of the Prophet), although only implied in the Qur’an.

Historical and Organizational Consequences

As far back as the 1948 war, some Jewish extremist groups justified their contribution to the conflict as part of a divinely promised return to the holy land of Israel. More recently, however, the most extreme such groups, like the “Gush Emunim Underground” which plotted to bomb the mosques in the Temple Mount area back in the 1980s, have been banned by the Israeli authorities

On the other side, several religious extremist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood justified their contribution to the conflict in 1948 as an eschatological event pertinent to the approach of the Day of Judgment. Nowadays, terrorist Brotherhood offshoots like Hamas call for using violence against Israel in the name of Islam, without distinction between civilian and military targets. They continue to use religion to gain supporters in Gaza and elsewhere by propagating this apocalyptic narrative. This Muslim Brotherhood group ideology, stretching through many Arab (and several non-Arab) countries, seeks to revive Islam and re-establish the historical Islamic Caliphate by seizing power. They consider Israel to be a “foreign object” in the continuum of a potential Islamic Caliphate, and they continue to call for the use of violence against it.

In parallel to this extreme Sunni side, ever since the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, Iran has been the fiercest in opposing Israel. Its radical regime calls openly for the destruction of Israel and asserts the necessity of this quest from a theological standpoint. It finances Hezbollah and Hamas and supplies them with weapons and training, as well as supporting Assad’s forces in Syria, thereby posing a direct security threat to Israel – all allegedly in the name of Islam.

Social Consequences

For two Arab countries, Egypt and Jordan, direct peacemaking was achieved with Israel. Nevertheless, that did not entail the people-to-people or cultural normalization that is assumed to accompany peace, due to many reasons -- including religious ones. Accepting peace with Israel may be viewed as religious treachery, which goes against the beliefs not only of extremists but also of many relative moderates in Arab states. The key point is that these various forms of religion-based conflict drivers are not limited to religious groups, but are linked to much wider bases in society. This results from two major factors, as follows:

Interest and Identity Overlap: Interests of religious extremists who are directly linked to the religious drivers at many instances overlap with other segments in the Arab and Islamic societies. They share some elements of their identities, if not the whole. For example, a secular nationalist Palestinian and an extremely religious, Salafi Palestinian in the Qassam Brigades of Hamas may share very similar views of Israel. Much the same is true of some secularists, traditionalists, and fundamentalists in other Arab or Islamic societies.

Systematic Abuse of Linkages to Wider Bases in Societies: Religious extremists in the Arab and Islamic world and in Israel, whether violent or not, have used deliberately the ideological and functional linkages to connect to wider bases in their respective countries. Ideologically, links with the wider society are established by trying to radicalize elements that have this potential, either due to natural tendencies toward perceived communal self-defense, or to the superficial knowledge of their religions. For example, extremists would use an isolated incident of violence against the Jewish community to justify retaliation by their wider society. A non-religious traditional Arab might well share the fear of secularization, and of “Jewish influence,” with the Islamist.  Functionally, extreme Imams have very strong tools at their disposals across the Arab and Islamic world to promote violence through their mosques and privately funded media, subjecting people repeatedly to the narrative and rhetoric of violence against Israel in particular and Jewish people in general.

Possible Interventions

To contribute to curbing the religious violence in this conflict, several interventions can be considered: interfaith dialogue; the remembrance of past fruitful cooperation between Jews and Muslims, ever since the seventh century; and focusing on religious texts asserting positive and tolerant religious values, and reinforcing these values in educational systems on both sides. These are perhaps not new ideas. What should be new, however, is the urgency and centrality of this religious component as part of any current effort to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian “deal of the century” – or even just to mitigate the conflict and pave the way for peaceful coexistence in the long-term future.

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Issues of war and peace: is religion more of the problem and what are mahatma gandhi’s insights.

1. Introduction

2. violence and war, 3. war and peace, 4. religion as a negative force, 5. a phenomenological structural model of religion, 6. some of mahatma gandhi’s insights on religion, nonviolence, and peace, 7. concluding reflections, conflicts of interest.

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Allen, D. Issues of War and Peace: Is Religion More of the Problem and What Are Mahatma Gandhi’s Insights? Religions 2022 , 13 , 1088. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13111088

Allen D. Issues of War and Peace: Is Religion More of the Problem and What Are Mahatma Gandhi’s Insights? Religions . 2022; 13(11):1088. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13111088

Allen, Douglas. 2022. "Issues of War and Peace: Is Religion More of the Problem and What Are Mahatma Gandhi’s Insights?" Religions 13, no. 11: 1088. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13111088

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Religion as the Cause of Wars Essay (Critical Writing)

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Introduction

The Great War that took place between 1914 and 1918 was not a chronological event, which can easily be identified with religion. The followers from each side claimed that all were engaged in a justifiable war to defend themselves against aggression. In fact, all argued that the Supreme Being was on their side and each religion prayed for success. As a result, it did not matter whether or not other believers were destroyed given that they were simply considered as enemies. Religious wars are common since the creation of human being although they do not have many fatalities similar to other types of wars. The wars are always regarded as a struggle between different religions namely Jews, Christians and Muslims. This demonstrates that despite the civilization humankind has undergone over years, religion continues to cause war.

Religious beliefs are powerful motivations since aggressive individuals fight about them. They continue to cause conflicts even in small families. In fact, it is common for husbands and wives to fight on the religion that the family should adopt. The fight escalates especially when the wife refuses to follow the religion of his husband. As a result, it is common for divorce to arise from the religious differences between married couples. Such a relationship arises owing to the initial attraction between these companions. Each of these individuals has the hope that everyone will eventually see the righteousness in the other partner’s religion and accept to be converted. Conversely, some individuals coerce others to convert given that they strongly believe that they should belong to the same religion in order to have a lasting relationship. When the effort becomes futile, chances of domestic violence become high. Consequently, when they consider that the differences between them cannot be resolved even after involving other parties they end up in divorce (Erbele, 2012).

Religion causes tension even between close friends. For instance, it is common for Islamic families to have relationships with Christians. However, Muslims do not consume pork since it is not allowed by their religion. Although the relationship may be cordial, there is always suspicion from Muslim believers about the king of food they consume in Christian families particularly when the meal involves any kind of meat. Muslims are suspicious even when the meal does not include meat given that the meal may have been prepared using pork fat. Muslims ensure that they stay away from anything that involves pork. In one situation, a Muslim woman warned her husband to ensure that any Christian family they were visiting did not give her daughter any pork. This caused tension between them as the Muslim husband thought that the wife did not trust him to keep a close watch over their daughter (Woodlock et al., 2013).

The wife later admitted that she trusted the husband but did not trust the Christian family on issues regarding what they consume. Apparently, the woman does not even trust her in-law family since they are not Muslims. The tension between families is evident as in-law’s family openly consumes pork products. When visiting the in-law family, the wife ensures that she accompanies her husband and their daughter to ensure that the mother in-law who is usually craving for sausages does not give her daughter any pork product. She admits that it takes a few days for her blood pressure to resume its usual level after visiting the mother in-law who talks about the good taste of pork products (Woodlock et al., 2013).

There are other sources of war between humans such as soccer matches. However, religious differences are common excuses used by states to cause harm on those believed to have diverse religious views. For example, during the 20 th century, cruel administrations of Pol Pot, Mao Zedong, and Stalin ruthlessly murdered millions of those with different religious views. In Russia, atheists murdered thousands of Christians. The atheists sought to eliminate any kind of religion from the region. It is therefore evident that religion has been a contributive attribute to most historical wars.

