critically examine francis bacon's essays with suitable examples

Want to create or adapt books like this? Learn more about how Pressbooks supports open publishing practices.

51 Francis Bacon: Essays

Introduction.

by Mary Larivee and Rithvik Saravanan

Francis Bacon (1561-1626), the English philosopher, was instrumental in the development of the Scientific Revolution in the late 18th century even though he had passed away centuries before.  The “Scientific Revolution” was an important movement that emphasized Europe’s shift toward modernized science in fields such as mathematics, physics, astronomy, biology, and chemistry (Grant). It was an extension of the Renaissance period, which then led to the Enlightenment which brought advances across all areas of human endeavor. Francis Bacon, in particular, is remembered today primarily for the “scientific method” as a way of establishing what is true from what is false perception (a method that still lies at the heart of modern science). Bacon’s primary focus in his writings revolved around the practice of inductive reasoning, which he believed to be a complement to practical observation (Grant). Most people before this period followed the Aristotelian methodology for scientific arguments. This idea maintained that “if sufficiently clever men discussed a subject long enough, the truth would eventually be discovered” (“History – Francis Bacon.”). However irrational this sounds, the Scientific Revolution helped replace this outdated system of thinking with Bacon’s scientific method. Bacon argued that any proper argument required “evidence from the real world” (“History – Francis Bacon.”). His revolutionary ideas about empirical information helped propel him toward political and societal importance and fame.

Literary Context

Francis Bacon had a passion for metaphors, analogies, and vivid imagery. He was a rhetorical writer and his essays highlight his wisdom and incisive mind. His first book was released in 1597 followed by later editions with added essays that were released in 1612 and 1625. Each essay that Bacon wrote reveals his knowledge of Latin and draws on ancient Roman wisdom through axioms and proverbs. Additionally, Bacon uses wit as a way of getting his point across to his audience and this indeed causes the reader to reflect on his or her own beliefs and values. A key aspect of Bacon’s literature is its “terseness and epigrammatic force” (De). By managing to pack all of his thoughts and ideas into quick, brief statements, Bacon deepens the reach and impact of his work. His writing deviated from the typical Ciceronian style of the time, which was characterized by “melodious language, clarity, and forcefulness of presentation” (“Ciceronian.”). His statements are meaningful particularly because they are straight and to the point. The brevity of his ideas also facilitates the communication of his arguments, which is significant because, at the time, a solid, meaningful education was hard to come by. As such, Bacon’s work helped spread the notions that would eventually bear fruit with the discoveries of the Scientific Revolution.

Historical Context

Francis Bacon’s Essays cover a wide variety of topics and styles, ranging from individual to societal issues and from commonplace to existential. Another important aspect of the appeal of Bacon’s essays are that they weigh the argument at hand with multiple points of view. Bacon’s essays were received at the time with great praise, adoration, and reverence (Potter). He was noted for borrowing ideas from the works of historical writers such as Aristotle (Harmon), and, as such, he represents a continuation of this philosophical school of thought. Another important impact of the Scientific Revolution and Bacon’s literature is that it allowed common people of the era to question old, traditional beliefs. They began to consider everything with reason, which led to a greater sense of self as well as moral and ethical standards. By having the opportunity to judge for themselves, the people were able to advance society a step closer to a form of democracy.

Francis Bacon Essays is a collection of eight of the famous philosopher’s many essays. Each dissertation contains words of wisdom that have proven to be enlightening for many generations that followed. From “Truth” to “Of Superstition” and “Marriage and Single Life”, Bacon covers a wide range of intriguing topics in order to challenge the human mind to think deeply; as he himself writes: “Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse, but to weigh and consider” (Bacon). The philosopher not only provides a framework for the genre of the modern essay but also provides his readers a code to live by.

Works Cited

“Ciceronian.” Dictionary.com , n.d., www.dictionary.com/browse/ciceronian. 23 Oct. 2020.

De, Ardhendu. “Rhetorical Devices as Used by Francis Bacon in His Essays.” A.D.’s English Literature: Notes and Guide , 07 Apr. 2011, ardhendude.blogspot.com/2011/04/rhetorical-devices-used-by-francis.html. Accessed 23 Oct. 2020.

Grant, Edward. The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional, and Intellectual Contexts . Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Harmon, William. The Oxford Book of American Light Verse. Oxford University Press, 1979.

“History – Francis Bacon.” History , British Broadcasting Corporation, 2014, www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/bacon_francis.shtml. Accessed 24 Oct. 2020.

Potter, Vincent G. Readings in Epistemology: from Aquinas, Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant. Fordham University Press, 1993.

Discussion Questions

• Why do you think Francis Bacon chose to enlighten and inspire his readers as opposed to other writers of his time who focused more on classic folklore tales?
• Why do you think Francis Bacon choose the topics that he did? Who or what do you think had a major influence on his writings?
• What are the goals and intentions behind Bacon’s use of rhetorical questioning?
• What are some common themes and ideas from Francis Bacon’s Essays that can be applied to general situations and contemporary society?
• From the ideas presented in this reading, how do you think Francis Bacon’s work affected government policies throughout history, including modern day governmental standards?

Further Resources

• Detailed biography of Franics Bacon’s life
• Analytical article of Francis Bacon’s impact on the Scientific Revolution
• List of Francis Bacon’s most significant accomplishments
• Compilation of Francis Bacon’s literature
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Francis Bacon
• Discussion video of Francis Bacon’s “Of Studies”

Reading: From Essayes

I. of truth..

What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer. Certainly there be that delight in giddiness; and count it a bondage to fix a belief; affecting free-will in thinking, as well as in acting. And though the sects of philosophers of that kind be gone, yet there remain certain discoursive wits, which are of the same veins, though there be not so much blood in them as was in those of the ancients. But it is not only the difficulty and labour which men take in finding out of truth, nor again, that when it is found, it imposeth upon men’s thoughts, that doth bring lies in favour, but a natural though corrupt love of the lie itself. One of the later schools of the Grecians examineth the matter, and is at a stand to think what should be in it, that men should love lies; where neither they make for pleasure, as with poet; nor for advantage, as with the mer chant, but for the lie’s sake. But I cannot tell: this same truth is a naked and open daylight, that doth not show the masks, and mummeries, and triumphs of the world, half so stately and daintily as candlelights. Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl, that showeth best by day, but it will not rise to the price of a diamond or carbuncle, that showeth best in varied lights. A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken out of men’s minds, vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds of a number of men, poor shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves? One of the fathers, in great severity, called poesy “vinum dæmonum,”; because it filleth the imagination, and yet it is but with the shadow of a lie. But it is not the lie that passeth through the mind, but the lie that sinketh in, and settleth in it, that doth the hurt, such as we spake of before. But howsoever these things are thus in men’s depraved judgments and affections, yet truth, which only doth judge itself, teacheth, that the inquiry of truth, which is the love-making, or wooing of it, the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it, and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it, is the sovereign good of human nature. The first creature of God, in the works of the days, was the light of the sense: the last was the light of reason; and his Sabbath work ever since, is the illumination of his Spirit. First, he breathed light upon the face of the matter, or chaos; then he breathed light into the face of man; and still he breatheth and inspireth light into the face of his chosen. The poet that beautified the sect, that was otherwise inferior to the rest, saith yet excellently well: “It is a pleasure to stand upon the shore, and to see ships tossed upon the sea: a pleasure to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle, and the adventures thereof below: but no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of truth, (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene,) and to see the errors, and wanderings, and mists, and tempests in the vale below:” so always that this prospect be with pity, and not with swelling or pride. Certainly, it is heaven upon earth, to have a man’s mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.

To pass from theological and philosophical truth, to the truth of civil business; it will be acknowledged even by those that practise it not, that clean and round dealing is the honour of man’s nature, and that mixture of falsehood is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work the better, but it embaseth it. For these winding and crooked courses are the goings of the serpent; which goeth basely upon the belly, and not upon the feet. There is no vice that doth so cover a man with shame as to be found false and perfidious; and therefore Montaigne saith prettily, when he inquired the reason, why the word of the lie should be such a disgrace, and such an odious charge, saith he, “If it be well weighed, to say that a man lieth, is as much as to say, that he is brave towards God, and a coward towards men. For a lie faces God, and shrinks from man.” Surely the wickedness of falsehood and breach of faith cannot possibly be so highly expressed, as in that it shall be the last peal to call the judgments of God upon the generations of men: it being foretold, that when “Christ cometh,” he shall not “find faith upon the earth.”

VIII. OF MARRIAGE AND SINGLE LIFE.

He that hath wife and children hath given hostages to fortune; for they are impediments to great enterprises, either of virtue or mischief. Certainly the best works, and of greatest merit for the public, have proceeded from the unmarried or childless men; which, both in affection and means, have married and endowed the public. Yet it were great reason that those that have children should have greatest care of future times, unto which they know they must transmit their dearest pledges. Some there are, who, though they lead a single life, yet their thoughts do end with themselves, and account future times impertinences; nay, there are some other that account wife and children but as bills of charges; nay more, there are some foolish rich covetous men, that take a pride in having no children, because they may be thought so much the richer; for, perhaps, they have heard some talk, “Such an one’s a great rich man” and another except to it. “Yea, but he hath a great charge of children;” as if it were an abatement to his riches: but the most ordinary cause of a single life is liberty, especially in certain self-pleasing and humorous minds, which are so sensible of every restraint, as they will go near to think heir girdles and garters to be bonds and shackles. Unmarried men are best friends, best masters, best servants; but not always best subjects; for they are light to run away; and almost all fugitives are of that condition. A single life doth well with churchmen, for charity will hardly water the ground where it must first fill a pool. It is indifferent for judges and magistrates; for if they be facile and corrupt, you shall have a servant five times worse than a wife. For soldiers, I find the generals commonly, in their hortatives, put men in mind of their wives and children; and I think the despising of marriage among the Turks maketh the vulgar soldier more base. Certainly wife and children are a kind of discipline of humanity; and single men, though they may be many times more charitable, because their means are less exhaust, yet, on the other side, they are more cruel and hardhearted, (good to make severe inquisitors,) because their tenderness is not so oft called upon. Grave natures, led by custom, and therefore constant, are commonly loving husbands, as was said of Ulysses, “vetulam suam prætulit immortalitati.” Chaste women are often proud and froward, as presuming upon the merit of their chastity. It is one of the best bonds, both of chastity and obedience, in the wife, if she think her husband wise; which she will never do if she find him jealous. Wives are young men’s mistresses, companions for middle age, and old men’s nurses; so as a man may have a quarrel to marry when he will: but yet he was reputed one of the wise men, that made answer to the question when a man should marry:—”A young man not yet, an elder man not at all.” It is often seen, that bad husbands have very good wives; whether it be that it raiseth the price of their husband’s kindness when it comes, or that the wives take a pride in their patience; but this never fails, if the bad husbands were of their own choosing, against their friends consent, for then they will be sure to make good their own folly.

XI. OF GREAT PLACE.

Men in great place are thrice servants; servants of the sovereign or state, servants of fame, and servants of business; so as they have no freedom, neither in their persons, nor in their actions, nor in their times. It is a strange desire to seek power and to lose liberty; or to seek power over others, and to lose power over a man’s self. The rising unto place is laborious, and by pains men come to greater pains; and it is sometimes base, and by indignities men come to dignities. The standing is slippery, and the regress is either a downfall, or at least an eclipse, which is a melancholy thing: “Cum non sis qui fueris, non esse cur velis vivere.” Nay, retire men cannot when they would, neither will they when it were reason; but are impatient of privateness even in age and sickness, which require the shadow: like old townsmen, that will be still sitting at their street door, though thereby they offer age to scorn. Certainly great persons had need to borrow other men’s opinions to think themselves happy; for if they judge by their own feeling, they cannot find it: but if they think with themselves what other men think of them, and that other men would fain be as they are, then they are happy as it were by report, when, perhaps, they find the contrary within; for they are the first that find their own griefs, though they be the last that find their own faults. Certainly men in great fortunes are strangers to themselves, and while they are in the puzzle of business they have no time to tend their health either of body or mind: “Illi mors gravis incubat, qui notus nimis omnibus, ignotus moritur sibi.” In place there is license to do good and evil; whereof the latter is a curse: for in evil the best condition is not to will; the second not to can. But power to do good is the true and lawful end of aspiring; for good thoughts (though God accept them,) yet towards men are little better than good dreams, except they be put in act; and that cannot be without power and place, as the vantage and commanding ground. Merit and good works is the end of man’s motion; and conscience of the same is the accomplishment of man’s rest; for if a man can be partaker of God’s theatre, he shall likewise be partaker of God’s rest: “Et conversus Deus, ut aspiceret opera, quaæ fecerunt manus suæ, vidit quod omnia essent bona nimis;” and then the sabbath. In the discharge of the place set before thee the best examples; for imitation is a globe of precepts; and after a time set before thine own example; and examine thyself strictly whether thou didst not best at first. Neglect not also the examples of those that have carried themselves ill in the same place; not to set off thyself by taxing their memory, but to direct thyself what to avoid. Reform, therefore, without bravery or scandal of former times and persons; but yet set it down to thyself, as well to create good precedents as to follow them. Reduce things to the first institution, and observe wherein and how they have degenerated; but yet ask counsel of both times; of the ancienter time what is best; and of the latter time what is fittest. Seek to make thy course regular, that men may know be forehand what they may expect; but be not too positive and peremptory; and express thyself well when thou digressest from thy lure. Preserve the right of thy place, but stir not questions of jurisdiction; and rather assume thy right in silence, and “de facto,” than voice it with claims and challenges. Preserve likewise the rights of inferior places; and think it more honour to direct in chief than to be busy in all. Embrace and invite helps and advices touching the execution of thy place; and do not drive away such as bring thee information as meddlers, but accept of them in good part. The vices of authority are chiefly four; delays, corruption, roughness, and facility. For delays give easy access: keep times appointed; go through with that which is in hand, and interlace not business but of necessity. For corruption, do not only bind thine own hands or thy servant’s hands from taking, but bind the hands of suitors also from offering; for integrity used doth the one; but integrity professed, and with a manifest detestation of bribery, doth the other; and avoid not only the fault, but the suspicion. Whosoever is found variable, and changeth manifestly without manifest cause, giveth suspicion of corruption; therefore, always when thou changest thine opinion or course, profess it plainly, and declare it, together with the reasons that move thee to change, and do not think to steal it. A servant or a favourite, if he be inward, and no other apparent cause of esteem, is commonly thought but a by-way to close corruption. For roughness, it is a needless cause of discontent; severity breedeth fear, but roughness breedeth hate. Even reproofs from authority ought to be grave, and not taunting. As for facility, it is worse than bribery; for bribes come but now and then; but if importunity or idle respects lead a man, he shall never be without; as Solomon saith, “To respect persons is not good, for such a man will transgress for a piece of bread.” It is most true that was anciently spoken, “A place showeth the man; and it showeth some to the better and some to the worse;” “omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset,” saith Tacitus of Galba; but of Vespasian he saith, “solus imperantium, Vespasianus mutatus in melius;” though the one was meant of sufficiency, the other of manners and affection. It is an assured sign of a worthy and generous spirit, whom honour amends; for honour is, or should be, the place of virtue; and as in nature things move violently to their place and calmly in their place, so virtue in ambition is violent, in authority settled and calm. All rising to great place is by a winding stair; and if there be factions, it is good to side a man’s self whilst he is in the rising, and to balance himself when he is placed. Use the memory of thy predecessor fairly and tenderly; for if thou dost not, it is a debt will sure be paid when thou art gone. If thou have colleagues, respect them; and rather call them when they looked not for it, than exclude them when they have reason to look to be called. Be not too sensible or too remembering of thy place in conversation and private answers to suitors; but let it rather be said, “When he sits in place he is another man.”

XVII. OF SUPERSTITION.

It were better to have no opinion of God at all than such an opinion as is unworthy of him; for the one is unbelief, the other is contumely; and certainly superstition is the reproach of the Deity. Plutarch saith well to that purpose: “Surely,” saith he, “I had rather a great deal men should say there was no such man at all as Plutarch, than that they should say that there was one Plutarch, that would eat his children as soon as they were born:” as the poets speak of Saturn: and, as the contumely is greater towards God, so the danger is greater towards men. Atheism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation: all which may be guides to an outward moral virtue, though religion were not; but superstition dismounts all these, and erecteth an absolute monarchy in the minds of men: therefore atheism did never perturb states; for it makes men wary of themselves, as looking no further, and we see the times inclined to atheism (as the time of Augustus Cæsar) were civil times: but superstition hath been the confusion of many states, and bringeth in a new “primum mobile,” that ravisheth all the spheres of government. The master of superstition is the people, and in all superstition wise men follow fools; and arguments are fitted to practice, in a reversed order. It was gravely said, by some of the prelates in the council of Trent, where the doctrine of the schoolmen bare great sway, that the schoolmen were like astronomers, which did feign eccentrics and epicycles, and such engines of orbs to save phenomena, though they knew there were no such things; and, in like manner, that the schoolmen had framed a number of subtle and intricate axioms and theorems, to save the practice of the church. The causes of superstition are, pleasing and sensual rites and ceremonies; excess of outward and pharisaical holiness; over great reverence of traditions, which cannot but load the church; the stratagems of prelates for their own ambition and lucre; the favouring too much of good intentions, which openeth the gate to conceits and novelties; the taking an aim at divine matters by human, which cannot but breed mixture of imaginations; and, lastly, barbarous times, especially joined with calamities and disasters. Superstition, without a veil, is a deformed thing: for as it addeth deformity to an ape to be so like a man, so the similitude of superstition to religion makes it the more deformed: and, as wholesome meat corrupteth to little worms, so good forms and  orders corrupt into a number of petty observances. There is a superstition in avoiding superstition, when men think to do best if they go furthest from the superstition formerly received; therefore care would be had that (as it fareth in ill purgings) the good be not taken away with the bad, which commonly is done when the people is the reformer.