In the contemporary world, acts of terrorisms are believed to be caused by religious differences. Recently, there was an attack on Kenya’s Westgate Mall. The perpetrators of the heinous act were evidently Muslims considering the CCTV footages that captured them praying while facing Mecca. When the attackers first entered the mall, they held over three hundred shoppers hostage. According to reports by those who survived the attack, the attackers would ask each person different Islamic questions. Those who did not know were shot dead immediately. However, the attackers allegedly told Muslims to leave unharmed. All others who subscribed to different religions were executed.

In Iraq, religious war continues to escalate between different arms of Muslims. Terrorism in the country particularly the capital city of Bagdad continues to kill and maim tens of people daily. Muslims extremists strongly believe that any human that does not subscribe to Islam does not deserve to live. It is this conviction that lead to war between Shiite and Kurds in Iraq despite both being Muslims. The Quran is often observed as one that incites religious wars. It acknowledges the humankind tendency of disagreement and consequently allows defensive warfare. In addition to the individual’s permission for self-defense, it permits religious war in the name of Jihad against non-Muslims.

In Gulf region, the unrelenting war is mainly caused by religious differences. The war between Israel and Palestine is contributed by the fact that Israel is mainly a Jewish state while Palestine is an Islam state. The tension between these countries is further increased by the urge to dominate a large portion of land to settle those who subscribe to the Jewish religion. In the Africa’s most populated state of Nigeria, tension between Christians and Muslims in the 20 th century consequently led to the current state of war perpetrated by the Muslim arm called Boko Haram. The extremists execute Christians at any opportunity. The Al-Qaeda-supported group has taken advantage of the hostility between the two religions to claim and secede from the main Nigeria and create a Muslim state (Abah, 2013).

On the other hand, it has been argued that religion has developed additional importance in the current world given that globalization has changed almost everything. It becomes essential when political and national groupings are broken apart. For example, in Yugoslavia during the beginning of the fiscal 1990s, Serbians, Croatians, and Bosnians took positions as Muslims, Orthodox, or Christians (Woodlock et al., 2013). From this, Muslim academics have over centuries managed to develop a ‘just war’ theory. The theory seeks to justify that Muslims can kill others when protecting their religious beliefs. Thus, for greedy and cruel leaders to advance their territorial desires, they have taken advantage of the inclusion of ‘just-war’ in the name of Jihad in the Quran.

In the Bible, it is evident that wars were mainly based on religion. God would use a certain population to punish those who did not follow His ways. The Israelites were commonly used as the vessel for God to punish others who turned against Him. Many people who try to justify terrorism tend to distort the approach in the contemporary world to cause fear in those perceived to be of different religion. Besides, for cruel people to oppress others, they often exploit religion based on the claim for defenseless. In other situations, it is positively utilized by others to defend against such oppression. Those who are perceived to be weak in the society gang up on religious grounds to ensure that the strong and cruel hardly unleash harm on them.

Thus, religious corruption is often criticized in almost all religions. For example, both the Bible and Quran criticize religious hypocrisy. The verse that criticizes religious in the Quran (Q2:204-205) may appropriately be applied to Saddam Hussein situation in the 1990s and early 2000. The president ensured that the world saw him reciting prayers on television. However, he continued to gas and bomb Kurds. He was evidently a cruel dictator who disguised himself as a devoted Muslim. It is this fact that one may conclude that indeed religion offers an essential cover and strong motivation for those who seek to do evil.

Another aspect of religion can be seen from the perspective of Atheism. When people declare that they are atheists, believers of such a religion frown upon them. It is common for such individuals to be excommunicated from the mainstream society. Such individuals are described in hurting terms. Savage comments such as being labeled stupid or fascists are common especially among age mates as well as those who are grown-up than the atheists. Such scenarios are common in the internet. When people declare that they are atheists, there is always an overwhelming reaction from all places on earth. In fact, atheists believe that all religions are unhelpful making believers to be agitated and angered. Conversely, atheists observe those who believe in religion as foolish (Houlihan, 2012).

In the recent years, tension between atheists and believers has been rising considering the swelling number of atheists who are convinced of the need to scorn believers. After the 9/11 attack on American landmarks, some popular people who practice atheism including Ayaan Ali backed nations to be violent against any Islamic country. In a conversation between Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens, atheist’s hatred of Muslims was evident. He asked his friend if he is ever worried that after atheists win the war and wipe out Christianity, Muslims would replace the vacuum. This demonstrates the violent hatred of Islamic religion by emerging atheists.

On the other hand, it is indicative of the frightening idealized nightmare that atheists possess. One may wonder why atheists seek to eliminate Christianity. The atheists’ objective to eliminate Christianity may be driven by the fact that Catholics have allegedly committed multiple contravening crimes such as protecting their leaders who commit sex with minors while they are supposed to live in celibacy. The opposition of abortion by Christians and other religions is also a driving force that renders atheists to violently attack them resulting in actual war. Although religious institutions may be dysfunctional, it does not justify their elimination. The view echoes strong hatred that continues to increase anxiety in the society.

From the beginning of human existence, religion has been linked to many types of quarrels and brutalities. The hands of believers are tainted with blood. Thus, it is reasonable to claim that religion when placed in the hands of wrong individuals may result in devastating harm. In the early days, religious wars were less than what is experienced in the current world. The perception that religion is the primary cause of main wars in the history of humankind is only engrained in mind and community. Out of more than 1,800 main armed conflicts, only less than 130 can be categorized as having originated from religious differences. This means that about ten percent can be associated with religion. It indicates that few people were killed in these conflicts. In the ancient world, wars that were fought due to religion appeared to be less bloody compared to those fought based on other reasons.

In many societies, religion is a positive tool that facilitates the cohesion of a community. It offers a platform for relating and associating with others. Unfortunately, it is openly different when placed in the possession of power-hungry individuals. Such individuals use religious convictions to trounce their rivals. During political campaigns, it is common for aspirants to consolidate votes by associating themselves with certain religions. It is common for such power-hungry aspirants to convert to religions that they consider as a boost to their political endeavors. When religious authority is in the hands of such individuals, it demonstrates the state of human psychology as opposed to the religion itself. This is mainly the basis why most wars experienced in the past involved and will probably continue to entail religion.

Abah, H. (2013). Boko haram has no religious coloration – Bideh. Web.

Erbele, C. (2012). God and War: An exploration. Journal of Law & Religion, 28(1), 1-46.

Houlihan, P. (2012). Local Catholicism as transnational war experience: Everyday religious practice in occupied northern France, 1914–1918. Central European History, 45(1), 233-267.

Woodlock, R., Loewenstein, A., Caro, J. & Smart, S. (2013). Doesn’t religion cause most of the conflict in the world? Web.

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The cause of violence is a lack of respect for other persons’ individual rights. Religion is just another of the myriad excuses used to justify bad behavior.

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Germany , France , and the Netherlands each achieved a settlement of the religious problem by means of war, and in each case the solution contained original aspects. In Germany the territorial formula of cuius regio, eius religio applied—that is, in each petty state the population had to conform to the religion of the ruler. In France, the Edict of Nantes in 1598 embraced the provisions of previous treaties and accorded the Protestant Huguenots toleration within the state, together with the political and military means of defending the privileges that they had exacted. The southern Netherlands remained Catholic and Spanish, but the Dutch provinces formed an independent Protestant federation in which republican and dynastic influences were nicely balanced. Nowhere was toleration accepted as a positive moral principle, and seldom was it granted except through political necessity.

There were occasions when the Wars of Religion assumed the guise of a supranational conflict between Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Spanish, Savoyard, and papal troops supported the Catholic cause in France against Huguenots aided by Protestant princes in England and Germany. In the Low Countries , English, French, and German armies intervened; and at sea Dutch, Huguenot, and English corsairs fought the Battle of the Atlantic against the Spanish champion of the Counter-Reformation. In 1588 the destruction of the Spanish Armada against England was intimately connected with the progress of the struggles in France and the Netherlands.

Behind this ideological grouping of the powers, national, dynastic, and mercenary interests generally prevailed. The Lutheran duke Maurice of Saxony assisted Charles V in the first Schmalkaldic War in 1547 in order to win the Saxon electoral dignity from his Protestant cousin, John Frederick; while the Catholic king Henry II of France supported the Lutheran cause in the second Schmalkaldic War in 1552 to secure French bases in Lorraine. John Casimir of the Palatinate, the Calvinist champion of Protestantism in France and the Low Countries, maintained an understanding with the neighbouring princes of Lorraine, who led the ultra-Catholic Holy League in France. In the French conflicts, Lutheran German princes served against the Huguenots, and mercenary armies on either side often fought against the defenders of their own religion. On the one hand, deep divisions separated Calvinist from Lutheran; and, on the other hand, political considerations persuaded the moderate Catholic faction, the Politiques, to oppose the Holy League. The national and religious aspects of the foreign policy of Philip II of Spain were not always in accord. Mutual distrust existed between him and his French allies, the family of Guise, because of their ambitions for their niece Mary Stuart . His desire to perpetuate French weakness through civil war led him at one point to negotiate with the Huguenot leader, Henry of Navarre (afterward Henry IV of France). His policy of religious uniformity in the Netherlands alienated the most wealthy and prosperous part of his dominions. Finally, his ambition to make England and France the satellites of Spain weakened his ability to suppress Protestantism in both countries.

In 1562, seven years after the Peace of Augsburg had established a truce in Germany on the basis of territorialism, France became the centre of religious wars which endured, with brief intermissions, for 36 years. The political interests of the aristocracy and the vacillating policy of balance pursued by Henry II’s widow, Catherine de Médicis , prolonged these conflicts. After a period of warfare and massacre, in which the atrocities of St. Bartholomew’s Day (1572) were symptomatic of the fanaticism of the age, Huguenot resistance to the crown was replaced by Catholic opposition to the monarchy’s policy of conciliation to Protestants at home and anti-Spanish alliances abroad. The revolt of the Holy League against the prospect of a Protestant king in the person of Henry of Navarre released new forces among the Catholic lower classes, which the aristocratic leadership was unable to control. Eventually Henry won his way to the throne after the extinction of the Valois line, overcame separatist tendencies in the provinces, and secured peace by accepting Catholicism. The policy of the Bourbon dynasty resumed the tradition of Francis I, and under the later guidance of Cardinal Richelieu the potential authority of the monarchy was realized.

In the Netherlands the wise Burgundian policies of Charles V were largely abandoned by Philip II and his lieutenants. Taxation, the Inquisition, and the suppression of privileges for a time provoked the combined resistance of Catholic and Protestant. The house of Orange, represented by William I the Silent and Louis of Nassau , acted as the focus of the revolt; and, in the undogmatic and flexible personality of William, the rebels found leadership in many ways similar to that of Henry of Navarre. The sack of the city of Antwerp by mutinous Spanish soldiery in 1576 (three years after the dismissal of Philip II’s autocratic and capable governor, the duke de Alba) completed the commercial decline of Spain’s greatest economic asset. In 1579 Alessandro Farnese, duke di Parma, succeeded in recovering the allegiance of the Catholic provinces, while the Protestant north declared its independence. French and English intervention failed to secure the defeat of Spain, but the dispersal of the Armada and the diversion of Parma’s resources to aid the Holy League in France enabled the United Provinces of the Netherlands to survive. A 12-year truce was negotiated in 1609, and when the campaign began again it merged into the general conflict of the Thirty Years’ War , which, like the other wars of religion of this period, was fought mainly for confessional security and political gain.

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By Eric Brahm

November 2005  

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, a casual glance at world affairs would suggest that religion is at the core of much of the strife around the globe. Often, religion is a contentious issue. Where eternal salvation is at stake, compromise can be difficult at or even sinful. Religion is also important because, as a central part of many individuals' identity, any threat to one's beliefs is a threat to one's very being. This is a primary motivation for ethno-religious nationalists.

However, the relationship between religion and conflict is, in fact, a complex one. Religiously-motivated peace builders have played important roles in addressing many conflicts around the world. This aspect of religion and conflict is discussed in the parallel essay on religion and peace . This essay considers some of the means through which religion can be a source of conflict.

Religion and Conflict

Although not necessarily so, there are some aspects of religion that make it susceptible to being a latent source of conflict. All religions have their accepted dogma, or articles of belief, that followers must accept without question. This can lead to inflexibility and intolerance in the face of other beliefs. After all, if it is the word of God, how can one compromise it? At the same time, scripture and dogma are often vague and open to interpretation. Therefore, conflict can arise over whose interpretation is the correct one, a conflict that ultimately cannot be solved because there is no arbiter . The winner generally is the interpretation that attracts the most followers. However, those followers must also be motivated to action. Although, almost invariably, the majority of any faith hold moderate views, they are often more complacent, whereas extremists are motivated to bring their interpretation of God's will to fruition.

Religious extremists can contribute to conflict escalation . They see radical measures as necessary to fulfilling God's wishes. Fundamentalists of any religion tend to take a Manichean view of the world. If the world is a struggle between good and evil, it is hard to justify compromising with the devil. Any sign of moderation can be decried as selling out, more importantly, of abandoning God's will.

Some groups, such as America's New Christian Right and Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan, have operated largely through constitutional means though still pursue intolerant ends. In circumstances where moderate ways are not perceived to have produced results, whether social, political, or economic, the populace may turn to extreme interpretations for solutions. Without legitimate mechanisms for religious groups to express their views, they may be more likely to resort to violence. Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine have engaged in violence, but they also gained supporters through social service work when the government is perceived as doing little for the population. Radical Jewish cells in Israel and Hindu nationalists and Sikh extremists in India are other examples of fundamentalist movements driven by perceived threat to the faith. Religious revivalism is powerful in that it can provide a sense of pride and purpose, but in places such as Sri Lanka and Sudan it has produced a strong form of illiberal nationalism that has periodically led to intolerance and discrimination .[1] Some religious groups, such as the Kach and Kahane Chai parties in Israel or Egypt's Islamic Jihad, consider violence to be a ‘duty'.[2] Those who call for violence see themselves as divinely directed and therefore obstacles must be eliminated.

Many religions also have significant strains of evangelism, which can be conflictual. Believers are called upon to spread the word of God and increase the numbers of the flock. For example, the effort to impose Christianity on subject peoples was an important part of the conflict surrounding European colonization. Similarly, a group may seek to deny other religions the opportunity to practice their faith. In part, this is out of a desire to minimize beliefs the dominant group feels to be inferior or dangerous. Suppression of Christianity in China and the Sudan are but two contemporary examples. In the case of China, it is not a conflict between religions, but rather the government views religion as a dangerous rival for citizens' loyalties. All of these instances derive from a lack of respect for other faiths.