XXXIII. OF PLANTATIONS.

Plantations are amongst ancient, primitive, and heroical works. When the world was young, it begat more children; but now it is old, it begets fewer; for I may justly account new plantations to be the children of former kingdoms. I like a plantation in a pure soil; that is, where people are not displanted to the end to plant in others; for else it is rather an extirpation than a plantation. Planting of countries is like planting of woods; for you must make account to lose almost twenty years profit, and expect your recompense in the end: for the principal thing that hath been the destruction of most plantations, hath been the base and hasty drawing of profit in the first years. It is true, speedy profit is not to be neglected, as far as may stand with the good of the plantation, but no further. It is a shameful and unblessed thing to take the scum of people and wicked condemned men, to be the people with whom you plant; and not only so, but it spoileth the plantation; for they will ever live like rogues, and not fall to work, but be lazy, and do mischief, and spend victuals, and be quickly weary, and then certify over to their country to the discredit of the plantation. The people wherewith you plant ought to be gardeners, ploughmen, labourers, smiths, carpenters, joiners, fishermen, fowlers, with some few apothecaries, surgeons, cooks, and bakers. In a country of plantation, first look about what kind of victual the country yields of itself to hand; as chestnuts, walnuts, pineapples, olives, dates, plums, cherries, wild honey, and the like, and make use of them. Then consider what victual, or esculent things there are which grow speedily and within the year: as parsnips, carrots, turnips, onions, radish, artichokes of Jerusalem, maize, and the like: for wheat, barley, and oats, they ask too much labour; but with pease and beans you may begin, both because they ask less labour, and because they serve for meat as well as for bread; and of rice likewise cometh a great increase, and it is a kind of meat. Above all, there ought to be brought store biscuit, oatmeal, flour, meal, and the like, in the beginning, till bread may be had. For beasts, or birds, take chiefly such as are least subject to diseases, and multiply fastest; as swine, goats, cocks, hens, turkeys, geese, house-doves, and the like. The victual in plantations ought to be expended almost as in a besieged town; that is, with certain allowance: and let the main part of the ground employed to gardens or corn, be to a common stock; and to be laid in, and stored up, and then delivered out in proportion; besides some spots of ground that any particular person will manure for his own private use. Consider, likewise, what commodities the soil where the plantation is doth naturally yield, that they may some way help to defray the charge of the plantation; so it be not, as was said, to the untimely prejudice of the main business, as it hath fared with tobacco in Virginia. Wood commonly aboundeth but too much: and therefore timber is fit to be one. If there be iron ore, and streams whereupon to set the mills, iron is a brave commodity where wood aboundeth. Making of bay-salt, if the climate be proper for it, would be put in experience: growing silk likewise, if any be, is a likely commodity: pitch and tar, where store of firs and pines are, will not fail; so drugs and sweet woods, where they are, cannot but yield great profit; soap-ashes likewise, and other things that may be thought of; but moil not too much under ground, for the hope of mines is very uncertain and useth to make the planters lazy in other things. For government, let it be in the hands of one, assisted with some counsel; and let them have commission to exercise martial laws, with some limitation; and, above all, let men make that profit of being in the wilderness, as they have God always, and his service before their eyes; let not the government of the plantation depend upon too many counsellors and undertakers in the country that planteth, but upon a temperate number; and let those be rather noblemen and gentle men, than merchants; for they look ever to the present gain: let there be freedoms from custom, till the plantation be of strength; and not only freedom from custom, but freedom to carry their commodities where they may make their best of them, except there be some special cause of caution. Cram not in people, by sending too fast, company after company; but rather hearken how they waste, and send supplies proportionably; but so as the number may live well in the plantation, and not by surcharge be in penury. It hath been a great endangering to the health of some plantations, that they have built along the sea and rivers in marish and unwholesome grounds: therefore, though you begin there, to avoid carriage and other like discommodities, yet build still rather upwards from the stream, than along. It concerneth likewise the health of the plantation that they have good store of salt with them, that they may use it in their victuals when it shall be necessary. If you plant where savages are, do not only entertain them with trifles and gingles, but use them justly and graciously, with sufficient guard nevertheless; and do not win their favour by helping them to invade their enemies, but for their defence it is not amiss: and send oft of them over to the country that plants, that they may see a better condition than their own, and commend it when they return. When the plantation grows to strength, then  it is time to plant with women as well as with men; that the plantation may spread into generations, and not be ever pieced from without. It is the sinfullest thing in the world to forsake or destitute a plantation once in forwardness; for, besides the dishonour, it is the guiltiness of blood of many commiserable persons.

XLVII. OF NEGOTIATING.

It is generally better to deal by speech than by letter; and by the mediation of a third than by a man’s self. Letters are good when a man would draw an answer by letter back again; or when it may serve for a man’s justification afterwards to produce his own letter; or where it may be danger to be interrupted, or heard by pieces. To deal in person is good, when a man’s face breedeth regard, as commonly with inferiors; or in tender cases, where a man’s eye upon the countenance of him with whom he speaketh, may give him a direction how far to go; and generally, where a man will reserve to himself liberty either to disavow or to expound. In choice of instruments, it is better to choose men of a plainer sort, that are like to do that that is committed to them, and to report back again faithfully the success, than those that are cunning to contrive out of ether men’s business somewhat to grace themselves, and will help the matter in report, for satisfaction sake. Use also such persons as affect the business wherein they are employed, for that quickeneth much; and such as are fit for the matter, as bold men for expostulation, fair-spoken men for persuasion, crafty men for inquiry and observation, froward and absurd men for business that doth not well bear out itself. Use also such as have been lucky and prevailed before in things wherein you have employed them; for that breeds confidence, and they will strive to maintain their prescription. It is better to sound a person with whom one deals afar off, than to fall upon the point at first; except you mean to surprise him by some short question. It is better dealing with men in appetite, than with those that are where they would be. If a man deal with another upon conditions, the start of first performance is all; which a man can reasonably demand, except either the nature of the thing be such, which must go before: or else a man can persuade the other party, that he shall still need him in some other thing; or else that he be counted the honester man. All practice is to discover, or to work. Men discover themselves in trust, in passion, at unawares; and of necessity, when they would have somewhat done, and cannot find an apt pretext, if you would work any man, you must either know his nature and fashions, and so lead him; or his ends, and so persuade him; or his weakness and disadvantages, and so awe him; or these that have interest in him, and so govern him. In dealing with cunning persons, we must ever consider their ends, to interpret their speeches; and it is good to say little to them, and that which they least look for. In all negotiations of difficulty, a man may not look to sow and reap at once; but must prepare business, and so ripen it by degrees.

XXXVII. OF MASQUES AND TRIUMPHS.

These things are but toys to come amongst such serious observations; but yet, since princes will have such things, it is better they should be graced with elegancy, than daubed with cost. Dancing to song, is a thing of great state and pleasure. I understand it that the song be inquire, placed aloft, and accompanied by some broken music; and the ditty fitted to the device. Acting in song, especially in dialogues, hath an extreme good grace; I say acting, not dancing, (for that is a mean and vulgar thing;) and the voices of the dialogue would be strong and manly, (a base and a tenor, no treble,) and the ditty high and tragical, not nice or dainty. Several quires placed one over against another, and taking the voice by catches anthem-wise, give great pleasure. Turning dances into figure is a childish curiosity; and generally let it be noted, that those things which  I here set down are such as do naturally take the sense, and not respect petty wonderments. It is true, the alterations of scenes, so it be quietly and without noise, are things of great beauty and pleasure; for they feed and relieve the eye before it be full of the same object. Let the scenes abound with light, especially coloured and varied; and let the masquers, or any other that are to come down from the scene, have some motions upon the scene it self before their coining down; for it draws the eye strangely, and makes it with great pleasure to desire to see that it cannot perfectly discern. Let the songs be loud and cheerful, and not chirpings or pulings: let the music likewise be sharp and loud, and well placed. The colours that show best by candle-light, are white, carnation, and a kind of sea-water green and ouches, or spangs, as they are of no great cost, so they are of most glory. As for rich embroidery, it is lost and not discerned. Let the suits of the masquers be graceful, and such as become the person when the vizards are off; not after examples of known attires; Turks, soldiers, mariners, and the like. Let anti-masques not be long; they have been commonly of fools, satyrs, baboons, wild men antics, beasts, spirits, witches, Ethiopes, pigmies turquets, nymphs, rustics, Cupids, statues moving and the like. As for angels, it is not comical enough to put them in anti-masques; and any thing that is hideous, as devils, giants, is, on the other side as unfit; but chiefly, let the music of them be recreative, and with some strange changes. Some sweet odours suddenly coming forth, without any drops falling, are, in such a company as there is steam and heat, things of great pleasure and refreshment. Double masques, one of men another of ladies, addeth state and variety; but all is nothing except the room be kept clean and neat.

For jousts, and tourneys, and barriers, the glories of them are chiefly in the chariots, wherein the challengers make their entry; especially if they be drawn with strange beasts; as lions, bears camels, and the like; or in the devices of their entrance, or in bravery of their liveries, or in the goodly furniture of their horses and armour. But enough of these toys.

L. OF STUDIES.

Studies serve for delight, for ornament and for ability. Their chief use for delight, is in privateness and retiring; for ornament, is in discourse; and for ability, is in the judgment and disposition of business; for expert men can execute, and perhaps judge of particulars, one by one: but the general counsels, and the plots and marshalling of affairs come best from those that are learned. To spend too much time in studies, is sloth; to use them too much for ornament, is affectation; to make judgment wholly by their rules, is the humour of a scholar: they perfect nature, and are perfected by experience: for natural abilities are like natural plants, that need pruning by study; and studies themselves do give forth directions too much at large, except they be bounded in by experience. Crafty men contemn studies, simple men admire them, and wise men use them; for they teach not their own use; but that is a wisdom without them, and above them, won by observation. Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse, but to weigh and consider. Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested; that is, some books are to be read only in parts; others to be read, but not curiously; and some few to be read wholly, and with diligence and attention. Some books also may be read by deputy, and extracts made of them by others; but that would be only in the less important arguments, and the meaner sort of books; else distilled books are, like common distilled waters, flashy things. Reading maketh a full man; conference a ready man; and writing an exact man; and, therefore, if a man write little, he had need have a great memory; if he confer little, he had need have a present wit: and if he read little, he had need have much cunning, to seem to know that he doth not. Histories make men wise; poets witty; the mathematics subtile; natural philosophy deep; moral, grave; logic and rhetoric, able to contend “Abeunt studia in mores;” nay, there is no stond or impediment in the wit, but may be wrought out by fit studies: like as diseases of the body may have appropriate exercises; bowling is good for the stone and reins, shooting for the lungs and breast, gentle walking for the stomach, riding for the head, and the like; so, if a man’s wit be wandering, let him study the mathematics; for in demonstrations, if his wit be called away never so little, he must begin again; if his wit be no apt to distinguish or find differences, let him study the schoolmen, for they are “Cymini sectores;” if he be not apt to beat over matters, and to call upon one thing to prove and illustrate another, let him study the lawyer’s cases: so every defect of the mind may have a special receipt.

Source Text:

Bacon, Francis. Bacon’s Essays and Wisdom of the Ancients . Little, Brown, and Company, 1884, is licensed under no known copyright.

An Open Companion to Early British Literature Copyright © 2019 by Allegra Villarreal is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

Share This Book

Bacon as an Essayist | Bacon’s Prose Style | Bacon as a father of English Prose

Francis Bacon was a famous Essayist of the 16th century and also known as the father of English prose. The collection of his essays was also titled “Essays” which was first published in 1597 and later its second edition was published in 1812 and 1625 respectively.

Bacon as an essayist penned in a methodical way, taking their subject-matter from a collection of perspectives, analyzing them, and writing in distinct prose style, using aphorisms to clearly make a point. He enclosed such subjects as study, love, health, work, truth, travel, friendship, beauty, anger, and so on.

Read more: Renaissance in English Literature

Francis Bacon believed that a person’s mind and personality are expressed through his writing. Therefore if a person had a muddled, unclear and cryptic writing style, then that was an indication that his mind was also disordered and confused. Furthermore if a person’s writing skill was clear, simple and straightforward then that was an indication that his mind was also transparent and uncomplicated. This is very much evident in Bacon’s writings too as he employs short, concise, and aphoristic writing technique in his essays. 

Table of Contents

Bacon’s aphoristic style as an essayist

An aphoristic technique signifies the close-packed and concise style of writing. An aphorism is a terse sentence, conveying the idea in the least possible words. Certainly, Bacon’s essays are replete with such aphorism. His essays amalgamate knowledge with utmost conciseness. The brief, epigrammatic pearl of wisdom in his essays has turned into well-liked mottoes and household verbalism. There are numerous aphoristic lines that we find in his essays. For example in the essay “Of Truth”: “A mixture of lie doth ever add pleasure.” (Francis Bacon, Of Truth).

Through this sentence Bacon wishes to forward the concept that the truth gets more appealing when mingled with a lie in it. Therefore, most of the times, when we wish to protect a lie; we use this pronouncement of Bacon. 

Bacon’s essay “Of Friendship” reveals Bacon’s pithy and laconic style: “For a crowd is not a company and faces are but a gallery of pictures.” (Francis Bacon, Of Friendship).

Read more: Humanism renaissance in English Literature

All the aphorisms of Bacon’s essays amazed us by their freshness and novelty. Every aphoristic sentence seizes us. His laconic style grabs our attention. Basically, they all gratify, excite and delight us because they all consist of priceless ideas, advice, and lessons. 

Bacon’s use of allusions and quotations in his essays:

The learning spirit of renaissance is very much evident in Bacon’s writings. Bacon employs allusions and references carried from varied origins, chronicles, past records, ancient Greek and Roman writers, classical tales, and the Bible. Bacon employs the references of Montaigne and Pilate in his essay “Of Truth” . Similarly in “Of Friendship” Bacon mentions Aristotle. Bacon uses references and allusions so as to elucidate his purpose more distinctly and this also makes Bacon’s prose style more erudite and enriching.

Bacon as a philosopher and a moralist:

As Bacon’s essays show, Bacon is not only a philosopher but also a moralist . A Philosopher is a person who is intensely focused on seeking truth, on the other hand, a moralist is a person who educates human beings on the difference between what is virtuous and what is evil, and encourages them to go in the right direction only. Bacon comes out in this twofold role in numerous essays that he has penned. In his essay “Of Truth,” Bacon states that truth is the ultimate virtue for mankind. In the context of the Bible, Bacon claims that in the first place God made light and the last thing that God made was rational faculty that God gave to mankind. First God passed off light upon substance; then he passed off light upon man, and subsequently, God has been always giving light into the faces of people whom he selects for his unique favor. After explaining all these, we can conclude that these are the investigations of a philosopher-cum-moralist . The main purpose of writing all these essays was that Bacon wanted to teach the importance of truth to his readers.

Bacon’s essays are a storehouse of practical knowledge:

Bacon is regarded as one of the earliest empiricists, building his concepts on investigation of actual life not from prejudices or received facts. Bacon’s essays are a storehouse of practical knowledge. Practical knowledge is a type of knowledge that is compulsory for attaining worldly success. Bacon instructs us on how to advance in this world. Bacon also explains to us how to flourish in life and become wealthy. For example, Bacon writes his “Of Friendship” clearly from a utilitarian point of view. Bacon makes us aware of the “uses” of friendship. A friend simplifies our apprehension and his counsel is most dependable. A friend can take necessary action for us in such circumstances in which we personally cannot take action. Bacon hints to indicate that we require friends only for our worldly contentment and success. It is also noteworthy that he illustrated his essays as “Counsels, civil and moral” which suggests that he wanted his essays to give such instruction to his readers as could assist them in achieving prosperity in civil life while concurrently recognizing certain primary moral values. 

Conclusion:

Francis Bacon also wrote a philosophical work called “Novum Organum” which was his commentary on logic and syllogism. In this work Bacon proposes a new method of logic: he feels to be better to the old method of syllogism.  Bacon was a genuine Renaissance man as he shared his wisdom and knowledge in many different fields like philosophy, science, logic and politics. His technique of essay writing is not adamant and authoritative but willingly he’s own and amiable. For instance in one of his essays “Of Envy” , Bacon does not start with an announcement of envy being dangerous and damaging of pleasure. His style permits him to investigate such topics with an experimental eye that connects experiences to meaning and then only finally unveils his insight and judgment on the topic. To conclude we can say that Bacon was the acute observer of life. Bacon’s essays reflect his vast experience and understanding of men and situations and also of the universe. 

Critical Appreciation of Tennyson’s “Break, Break Break” Tennyson as a representative poet of Victorian age Short note on elegy Justify the title Pride and Prejudice The use of irony in Austen’s Pride and Prejudice

2 thoughts on “Bacon as an Essayist | Bacon’s Prose Style | Bacon as a father of English Prose”

it is very helpful to us…thank you

Leave a Comment Cancel reply

You must be logged in to post a comment.

Of Friendship By Francis Bacon Critical Analysis | Of Friendship Essay

Table of Contents

Introduction

            Of Friendship is the masterpiece essay nicely written by Francis Bacon who is popularly known as an eminent essayist, thinker, scholar, and philosopher in English literature. He belongs to the Elizabethan age. This essay was first published in 1612 was very brief. The present version published in  1625, is practically a new composition much longer than the original version. The essay was actually written at the request of Bacon’s intimate friend “Toby Matthew”.

About Francis Bacon

            Francis Bacon was one of the most remarkable men of Literature and is popularly known as the Father of English Literature Essays. Being an essayist, he wrote a galaxy of essays on different issues. His some world famous essays are – Of Studies, Of Love, Of Hatred, of Death, Of Truth, Of Philosophy, Of Ambition, Of Beauty, and Of Custom and Education.

Analysis Of “Of Friendship”

            Francis Bacon begins Of Friendship with an anthropological statement from Aristotle,

 “Whatsoever is delighted in Solitude,    is either a wild beast or a god.”