Religious fundamentalists are primarily driven by displeasure with modernity.[3] Motivated by the marginalization of religion in modern society, they act to restore faith to a central place. There is a need for purification of the religion in the eyes of fundamentalists. Recently, cultural globalization has in part become shorthand for this trend. The spread of Western materialism is often blamed for increases in gambling, alcoholism, and loose morals in general. Al-Qaeda, for example, claims it is motivated by this neo-imperialism as well as the presence of foreign military forces in the Muslim holy lands. The liberal underpinning of Western culture is also threatening to tradition in prioritizing the individual over the group, and by questioning the appropriate role for women in society. Of course, the growth of the New Christian Right in the United States indicates that Westerners too feel that modern society is missing something. Conflict over abortion and the teaching of evolution in schools are but two examples of issues where some groups feel religious tradition has been abandoned.

Religious nationalists too can produce extremist sentiment. Religious nationalists tend to view their religious traditions as so closely tied to their nation or their land that any threat to one of these is a threat to one's existence. Therefore, religious nationalists respond to threats to the religion by seeking a political entity in which their faith is privileged at the expense of others. In these contexts, it is also likely that religious symbols will come to be used to forward ethnic or nationalist causes. This has been the case for Catholics in Northern Ireland, the Serbian Orthodox church in Milosevic's Yugoslavia, and Hindu nationalists in India.

Popular portrayals of religion often reinforce the view of religion being conflictual. The global media has paid significant attention to religion and conflict, but not the ways in which religion has played a powerful peacemaking role. This excessive emphasis on the negative side of religion and the actions of religious extremists generates interfaith fear and hostility. What is more, media portrayals of religious conflict have tended to do so in such a way so as to confuse rather than inform. It does so by misunderstanding goals and alliances between groups, thereby exacerbating polarization . The tendency to carelessly throw around the terms ‘fundamentalist' and ‘extremist' masks significant differences in beliefs, goals, and tactics.

Religion and Latent Conflict

In virtually every heterogeneous society, religious difference serves as a source of potential conflict. Because individuals are often ignorant of other faiths, there is some potential tension but it does not necessarily mean conflict will result. Religion is not necessarily conflictual but, as with ethnicity or race, religion serves, as a way to distinguish one's self and one's group from the other. Often, the group with less power, be it political or economic, is more aware of the tension than the privileged. When the privileged group is a minority, however, such as the Jews historically were in much of Europe, they are often well aware of the latent conflict. There are steps that can be taken at this stage to head off conflict. Interfaith dialogue , discussed further below, can increase understanding. Intermediaries may help facilitate this.

Religion and Conflict Escalation

With religion a latent source of conflict, a triggering event can cause the conflict to escalate. At this stage in a conflict, grievances, goals, and methods often change in such a way so as to make the conflict more difficult to resolve. The momentum of the conflict may give extremists the upper hand. In a crisis, group members may see extremists as those that can produce what appear to be gains, at least in the short-term. In such situations, group identities are even more firmly shaped in relation to the other group, thereby reinforcing the message of extremists that one's religion is threatened by another faith that is diametrically opposed. Often, historic grievances are recast as being the responsibility of the current enemy. Because at this stage tactics often come detached from goals, radical interpretations are increasingly favored. Once martyrs have been sacrificed, it becomes increasingly difficult to compromise because their lives will seem to have been lost in vain (see the essay on entrapment* for more on this problem).

What is to Be Done

In the eyes of many, religion is inherently conflictual, but this is not necessarily so. Therefore, in part, the solution is to promote a heightened awareness of the positive peace building and reconciliatory role religion has played in many conflict situations. More generally, fighting ignorance can go a long way. Interfaith dialogue would be beneficial at all levels of religious hierarchies and across all segments of religious communities. Where silence and misunderstanding are all too common, learning about other religions would be a powerful step forward. Being educated about other religions does not mean conversion but may facilitate understanding and respect for other faiths. Communicating in a spirit of humility and engaging in self-criticism would also be helpful.[4]

[1] David Little, "Belief, Ethnicity, and Nationalism" http://www.usip.org/religionpeace/rehr/belethnat.html .

[2] David Little, "Religious Militancy," in Managing Global Chaos, eds, Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington DC: USIP Press, 1996).

[3] R. Scott Appleby, "Religion, Conflict Transformation, and Peacebuilding," in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, eds, Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington DC: USIP Press, 2001).

[4] David Smock, Building Interreligious Trust in a Climate of Fear: An Abrahamic Trialogue, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr99.pdf

Use the following to cite this article: Brahm, Eric. "Religion and Conflict." Beyond Intractability . Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: November 2005 < http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/religion-and-conflict >.

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The Struggle Is Real: Understanding the American “Culture War”

by joelabrown | Jul 11, 2017 | July 2017 | 1 comment

The July issue of the  Forum features Russell Johnson’s (University of Chicago) essay, “The Struggle Is Real: Understanding the American ‘Culture War.’ ” Three recent books all claim the culture war is over, though they come to different conclusions about why. Their different points, this essay argues, illustrate not why the culture war is over, but rather why it is so endlessly fascinating. In response to these books, this essay clarifies what exactly the culture war is, and how to understand in what sense it is still a part of American life. The culture war brings together a diverse array of political, religious, and cultural ideas into a neat dichotomy that has managed to persist through decades of social change.

Throughout the month, scholars will offer responses to Johnson’s essay. We invite you to join the conversation by sharing your thoughts and questions in the comments section below.

• Andrew Hartman (Illinois State University), “ Culture Wars and Other Subterranean Historical Forces “
• Seth Dowland (Pacific Lutheran University), “ Where are the Culture Wars? “
• L. Benjamin Rolsky (Monmouth University), “ American Cultural Warfare and the Recent Religious Past “
• Russell Johnson, “ Author’s Response: War forms Its Own Culture “

An abortion rights advocate debated an anti-abortion campaigner at the March for Life in Washington on January 23, 2012. (Shawn Thew | European Pressphoto Agency)

by Russell Johnson

Three recent books all claim the culture war is over, though they give quite different explanations. I argue that their different interpretations illustrate not why the culture war is over, but rather why it is so endlessly fascinating. In response to these books, this article clarifies what exactly the culture war is, and how to understand in what sense it is still a part of American life.

First, Rod Dreher argues that the culture war is over and religious conservatives have lost, and cites as evidence the nationwide legalization of gay marriage. In response to this widely-shared sentiment, I argue that a closer look at the protean history of the culture war since the early 1960s shows that it cannot be reduced to any one issue, nor should we be too quick to declare it over.

Second, Philip Gorski writes that the idea of two warring sides does not accurately represent the American populace. Americans have both more in common and greater diversity than any attempt to specify two “sides” can capture. I agree with Gorski, but maintain that while the strict dichotomy of the culture war fails as a demographic description, we must nevertheless consider why moral discourse in America tends to fall into dichotomous culture war categories.

Third, historian Andrew Hartman concludes that the culture war is over and capitalism won. Economic factors, he writes, are now more determinative for American behavior and ideology than the two moral narratives of the culture war. I argue that, while it may be true that economic motives, racial motives, and foreign policy motives have recently—especially in Donald Trump’s campaign—been more prevalent than culture war motives, nonetheless the culture war framework is still salient for most Americans.

I will not engage these specific authors’ arguments in the depth they deserve; I will simply argue that the three positions they represent are each partly true and partly misleading. My conclusion is that anyone hoping to make moral arguments in contemporary America—even arguments about how we need to move beyond the culture war—still needs to take into account the dominant narratives of the culture war.

I. The Struggle to Define America

In Rod Dreher’s The Benedict Option , arguably this year’s most blogged-about Christian ethics book, the author minces no words about the culture war: “Today the culture war as we know it is over. The so-called values voters—social and religious conservatives—have been defeated and are being swept to the political margins.” 1 For Dreher, the values voters’ last stand was on the issue of gay marriage, and he declares that after Obergefell , “The culture war that began with the sexual revolution in the 1960s has now ended in defeat for Christian conservatives.” 2 When one understands the history of moral debate over the last half-century, however, it becomes clear that fixating too narrowly on gay marriage legalization underestimates the protean, persistent nature of the culture war.

America in the 1960s also saw the rise of another ethos. Liberation, self-expression, and revolution were the words on everyone’s lips (N.B. also “groovy”). Groups questioned whether established cultural mores, social roles, and artistic conventions stifle authenticity. One aspect of this revolutionary spirit came to be called “identity politics,” as second-wave feminism, the black power movement, and the gay rights movement were all emerging. Though these movements started independently—and in some cases distanced themselves from each other—they gave voice to a common message: groups that have been marginalized by the dominant political system need to stand against oppressive forces. The status quo, they reasoned, was sustained by violence and inequality, therefore efforts to shake things up were needed in the realization of a better world. This political message was expressed in the arts by a rebellious, non-conformist spirit. As Cat Stevens sang in 1970, “You can do what you want/ The opportunity’s on/ And if you can find a new way/ You can do it today/ You can make it all true/ And you can make it undo.” Music, legislation, philosophy, poetry, and activism were all blended together in sixties radicals’ efforts to “make it undo” and “find a new way.”

In different ways, then, both “sides” of the emerging culture war latched onto the idea that the personal is political and the political is personal. That is why so many different realms of culture—education, law, film and television, sex and family life, churches and synagogues, news media, symbols like flags and monuments—could all be framed as battlefronts in the struggle to define America. The two sides are really two narratives about America; we can call these two narratives “social justice” and “traditional values.” The “social justice” narrative is of uneven progress toward greater equality, inclusion, and freedom of self-expression. That narrative ends with a summons to choose for yourself, stand up for the marginalized, and question established norms. The “traditional values” narrative is of decline from religious faithfulness, independence, and moral absolutes. That narrative ends with a summons to cultivate virtue, return to time-tested wisdom, and preserve civilizing institutions. As they have been told since the sixties, both narratives presuppose that changes in one area of culture have effects—sometimes ripples, sometimes shockwaves—on all the others. One song can ignite a revolution. One pill can change a generation. One story can sustain a community. This wide scope, the high stakes, and the ability of the two narratives to connect seemingly disparate dots have contributed to the pervasiveness and longevity of the culture war framework.

Mark Twain once said that history does not repeat itself, but it rhymes. This has certainly been the case with the culture war. Over the last fifty-five years, the two narratives have been used to interpret a panoply of events and provide perspectives on a range of issues. So, a college freshman in 2013 who says that Miley Cyrus is not a good role model is unknowingly rehashing criticisms made about the Beatles in the sixties, The Doors in the seventies, Madonna in the eighties, 2 Live Crew in the nineties, and Britney Spears in the aughts. He may have never even heard of Twisted Sister (millennials…) but his criticisms, as it were, rhyme with those made before he was born, and the same could be said of most of the conflicts that make up the culture war. Debates over the HB2 “bathroom bill” in North Carolina rhyme with debates about women in the military. The rhetoric surrounding Colin Kaepernick’s protest rhymes with the rhetoric surrounding the 1968 Mexico City Olympics protest. Some of the original controversies that sparked the culture war (over prayer in public schools, for example) are no longer hot-button issues, and some new issues (preteens sexting, for example) were never imagined by sixties culture warriors. The frameworks of moral progress toward freedom and moral decline from truth can accommodate changing circumstances, so no single battle is decisive.

Of course, Dreher and others can accept that the culture war is ongoing but maintain that the victories have overwhelmingly been for one side. The shift from prayer in schools to sexting in schools, and from mop-tops to twerking, show that even if the traditional values voters are still fighting, they have lost ground. But many of the issues that have been disputed for decades—abortion laws, teaching evolution and intelligent design, the Western canon in universities, First Amendment rights, school choice—are still hotly contested. If nothing else, the question of the status of Muslims in America—typically framed in culture war terms—is proof that culture war rhetoric is still galvanizing opinions. When one takes all of these debates, old and new, into account, it is not obvious that one narrative has triumphed over the other in the struggle to define America. (I will add that even attempts to move beyond the culture war, like Dreher’s own “Benedict Option,” sound suspiciously like strategic retreats in the culture war instead of concessions of defeat.)

II. Fighting Words

Philip Gorksi , in American Covenant , argues that the idea of two ideological monoliths does not do justice to the web of overlapping traditions that make up the American moral imagination. 7 Like Gorski, many sociologists have pointed out that the culture-war-as-demographic-reality idea does not accurately represent present-day America. 8 When polled or interviewed, Americans show a remarkable diversity of views on social issues, and at the same time show widespread agreement on moral principles. To isolate two opposing sides does injustice to both the diversity and unanimity of opinion in the U.S. This is not a disproof of Hunter’s original thesis, it is in fact a key part of Hunter’s argument. “Without a doubt,” Hunter writes, “public discourse is more polarized than the American public itself.” Hunter argues that the culture war is more characteristic of institutions and the media than individuals’ beliefs, writing, “It is through these media that public discourse acquires a life of its own; not only do the categories of public rhetoric become detached from the intentions of the speaker, they also overpower the subtleties of perspective and opinion of that vast majority of citizens who position themselves ‘somewhere in the middle’ of these debates.” 9

The narratives function as what ancient Greeks call topoi , commonplaces that serve as bridges between the customary and the new. Rhetorician Kenneth Burke argues that humans use topoi to create identifications: this is like that, so think and feel about this the way you think and feel about that . We make sense of unfamiliar events by using symbols to connect them to familiar ones. For example, the current investigation of President Trump is framed as either a “witch hunt” or a “Watergate moment.” In a similar fashion, the two opposing narratives of the culture war provide readymade frameworks through which people interpret current events. Through the ways we talk about them, new developments become only the latest instances of familiar trends—of liberation, of perseverance, of injustice, of decadence. A person who finds one of these narratives compelling will tend to respond positively to advocacy that presupposes that narrative. Hence, advocacy for a moral position on an issue often gets framed in terms of one of these two narratives. As speakers and writers appeal to them to create identifications in their audiences’ minds, these narratives are nourished and transformed through continued use. As Hunter says, public discourse takes on “a life of its own.”

Now, it is worth mentioning that few people adhere exclusively to one of these two narratives. Even among the most fervent culture warriors on both sides, some things are getting better but others are getting worse. There are some timeless moral truths but there is some room for innovation and reinterpretation. It is perfectly reasonable to believe in both identity politics and family values. Individuals can thus reject the way events get framed, or find themselves telling different narratives for different issues.

Of course, we also spend most of our daily lives without thinking about these moral narratives, so middle-class Americans on opposing sides of culture-war-as-demographic-description tend to live remarkably similar lives. We drive to work, pet dogs, celebrate birthdays, buy shoes, and watch basketball. We bake cupcakes, listen to Adele, and think about jogging but decide not to. Polarization thrives, not in our everyday lives, but in the media we consume and produce. When we read the news, get in arguments on Facebook, make signs for a protest, watch late night comedy, or listen to stump speeches, we find ourselves on the front lines of the culture war.