            Bacon posits that human nature demands company and social contact. Human beings and anyone who avoids such interactions is not doing justice to his natural state. Bacon does not criticize people who feel shy in a crowd and head for therefore seek isolation in the wild. Such people find great value in peace and it aids their mental processes to contemplate profound issues. Bacon points to philosophers like Epimenides the Canadian, Numa the Roman, Empedocles the Sicilian, and Apollonius of Tyana, who postulated theories unique to their age and contemporaries.

            Bacon attempts to differentiate between kinship and the general crowd. For him, there is a big difference between strangers of society and known friends.

“A Person can feel lonely in a crowd too.”

            Bacon uses a Latin adage which means that a big city is filled with great solitude. In a large city, people are separated and encamped in distinct areas that are difficult to bring closer together.

            These long distances cause separation between friends and relatives. Therefore, for cultivating friendship a small city or town is more conducive. In smaller towns, people live closer by and mingle a lot more regularly. Thus, these small cities have strong and united communities.

            According to Bacon, friendship demands the involvement of passions and feelings. They form the foundation of any friendship. Emotions are the threads that bind the hearts together.

A Cure For Ailing Heats

            Bacon points to the ailments of the heart that it suffers if it stops or in suffocate. A healthy heart required vigor and the same is provided by an intimate and friendly conversation with one’s pals. Patients take medicines for the liver spleen, lungs, brain, etc, but for the issues of hearts, the love and affection of a friend is the best cure.

Friendship Can be Bought

            The elite of society like kings and leaders are really adept at making friends. They understand the value of friendly ties with worthy people. The rich and the powerful often try to buy friendships with noble and influential people through gifts, badges of reverence, and their wealth, but such friends lack emotional attachment with their patron or benefactors.

History Teaches the Toughest

            Now Bacon comments on some of his theoretical examples. He says the Roman ruler Sylla gave Pompey the moniker of Great. However, Pompey divided Sylla as the setting sun while calling himself the rising sun of Roman Power.

            Similarly, Decimus Brutus gained Julius Ceasar’s friendship and became his most trusted advisor. His blind trust in Brutus caused Caesar’s final downfall.

            Bacon also gives the example of Agrippa and Augustus, Tiberius and Sejanus, Septimus Servers, and Plautianus.

            In this essay, Bacon addresses

Three fruits of Friendship

The first fruits of friendship.

                        The Communication of a man’s self to his friend works two contrary effects, first, it redoubles his joy and second, it cuts his grief in halves. Because there is no doubt when a person imparts his joy to his friends, he joys more than others. However, when he imparts his grief, they become less. It is a fact that bodies become healthier upon natural actions such as joy and happiness.

The Second Fruit of Friendship

                        As the first fruit is for affection, the second fruit is for the understanding of things from different perspectives. Moreover, a friend is undoubtedly, a witty counselor. Sharing one’s problems with a friend is far more fruitful than a day’s meditation. A friend’s counsel always works when a person himself is not clear with his thoughts.

The Last and Third Fruit of Friendship

            The first two fruits help for peace in the affections and support of the judgment. The last fruit is like a pomegranate, full of many kernels. It helps in several ways and has manifold fruits in itself. There are many things that a man cannot do himself, and then a friend is an appropriate alternative.

            Thus, Of Friends bring a lot of ease in such difficult situations and helps break barriers of communication. Francis Bacon ends the essay by condemning an unsociable man without friends as an aloof being not fit to belong to society.

Are you struggling to keep up with your English Literature Coursework? Do you need detailed, customized notes to help you better understand the texts you’re studying?  “Look no further! Our customized paid notes will help you achieve your study goals quickly.

– varsha singh, related posts.

War Poetry In English Literature | Fight during World War 1st | War Poets

I Know Why The Caged Bird Sings Summary & Analysis | I Know Why The Caged Bird Sings Poem Explanation

French Borrowing Words & French Loan Words | French loan Words In English Literature

New Criticism in literature | 20th Century Criticism | Modern Criticism

Aphoristic Style of Bacon

Francis Bacon’s fame as a writer depends most of all on the fact that he is the father of modern English prose . He evolved a prose style that proved for the first time that English could also be used to express the subtleties of thought, in clear and uninvolved sentences. He was the first scientific philosopher to write English in a clear, lucid and terse style . Though he borrowed the form of the essay from Montaigne, he adapted it to suit his own purpose and to his natural ability of writing. His essays are considered a whiff of a fresh air in the heavy and pompous essays written in Elizabethan age.

Bacon’s essays enjoy a great charm and appeal for readers thanks to their many merits or qualities such as wisdom, marvelous diction , captivating style of writing, huge variety of subjects, pragmatic approach, sensuousness, wealth of metaphor and analogy and the dispersed meditations of Bacon, whose sharp wit , worldly wisdom and practical approach towards things made his essays unsurpassable and masterpieces of English literature. What makes Bacon’s Essays a unique is compact and epigrammatic style of writing. Bacon was unsurpassable in bringing his great thoughts in nutshell. He had a great and impressive mastery over the art of saying maximum in minimum words.

An aphorism is a short, pithy and a concise statement of a principle and truth while an epigram is a terse, sage, or witty often a paradoxical saying. Bacon has aptly and effectively demonstrated his singular ability to express himself aphoristically and epigrammatically in his writings. His essays are replete with aphorisms. Many sentences in his essays are like proverbs, which can be quoted to give weight to the arguments. Almost every sentence in his essays is pregnant with meaning. His utterances are thoughtful, insightful, lively, witty and meaningful to the core. Only a person of high caliber like Bacon can develop a remarkable style of terseness and condensation. Following are some of the sentences from his essays, which depict vociferously his wonderful epigrammatic style of writing:

Wives are young men’s mistresses, companions for middle age and old men’s nurses. ( Of Marriage and Single Life ).

The rising unto place is laborious, and by pains men come to greater pains. ( Of Great Place )

Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested. ( Of Studies )

Studies serve for delight, for ornament, and for ability. ( Of Studies )

Crafty men condemn studies; simple men admire them; and wise men use them. ( Of Studies )

Reading maketh a full man; conference a ready man; and writing an exact man. ( Of Studies )

Revenge is a kind of wild justice. ( Of Studies )

Men fear death as children fear to go in the dark. (Of Fear)

Virtue is like precious odours, most fragrant when they are incensed or crushed; for prosperity doth best discover vice, but adversity doth best discover virtue. (Of Adversity).

These sentences from his essays are but a few glaring examples of Bacon’s terse, pithy and epigrammatic style of writing, which speak volumes of his great talent and wisdom. A reader feels inexpressible delight in reading his essays and feels wiser and more enlightened after reading the pearls of wisdom in the essays of Bacon. His essays, beyond doubt, are great literary work in English literature.

Want to create or adapt books like this? Learn more about how Pressbooks supports open publishing practices.

37 Francis Bacon: Essays

Introduction.

by Mary Larivee and Rithvik Saravanan

Francis Bacon (1561-1626), the English philosopher, was instrumental in the development of the Scientific Revolution in the late 18th century even though he had passed away centuries before.  The “Scientific Revolution” was an important movement that emphasized Europe’s shift toward modernized science in fields such as mathematics, physics, astronomy, biology, and chemistry (Grant). It was an extension of the Renaissance period, which then led to the Enlightenment which brought advances across all areas of human endeavor. Francis Bacon, in particular, is remembered today primarily for the “scientific method” as a way of establishing what is true from what is false perception (a method that still lies at the heart of modern science). Bacon’s primary focus in his writings revolved around the practice of inductive reasoning, which he believed to be a complement to practical observation (Grant). Most people before this period followed the Aristotelian methodology for scientific arguments. This idea maintained that “if sufficiently clever men discussed a subject long enough, the truth would eventually be discovered” (“History – Francis Bacon.”). However irrational this sounds, the Scientific Revolution helped replace this outdated system of thinking with Bacon’s scientific method. Bacon argued that any proper argument required “evidence from the real world” (“History – Francis Bacon.”). His revolutionary ideas about empirical information helped propel him toward political and societal importance and fame.

Literary Context

Francis Bacon had a passion for metaphors, analogies, and vivid imagery. He was a rhetorical writer and his essays highlight his wisdom and incisive mind. His first book was released in 1597 followed by later editions with added essays that were released in 1612 and 1625. Each essay that Bacon wrote reveals his knowledge of Latin and draws on ancient Roman wisdom through axioms and proverbs. Additionally, Bacon uses wit as a way of getting his point across to his audience and this indeed causes the reader to reflect on his or her own beliefs and values. A key aspect of Bacon’s literature is its “terseness and epigrammatic force” (De). By managing to pack all of his thoughts and ideas into quick, brief statements, Bacon deepens the reach and impact of his work. His writing deviated from the typical Ciceronian style of the time, which was characterized by “melodious language, clarity, and forcefulness of presentation” (“Ciceronian.”). His statements are meaningful particularly because they are straight and to the point. The brevity of his ideas also facilitates the communication of his arguments, which is significant because, at the time, a solid, meaningful education was hard to come by. As such, Bacon’s work helped spread the notions that would eventually bear fruit with the discoveries of the Scientific Revolution.

Historical Context

Francis Bacon’s Essays cover a wide variety of topics and styles, ranging from individual to societal issues and from commonplace to existential. Another important aspect of the appeal of Bacon’s essays are that they weigh the argument at hand with multiple points of view. Bacon’s essays were received at the time with great praise, adoration, and reverence (Potter). He was noted for borrowing ideas from the works of historical writers such as Aristotle (Harmon), and, as such, he represents a continuation of this philosophical school of thought. Another important impact of the Scientific Revolution and Bacon’s literature is that it allowed common people of the era to question old, traditional beliefs. They began to consider everything with reason, which led to a greater sense of self as well as moral and ethical standards. By having the opportunity to judge for themselves, the people were able to advance society a step closer to a form of democracy.

Francis Bacon Essays is a collection of eight of the famous philosopher’s many essays. Each dissertation contains words of wisdom that have proven to be enlightening for many generations that followed. From “Truth” to “Of Superstition” and “Marriage and Single Life”, Bacon covers a wide range of intriguing topics in order to challenge the human mind to think deeply; as he himself writes: “Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse, but to weigh and consider” (Bacon). The philosopher not only provides a framework for the genre of the modern essay but also provides his readers a code to live by.

Works Cited

“Ciceronian.” Dictionary.com , n.d., www.dictionary.com/browse/ciceronian. 23 Oct. 2020.

De, Ardhendu. “Rhetorical Devices as Used by Francis Bacon in His Essays.” A.D.’s English Literature: Notes and Guide , 07 Apr. 2011, ardhendude.blogspot.com/2011/04/rhetorical-devices-used-by-francis.html. Accessed 23 Oct. 2020.

Grant, Edward. The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional, and Intellectual Contexts . Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Harmon, William. The Oxford Book of American Light Verse. Oxford University Press, 1979.

“History – Francis Bacon.” History , British Broadcasting Corporation, 2014, www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/bacon_francis.shtml. Accessed 24 Oct. 2020.

Potter, Vincent G. Readings in Epistemology: from Aquinas, Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant. Fordham University Press, 1993.

Discussion Questions

• Why do you think Francis Bacon chose to enlighten and inspire his readers as opposed to other writers of his time who focused more on classic folklore tales?
• Why do you think Francis Bacon choose the topics that he did? Who or what do you think had a major influence on his writings?
• What are the goals and intentions behind Bacon’s use of rhetorical questioning?
• What are some common themes and ideas from Francis Bacon’s Essays that can be applied to general situations and contemporary society?
• From the ideas presented in this reading, how do you think Francis Bacon’s work affected government policies throughout history, including modern day governmental standards?

Further Resources

• Detailed biography of Franics Bacon’s life
• Analytical article of Francis Bacon’s impact on the Scientific Revolution
• List of Francis Bacon’s most significant accomplishments
• Compilation of Francis Bacon’s literature
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Francis Bacon
• Discussion video of Francis Bacon’s “Of Studies”

Reading: From Essayes

I. of truth..

What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer. Certainly there be that delight in giddiness; and count it a bondage to fix a belief; affecting free-will in thinking, as well as in acting. And though the sects of philosophers of that kind be gone, yet there remain certain discoursive wits, which are of the same veins, though there be not so much blood in them as was in those of the ancients. But it is not only the difficulty and labour which men take in finding out of truth, nor again, that when it is found, it imposeth upon men’s thoughts, that doth bring lies in favour, but a natural though corrupt love of the lie itself. One of the later schools of the Grecians examineth the matter, and is at a stand to think what should be in it, that men should love lies; where neither they make for pleasure, as with poet; nor for advantage, as with the mer chant, but for the lie’s sake. But I cannot tell: this same truth is a naked and open daylight, that doth not show the masks, and mummeries, and triumphs of the world, half so stately and daintily as candlelights. Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl, that showeth best by day, but it will not rise to the price of a diamond or carbuncle, that showeth best in varied lights. A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken out of men’s minds, vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds of a number of men, poor shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves? One of the fathers, in great severity, called poesy “vinum dæmonum,”; because it filleth the imagination, and yet it is but with the shadow of a lie. But it is not the lie that passeth through the mind, but the lie that sinketh in, and settleth in it, that doth the hurt, such as we spake of before. But howsoever these things are thus in men’s depraved judgments and affections, yet truth, which only doth judge itself, teacheth, that the inquiry of truth, which is the love-making, or wooing of it, the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it, and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it, is the sovereign good of human nature. The first creature of God, in the works of the days, was the light of the sense: the last was the light of reason; and his Sabbath work ever since, is the illumination of his Spirit. First, he breathed light upon the face of the matter, or chaos; then he breathed light into the face of man; and still he breatheth and inspireth light into the face of his chosen. The poet that beautified the sect, that was otherwise inferior to the rest, saith yet excellently well: “It is a pleasure to stand upon the shore, and to see ships tossed upon the sea: a pleasure to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle, and the adventures thereof below: but no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of truth, (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene,) and to see the errors, and wanderings, and mists, and tempests in the vale below:” so always that this prospect be with pity, and not with swelling or pride. Certainly, it is heaven upon earth, to have a man’s mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.

To pass from theological and philosophical truth, to the truth of civil business; it will be acknowledged even by those that practise it not, that clean and round dealing is the honour of man’s nature, and that mixture of falsehood is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work the better, but it embaseth it. For these winding and crooked courses are the goings of the serpent; which goeth basely upon the belly, and not upon the feet. There is no vice that doth so cover a man with shame as to be found false and perfidious; and therefore Montaigne saith prettily, when he inquired the reason, why the word of the lie should be such a disgrace, and such an odious charge, saith he, “If it be well weighed, to say that a man lieth, is as much as to say, that he is brave towards God, and a coward towards men. For a lie faces God, and shrinks from man.” Surely the wickedness of falsehood and breach of faith cannot possibly be so highly expressed, as in that it shall be the last peal to call the judgments of God upon the generations of men: it being foretold, that when “Christ cometh,” he shall not “find faith upon the earth.”

VIII. OF MARRIAGE AND SINGLE LIFE.

He that hath wife and children hath given hostages to fortune; for they are impediments to great enterprises, either of virtue or mischief. Certainly the best works, and of greatest merit for the public, have proceeded from the unmarried or childless men; which, both in affection and means, have married and endowed the public. Yet it were great reason that those that have children should have greatest care of future times, unto which they know they must transmit their dearest pledges. Some there are, who, though they lead a single life, yet their thoughts do end with themselves, and account future times impertinences; nay, there are some other that account wife and children but as bills of charges; nay more, there are some foolish rich covetous men, that take a pride in having no children, because they may be thought so much the richer; for, perhaps, they have heard some talk, “Such an one’s a great rich man” and another except to it. “Yea, but he hath a great charge of children;” as if it were an abatement to his riches: but the most ordinary cause of a single life is liberty, especially in certain self-pleasing and humorous minds, which are so sensible of every restraint, as they will go near to think heir girdles and garters to be bonds and shackles. Unmarried men are best friends, best masters, best servants; but not always best subjects; for they are light to run away; and almost all fugitives are of that condition. A single life doth well with churchmen, for charity will hardly water the ground where it must first fill a pool. It is indifferent for judges and magistrates; for if they be facile and corrupt, you shall have a servant five times worse than a wife. For soldiers, I find the generals commonly, in their hortatives, put men in mind of their wives and children; and I think the despising of marriage among the Turks maketh the vulgar soldier more base. Certainly wife and children are a kind of discipline of humanity; and single men, though they may be many times more charitable, because their means are less exhaust, yet, on the other side, they are more cruel and hardhearted, (good to make severe inquisitors,) because their tenderness is not so oft called upon. Grave natures, led by custom, and therefore constant, are commonly loving husbands, as was said of Ulysses, “vetulam suam prætulit immortalitati.” Chaste women are often proud and froward, as presuming upon the merit of their chastity. It is one of the best bonds, both of chastity and obedience, in the wife, if she think her husband wise; which she will never do if she find him jealous. Wives are young men’s mistresses, companions for middle age, and old men’s nurses; so as a man may have a quarrel to marry when he will: but yet he was reputed one of the wise men, that made answer to the question when a man should marry:—”A young man not yet, an elder man not at all.” It is often seen, that bad husbands have very good wives; whether it be that it raiseth the price of their husband’s kindness when it comes, or that the wives take a pride in their patience; but this never fails, if the bad husbands were of their own choosing, against their friends consent, for then they will be sure to make good their own folly.

XI. OF GREAT PLACE.

Men in great place are thrice servants; servants of the sovereign or state, servants of fame, and servants of business; so as they have no freedom, neither in their persons, nor in their actions, nor in their times. It is a strange desire to seek power and to lose liberty; or to seek power over others, and to lose power over a man’s self. The rising unto place is laborious, and by pains men come to greater pains; and it is sometimes base, and by indignities men come to dignities. The standing is slippery, and the regress is either a downfall, or at least an eclipse, which is a melancholy thing: “Cum non sis qui fueris, non esse cur velis vivere.” Nay, retire men cannot when they would, neither will they when it were reason; but are impatient of privateness even in age and sickness, which require the shadow: like old townsmen, that will be still sitting at their street door, though thereby they offer age to scorn. Certainly great persons had need to borrow other men’s opinions to think themselves happy; for if they judge by their own feeling, they cannot find it: but if they think with themselves what other men think of them, and that other men would fain be as they are, then they are happy as it were by report, when, perhaps, they find the contrary within; for they are the first that find their own griefs, though they be the last that find their own faults. Certainly men in great fortunes are strangers to themselves, and while they are in the puzzle of business they have no time to tend their health either of body or mind: “Illi mors gravis incubat, qui notus nimis omnibus, ignotus moritur sibi.” In place there is license to do good and evil; whereof the latter is a curse: for in evil the best condition is not to will; the second not to can. But power to do good is the true and lawful end of aspiring; for good thoughts (though God accept them,) yet towards men are little better than good dreams, except they be put in act; and that cannot be without power and place, as the vantage and commanding ground. Merit and good works is the end of man’s motion; and conscience of the same is the accomplishment of man’s rest; for if a man can be partaker of God’s theatre, he shall likewise be partaker of God’s rest: “Et conversus Deus, ut aspiceret opera, quaæ fecerunt manus suæ, vidit quod omnia essent bona nimis;” and then the sabbath. In the discharge of the place set before thee the best examples; for imitation is a globe of precepts; and after a time set before thine own example; and examine thyself strictly whether thou didst not best at first. Neglect not also the examples of those that have carried themselves ill in the same place; not to set off thyself by taxing their memory, but to direct thyself what to avoid. Reform, therefore, without bravery or scandal of former times and persons; but yet set it down to thyself, as well to create good precedents as to follow them. Reduce things to the first institution, and observe wherein and how they have degenerated; but yet ask counsel of both times; of the ancienter time what is best; and of the latter time what is fittest. Seek to make thy course regular, that men may know be forehand what they may expect; but be not too positive and peremptory; and express thyself well when thou digressest from thy lure. Preserve the right of thy place, but stir not questions of jurisdiction; and rather assume thy right in silence, and “de facto,” than voice it with claims and challenges. Preserve likewise the rights of inferior places; and think it more honour to direct in chief than to be busy in all. Embrace and invite helps and advices touching the execution of thy place; and do not drive away such as bring thee information as meddlers, but accept of them in good part. The vices of authority are chiefly four; delays, corruption, roughness, and facility. For delays give easy access: keep times appointed; go through with that which is in hand, and interlace not business but of necessity. For corruption, do not only bind thine own hands or thy servant’s hands from taking, but bind the hands of suitors also from offering; for integrity used doth the one; but integrity professed, and with a manifest detestation of bribery, doth the other; and avoid not only the fault, but the suspicion. Whosoever is found variable, and changeth manifestly without manifest cause, giveth suspicion of corruption; therefore, always when thou changest thine opinion or course, profess it plainly, and declare it, together with the reasons that move thee to change, and do not think to steal it. A servant or a favourite, if he be inward, and no other apparent cause of esteem, is commonly thought but a by-way to close corruption. For roughness, it is a needless cause of discontent; severity breedeth fear, but roughness breedeth hate. Even reproofs from authority ought to be grave, and not taunting. As for facility, it is worse than bribery; for bribes come but now and then; but if importunity or idle respects lead a man, he shall never be without; as Solomon saith, “To respect persons is not good, for such a man will transgress for a piece of bread.” It is most true that was anciently spoken, “A place showeth the man; and it showeth some to the better and some to the worse;” “omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset,” saith Tacitus of Galba; but of Vespasian he saith, “solus imperantium, Vespasianus mutatus in melius;” though the one was meant of sufficiency, the other of manners and affection. It is an assured sign of a worthy and generous spirit, whom honour amends; for honour is, or should be, the place of virtue; and as in nature things move violently to their place and calmly in their place, so virtue in ambition is violent, in authority settled and calm. All rising to great place is by a winding stair; and if there be factions, it is good to side a man’s self whilst he is in the rising, and to balance himself when he is placed. Use the memory of thy predecessor fairly and tenderly; for if thou dost not, it is a debt will sure be paid when thou art gone. If thou have colleagues, respect them; and rather call them when they looked not for it, than exclude them when they have reason to look to be called. Be not too sensible or too remembering of thy place in conversation and private answers to suitors; but let it rather be said, “When he sits in place he is another man.”

XVII. OF SUPERSTITION.

It were better to have no opinion of God at all than such an opinion as is unworthy of him; for the one is unbelief, the other is contumely; and certainly superstition is the reproach of the Deity. Plutarch saith well to that purpose: “Surely,” saith he, “I had rather a great deal men should say there was no such man at all as Plutarch, than that they should say that there was one Plutarch, that would eat his children as soon as they were born:” as the poets speak of Saturn: and, as the contumely is greater towards God, so the danger is greater towards men. Atheism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation: all which may be guides to an outward moral virtue, though religion were not; but superstition dismounts all these, and erecteth an absolute monarchy in the minds of men: therefore atheism did never perturb states; for it makes men wary of themselves, as looking no further, and we see the times inclined to atheism (as the time of Augustus Cæsar) were civil times: but superstition hath been the confusion of many states, and bringeth in a new “primum mobile,” that ravisheth all the spheres of government. The master of superstition is the people, and in all superstition wise men follow fools; and arguments are fitted to practice, in a reversed order. It was gravely said, by some of the prelates in the council of Trent, where the doctrine of the schoolmen bare great sway, that the schoolmen were like astronomers, which did feign eccentrics and epicycles, and such engines of orbs to save phenomena, though they knew there were no such things; and, in like manner, that the schoolmen had framed a number of subtle and intricate axioms and theorems, to save the practice of the church. The causes of superstition are, pleasing and sensual rites and ceremonies; excess of outward and pharisaical holiness; over great reverence of traditions, which cannot but load the church; the stratagems of prelates for their own ambition and lucre; the favouring too much of good intentions, which openeth the gate to conceits and novelties; the taking an aim at divine matters by human, which cannot but breed mixture of imaginations; and, lastly, barbarous times, especially joined with calamities and disasters. Superstition, without a veil, is a deformed thing: for as it addeth deformity to an ape to be so like a man, so the similitude of superstition to religion makes it the more deformed: and, as wholesome meat corrupteth to little worms, so good forms and  orders corrupt into a number of petty observances. There is a superstition in avoiding superstition, when men think to do best if they go furthest from the superstition formerly received; therefore care would be had that (as it fareth in ill purgings) the good be not taken away with the bad, which commonly is done when the people is the reformer.

XXXIII. OF PLANTATIONS.

Plantations are amongst ancient, primitive, and heroical works. When the world was young, it begat more children; but now it is old, it begets fewer; for I may justly account new plantations to be the children of former kingdoms. I like a plantation in a pure soil; that is, where people are not displanted to the end to plant in others; for else it is rather an extirpation than a plantation. Planting of countries is like planting of woods; for you must make account to lose almost twenty years profit, and expect your recompense in the end: for the principal thing that hath been the destruction of most plantations, hath been the base and hasty drawing of profit in the first years. It is true, speedy profit is not to be neglected, as far as may stand with the good of the plantation, but no further. It is a shameful and unblessed thing to take the scum of people and wicked condemned men, to be the people with whom you plant; and not only so, but it spoileth the plantation; for they will ever live like rogues, and not fall to work, but be lazy, and do mischief, and spend victuals, and be quickly weary, and then certify over to their country to the discredit of the plantation. The people wherewith you plant ought to be gardeners, ploughmen, labourers, smiths, carpenters, joiners, fishermen, fowlers, with some few apothecaries, surgeons, cooks, and bakers. In a country of plantation, first look about what kind of victual the country yields of itself to hand; as chestnuts, walnuts, pineapples, olives, dates, plums, cherries, wild honey, and the like, and make use of them. Then consider what victual, or esculent things there are which grow speedily and within the year: as parsnips, carrots, turnips, onions, radish, artichokes of Jerusalem, maize, and the like: for wheat, barley, and oats, they ask too much labour; but with pease and beans you may begin, both because they ask less labour, and because they serve for meat as well as for bread; and of rice likewise cometh a great increase, and it is a kind of meat. Above all, there ought to be brought store biscuit, oatmeal, flour, meal, and the like, in the beginning, till bread may be had. For beasts, or birds, take chiefly such as are least subject to diseases, and multiply fastest; as swine, goats, cocks, hens, turkeys, geese, house-doves, and the like. The victual in plantations ought to be expended almost as in a besieged town; that is, with certain allowance: and let the main part of the ground employed to gardens or corn, be to a common stock; and to be laid in, and stored up, and then delivered out in proportion; besides some spots of ground that any particular person will manure for his own private use. Consider, likewise, what commodities the soil where the plantation is doth naturally yield, that they may some way help to defray the charge of the plantation; so it be not, as was said, to the untimely prejudice of the main business, as it hath fared with tobacco in Virginia. Wood commonly aboundeth but too much: and therefore timber is fit to be one. If there be iron ore, and streams whereupon to set the mills, iron is a brave commodity where wood aboundeth. Making of bay-salt, if the climate be proper for it, would be put in experience: growing silk likewise, if any be, is a likely commodity: pitch and tar, where store of firs and pines are, will not fail; so drugs and sweet woods, where they are, cannot but yield great profit; soap-ashes likewise, and other things that may be thought of; but moil not too much under ground, for the hope of mines is very uncertain and useth to make the planters lazy in other things. For government, let it be in the hands of one, assisted with some counsel; and let them have commission to exercise martial laws, with some limitation; and, above all, let men make that profit of being in the wilderness, as they have God always, and his service before their eyes; let not the government of the plantation depend upon too many counsellors and undertakers in the country that planteth, but upon a temperate number; and let those be rather noblemen and gentle men, than merchants; for they look ever to the present gain: let there be freedoms from custom, till the plantation be of strength; and not only freedom from custom, but freedom to carry their commodities where they may make their best of them, except there be some special cause of caution. Cram not in people, by sending too fast, company after company; but rather hearken how they waste, and send supplies proportionably; but so as the number may live well in the plantation, and not by surcharge be in penury. It hath been a great endangering to the health of some plantations, that they have built along the sea and rivers in marish and unwholesome grounds: therefore, though you begin there, to avoid carriage and other like discommodities, yet build still rather upwards from the stream, than along. It concerneth likewise the health of the plantation that they have good store of salt with them, that they may use it in their victuals when it shall be necessary. If you plant where savages are, do not only entertain them with trifles and gingles, but use them justly and graciously, with sufficient guard nevertheless; and do not win their favour by helping them to invade their enemies, but for their defence it is not amiss: and send oft of them over to the country that plants, that they may see a better condition than their own, and commend it when they return. When the plantation grows to strength, then  it is time to plant with women as well as with men; that the plantation may spread into generations, and not be ever pieced from without. It is the sinfullest thing in the world to forsake or destitute a plantation once in forwardness; for, besides the dishonour, it is the guiltiness of blood of many commiserable persons.

XLVII. OF NEGOTIATING.

It is generally better to deal by speech than by letter; and by the mediation of a third than by a man’s self. Letters are good when a man would draw an answer by letter back again; or when it may serve for a man’s justification afterwards to produce his own letter; or where it may be danger to be interrupted, or heard by pieces. To deal in person is good, when a man’s face breedeth regard, as commonly with inferiors; or in tender cases, where a man’s eye upon the countenance of him with whom he speaketh, may give him a direction how far to go; and generally, where a man will reserve to himself liberty either to disavow or to expound. In choice of instruments, it is better to choose men of a plainer sort, that are like to do that that is committed to them, and to report back again faithfully the success, than those that are cunning to contrive out of ether men’s business somewhat to grace themselves, and will help the matter in report, for satisfaction sake. Use also such persons as affect the business wherein they are employed, for that quickeneth much; and such as are fit for the matter, as bold men for expostulation, fair-spoken men for persuasion, crafty men for inquiry and observation, froward and absurd men for business that doth not well bear out itself. Use also such as have been lucky and prevailed before in things wherein you have employed them; for that breeds confidence, and they will strive to maintain their prescription. It is better to sound a person with whom one deals afar off, than to fall upon the point at first; except you mean to surprise him by some short question. It is better dealing with men in appetite, than with those that are where they would be. If a man deal with another upon conditions, the start of first performance is all; which a man can reasonably demand, except either the nature of the thing be such, which must go before: or else a man can persuade the other party, that he shall still need him in some other thing; or else that he be counted the honester man. All practice is to discover, or to work. Men discover themselves in trust, in passion, at unawares; and of necessity, when they would have somewhat done, and cannot find an apt pretext, if you would work any man, you must either know his nature and fashions, and so lead him; or his ends, and so persuade him; or his weakness and disadvantages, and so awe him; or these that have interest in him, and so govern him. In dealing with cunning persons, we must ever consider their ends, to interpret their speeches; and it is good to say little to them, and that which they least look for. In all negotiations of difficulty, a man may not look to sow and reap at once; but must prepare business, and so ripen it by degrees.

XXXVII. OF MASQUES AND TRIUMPHS.

These things are but toys to come amongst such serious observations; but yet, since princes will have such things, it is better they should be graced with elegancy, than daubed with cost. Dancing to song, is a thing of great state and pleasure. I understand it that the song be inquire, placed aloft, and accompanied by some broken music; and the ditty fitted to the device. Acting in song, especially in dialogues, hath an extreme good grace; I say acting, not dancing, (for that is a mean and vulgar thing;) and the voices of the dialogue would be strong and manly, (a base and a tenor, no treble,) and the ditty high and tragical, not nice or dainty. Several quires placed one over against another, and taking the voice by catches anthem-wise, give great pleasure. Turning dances into figure is a childish curiosity; and generally let it be noted, that those things which  I here set down are such as do naturally take the sense, and not respect petty wonderments. It is true, the alterations of scenes, so it be quietly and without noise, are things of great beauty and pleasure; for they feed and relieve the eye before it be full of the same object. Let the scenes abound with light, especially coloured and varied; and let the masquers, or any other that are to come down from the scene, have some motions upon the scene it self before their coining down; for it draws the eye strangely, and makes it with great pleasure to desire to see that it cannot perfectly discern. Let the songs be loud and cheerful, and not chirpings or pulings: let the music likewise be sharp and loud, and well placed. The colours that show best by candle-light, are white, carnation, and a kind of sea-water green and ouches, or spangs, as they are of no great cost, so they are of most glory. As for rich embroidery, it is lost and not discerned. Let the suits of the masquers be graceful, and such as become the person when the vizards are off; not after examples of known attires; Turks, soldiers, mariners, and the like. Let anti-masques not be long; they have been commonly of fools, satyrs, baboons, wild men antics, beasts, spirits, witches, Ethiopes, pigmies turquets, nymphs, rustics, Cupids, statues moving and the like. As for angels, it is not comical enough to put them in anti-masques; and any thing that is hideous, as devils, giants, is, on the other side as unfit; but chiefly, let the music of them be recreative, and with some strange changes. Some sweet odours suddenly coming forth, without any drops falling, are, in such a company as there is steam and heat, things of great pleasure and refreshment. Double masques, one of men another of ladies, addeth state and variety; but all is nothing except the room be kept clean and neat.

For jousts, and tourneys, and barriers, the glories of them are chiefly in the chariots, wherein the challengers make their entry; especially if they be drawn with strange beasts; as lions, bears camels, and the like; or in the devices of their entrance, or in bravery of their liveries, or in the goodly furniture of their horses and armour. But enough of these toys.

L. OF STUDIES.

Studies serve for delight, for ornament and for ability. Their chief use for delight, is in privateness and retiring; for ornament, is in discourse; and for ability, is in the judgment and disposition of business; for expert men can execute, and perhaps judge of particulars, one by one: but the general counsels, and the plots and marshalling of affairs come best from those that are learned. To spend too much time in studies, is sloth; to use them too much for ornament, is affectation; to make judgment wholly by their rules, is the humour of a scholar: they perfect nature, and are perfected by experience: for natural abilities are like natural plants, that need pruning by study; and studies themselves do give forth directions too much at large, except they be bounded in by experience. Crafty men contemn studies, simple men admire them, and wise men use them; for they teach not their own use; but that is a wisdom without them, and above them, won by observation. Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse, but to weigh and consider. Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested; that is, some books are to be read only in parts; others to be read, but not curiously; and some few to be read wholly, and with diligence and attention. Some books also may be read by deputy, and extracts made of them by others; but that would be only in the less important arguments, and the meaner sort of books; else distilled books are, like common distilled waters, flashy things. Reading maketh a full man; conference a ready man; and writing an exact man; and, therefore, if a man write little, he had need have a great memory; if he confer little, he had need have a present wit: and if he read little, he had need have much cunning, to seem to know that he doth not. Histories make men wise; poets witty; the mathematics subtile; natural philosophy deep; moral, grave; logic and rhetoric, able to contend “Abeunt studia in mores;” nay, there is no stond or impediment in the wit, but may be wrought out by fit studies: like as diseases of the body may have appropriate exercises; bowling is good for the stone and reins, shooting for the lungs and breast, gentle walking for the stomach, riding for the head, and the like; so, if a man’s wit be wandering, let him study the mathematics; for in demonstrations, if his wit be called away never so little, he must begin again; if his wit be no apt to distinguish or find differences, let him study the schoolmen, for they are “Cymini sectores;” if he be not apt to beat over matters, and to call upon one thing to prove and illustrate another, let him study the lawyer’s cases: so every defect of the mind may have a special receipt.

Source Text:

Bacon, Francis. Bacon’s Essays and Wisdom of the Ancients . Little, Brown, and Company, 1884, is licensed under no known copyright.