Given that people have so many different moral and political commitments, why is it that two and only two narratives set the agenda for moral discourse in America? Why is it that even people who want to promote alternate moral visions have to position themselves in relation to these two sides? In trying to answer this question, Hunter emphasizes that the culture war is a product of elites and institutions, and that alternate visions often lack the cultural capital to make themselves heard. I do not dispute this, but talking in terms of elites and institutions can give the impression of a conspiracy. These politicians, lobbyists, writers, and advocacy groups are the primary agents of culture war polarization, but they, too, are swept up in patterns of discourse that have taken on “a life of their own.” Drawing on political theory and social psychology, I will now give a brief outline of how this binary is sustained.

In the 1950s, a sociologist named Maurice Duverger theorized that in a winner-takes-all political system, a multiplicity of viewpoints will tend to condense into two major parties. People with varying concerns form coalitions in order to improve their chances of securing at least some of their goals. We see the Duverger effect quite clearly in the American primary system and the continued pressure to abandon third party candidates. A vote for Jill Stein is a vote for Trump, pundits warned, and a vote for Evan McMullin is a vote for Hillary. Americans have widely diverse political concerns, but because only one candidate can win, the system tends toward two alternatives simply because people think pragmatically about how to avert their own worst case scenarios.

A yard sign in my neighborhood

The culture war follows an analogous logic. People form strategic coalitions to defeat the ideas and institutions they believe to be harmful. People intuit connections between one issue and another issue in an effort to persuade others, and issues become linked in their minds. As people take public stands on these issues, there is pressure to preserve a relatively stable front lest the other side gain any ground. Uncertainties, ambiguities, concessions, and middling positions get pushed aside as the pressure to be either “for” or “against” grows stronger. Individuals borrow arguments, slogans, and ideas from public figures on their side in order to persuade others, in the process absorbing some of the assumptions of those authors even if these assumptions are at odds with an individual’s convictions. As psychologists have observed, we tend to accept the attitudes and beliefs of those we spend time with and consider part of an “us.” What starts out as a loose coalition becomes more cohesive and uniform through continued social interaction. 10 As other contested issues emerge and new events call for interpretation, these coalitions adapt, expand, and reinforce their own narratives for the sake of consistency, relevance, and steering public opinion. By exposure to each other’s arguments and stories, as well as social pressure to conform, members of an intellectually diverse group come to share attitudes and beliefs on a range of issues. Even when there are intramural disagreements, the felt need to present a unified front makes members sound like one another in public. Since we typically come to believe what we argue for, this too has a homogenizing effect on the speakers. 11 All of these factors are at work in the rhetorical phenomenon Hunter describes, “However individuals or organizations align themselves on particular issues, they become subservient to, and if unwilling must struggle against, the dominating and almost irresistible categories and logic of the opposing visions and rhetoric of the culture war .” 12

Thus, though Gorski and others are correct to insist that Americans are both more ideologically diverse and more ideologically unified than the strict bipolarity of the culture war framework, culture war rhetoric nonetheless dominates the media. Recognizing that the culture war is primarily a media phenomenon does not make it any less real. After all, the Spanish-American war was largely prompted by the media. Those tempted to dismiss the culture war as “mere rhetoric” would do well to remember the Maine . The culture war as a rhetorical phenomenon has the potential to mobilize, convert, divide, and provoke, and the stark dichotomy of culture war rhetoric is contributing factor to the negative opinions people have of their political opponents. 13 To say that people are not actually polarized even though they feel that way is like saying people are not actually sad even though they feel that way. Feelings, attitudes, and impressions are politically significant realities. Even if, as we will discuss next, one believes that culture war rhetoric is a façade that covers deeper motivating forces, the fact that people express their commitments in culture war terms and respond to culture war rhetoric cannot be dismissed as window-dressing.

III. Different Frames

Our third and final book is Andrew Hartman’s 2015 A War for the Soul of America: A History of the Culture Wars. Hartman gives a sweeping, readable history of the key figures and debates that make up the culture war. Though the book’s title comes from Pat Buchanan’s speech, Hartman does not limit his analysis to politicians and Religious Right figures. The reader not only encounters Falwells and Dobsons, but professors, lawyers, filmmakers, museum curators, and Ice-T. At the end of this wide-ranging survey, Hartman writes, “This book gives the culture wars a history—because they are history. The logic of the culture wars has been exhausted. The metaphor has run its course.” The culture war has lost its energy, he observes, and leaves only “lingering residues.” 14

Of course, one could argue that economics and economic culture has always been more determinative for American politics than the culture war. Remember that the same year Pat Buchanan gave his “cultural war” speech, the Clinton campaign mantra was “it’s the economy stupid”… and Clinton won. Some go further and argue that the culture war was always a distraction from the class war, and that capital is the moving force in American history regardless of the moral narratives we tell ourselves. I will not address these arguments here. Rather, in this final section, I will argue that the culture war framework is one among several frameworks, each of which is necessary but not sufficient to make sense of American public opinion. Even if the culture war framework is less useful than it once was for accounting for contemporary political, artistic, and social behavior, it still has salience for the majority of Americans.

To illustrate this point, let us focus solely on voting and specifically on the Republican Party. The culture war continues to set the terms of the moral debate over, as Hunter puts it, “the meaning of America: what it has been, what it is, and what it should be.” But moral considerations about the meaning of America are not the only concerns people have in mind when they go to the polls. There are a range of concerns that incline people’s opinions, and any candidate with a chance at winning needs to address several of them. It must be remembered that both of the major political parties in America are coalitions of different groups with different principal concerns. The present-day Republican Party in America, for instance, is a coalition of: (1) advocates of libertarian freedom and self-reliance, (2) believers in free market economics, (3) interventionist neoconservatives, (4) white nationalists, and (5) evangelical traditionalists. This is only a partial list, and a deeper typology would involve anti-Communism, isolationism, fiscal responsibility, and Trumpism, not to mention single-issue voters of various stripes and voters who just despise Democratic leaders. Despite substantial overlaps, these groups bring different concerns into their voting booths. A candidate hoping to win the support of these groups has to address their disparate concerns.

Donald Trump’s campaign slogan, “Make America Great Again,” is a brilliant piece of persuasive rhetoric. 16 This slogan—necessarily vague—can be interpreted in different ways by different groups. To free market enthusiasts, it means “make America prosperous again.” To neoconservatives, it means “make America a global powerhouse again.” To white nationalists, it means “make America white again.” Most importantly for our purposes, to believers in the traditional values narrative, it means “make America virtuous again.” Anyone hoping to understand Trump’s victory needs to understand how his campaign appealed to these various groups, including those for whom this moral narrative is particularly salient . And anyone hoping to understand how this current presidency is affecting Americans’ moral imaginations needs to consider what being a part of this coalition does to “traditional values” advocates.

In Trump’s campaign, the rhetoric of the culture war was less important than language that appealed explicitly to voters’ economic interests, racial prejudices, or foreign policy aspirations. But it was still omnipresent in conversations surrounding his candidacy, as values voters questioned whether Trump would represent their commitments. If we define “culture warrior” as a person who regularly draws on the rhetoric of the culture war narratives to interpret events and influence opinions, then Trump is at best a half-hearted culture warrior. But even if culture war reasoning was on the back-burner, it was never wholly absent from Trump’s campaign. In fact, the priorities of the contemporary American Right may be symbolized by the fact that the president is a big-business caricature while the vice president is a traditional culture warrior. This lends credence to Hartman’s hypothesis that economic concerns are more determinative of public opinion than culture war morality. But though culture war rhetoric has taken a back seat for those on the right (and it is not as clear that the same has happened on the left), it still emerges when people talk about morality and the meaning of America.