Early English Literature Copyright © 2019 by Allegra Villarreal is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

Share This Book

ASK LITERATURE

THROWING LIGHT ON LITERATURE

Home / Prose / Francis Bacon / Of Truth Critical Analysis by Sir Francis Bacon along with Summary

Of Truth Critical Analysis by Sir Francis Bacon along with Summary

The world knows Sir Francis Bacon for his worldly wisdom. He had made an analysis of the world and in “Of Truth”, he guided his readers on how to get success even in critical situations. Alexander Pope called Bacon the meanest kind of person because of his worldly philosophy. Bacon always focuses on worldly benefits and rarely talks about the fruits of eternal life. In “Of Truth”, he speaks in favor of the truth; he also differentiates it from lie and forces us to speak the truth in every situation. He supports his arguments through solid quotations.

Bacon also answers some of the old skeptical people, who were against the truth. He does not exaggerate truth but put reality in front of his readers. A person can only become honest if he speaks the truth. A lie may delight a person but it does not honor him. Let’s see what else he says.

“Of Truth” Summary and Critical Analysis:

Sir Francis Bacon starts his essay while referring the Ancient Roman Governor Pilate, who made the situation critical without doing an analysis of truth. Pilate asked for truth but did not wait for it. If he would have known the truth, he may have not passed the judgment to crucify the Christ. He then talks about skeptical minds, who are not easily convincible. He doubts that Pilate was also skeptical. Definitely, there are people who do not have strong beliefs. Numerous people are there in the world, who change their minds frequently. They consider that fixed beliefs are a sign of mental slavery. Whenever they think or take decisions, they use their free will; they stubbornly ignore every belief. In Greeks, there was a school of philosophers having skeptics. They may have died now but skeptical people are there even today in this world.

Why Do Not People Speak the Truth?

There are many reasons behind not speaking the truth. One of them is that discovery of truth requires efforts and time. Let us do a critical analysis of this truth from real life example. There are many courts in every country; each court has thousands of cases; in every case, either the defendant or the plaintiff is right. Every case has been heard for many years in order to find out who is speaking the truth. Secondly, both the parties (plaintiff and defendant) struggle to prove themselves right. Indeed Sir Francis Bacon is right. Effort and time are required to discover the truth. The second reason, which Bacon provides for not speaking the truth, is that it is hard to digest. When it is discovered people hardly believe it.

Then he talks about lies. He is of the view that lies attract people but no one adopts truth. He is confused that why people tell a lie for the sake of a lie. Nevertheless, he understands that poets sell lie because it gives pleasure to human beings. Traders tell lies because they want to sell their goods but lie for the sake of lie is not understandable.

How Is The Truth Different from Lie?

Bacon gives a real-life example. He says that if the audience sees a spectacle on the stage in daylight it will look as it is. On the other hand, if the same show is presented with candlelight then it will attract more people; it would definitely give pleasure to the audience. Lie, in the same way, has a beautiful and shiny cover, due to which people like lie instead of truth. However, if the truth were mixed with a lie then it would also give pleasure. Moreover, people have created their own false beliefs, judgments, and opinions. If these things were snatched from them, their condition would become miserable as these things give them hope and strange kind of pleasure.

Critical Analysis of “Of Truth” Shows that Poetry is Harmful?

Is poetry a lie? If so, is it harmful? No, Bacon does not think so. Early writers of the church called poetry a devil’s wine. It is because it exaggerates things and is full of fancies. It also takes a person in the world of imagination; therefore, they called poetry a lie and harmful to human beings. Bacon agrees that the poetry is a lie but he denies the second allegation. He says that it is not harmful at all. He divides lies into two categories; short-term and long-term. Poetry tells lie but people soon forget it; therefore, it causes no harm to them. Only those lies are harmful that sink in the mind and are difficult to forget.

Truth Ends Pride:

The light was the first thing, which the God had created. Then He bestowed men, rational faculty. Since then, He is illuminating the human minds. Bacon advises that whenever a person takes a decision, he should rely on his rationality. It would be based upon truth. He quotes Lucretius, who says that realization of truth is the greatest pleasure in the world. When someone realizes the truth, he becomes aware of its importance. He also recognizes his false beliefs and silly hopes. Truth also nips the pride in the bud due to which a person becomes pitiful.

Importance of Truth:

If we deeply do critical analysis “Of Truth” then we realize that Bacon truth has its own significance. Falsehood brings disgrace and truth brings honor. Even those persons, who do not speak truth, know its worth. Furthermore, the truth is required not only in the field of theology and philosophy but also in every field of life. Bacon refers Montaigne, who says that a liar is always brave towards God but coward towards humans. By telling a lie, a liar directly challenges God. He knows that he has to face God on doomsday yet he promotes falsehood. Thus, he is brave enough to get punishment in enteral life.

At the end of the essay, we find some morality. Bacon tries his best to convince his readers and compels them to speak the truth. The last argument, which he advances, is the “fear of doomsday”. A liar would be punished on the Day of Judgment, says Sir Francis Bacon.

Conclusion of “Of Truth Critical Analysis”:

To conclude, Bacon in this essay persuades people to speak the truth at any cost. He appreciates those people who stick with the truth. Thus, his tone in this essay is didactic; style is lucid and examples are rich. Solid references from Greeks, Romans, other subjects and various philosophers demonstrate experience and knowledge of the writer in every field of life. It seems that he has made critical analysis of his experiences and then written “Of Truth”. In short, the whole essay is worth reading for the person, who wants success in both the worlds.

Watch the video instead of reading the article “Critical Analysis of “Of Truth”.

Premium Content

• Republic Policy

Constitutional Law

Criminal Law

International Law

Civil Service Law

Recruitment

Appointment

Civil Services Reforms

Legislature

Fundamental Rights

Civil & Political Rights

Economic, Social & Cultural Rights

Focused Rights

Political Philosophy

Political Economy

International Relations

National Politics

• Organization

Tariq Mahmood Awan

As a literature student, Francis Bacon has always inspired me. Therefore, reading him is a privilege. The best thing about his literary endeavors is his clarity of thought and persuasive expression.

Francis Bacon’s essay “Of Studies” provides multifaceted benefits of learning while offering cautions against potential pitfalls. Bacon argues that studies serve three primary purposes: delight, ornament, and ability. In private moments, studies provide intellectual pleasure and the satisfaction of acquiring new knowledge. They also enhance one’s communication ability, adding depth and richness to conversations through a broader knowledge base. Ultimately, their ability to improve judgment and decision-making is the most significant benefit. While experts excel at specific tasks, those with a more comprehensive understanding gained from studies can effectively manage complex situations and formulate strategic plans.

However, Bacon warns against taking studies to extremes. Dedicating an excessive amount of time solely to studies can be a form of idleness, neglecting the practical application of knowledge. Similarly, using studies purely for show, to impress others with one’s erudition, is seen as affectation. True wisdom lies not just in accumulating facts but in applying them effectively. Studies are best viewed as tools that refine our natural abilities, just as pruning cultivates a plant’s growth. However, studies can provide overly broad guidance without the grounding of practical experience.

The essay explores how different people perceive the value of studies. Cunning individuals may dismiss their importance, while the naive may overestimate their impact. The truly wise, however, recognize studies as a valuable resource but not a substitute for practical wisdom gained through observation. Bacon emphasizes approaching reading with a critical mind. Effective reading is not about passively accepting information, arguing about contradicting or simply finding conversation topics. It’s about careful analysis, weighing evidence, and forming well-considered opinions. The essay suggests different strategies for various types of books. Some deserve a thorough, in-depth reading, while others may only require skimming or relying on summaries for key points.

Writing refines one’s thoughts and expressions, leading to greater precision. Engaging in discussions helps one think on one’s feet and articulate ideas clearly. The essay concludes by highlighting how different disciplines contribute to intellectual development. History imparts wisdom, poetry fosters wit, mathematics sharpens logic, and various fields cultivate valuable mental faculties. By studying these diverse areas, one can achieve a well-rounded mind.

Critical evaluation of the essay is essential. An essay will always remain subjective despite how much it is written objectively. Francis Bacon’s essay “Of Studies” is a thought-provoking exploration of the importance of learning and the pursuit of knowledge. Bacon argues that studies offer three distinct benefits. The act of learning itself can be a source of enjoyment. Whether one dives into scholarly pursuits during quiet moments or seeks intellectual stimulation as a respite from a busy life, the process of acquiring knowledge can be inherently pleasurable. Studies enhance our communication skills. A well-read individual can draw upon a broader knowledge base to enrich conversations, making them more engaging and insightful.

Ultimately, the most significant benefit of studies lies in their ability to improve our judgment and decision-making capabilities. While experts excel in specific areas based on experience, those with a broader understanding gained through studies can effectively handle complex situations and formulate strategic plans.

While advocating for the importance of studies, Bacon warns against taking them to extremes. Devoting an excessive amount of time solely to studies can be a form of laziness. Without applying the acquired knowledge to real-world problems or situations, one is essentially neglecting the practical value of learning. Using studies purely for ornamental purposes, to impress others with one’s erudition, is seen as a form of pretentiousness. True wisdom lies not just in accumulating facts but in utilizing them effectively. Furthermore, relying solely on theoretical knowledge acquired through studies to make life decisions can be unwise. Experience and practical application are crucial for sound judgment.

Bacon uses a metaphor to illustrate the relationship between natural abilities and studies. He compares natural abilities to a tree that thrives with proper pruning. Studies serve as the pruning tool, refining and shaping our natural talents. However, studies by themselves can provide overly broad guidance. Experience acts as the grounding force, ensuring that theoretical knowledge is applied effectively in the real world.

Furthermore, the essay explores how different people perceive the value of studies.  Crafty Men  focused solely on practical matters may dismiss the importance of studies, viewing them as unnecessary.  Simple Men  may overestimate the impact of studies, believing that knowledge alone is sufficient for success.  Wise Men  truly recognize studies as a valuable resource but not a substitute for practical wisdom gained through observation and experience. Then, Bacon emphasizes the importance of approaching reading with a critical and active mind. Effective reading is not about passive acceptance of information. More importantly, one should not read solely to contradict others or take everything at face value. Instead, the focus should be critically evaluating the presented information, weighing evidence, and forming well-considered opinions.

The essay suggests different strategies for various types of books. Some books may not require a deep dive. Skimming or sampling key passages may be sufficient to grasp the main ideas. Certain books, particularly those rich in content or seminal works in a field, deserve a thorough and attentive reading. Then, hidden treasures may lie within complex texts that demand in-depth exploration and analysis. Careful study and reflection are crucial to extracting such books’ full value. Bacon cautions against relying solely on “distilled books,” essentially compilations of other works’ extracts. These summaries often lack the depth of the original sources and can provide a superficial understanding of complex topics. Therefore, readers need to be wiser in selecting books that could provide substantive information and compelling persuasion to the imagination.

Bacon’s “Of Studies” is a powerful endorsement of the pursuit of knowledge. However, he emphasizes the importance of balance and discernment. Studies, when combined with experience and practical application, lead to true wisdom. As readers, we must engage actively with texts, critically evaluating information and extracting the essence of what they offer.

Please, subscribe to the YouTube channel of republicpolicy.com

Leave a Comment Cancel Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.

Search the Blog

The Significance of World Food Safety Day

Our Land. Our Future: World Environment Day5, June

Reforming Pakistan’s Agriculture Sector

Know Your Twenty Twenty Cricket World Cup 2024 in USA & West Indies

Controlling the Menace of Human Trafficking

Empowering Peacekeeping Through Gender Parity: International Day of UN Peacekeepers, 29 May

Muhammad Ayub Khan Era: A Detailed Look at the Second President of Pakistan

International Week of Solidarity with the Peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories25-31 May

The Importance of Vesak Day, 23rd May

Unlocking Pakistan’s IT Potential: A Critical Analysis of Opportunities and Challenges

Support our cause.

"Republic Policy Think Tank, a team of dedicated volunteers, is working tirelessly to make Pakistan a thriving republic. We champion reforms, advocate for good governance, and fight for human rights, the rule of law, and a strong federal system. Your contribution, big or small, fuels our fight. Donate today and help us build a brighter future for all."

Qiuck Links

• Op Ed columns

Contact Details

• Editor: +923006650789
• Lahore Office: +923014243788
• E-mail: [email protected]
• Lahore Office: 143-Gull-e-Daman, College Road, Lahore
• Islamabad Office: Zafar qamar and Co. Office No. 7, 1st Floor, Qasim Arcade, Street 124, G-13/4 Mini Market, Adjacent to Masjid Ali Murtaza, Islamabad
• Submission Guidelines
• Terms & Conditions
• Privacy & Policy

Copyright © 2024 Republic Policy

| Developed and managed by Abdcorp.co

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

Francis Bacon

Francis Bacon (1561–1626) was one of the leading figures in natural philosophy and in the field of scientific methodology in the period of transition from the Renaissance to the early modern era. As a lawyer, member of Parliament, and Queen's Counsel, Bacon wrote on questions of law, state and religion, as well as on contemporary politics; but he also published texts in which he speculated on possible conceptions of society, and he pondered questions of ethics ( Essays ) even in his works on natural philosophy ( The Advancement of Learning ).

After his studies at Trinity College, Cambridge and Gray's Inn, London, Bacon did not take up a post at a university, but instead tried to start a political career. Although his efforts were not crowned with success during the era of Queen Elizabeth, under James I he rose to the highest political office, Lord Chancellor. Bacon's international fame and influence spread during his last years, when he was able to focus his energies exclusively on his philosophical work, and even more so after his death, when English scientists of the Boyle circle ( Invisible College ) took up his idea of a cooperative research institution in their plans and preparations for establishing the Royal Society.

To the present day Bacon is well known for his treatises on empiricist natural philosophy ( The Advancement of Learning , Novum Organum Scientiarum ) and for his doctrine of the idols, which he put forward in his early writings, as well as for the idea of a modern research institute, which he described in Nova Atlantis .

1. Biography

2. natural philosophy: struggle with tradition, 3.1 the idols, 3.2 system of sciences, 3.3 matter theory and cosmology, 4. scientific method: the project of the instauratio magna, 5. scientific method: novum organum and the theory of induction, 6. science and social philosophy, 7. the ethical dimension in bacon's thought, major philosophical works by bacon, selected works on bacon, other secondary literature, other internet resources, related entries.

Francis Bacon was born January, 22, 1561, the second child of Sir Nicholas Bacon (Lord Keeper of the Seal) and his second wife Lady Anne Cooke Bacon, daughter of Sir Anthony Cooke, tutor to Edward VI and one of the leading humanists of the age. Lady Anne was highly erudite: she not only had a perfect command of Greek and Latin, but was also competent in Italian and French. Together with his older brother Anthony, Francis grew up in a context determined by political power, humanist learning, and Calvinist zeal. His father had built a new house in Gorhambury in the 1560s, and Bacon was educated there for some seven years; later, along with Anthony, he went to Trinity College, Cambridge (1573–5), where he sharply criticized the scholastic methods of academic training. Their tutor was John Whitgift, in later life Archbishop of Canterbury. Whitgift provided the brothers with classical texts for their studies: Cicero, Demosthenes, Hermogenes, Livy, Sallust, and Xenophon (Peltonen 2007). Bacon began his studies at Gray's Inn in London in 1576; but from 1577 to 1578 he accompanied Sir Amias Paulet, the English ambassador, on his mission in Paris. According to Peltonen (2007):

During his stay in France, perhaps in autumn 1577, Bacon once visited England as the bearer of diplomatic post, delivering letters to Walsingham, Burghley, Leicester, and to the Queen herself.

When his father died in 1579, he returned to England. Bacon's small inheritance brought him into financial difficulties and since his maternal uncle, Lord Burghley, did not help him to get a lucrative post as a government official, he embarked on a political career in the House of Commons, after resuming his studies in Gray's Inn. In 1581 he entered the Commons as a member for Cornwall, and he remained a Member of Parliament for thirty-seven years. He was admitted to the bar in 1582 and in 1587 was elected as a reader at Gray's Inn. His involvement in high politics started in 1584, when he wrote his first political memorandum, A Letter of Advice to Queen Elizabeth . Right from the beginning of his adult life, Bacon aimed at a revision of natural philosophy and—following his father's example—also tried to secure high political office. Very early on he tried to formulate outlines for a new system of the sciences, emphasizing empirical methods and laying the foundation for an applied science ( scientia operativa ). This twofold task, however, proved to be too ambitious to be realized in practice. Bacon's ideas concerning a reform of the sciences did not meet with much sympathy from Queen Elizabeth or from Lord Burghley. Small expectations on this front led him to become a successful lawyer and Parliamentarian. From 1584 to 1617 (the year he entered the House of Lords) he was an active member in the Commons. Supported by Walsingham's patronage, Bacon played a role in the investigation of English Catholics and argued for stern action against Mary Queen of Scots. He served on many committees, including one in 1588 which examined recusants; later he was a member of a committee to revise the laws of England. He was involved in the political aspects of religious questions, especially concerning the conflict between the Church of England and nonconformists. In a tract of 1591, he tried to steer a middle course in religious politics; but one year later he was commissioned to write against the Jesuit Robert Parson (Jardine and Stewart 1999, p. 125), who had attacked English sovereignty.

From the late 1580s onwards, Bacon turned to the Earl of Essex as his patron. During this phase of his life, he particularly devoted himself to natural philosophy. He clearly expressed his position in a famous letter of 1592 to his uncle, Lord Burghley:

I confess that I have as vast contemplative ends, as I have moderate civil ends: for I have taken all knowledge to be my province; and if I could purge it of two sorts of rovers, whereof the one with frivolous disputations, confutations, and verbosities, the other with blind experiments and auricular traditions and impostures, hath committed so many spoils, I hope I should bring in industrious observations, grounded conclusions, and profitable inventions and discoveries; the best state of that province. This, whether it be curiosity, or vain glory, or nature, or (if one take it favourably) philanthropia, is so fixed in my mind as it cannot be removed. And I do easily see, that place of any reasonable countenance doth bring commandment of more wits than of a man's own; which is the thing I greatly affect. (Bacon 1857–74, VIII, 109)

In 1593 Bacon fell out favor with the queen on account of his refusal to comply with her request for funds from Parliament. Although he did not vote against granting three subsidies to the government, he demanded that these should be paid over a period six, rather than three, years. This led Sir Robert Cecil and Sir Walter Raleigh to argue against him in Parliament. Bacon's patron, the Earl of Essex, for whom he had already served as a close political advisor and informer, was not able to mollify the queen's anger over the subsidies; and all Essex's attempts to secure a high post for Bacon (attorney-general or solicitor-general) came to nothing. Nevertheless, the queen valued Bacon's competence as a man of law. He was involved in the treason trial of Roderigo Lopez and later on in the proceedings against the Earl of Essex. In his contribution to the Gesta Grayorum (the traditional Christmas revels held in Gray's Inn) of 1594–5, Bacon had emphasized the necessity of scientific improvement and progress. Since he failed to secure for himself a position in the government, he considered the possibility of giving up politics and concentrating on natural philosophy. It is no wonder, then, that Bacon engaged in many scholarly and literary pursuits in the 1590s. His letters of advice to the Earl of Rutland and to the Earl of Essex should be mentioned in this context. The advice given to Essex is of particular importance because Bacon recommended that he should behave in a careful and intelligent manner in public, above all abstaining from aspiring to military commands. Bacon also worked in this phase of his career for the reform of English law. In 1597 his first book was published, the seminal version of his Essays , which contained only ten pieces (Klein 2004b). His financial situation was still insecure; but his plan to marry the rich widow Lady Hatton failed because she was successfully courted by Sir Edward Coke. In 1598 Bacon was unable to sell his reversion of the Star Chamber clerkship, so that he was imprisoned for a short time on account of his debts. His parliamentary activities in 1597–98, mainly involving committee work, were impressive; but when the Earl of Essex in 1599 took command of the attempt to pacify the Irish rebels, Bacon's hopes sank. Essex did not solve the Irish question, returned to court and fell from grace, as Bacon had anticipated he would. He therefore lost a valuable patron and spokesman for his projects. Bacon tried to reconcile the queen and Essex; but when the earl rebelled against the crown in 1601, he could do nothing to help him. The queen ordered Bacon to participate in the treason trial against Essex. In 1601 Bacon sat in Elizabeth's last parliament, playing an extremely active role.

Bacon looked forward to the next reign and tried to get in contact with James VI of Scotland, Elizabeth's successor. During James' reign Bacon rose to power. He was knighted in 1603 and was created a learned counsel a year later. He took up the political issues of the union of England and Scotland, and he worked on a conception of religious toleration, endorsing a middle course in dealing with Catholics and nonconformists. Bacon married Alice Barnhem, the young daughter of a rich London alderman in 1606. One year later he was appointed Solicitor General. He was also dealing with theories of the state and developed the idea, in accordance with Machiavelli, of a politically active and armed citizenry. In 1608 Bacon became clerk of the Star Chamber; and at this time, he made a review of his life, jotting down his achievements and failures. Though he still was not free from money problems, his career progressed step by step. In the period from 1603 to 1613 Bacon was not only busy within English politics. He also created the foundations of his philosophical work by writing seminal treatises which prepared the path for the Novum Organum and for the Instauratio Magna . In 1613 he became Attorney General and began the rise to the peak of his political career: he became a member of the Privy Council in 1616, was appointed Lord Keeper of the Great Seal the following year—thus achieving the same position as his father—and was granted the title of Lord Chancellor and created Baron of Verulam in 1618. In 1621, however, Bacon, after being created Viscount of St Alban, was impeached by Parliament for corruption. He fell victim to an intrigue in Parliament because he had argued against the abuse of monopolies, indirectly attacking his friend, the Duke of Buckingham, who was the king's favorite. In order to protect Buckingham, the king sacrificed Bacon, whose enemies had accused him of taking bribes in connection with his position as a judge. Bacon saw no way out for himself and declared himself guilty. His fall was contrived by his adversaries in Parliament and by the court faction, for which he was a scapegoat to save the Duke of Buckingham not only from public anger but also from open aggression (Mathews 1996). He lost all his offices and his seat in Parliament, but retained his titles and his personal property. Bacon devoted the last five years of his life—the famous quinquennium—entirely to his philosophical work. He tried to go ahead with his huge project, the Instauratio Magna Scientiarum ; but the task was too big for him to accomplish in only a few years. Though he was able to finish important parts of the Instauratio , the proverb, often quoted in his works, proved true for himself: Vita brevis, ars longa . He died in April 1626 of pneumonia after experiments with ice.

Bacon's struggle to overcome intellectual blockades and the dogmatic slumber of his age and of earlier periods had to be fought on many fronts. Very early on he criticized not only Plato, Aristotle and the Aristotelians, but also humanists and Renaissance scholars such as Paracelsus and Bernardino Telesio.

Although Aristotle provided specific axioms for every scientific discipline, what Bacon found lacking in the Greek philosopher's work was a master principle or general theory of science, which could be applied to all branches of natural history and philosophy (Klein 2003a). For Bacon, Aristotle's cosmology, as well as his theory of science, had become obsolete and consequently so too had many of the medieval thinkers who followed his lead. He does not repudiate Aristotle completely, but he opposes the humanistic interpretation of him, with its emphasis on syllogism and dialectics ( scientia operativa versus textual hermeneutics) and the metaphysical treatment of natural philosophy in favor of natural forms (or nature's effects as structured modes of action, not artifacts), the stages of which correspond—in the shape of a pyramid of knowledge—to the structural order of nature itself.

If any ‘modern’ Aristotelians came near to Bacon, it was the Venetian or Paduan branch, represented by Jacopo Zabarella. On the other hand, Bacon criticized Telesio, who—in his view—had only halfway succeeded in overcoming Aristotle's deficiencies. Although we find the debate with Telesio in an unpublished text of his middle period ( De Principiis atque Originibus, secundum fabulas Cupidinis et Coelum or On Principles and Origins According to the Fables of Cupid and Coelum , written in 1612; Bacon V [1889], 461–500), Bacon began to struggle with tradition as early as 1603. In Valerius Terminus (1603?) he already repudiates any mixture of natural philosophy and divinity; he provides an outline of his new method and determines that the end of knowledge was “a discovery of all operations and possibilities of operations from immortality (if it were possible) to the meanest mechanical practice” (Bacon III [1887], 222). He opposes Aristotelian anticipatio naturae , which favored the inquiry of causes to satisfy the mind instead of those “as will direct him and give him light to new experiences and inventions” (Bacon III [1887], 232).

When Bacon introduces his new systematic structure of the disciplines in The Advancement of Learning (1605), he continues his struggle with tradition, primarily with classical antiquity, rejecting the book learning of the humanists, on the grounds that they “hunt more after words than matter” (Bacon III [1887], 283). Accordingly, he criticizes the Cambridge University curriculum for placing too much emphasis on dialectical and sophistical training asked of “minds empty and unfraught with matter” (Bacon III [1887], 326). He reformulates and functionally transforms Aristotle's conception of science as knowledge of necessary causes. He rejects Aristotle's logic, which is based on his metaphysical theory, whereby the false doctrine is implied that the experience which comes to us by means of our senses (things as they appear ) automatically presents to our understanding things as they are . Simultaneously Aristotle favors the application of general and abstract conceptual distinctions, which do not conform to things as they exist. Bacon, however, introduces his new conception of philosophia prima as a meta-level for all scientific disciplines.

From 1606 to 1612 Bacon pursued his work on natural philosophy, still under the auspices of a struggle with tradition. This tendency is exemplified in the unpublished tracts Temporis partus masculus , 1603/1608 (Bacon III [1887], 521–31), Cogitata et Visa , 1607 (Bacon III, 591–620), Redargutio Philosophiarum , 1608 (III, 557–85), and De Principiis atque Originibus …, 1612 (Bacon V [1889], 461–500). Bacon rediscovers the Pre-Socratic philosophers for himself, especially the atomists and among them Democritus as the leading figure. He gives preference to Democritus' natural philosophy in contrast to the scholastic—and thus Aristotelian—focus on deductive logic and belief in authorities. Bacon does not expect any approach based on tradition to start with a direct investigation of nature and then to ascend to empirical and general knowledge. This criticism is extended to Renaissance alchemy, magic, and astrology ( Temporis partus masculus ), because the ‘methods’ of these ‘disciplines’ are based on occasional insights, but do not command strategies to reproduce the natural effects under investigation. His criticism also concerns contemporary technical literature, in so far as it lacks a new view of nature and an innovative methodological program. Bacon takes to task the ancients, the scholastics and also the moderns. He not only criticizes Plato, Aristotle, and Galen for these failings, but also Jean Fernel, Paracelsus, and Telesio, while praising the Greek atomists and Roger Bacon.

Bacon's manuscripts already mention the doctrine of the idols as a necessary condition for constituting scientia operativa . In Cogitata et Visa he compares deductive logic as used by the scholastics to a spider's web, which is drawn out of its own entrails, whereas the bee is introduced as an image of scientia operativa . Like a bee, the empiricist, by means of his inductive method, collects the natural matter or products and then works them up into knowledge in order to produce honey, which is useful for healthy nutrition.

In Bacon's follow-up paper, Redargutio Philosophiarum , he carries on his empiricist project by referring to the doctrine of twofold truth, while in De Principiis atque Originibus he rejects alchemical theories concerning the transformation of substances in favor of Greek atomism. But in the same text he sharply criticizes his contemporary Telesio for propagating a non-experimental halfway house empiricism. Though Telesio proves to be a moderate ‘modern’, he clings to the Aristotelian framework by continuing to believe in the quinta essentia and in the doctrine of the two worlds, which presupposes two modes of natural law (one mode for the sublunary and another for the superlunary sphere).

3. Natural Philosophy: Theory of the Idols and the System of Sciences

Bacon's doctrine of the idols not only represents a stage in the history of theories of error (Brandt 1979) but also functions as an important theoretical element within the rise of modern empiricism. According to Bacon, the human mind is not a tabula rasa . Instead of an ideal plane for receiving an image of the world in toto, it is a crooked mirror, on account of implicit distortions (Bacon IV [1901], 428–34). He does not sketch a basic epistemology but underlines that the images in our mind right from the beginning do not render an objective picture of the true objects. Consequently, we have to improve our mind, i.e., free it from the idols, before we start any knowledge acquisition.

As early as Temporis partus masculus , Bacon warns the student of empirical science not to tackle the complexities of his subject without purging the mind of its idols:

On waxen tablets you cannot write anything new until you rub out the old. With the mind it is not so; there you cannot rub out the old till you have written in the new. (Farrington 1964, 72)

In Redargutio Philosophiarum Bacon reflects on his method, but he also criticizes prejudices and false opinions, especially the system of speculation established by theologians, as an obstacle to the progress of science (Farrington 1964, 107), together with any authoritarian stance in scholarly matters.

Bacon deals with the idols in the Second Book of The Advancement of Learning , where he discusses Arts intellectual (Invention, Judgment, Memory, Tradition). In his paragraph on judgment he refers to proofs and demonstrations, especially to induction and invention. When he comes to Aristotle's treatment of the syllogism, he reflects on the relation between sophistical fallacies (Aristotle, De Sophisticis Elenchis ) and the idols (Bacon III [1887], 392–6). Whereas induction, invention, and judgment presuppose “the same action of the mind”, this is not true for proof in the syllogism. Bacon, therefore, prefers his own interpretatio naturae , repudiating elenches as modes of sophistical ‘juggling’ in order to persuade others in redargutions (“degenerate and corrupt use … for caption and contradiction”). There is no finding without proof and no proof without finding. But this is not true for the syllogism, in which proof (syllogism: judgment of the consequent) and invention (of the ‘mean’ or middle term) are distinct. The caution he suggests in relation to the ambiguities in elenches is also recommended in face of the idols :

there is yet a much more important and profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or enquired at all, and think good to place here, as that which of all others appertaineth most to rectify judgment: the force whereof is such, as it doth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some particulars, but doth more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true incidence, nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced. For this purpose, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature of the mind …. (Bacon III [1887], 394–5)

Bacon still presents a similar line of argument to his reader in 1623, namely in De Augmentis (Book V, Chap. 4; see Bacon IV [1901], 428–34). Judgment by syllogism presupposes—in a mode agreeable to the human mind—mediated proof, which, unlike in induction, does not start from sense in primary objects. In order to control the workings of the mind, syllogistic judgment refers to a fixed frame of reference or principle of knowledge as the basis for “all the variety of disputations” (Bacon IV [1901], 491). The reduction of propositions to principles leads to the middle term. Bacon deals here with the art of judgment in order to assign a systematic position to the idols. Within this art he distinguishes the ‘Analytic’ from the detection of fallacies (sophistical syllogisms). Analytic works with “true forms of consequences in argument” (Bacon IV [1901], 429), which become faulty by variation and deflection. The complete doctrine of detection of fallacies, according to Bacon, contains three segments:

• Sophistical fallacies,
• Fallacies of interpretation, and
• False appearances or Idols.

Concerning (1) Bacon praises Aristotle for his excellent handling of the matter, but he also mentions Plato honorably. Fallacies of interpretation (2) refer to “Adventitious Conditions or Adjuncts of Essences”, similar to the predicaments, open to physical or logical inquiry. He focuses his attention on the logical handling when he relates the detection of fallacies of interpretation to the wrong use of common and general notions, which leads to sophisms. In the last section (3) Bacon finds a place for his idols, when he refers to the detection of false appearances as

the deepest fallacies of the human mind: For they do not deceive in particulars, as the others do, by clouding and snaring the judgment; but by a corrupt and ill-ordered predisposition of mind, which as it were perverts and infects all the anticipations of the intellect. (IV, 431)

Idols are productions of the human imagination (caused by the crooked mirror of the human mind) and thus are nothing more than “untested generalities” (Malherbe 1996, 80).

In his Preface to the Novum Organum Bacon promises the introduction of a new method, which will restore the senses to their former rank (Bacon IV [1901], 17f.), begin the whole labor of the mind again, and open two sources and two distributions of learning, consisting of a method of cultivating the sciences and another of discovering them. This new beginning presupposes the discovery of the natural obstacles to efficient scientific analysis, namely seeing through the idols, so that the mind's function as the subject of knowledge acquisition comes into focus (Brandt 1979, 19).

According to Aphorism XXIII of the First Book, Bacon makes a distinction between the Idols of the human mind and the Ideas of the divine mind: whereas the former are for him nothing more than “certain empty dogmas”, the latter show “the true signatures and marks set upon the works of creation as they are found in nature” (Bacon IV [1901], 51).

3.1.1 Idols of the Tribe

The Idols of the Tribe have their origin in the production of false concepts due to human nature, because the structure of human understanding is like a crooked mirror, which causes distorted reflections (of things in the external world).

3.1.2 Idols of the Cave

The Idols of the Cave consist of conceptions or doctrines which are dear to the individual who cherishes them, without possessing any evidence of their truth. These idols are due to the preconditioned system of every individual, comprising education, custom, or accidental or contingent experiences.

3.1.3 Idols of the Market Place

These idols are based on false conceptions which are derived from public human communication. They enter our minds quietly by a combination of words and names, so that it comes to pass that not only does reason govern words, but words react on our understanding.

3.1.4 Idols of the Theatre

According to the insight that the world is a stage, the Idols of the Theatre are prejudices stemming from received or traditional philosophical systems. These systems resemble plays in so far as they render fictional worlds, which were never exposed to an experimental check or to a test by experience. The idols of the theatre thus have their origin in dogmatic philosophy or in wrong laws of demonstration.

Bacon ends his presentation of the idols in Novum Organum , Book I, Aphorism LXVIII, with the remark that men should abjure and renounce the qualities of idols, “and the understanding [must be] thoroughly freed and cleansed” (Bacon IV [1901], 69). He discusses the idols together with the problem of information gained through the senses, which must be corrected by the use of experiments (Bacon IV [1901], 27).

Within the history of occidental philosophy and science, Bacon identifies only three revolutions or periods of learning: the heyday of the Greeks and that of the Romans and Western Europe in his own time (Bacon IV [1901], 70ff.). This meager result stimulated his ambition to establish a new system of the sciences. This tendency can already be seen in his early manuscripts, but is also apparent in his first major book, The Advancement of Learning . In this work Bacon presents a systematic survey of the extant realms of knowledge, combined with meticulous descriptions of deficiencies, leading to his new classification of knowledge. In The Advancement (Bacon III [1887], 282f.) a new function is given to philosophia prima , the necessity of which he had indicated in the Novum Organum , I, Aphorisms LXXIX–LXXX (Bacon IV [1901], 78–9). In both texts this function is attributed to philosophia naturalis , the basis for his concept of the unity of the sciences and thus of materialism.

Natural science is divided by Bacon into physics and metaphysics. The former investigates variable and particular causes, the latter reflects on general and constant ones, for which the term form is used. Forms are more general than the four Aristotelian causes and that is why Bacon's discussion of the forms of substances as the most general properties of matter is the last step for the human mind when investigating nature. Metaphysics is distinct from philosophia prima . The latter marks the position in the system where general categories of a general theory of science are treated as (1) universal categories of thought, (2) relevant for all disciplines. Final causes are discredited, since they lead to difficulties in science and tempt us to amalgamate theological and teleological points of doctrine. At the summit of Bacon's pyramid of knowledge are the laws of nature (the most general principles). At its base the pyramid starts with observations, moves on to invariant relations and then to more inclusive correlations until it reaches the stage of forms. The process of generalization ascends from natural history via physics towards metaphysics, whereas accidental correlations and relations are eliminated by the method of exclusion. It must be emphasized that metaphysics has a special meaning for Bacon. This concept (1) excludes the infinity of individual experience by generalization with a teleological focus and (2) opens our mind to generate more possibilities for the efficient application of general laws.