In conclusion, even if we are in the midst of a new realignment, akin to the one that happened in the sixties, the narratives and categories of the culture war are still setting the moral agenda for churches, schools, and advocacy in the media. A survey of the history of this conflict—which, again, has roots that go back centuries— indicates that these narratives will persist in American public discourse. The question that remains is whether these narratives’ interaction needs to persist as a culture war , or whether a less oppositional way through cultural conflict is possible. Can we, as Gorski advocates, come together over a shared civil religion and disagree with one another in a more constructive, sympathetic way? Should we, as Dreher advocates, focus our energy less on winning the soul of the nation and more on investing in local communities? Is the next step, as Hartman suggests, to turn our attention to economic ideology and the power it has over our moral imaginations? Though these authors are too quick to declare that the culture war is over, they are helpful to the extent that they envision ways to go on for culture warriors beyond simply continuing to fight. ♦

• Rod Dreher, The Benedict Option: A Strategy for Christians in a Post-Christian Nation (New York: Sentinel, 2017), 79. ↩
• Dreher, The Benedict Option , 3. ↩
• Hunter details this in Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 67-106. ↩
• http://buchanan.org/blog/1992-republican-national-convention-speech-148 ↩
• Hunter, Culture Wars , 63. ↩
• Hunter, Culture Wars , 161. ↩
• Philip Gorksi, American Covenant: A History of Civil Religion from the Puritans to the Present (Princeton, NJ: Princeton, 2017). ↩
• See, among others, Alan Wolfe, One Nation, After All (New York: Viking Penguin, 1998); Morris Fiorina, Samuel Abrams, and Jeremy Pope, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005); and Irene Taviss Thomson, Culture Wars and Enduring American Dilemmas (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2010). Hunter talks about a “small cottage industry” of books and articles pointing out that the culture war does not accurately represent the American populace; for an overview see Is There a Culture War? , James Davison Hunter and Alan Wolfe (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2006). ↩
• Hunter, Culture Wars , 159-160. ↩
• See, for example, the Dynamic Social Interaction Theory of Bibb Latané. ↩
• See the classic study by I.L. Janis and B.T. King, “The Influence of Role-playing on Opinion Change” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology , 49 (1954), 211–218. ↩
• Hunter, Culture Wars , 291. ↩
• https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/upshot/how-we-became-bitter-political-enemies.html ↩
• Hartman, A War for the Soul of America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 285. ↩
• Hartman, A War for the Soul of America , 289. ↩
• To see the two competing narratives of America’s past on stark display, watch the following segment from The Daily Show, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uVQvWwHM5kM . ↩

I disagree, to an extent, that economic issues are more important today than moral values issues. While voters, in the heyday of labor unions and heavy industry in the US, like steelmaking, for example, were known to “vote their pocketbook”, I am not so sure that is the case now. In his book “What’s the Matter with Kansas” author Tom Frank expressed incredulity that so many Kansans voted Republican when, in his opinion, they were voting against their own best economic interests. I believe that is b/c some things are more important than money. What good is it to be the wealthiest country in the world if its moral underpinnings are crumbling? Or, to use the words of Jesus, “How does a man profit if he gains the entire world yet loses his immortal soul?”

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Wars Of Religion

Throughout history, humanity has witnessed numerous conflicts and wars that have shaped the course of civilizations. One particularly impactful period was the era of the Wars of Religion. This turbulent time, spanning from the 16th to the 17th centuries, was characterized by religious strife and conflicts that tore apart nations, communities, and families. In this essay, we will explore the causes, consequences, and key events of the Wars of Religion.

The Wars of Religion were primarily fueled by religious tensions between Catholics and Protestants. These conflicts were deeply rooted in the Reformation, a religious movement that challenged the authority of the Catholic Church and led to the emergence of various Protestant denominations. The ideological differences between these two religious factions were often exacerbated by political and territorial ambitions, further intensifying the conflicts.

One of the key causes of the Wars of Religion was the struggle for power and control. Both Catholic and Protestant leaders sought to assert their dominance and influence over their respective territories. This power struggle frequently led to violent clashes, as each side fought to defend their religious beliefs and secure political supremacy. Additionally, the spread of religious ideas through the printing press and the growing literacy rates played a significant role in fueling the conflicts, as people became more aware of the religious differences and were inspired to take a stand.

The Wars of Religion had far-reaching consequences that extended beyond the religious sphere. These conflicts resulted in widespread devastation, economic decline, and social upheaval. Entire regions were ravaged by war, with cities and towns being besieged and destroyed. The loss of life was staggering, and the suffering endured by civilians was immense. Furthermore, the wars further deepened religious divisions and polarized societies, leading to a breakdown in social cohesion and trust.

One of the most notable events of the Wars of Religion was the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre in 1572. This infamous event occurred in France and resulted in the targeted killing of thousands of Huguenots, who were French Protestants. The massacre sent shockwaves throughout Europe and intensified the conflicts, as it demonstrated the extreme lengths to which religious factions were willing to go in order to assert their dominance.

In conclusion, the Wars of Religion were a tumultuous period marked by religious conflicts, political power struggles, and societal divisions. These wars had a profound impact on European history, leaving behind a legacy of destruction and division. The causes of these conflicts were deeply rooted in religious and political tensions, while the consequences were far-reaching and devastating. It is essential to study and understand this period in order to grasp the complexities of religious conflicts and their lasting implications on society.

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Religion, throughout history, has been both a unifying force and a source of conflict. While some argue that religion is the root cause of many wars and conflicts, others contend that it is merely a tool used to justify political, economic, and social agendas. To understand the role of religion in causing war, it is essential to examine historical examples, consider the complexities of human behavior, and evaluate the influence of various factors on conflict. One argument posits that religion is inherently divisive, as it often promotes exclusive beliefs and ideologies. Throughout history, numerous wars have been waged in the name of religion, such as the Crusades, the Thirty Years' War, and the conflicts in the Middle East. These wars were fueled by religious fervor and a desire to spread or defend particular faiths. However, it is crucial to recognize that religion alone is rarely the sole cause of war. Instead, it often intertwines with political, economic, and territorial motivations, exacerbating existing tensions and conflicts. Moreover, religion can serve as a rallying cry for oppressed or marginalized groups seeking liberation or justice. For example, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States drew heavily upon Christian principles of equality and justice to challenge racial segregation and discrimination. Similarly, liberation theology movements in Latin America utilized Catholicism to advocate for the rights of the poor and marginalized. In these cases, religion acted as a catalyst for social change and mobilized individuals to confront systemic injustices. Furthermore, religion can play a role in promoting peace and reconciliation. Many religious traditions emphasize principles of compassion, forgiveness, and reconciliation, which can mitigate conflicts and promote dialogue between opposing parties. Interfaith initiatives, such as the Parliament of the World's Religions and the United Religions Initiative, seek to foster understanding and cooperation among different religious communities to address global challenges. Additionally, religious leaders often play key roles in mediating conflicts and promoting peaceful resolutions. In conclusion, the relationship between religion and war is complex and multifaceted. While religion has been used to justify violence and conflict throughout history, it is not the sole cause of war. Political, economic, and social factors often intersect with religious beliefs to fuel conflicts. However, religion can also inspire movements for peace, justice, and reconciliation, demonstrating its potential to promote positive change in the world. Ultimately, the role of religion in war depends on how it is interpreted and wielded by individuals and societies....