According to Bacon, man would be able to explain all the processes in nature if he could acquire full insight into the hidden structure and the secret workings of matter (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 101). Bacon's conception of structures in nature, functioning according to its own working method, concentrates on the question of how natural order is produced, namely by the interplay of matter and motion. In De Principiis atque Originibus , his materialistic stance with regard to his conception of natural law becomes evident. The Summary Law of Nature is a virtus (matter-cum-motion) or power in accordance with matter theory, or

the force implanted by God in these first particles, form the multiplication thereof of all the variety of things proceeds and is made up. (Bacon V [1889], 463)

Similarly, in De Sapientia Veterum he attributes to this force an

appetite or instinct of primal matter; or to speak more plainly, the natural motion of the atom; which is indeed the original and unique force that constitutes and fashions all things out of matter. (Bacon VI [1890], 729)

Suffice it to say here that Bacon, who did not reject mathematics in science, was influenced by the early mathematical version of chemistry developed in the 16 th century, so that the term ‘instinct’ must be seen as a keyword for his theory of nature. The natural philosopher is urged to inquire into the

appetites and inclination of things by which all that variety of effects and changes which we see in the works of nature and art is brought about. (Bacon III [1887], 17–22; V [1889], 422–6 and 510ff.: Descriptio Globi Intellectualis ; cf. IV [1901], 349)

Bacon's theory of active or even vivid force in matter accounts for what he calls Cupid in De Principiis atque Originibus (Bacon V [1889], 463–5). Since his theory of matter aims at an explanation of the reality which is the substratum of appearances, he digs deeper than did the mechanistic physics of the 17 th century (Gaukroger 2001, 132–7). Bacon's ideas concerning the quid facti of reality presuppose the distinction

between understanding how things are made up and of what they consist, … and by what force and in what manner they come together, and how they are transformed. (Gaukroger 2001, 137)

This is the point in his work where it becomes obvious that he tries to develop an explanatory pattern in which his theory of matter, and thus his atomism, are related to his cosmology, magic, and alchemy.

In De Augmentis , Bacon not only refers to Pan and his nymphs in order to illustrate the permanent atomic movement in matter but in addition revives the idea of magic in a ‘honourable meaning’ as

the knowledge of the universal consents of things …. I … understand [magic] as the science which applies the knowledge of hidden forms to the production of wonderful operations; and by uniting (as they say) actives with passives, displays the wonderful works of nature. (Bacon IV [1901], 366–7: De Augmentis III.5)

Bacon's notion of form is made possible by integration into his matter theory, which (ideally) reduces the world of appearances to some minimal parts accessible and open to manipulation by the knower/maker. In contrast to Aristotle, Bacon's knowing-why type of definition points towards the formulation of an efficient knowing-how type (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 119). In this sense a convergence between the scope of definition and that of causation takes place according to a ‘constructivist epistemology’. The fundamental research of Graham Rees has shown that Bacon's special mode of cosmology is deeply influenced by magic and semi-Paracelsian doctrine. For Bacon, matter theory is the basic doctrine, not classical mechanics as it is with Galileo. Consequently, Bacon's purified and modified versions of chemistry, alchemy, and physiology remain primary disciplines for his explanation of the world.

According to Rees, the Instauratio Magna comprises two branches: (1) Bacon's famous scientific method, and (2) his semi-Paracelsian world system as “a vast, comprehensive system of speculative physics” (Rees 1986, 418). For (2) Bacon conjoins his specific version of Paracelsian cosmic chemistry to Islamic celestial kinematics (especially in Alpetragius [al-Bitruji]; see Zinner 1988, 71). The chemical world system is used to support Bacon's explanation of celestial motion in the face of contemporary astronomical problems (Rees 1975b, 161f.). There are thus two sections in Bacon's Instauratio , which imply the modes of their own explanation.

Bacon's speculative cosmology and matter theory had been planned to constitute Part 5 of Instauratio Magna . The theory put forward refers in an eclectic vein to atomism, criticizes Aristotelians and Copernicans, but also touches on Galileo, Paracelsus, William Gilbert, Telesio, and Arabic astronomy.

For Bacon, ‘magic’ is classified as applied science, while he generally subsumes under ‘science’ pure science and technology. It is never identified with black magic, since it represents the “ultimate legitimate power over nature” (Rees 2000, 66). Whereas magia was connected to crafts in the 16 th and 17 th centuries, Bacon's science remains the knowledge of forms in order to transform them into operations. Knowledge in this context, however, is no longer exclusively based on formal proof.

Bacon's cosmological system—a result of thought experiments and speculation, but not proven in accordance with the inductive method—presupposes a finite universe, a geocentric plenum, which means that the earth is passive and consists of tangible matter. The remaining universe is composed of active or pneumatic matter. Whereas the interior and tangible matter of the earth is covered by a crust which separates it from the pneumatic heaven, the zone between earth and the “middle region of the air” allows a mixture of pneumatic and tangible matter, which is the origin of organic and non-organic phenomena. Bacon speaks here of “attached spirit” (Rees 1986, 418–20), while otherwise he assumes four kinds of free spirit: air and terrestrial fire, which refer to the sublunary realm; ether and sidereal fire, which are relevant to the celestial realm. Ether is explained as the medium in which planets move around the central earth. Air and ether, as well as watery non-inflammable bodies, belong to Bacon's first group of substances or to the Mercury Quaternion .

Terrestrial fire is presented as the weak variant of sidereal fire; it joins with oily substances and sulphur, for all of which Bacon introduces the Sulphur Quaternion. These quaternions comprise antithetical qualities: air and ether versus fire and sidereal fire. The struggle between these qualities is determined by the distance from the earth as the absolute center of the world system. Air and ether become progressively weaker as the terrestrial and sidereal fire grow stronger. The quaternion theory functions in Bacon's thought as a constructive element for constituting his own theory of planetary movement and a general theory of physics. This theory differs from all other contemporary approaches, even though Bacon states that “many theories of the heavens may be supposed which agree well enough with the phenomena and yet differ with each other” (Bacon IV [1901], 104). The diurnal motion of the world system (9 th sphere) is driven by sympathy; it carries the heavens westward around the earth. The sidereal fire is powerful and, accordingly, sidereal motion is swift (the stars complete their revolution in 24 hours). Since the sidereal fire becomes weaker if it burns nearer to the earth, the lower planets move more slowly and unevenly than the higher ones (in this way Bacon, like Alpetragius, accounts for irregular planetary movement without reference to Ptolemy's epicycle theory). He applies his theory of consensual motion to physics generally (e.g., wind and tides) and thus comes into conflict with Gilbert's doctrine of the interstellar vacuum and Galileo's theory of the tides (for Bacon, the cycle of tides depends on the diurnal motion of the heavens but, for Galileo, on the earth's motion).

With quaternion theory we see that, in the final analysis, Bacon was not a mechanist philosopher. His theory of matter underwent an important transformation, moving in the direction of ‘forms’, which we would nowadays subsume under biology or the life sciences rather than under physics. Bacon distinguishes between non-spiritual matter and spiritual matter. The latter, also called ‘subtle matter’ or ‘spirit’, is more reminiscent of Leibniz' ‘monads’ than of mechanically defined and materially, as well as spatially, determined atoms. The spirits are seen as active agents of phenomena; they are endowed with ‘appetition’ and ‘perception’ (Bacon I [1889], 320–21: Historia Vitae et Mortis ; see also V, 63: Sylva Sylvarum , Century IX: “It is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense, yet they have perception: for when one body is applied to another, there is a kind of election to embrace that which is agreeable, and to exclude or expel that which is ingrate”).

These spirits are never at rest. In the Novum Organum , then, Bacon rejected the “existence of eternal and immutable atoms and the reality of the void” (Kargon 1966, 47). His new conception of matter was therefore “close to that of the chemists” in the sense of Bacon's semi-Paracelsian cosmology (Rees 2000, 65–69). The careful natural philosopher tries to disclose the secrets of nature step by step; and therefore he says of his method: “I propose to establish progressive stages of certainty” (Bacon IV [1901], 40: Novum Organum , Preface). This points towards his inductive procedure and his method of tables, which is a complicated mode of induction by exclusion. It is necessary because nature hides her secrets. In Aphorism XIX of Book I in his Novum Organum Bacon writes:

There are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering truth. The one flies from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from these principles, the truth of which it takes for settled and immoveable, proceeds to judgment and to the discovery of middle axioms. And this way is now in fashion. The other derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all. This is the true way, but as yet untried. (Bacon IV [1901], 50)

The laws of nature, which Bacon intended to discover by means of his new method, were expressed in the ‘forms’, in which the ‘unbroken ascent’ culminates. Through these forms the natural philosopher understands the general causes of phenomena (Kargon 1966, 48). In his endeavor to learn more about the secret workings of nature, Bacon came to the conclusion that the atomist theory could not provide sufficient explanations for the “real particles, such as really exist” (Bacon IV [1901], 126: Novum Organum , II.viii), because he thought that the immutability of matter and the void (both necessary assumptions for atomism) were untenable. His language turned from that of Greek physics to the usage of contemporary chemists. This is due to his insight that “subtlety of investigation” is needed, since our senses are too gross for the complexity and fineness of nature, so that method has to compensate for the shortcomings of our direct comprehension. Only method leads to the knowledge of nature: in Sylva Sylvarum , Century I.98 Bacon deals explicitly with the question of the asymmetrical relationship between man's natural instrument (i.e., the senses) and the intricacy of nature's structures and workings.

Bacon distinguishes ‘animate’ or vital spirits, which are continuous and composed of a substance similar to fire, from lifeless or inanimate spirits, which are cut off and resemble air: the spirits interact with gross matter through chemical processes (Bacon IV, 195–6 ( Novum Organum , II.xl)). These spirits have two different desires: self-multiplication and attraction of like spirits. According to Kargon (1966, 51):

Bacon's later theory of matter is one of the interaction of gross, visible parts of matter and invisible material spirits, both of which are physically mixed.

Spirits interact with matter by means of concoction, colliquation and other non-mechanical chemical processes, so that Bacon's scientific paradigm differs from Descartes' mechanist theory of matter in his Principia Philosophiae (1644), which presupposes res extensa moving in space. Bacon's theory of matter is thus closely related to his speculative philosophy:

The distinction between tangible and pneumatic matter is the hinge on which the entire speculative system turns. (Rees 1996, 125; Paracelsus had already stated that knowledge inheres in the object: see Shell 2004, 32)

Bacon's theory of matter in its final version was more corpuscular than atomist (Clericuzio 2000, 78). Bacon's particles are semina rerum : they are endowed with powers, which make a variety of motions possible and allow the production of all possible forms. These spirits are constitutive for Bacon's theory of matter. As material, fine substances, composed of particles, combined from air and fire, they can, as we have seen, be either inanimate or animate. Bacon thus suggests a corpuscular and chemical chain of being:

Small wonder, then, that Bacon's spirits are indispensable for his conception of physiology:

the vital spirits regulate all vegetative functions of plants and animals. Organs responsible for these functions, for digestion, assimilation, etc., seem to act by perception, mere reaction to local stimuli, but these reactions are coordinated by the vital spirit. These functions flow from the spirit's airy-flamy constitution. The spirit has the softness of air to receive impressions and the vigour of fire to propagate its actions. (Rees in OFB VI, 202–3)

This physiological stratum of Bacon's natural philosophy was influenced by his semi-Paracelsian cosmology (on Paracelsus see Müller-Jahncke 1985, 67–88), which Graham Rees (Rees and Upton 1984, 20–1) has reconstructed from the extant parts of the Instauratio Magna . Detailed consideration therefore has to be given to Bacon's theory of the ‘quaternions’.

Bacon's speculative system is a hybrid based on different sources which provided him with seminal ideas: e.g., atomism, Aristotelianism, Arabic astronomy, Copernican theory, Galileo's discoveries, the works of Paracelsus, and Gilbert. In his theory he combines astronomy, referring to Alpetragius (see Dijksterhuis 1956, 237–43; Rees and Upton 1984, 26; Gaukroger, 2001, 172–5; and see Grant 1994, 533–66, for discussion of the cosmology of Alpetragius), and chemistry (Rees 1975a, 84–5):

[i]t was partly designed to fit a kinematic skeleton and explain, in general terms, the irregularities of planetary motion as consequences of the chemical constitution of the universe. (Rees 1975b, 94)

Bacon had no explanation for the planetary retrogressions and saw the universe as a finite and geocentric plenum, in which the earth consists of the two forms of matter (tangible and pneumatic). The earth has a tangible inside and is in touch with the surrounding universe, but through an intermediate zone. This zone exists between the earth's crust and the pure pneumatic heavens; it reaches some miles into the crust and some miles into air. In this zone, pneumatic matter mixes with tangible matter, thus producing ‘attached spirits’, which must be distinguished from ‘free spirits’ outside tangible bodies. Bacon's four kinds of free spirits are relevant for his ‘quaternion theory’:

The planets move around the earth in the ether (a tenuous kind of air), which belongs to the ‘mercury quaternion’: it includes watery bodies and mercury. Terrestrial fire is a weakened form of sidereal fire. It is related to oily substances and sulphur, and constitutes the ‘sulphur quaternion’. The two quaternions oppose each other: air/ether vs. fire/sidereal fire. Air and ether loose power when terrestrial and sidereal fires grow more energetic—Bacon's sulphur and mercury are not principles in the sense of Paracelsus, but simply natural substances. The Paracelsian principle of salt is excluded by Bacon and the substance, which plays a role only in the sublunary realm, is for him a compound of natural sulphur and mercury (Rees and Upton 1984, 25).

Bacon used his quaternion theory for his cosmology, which differs greatly from other contemporary systems (Rees 2000, 68):

• the diurnal motion turns the heavens about the earth towards the west;
• under powerful sidereal fire (i.e., principle of celestial motion) the motion is swift: the revolution of the stars takes place in twenty-four hours;
• under weaker sidereal fire—nearer to the earth—planets move more slowly and more erratic.

Bacon, who tried to conceive of a unified physics, rejected different modes of motion in the superlunary and in the sublunary world (Bacon I [1889], 329). He did not believe in the existence of the (crystalline) spheres nor in the macrocosm-microcosm analogy. He revised Paracelsian ideas thoroughly. He rejected the grounding of his theories in Scripture and paid no attention at all to Cabbalistic and Hermetic tendencies (Rees 1975b, 90–1). But he extended the explanatory powers of the quaternions to earthly phenomena such as wind and tides.

Bacon's two systems were closely connected:

System 2 depends on System 1, since explanations for terrestrial things were subordinated to explanations of the cosmological level. The table of System 2 shows Bacon's matter theory. His quaternion theory is relevant for System 1. System 2 is explained in terms of ‘intermediates’, which combine the qualities of the items in one quaternion with their opposites in the other.

Bacon's system is built in a clear symmetrical way: each quaternion has four segments, together eight and there are four types of intermediates. Thus, the system distinguishes twelve segments in all. He wanted to explain all natural phenomena by means of this apparatus:

There are two principal intermediates:

Bacon's bi-quaternion theory necessarily refers to the sublunary as well as to the superlunary world. Although the quaternion theory is first mentioned in Thema Coeli (1612; see Bacon V [1889], 547–59), he provides a summary in his Novum Organum (Bacon II [1887], 50):

it has not been ill observed by the chemists in their triad of first principles, that sulphur and mercury run through the whole universe … in these two one of the most general consents in nature does seem to be observable. For there is consent between sulphur, oil and greasy exhalation, flame, and perhaps the body of a star. So is there between mercury, water and watery vapors, air, and perhaps the pure and intersiderial ether. Yet these two quaternions or great tribes of things (each within its own limits) differ immensely in quantity of matter and density, but agree very well in configuration. (Bacon IV [1901], 242–3; see also V [1889], 205–6; for tables of the two quaternions and Bacon's theory of matter see Rees 1996, 126, 137; Rees 2000, 68–9)

Bacon regarded his cosmological worldview as a system of anticipations, which was open to revision in light of further scientific results based on the inductive method (Rees 1975b, 171). It was primarily a qualitative system, standing aside from both mathematical astronomers and Paracelsian chemists. It thus emphasized the priority which he gave to physics over mathematics in his general system of the sciences.

Bacon's two quaternions and his matter theory provide a speculative framework for his thought, which was open to the future acquisition of knowledge and its technical application. His Nova Atlantis can be understood as a text which occupies an intermediate position between his theory of induction and his speculative philosophy (Klein 2003c; Price 2002).

It is important to bear in mind that Bacon's speculative system was his way out of a dilemma which had made it impossible for him to finish his Instauratio Magna . His turn towards speculation can only be interpreted as an intellectual anticipation during an intermediate phase of the history of science, when a gigantic amount of research work was still to be accomplished, so that empirical theories could neither be established nor sufficiently guaranteed. Speculation in Bacon's sense can therefore be seen as a preliminary means of explaining the secrets of nature until methodical research has caught up with our speculations. The speculative stance remains a relative and intermediate procedure for the ‘man of science’.

The Great Instauration , Bacon's main work, was published in 1620 under the title: Franciscus de Verulamio Summi Angliae Cancellaris Instauratio magna . This great work remained a fragment, since Bacon was only able to finish parts of the planned outline. The volume was introduced by a Prooemium , which gives a general statement of the purpose, followed by a Dedication to the King (James I) and a Preface , which is a summary of all “directions, motifs, and significance of his life-work” (Sessions 1996, 71). After that, Bacon printed the plan of the Instauratio , before he turned to the strategy of his research program, which is known as Novum Organum Scientiarum . Altogether the 1620 book constitutes the second part of Part II of the Instauratio , the first part of which is represented by De Augmentis and Book I of The Advancement of Learning . When Bacon organized his Instauratio , he divided it into six parts, which reminded contemporary readers of God's work of the six days (the creation), already used by writers like Guillaume Du Bartas ( La Sepmaine, ou Création du Monde , 1579, transl. by Joshua Sylvester, Bartas His Devine Weekes & Workes , 1605) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola ( Heptaplus , 1489).