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• Social Issues

Greek Religion: The Religion Of Ancient Greece

Greek religion, the belief system of the ancient Greeks, played a significant role in shaping their culture and society. The religion was polytheistic, meaning that the Greeks worshipped multiple gods and goddesses. These deities were believed to have control over various aspects of life, such as love, war, wisdom, and the natural world. The Greeks built temples and shrines to honor these gods, and they performed rituals and sacrifices to gain their favor. One of the most important gods in Greek religion was Zeus, the king of the gods and the ruler of Mount Olympus. Zeus was believed to control the weather and was often depicted throwing thunderbolts from the sky. Another important deity was Athena, the goddess of wisdom and warfare. Athena was highly revered by the Greeks, and they built the Parthenon in Athens as a temple in her honor. Other major gods included Poseidon, the god of the sea, and Apollo, the god of the sun and music. In addition to the major gods, the Greeks also worshipped a number of minor deities, such as nymphs, satyrs, and other nature spirits. These beings were believed to inhabit the natural world and could either help or hinder humans, depending on their mood. The Greeks also believed in the concept of fate, which was controlled by the three Fates, who determined the destiny of every individual. Overall, Greek religion was a complex and intricate belief system that influenced every aspect of ancient Greek life. The gods and goddesses were seen as powerful beings who could intervene in the lives of humans, and the Greeks sought to gain their favor through rituals and sacrifices. The religion also provided a sense of community and identity for the ancient Greeks, as they shared a common set of beliefs and practices. In conclusion, Greek religion was a central part of ancient Greek culture and society, shaping their worldview and influencing their daily lives....

• Greek Mythology
• Ancient Greece

War Essay: Is War Inevitable?

War, throughout the annals of human history, has been a recurring phenomenon, leaving behind a trail of destruction and despair. The question of whether war is an inevitable aspect of the human condition has been a subject of debate among scholars, philosophers, and policymakers for centuries. While some argue that war is an inherent part of human nature, others contend that it is a result of specific socio-political factors. Examining both perspectives sheds light on the complexity of the issue. On one hand, proponents of the inevitability of war often point to the aggressive tendencies ingrained in human nature. Evolutionary psychology suggests that humans have inherited a predisposition for violence as a means of survival and competition for limited resources. This view is supported by historical evidence of warfare dating back to ancient civilizations, where conflicts over territory, resources, and power were commonplace. Additionally, the presence of conflict in the animal kingdom further reinforces the argument that war is a natural and inevitable aspect of human behavior. However, the assertion that war is an inherent part of human nature overlooks the role of societal and political factors in driving conflicts. Wars are often the culmination of complex geopolitical tensions, ideological differences, and power struggles between nations and groups. Economic interests, political ambitions, and nationalist sentiments can fuel aggression and escalate disputes into full-scale conflicts. Moreover, the proliferation of weapons technology and the arms race exacerbate the potential for violence, making it easier for conflicts to escalate and causing devastating consequences for civilians caught in the crossfire. Nevertheless, the history of human civilization also offers examples of societies that have successfully maintained peace and resolved conflicts through diplomacy, negotiation, and cooperation. International institutions such as the United Nations were established with the aim of preventing wars and promoting peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue and mediation. Efforts to address root causes of conflict such as poverty, inequality, and injustice can mitigate the risk of violence and foster a more peaceful world. In conclusion, while the debate over the inevitability of war continues, it is evident that war is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon influenced by various factors. While human nature may incline towards aggression, societal and political dynamics play a significant role in shaping the occurrence and escalation of conflicts. By addressing underlying causes and promoting dialogue and cooperation, it is possible to mitigate the risk of war and build a more peaceful world for future generations....

The Trojan War : The Beauty Of The Trojan War

The Trojan War: The Beauty of the Epic Conflict The Trojan War is one of the most famous and enduring stories in Greek mythology. It is a tale of love, betrayal, and epic battles that have captivated audiences for centuries. The beauty of the Trojan War lies in its complexity and the timeless themes it explores. At the heart of the Trojan War is the story of Helen of Troy, whose beauty was said to be so great that it launched a thousand ships. Helen, the wife of King Menelaus of Sparta, was seduced by Paris, the prince of Troy, and taken to the city against her will. This act of betrayal sparked a war that would last for ten long years. The beauty of the Trojan War also lies in the characters who populate its pages. From the cunning Odysseus to the mighty Achilles, each hero and villain is richly drawn and full of depth. The gods themselves take an active role in the conflict, manipulating events and influencing the outcome of the war. The Trojan War is a story of honor, glory, and the power of fate. It explores the consequences of human actions and the role of the gods in shaping our destinies. Despite the passage of time, the beauty of the Trojan War endures, reminding us of the timeless themes of love, war, and the human experience....

• Historical Figures

War: Is Military Force Ever Justified?. War Has Become

War is a topic that has been debated for centuries, with people on both sides arguing whether military force is ever justified. Some believe that war is necessary in certain situations to protect a country's interests or to defend against aggression. Others argue that war is never justified and that there are always alternative solutions to conflicts. In this essay, we will explore both sides of the argument and consider the ethical implications of using military force. Proponents of war argue that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to protect innocent civilians from harm or to defend against a tyrannical regime. They believe that in some cases, diplomacy and negotiation are not enough to resolve conflicts, and that military intervention is the only way to ensure peace and security. For example, in cases of genocide or ethnic cleansing, military force may be necessary to stop the violence and protect vulnerable populations. On the other hand, opponents of war argue that the use of military force is never justified, as it inevitably leads to death, destruction, and suffering. They believe that there are always alternative solutions to conflicts, such as diplomacy, sanctions, or international intervention. They also argue that war often has unintended consequences, such as creating more instability and violence in the long run. In conclusion, the question of whether military force is ever justified is a complex and contentious issue. While some argue that war is sometimes necessary to protect innocent lives and defend against aggression, others believe that there are always alternative solutions to conflicts. Ultimately, the decision to use military force should be made carefully and with full consideration of the ethical implications. War should always be a last resort, and every effort should be made to resolve conflicts through peaceful means....

• World War I
• World War II
• Cyber Warfare and Defense
• War and the Environment

War I And World War II

War I and World War II were two of the most devastating conflicts in human history, each with its own unique causes and consequences. While both wars involved many of the same countries and alliances, they were separated by a period of just over two decades and had vastly different outcomes. World War I, also known as the Great War, was sparked by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary in 1914. This event set off a chain reaction of alliances and declarations of war that quickly engulfed much of Europe in conflict. The war was characterized by trench warfare, chemical weapons, and high casualty rates. The Treaty of Versailles, signed in 1919, officially ended the war but left many unresolved issues that would later contribute to the outbreak of World War II. World War II, which began in 1939 with the invasion of Poland by Germany, was even more destructive than its predecessor. The war saw the rise of totalitarian regimes in Germany, Italy, and Japan, as well as the widespread use of new technologies such as tanks, aircraft, and atomic weapons. The war ended in 1945 with the defeat of the Axis powers and the establishment of the United Nations in an effort to prevent future conflicts. Despite the differences between War I and World War II, both conflicts had a profound impact on the course of history. The aftermath of World War I led to the rise of fascism and communism in Europe, while World War II saw the beginning of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The wars also brought about significant social and cultural changes, including the empowerment of women in the workforce and the advancement of civil rights for minorities. In conclusion, War I and World War II were two of the most significant events of the 20th century, shaping the world we live in today. While the wars were devastating in terms of human life and destruction, they also brought about important changes in politics, society, and technology. It is essential to remember the lessons of these conflicts to prevent similar tragedies from occurring in the future....

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