Bacon sees nature as a labyrinth, whose workings cannot be exclusively explained by reference to “excellence of wit” and “repetition of chance experiments”:

Our steps must be guided by a clue, and see what way from the first perception of the sense must be laid out upon a sure plan. (Bacon IV [1901], 18)

Bacon's Plan of the Work runs as follows (Bacon IV [1901], 22):

• The Divisions of the Sciences.
• The New Organon; or Directions concerning the Interpretation of Nature.
• The Phenomena of the Universe; or a Natural and Experimental History for the foundation of Philosophy.
• The Ladder of Intellect.
• The Forerunners; or Anticipations of the New Philosophy.
• The New Philosophy; or Active Science .

Part 1 contains the general description of the sciences including their divisions as they presented themselves in Bacon's time. Here he aimed at a distinction between what was already invented and known in contrast to “things omitted which ought be there” (Bacon IV [1901], 23). This part could be taken from The Advancement of Learning (1605) and from the revised and enlarged version De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (1623).

Part 2 develops Bacon's new method for scientific investigation, the Novum Organum , equipping the intellect to pass beyond ancient arts and thus producing a radical revision of the methods of knowledge; but it also introduces a new epistemology and a new ontology. Bacon calls his new art Interpretatio Naturae , which is a logic of research going beyond ordinary logic, since his science aims at three inventions: of arts (not arguments), of principles (not of things in accordance to principles), and of designations and directions for works (not of probable reasons). The effect Bacon looks for is to command nature in action, not to overcome an opponent in argument. The Novum Organum is the only part of the Instauratio Magna which was brought near to completion.

Part 3 was going to contain natural and experimental history or the record of the phenomena of the universe. According to De Augmentis Scientarum (Bacon IV [1901], 275), natural history is split up into narrative and inductive, the latter of which is supposed “to minister and be in order to the building up of Philosophy ”. These functional histories support human memory and provide the material for research , or the factual knowledge of nature, which must be certain and reliable. Natural history starts from and emphasizes the subtlety of nature or her structural intricacy, but not the complexity of philosophical systems, since they have been produced by the human mind. Bacon sees this part of Instauratio Magna as a foundation for the reconstruction of the sciences in order to produce physical and metaphysical knowledge. Nature in this context is studied under experimental conditions, not only in the sense of the history of bodies, but also as a history of virtues or original passions, which refer to the desires of matter (Rees 1975a). This knowledge was regarded by Bacon as a preparation for Part 6, the Second Philosophy or Active Science , for which he gave only the one example of Historia Ventorum (1622); but—following his plan to compose six prototypical natural histories—he also wrote Historia vitae et mortis (1623) and the Historia densi , which was left in manuscript. The text, which develops the idea of Part 3, is called Parasceve ad Historiam Naturalem et Experimentalem.

Part 4, which Bacon called The Ladder of Intellect or Scala Intellectus , was intended to function as a link between the method of natural history and that of Second Philosophy/Active Science. It consists not only of the fragment Filum labyrinthi (Bacon III [1887], 493–504), but also includes the Abecedarium nouum naturae (OFB XIII, xxi), which was planned as a preface to all of section 4 “[to] demonstrate the whole process of the mind” (OFB XIII, xxii). Filum labyrinthi is similar to, but not identical with, Cogitata et Visa . Speaking of himself in an authorial voice, Bacon reflects on the state of science and derives his construction of a research program from the gaps and deficiencies within the system of disciplines: sciences of the future should be examined and further ones should be discovered. Emphasis must be laid on new matter (not on controversies). It is necessary to repudiate superstition, zealous religion, and false authorities. Just as the Fall was not caused by knowledge of nature, but rather by moral knowledge of good and evil, so knowledge of natural philosophy is for Bacon a contribution to the magnifying of God's glory, and, in this way, his plea for the growth of scientific knowledge becomes evident.

Part 5 deals with the forerunners or anticipations of the new philosophy, and Bacon emphasizes that the ‘big machinery’ of the Instauratio Magna needs a good deal of time to be completed. Anticipations are ways to come to scientific inferences without recourse to the method presented in the Novum Organum . Meanwhile, he has worked on his speculative system, so that portions of his Second Philosophy are treated and finished: De Fluxu et Refluxu Maris and Thema Coeli . For this part of the Great Instauration , texts are planned that draw philosophical conclusions from collections of facts which are not yet sufficient for the use or application of Bacon's inductive method.

Part 6 was scheduled to contain Bacon's description of the new philosophy, as the last part of his Great Instauration ; but nothing came of this plan, so that there is no extant text at all from this part of the project.

Already in his early text Cogitata et Visa (1607) Bacon dealt with his scientific method, which became famous under the name of induction . He repudiates the syllogistic method and defines his alternative procedure as one “which by slow and faithful toil gathers information from things and brings it into understanding” (Farrington 1964, 89). When later on he developed his method in detail, namely in his Novum Organum (1620), he still noted that

[of] induction the logicians seem hardly to have taken any serious thought, but they pass it by with a slight notice, and hasten to the formulae of disputation. I on the contrary reject demonstration by syllogism …. (Bacon IV [1901], 24)

Bacon's method appears as his conceptual plot,

applied to all stages of knowledge, and at every phase the whole process has to be kept in mind. (Malherbe 1996, 76)

Induction implies ascending to axioms, as well as a descending to works, so that from axioms new particulars are gained and from these new axioms. The inductive method starts from sensible experience and moves via natural history (providing sense-data as guarantees) to lower axioms or propositions, which are derived from the tables of presentation or from the abstraction of notions. Bacon does not identify experience with everyday experience, but presupposes that method corrects and extends sense-data into facts, which go together with his setting up of tables (tables of presence and of absence and tables of comparison or of degrees, i.e., degrees of absence or presence). “Bacon's antipathy to simple enumeration as the universal method of science derived, first of all, from his preference for theories that deal with interior physical causes, which are not immediately observable” (Urbach 1987, 30; see: sect. 2). The last type can be supplemented by tables of counter-instances, which may suggest experiments:

To move from the sensible to the real requires the correction of the senses, the tables of natural history, the abstraction of propositions and the induction of notions. In other words, the full carrying out of the inductive method is needed. (Malherbe 1996, 85)

The sequence of methodical steps does not, however, end here, because Bacon assumes that from lower axioms more general ones can be derived (by induction). The complete process must be understood as the joining of the parts into a systematic chain. From the more general axioms Bacon strives to reach more fundamental laws of nature (knowledge of forms), which lead to practical deductions as new experiments or works (IV, 24–5). The decisive instruments in this process are the middle or ‘living axioms,’ which mediate between particulars and general axioms. For Bacon, induction can only be efficient if it is eliminative by exclusion, which goes beyond the remit of induction by simple enumeration. The inductive method helps the human mind to find a way to ascertain truthful knowledge.

Novum Organum , I, Aphorism CXV (Bacon IV [1901], 103) ends the “pulling down” of “the signs and causes of the errors” within the sciences, achieved by means of three refutations, which constituted the condition for a rational introduction of method: refutation of ‘natural human reason’ (idols); refutation of ‘demonstrations’ (syllogisms) and refutation of ‘theories’ (traditional philosophical systems).

The Second Part of the Novum Organum deals with Bacon's rule for interpreting nature, even if he provides no complete or universal theory. He contributes to the new philosophy by introducing his tables of discovery ( Inst. Magna , IV), by presenting an example of particulars ( Inst. Magna , II), and by observations on history ( Inst. Magna , III). It is well known that he worked hard in the last five years of his life to make progress on his natural history, knowing that he could not always come up to the standards of legitimate interpretation.

Bacon's method presupposes a double starting-point: empirical and rational. True knowledge is acquired if we want to proceed from a lower certainty to a higher liberty and from a lower liberty to a higher certainty. The rule of certainty and liberty in Bacon converges with his repudiation of the old logic of Aristotle, which determined true propositions by the criteria of generality, essentiality, and universality. Bacon rejects anticipatio naturae (“anticipation of nature”) in favor of interpretatio naturae (“interpretation of nature”), which starts with the collecting of facts and their methodical (inductive) investigation, shunning entanglement in pure taxonomy (as in Ramism), which establishes the order of things (Urbach 1987, 26; see also Foucault 1966 [1970]), but does not produce knowledge. For Bacon, making is knowing and knowing is making (Bacon IV [1901], 109–10). In accordance with the maxim “command nature … by obeying her” (Sessions 1996, 136; Gaukroger 2001, 139ff.), the exclusion of superstition, imposture, error, and confusion are obligatory. Bacon introduces variations into “the maker's knowledge tradition” as the discovery of the forms of a given nature lead him to develop his method for acquiring factual and proven knowledge.

Bacon argues against “anticipation of nature”, which he regards as a conservative method, leading to theories that recapitulate the data without producing new ones conducive to the growth of knowledge. Moreover, such theories are considered to be final, so that they are never replaced.

“Anticipation of nature” resembles “conventionalism” (Urbach 1987, 30–41), according to which theories refer to unobservable entities (e.g., atoms, epicycles). The theories are “computation rules” or “inference licences” within this given framework, which give explanations and predictions of particular kinds of observable events. The conventionalist acceptance of making predictions concerning future events cannot be separated from the question of probability. Bacon's procedure of knowledge acquisition goes against “conventionalism”, because “anticipation of nature” does not reject authoritative and final speculations concerning “unobservables” and because it permits “ad hoc adjustments”. Nowadays, however,

philosophers would not accept the idea that just because we can't observe something directly … it follows that there is no such thing. (Huggett 2010, 82. See also Von Weizsäcker and Juilfs 1958, pp.67–70; Rae 1986 [2000], 1–27 and passim)

Conventionalist deep-level theories of the world are chosen from among alternative ways of observing phenomena. Although theories revealing the world structure are not directly provable or disprovable by means of observation or experiment, conventionalists might maintain their chosen theory even in the face of counter-evidence. They therefore avoid changes of theory. Any move to a new theory is not taken on the basis of new evidence, but because a new theory seems to be simpler, more applicable or more beautiful. Laws of nature are generally understood as being unrevisable (O'Hear 1995, 165). The famous debate, sparked by Thomas Kuhn, on paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic science and theory is relevant here. Bacon's position—open to scientific progress—is nearer to Kuhn than to Duhem or Poincaré. For Bacon, “anticipation of nature” (as a mode of “conventionalism”) produces obstacles to the progress of knowledge. Traditional methods shun speculation concerning things which are not immediately visible; Bacon's speculation, however, is an element of “interpretation of nature”. He presupposes hypothetical theories, but these do not go beyond the collected data. His acceptance of hypotheses is connected with his rejection of “ anticipation of nature”. Thus, hypotheses are related to the axioms of “interpretation of nature”, which go beyond the original data. The amount of established facts is not identical with that of possible data (Gillies 1998, 307). Anticipation is rejected, only if it “flies from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms” (OFB XI, xxv). Because of the dangers of premature generalization, Bacon is careful about speculations and rigorously rejects any dogmatic defense of them and the tendency to declare them infallible.

…the philosophy that we now possess clutches to its breast certain tenets with which (if we look into it carefully) they want wholly to conceive men that nothing difficult, nothing with real power and influence over nature, should be expected from art or human effort; […] These things, if we examine them minutely, tend wholly towards a wicked circumscription of human power and an intentional and unnatural despair which not only confounds the presages of hope but breaks every nerve and spur of industry, and throws away the chances afforded by experience itself—while all they care about is that their art be considered perfect, expending their effort to achieve the most foolish and bankrupt glory of having it believed that whatever has not been found out or understood so far cannot be found out or understood in the future. (OFB XI, 141)

Bacon sees nature as an extremely subtle complexity, which affords all the energy of the natural philosopher to disclose her secrets.

For him, new axioms must be larger and wider than the material from which they are taken. At the same time, “interpretation of nature” must not leap to remote axioms. In terms of his method, he rejects general ideas as simple abstractions from very few sense perceptions. Such abstract words may function as conventions for organizing “new observations”, but only in the sense of means for taxonomical order. Such a sterile procedure is irrelevant for “interpretation of nature”, which is not final or infallible and is based on the insight that confirming hypotheses do not provide strict proofs. Bacon's method is therefore characterized by openness:

Nevertheless, I do not affirm that nothing can be added to what I prescribe; on the contrary, as one who observes the mind not only in its innate capacity but also insofar as it gets to grips with things, it is my conviction that the art of discovering will grow as the number of things discovered will grow. (OFB, XI, 197)

Peter Urbach's commentary exactly underlines Bacon's openness:

He believed that theories should be advanced to explain whatever data were available in a particular domain. These theories should preferably concern the underlying physical, causal mechanisms and ought, in any case, to go beyond the data which generated them. They are then tested by drawing out new predictions, which, if verified in experience, may confirm the theory and may eventually render it certain, at least in the sense that it becomes very difficult to deny. (Urbach 1987, 49)

Bacon was no seventeenth-century Popperian. Rather, on account of his theory of induction, he was:

the first great theorist of experimentalism”: “the function of experiment was both to test theories and to establish facts” (Rees, in OFB XI, xli). Encyclopaedic repetition with an Aristotelian slant is being displaced by original compilation in which deference to authority plays no part whatever. Individual erudition is being dumped in favour of collective research. Conservation of traditional knowledge is being discarded in the interest of a new, functional realization of natural history, which demands that legenda —things worth reading—be supplanted by materials which will form the basis of a thoroughgoing attempt to improve the material conditions of the human race. (Rees, in OFB XI, xlii)

Form is for Bacon a structural constituent of a natural entity or a key to its truth and operation, so that it comes near to natural law, without being reducible to causality. This appears all the more important, since Bacon—who seeks out exclusively causes which are necessary and sufficient for their effects—rejects Aristotle's four causes (his four types of explanation for a complete understanding of a phenomenon) on the grounds that the distribution into material, formal, efficient, and final causes does not work well and that they fail to advance the sciences (especially the final, efficient, and material causes). Consider again the passage quoted in Section 3.3:

There are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering truth. The one flies from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from these principles, the truth of which it takes for settled and immovable, proceeds to judgment and to the discovery of middle axioms. And this way is now in fashion. The other derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms at last. This is the true way, but as yet untried. (Bacon IV [1901], 50: Novum Organum , I, Aphorism XIX).

Since for Bacon the formal necessity of the syllogism does not suffice to set up first principles, his method comprises two basic tasks: (1) the discovery of forms, and (2) the transformation of concrete bodies. The discovery from every case of generation and motion refers to a latent process according to which efficient and material causes lead to forms; but there is also the discovery of latent configurations of bodies at rest and not in motion (Bacon IV [1901], 119–20).

Bacon's new mode of using human understanding implies a parallelism between striving towards human power and constituting human knowledge. Technical know-how leads to successful operations, which converge with the discovery of forms (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 108; Bacon IV [1901], 121). To understand the workings of nature presupposes an arrangement of facts which makes the investigative analysis of cause and effect possible, especially by means of new experiments. At this point the idea of scientia operativa comes in again, since the direction for a true and perfect rule of operation is parallel to the discovery of a true form. Bacon's specific non-Aristotelian Aristotelianism (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 113, 115) is one of the main features of his theory. Other indispensable influences on Bacon, apart from a modified version of Aristotle, are critically assessed Hermeticism, rhetoric (Vickers) and alchemy (Rees).

Two kinds of axioms correspond to the following division of philosophy and the sciences: the investigation of forms or metaphysics ; and the investigation of efficient cause and matter, which leads to the latent process and configuration in physics . Physics itself is split up by Bacon into Mechanics , i.e., the practical, and Magic , i.e., the metaphysical.

Nowadays the view that Bacon “made little first-hand contribution to science” (Hesse 1964, 152) no longer coincides with the opinion that we have to assume an underestimation of the “place of hypothesis and mathematics” in his work (Urban 1987; Sessions 1999, 139; Rees 1986). But there were few doubts in the past that Bacon “encouraged detailed and methodical experimentation” (Hesse 1964, 152); and he did this on account of his new inductive method, which implied the need for negative instances and refuting experiments. Bacon saw that confirming instances could not suffice to analyze the structure of scientific laws, since this task presupposed a hypothetical-deductive system, which, according to Lisa Jardine, is closely connected to “the logical and linguistic backgrounds from which Bacon's New Logic proceeds …” (Sessions 1999, 140; Jardine 1974, 69ff.).

Bacon's interpretation of nature uses “Tables and Arrangements of Instances” concerning the natural phenomena under investigation, which function as a necessary condition for cracking the code of efficient causation. His prerogative instances are not examples or phenomena simply taken from nature but rather imply information with inductive potential which show priority conducive to knowledge or to methodological relevance when inserted into tables. The instances do not represent the order of sensible things, but instead express the order of qualities (natures). These qualities provide the working basis for the order of abstract natures. Bacon's tables have a double function: they are important for natural history , collecting the data on bodies and virtues in nature; and they are also indispensable for induction , which makes use of these data.

Already in Temporis Partus Masculus (1603) Bacon had displayed a “facility of shrewd observation” (Sessions 1999, 60) concerning his ideas on induction. In his Novum Organum the nature of all human science and knowledge was seen by him as proceeding most safely by negation and exclusion, as opposed to affirmation and inclusion. Even in his early tracts it was clear to Bacon that he had to seek a method of discovering the right forms, the most well known of which was heat ( Novum Organum II, Aph. XI–XII) or “the famous trial investigation of the form of heat” (Rees 2000, 66; see Bacon IV [1901], 154–5).

In his “[m]ethod of analysis by exclusion” (Sessions 1999, 141), negation proved to be “one of Bacon's strongest contributions to modern scientific method” (Wright 1951, 152). Most important were his tables of degrees and of exclusion. They were needed for the discovery of causes, especially for supreme causes, which were called forms. The method of induction works in two stages:

• Learned experience from the known to the unknown has to be acquired, and the tables (of presence, absence, degrees) have to be set up before their interpretation can take place according to the principle of exclusion. After the three tables of the first presentation have been judged and analyzed, Bacon declares the First Vintage or the first version of the interpretation of nature to be concluded.
• The second phase of the method concentrates on the process of exclusion. The aim of this procedure is the reduction of the empirical character of experience, so that the analysis converges with an anatomy of things. Here, too, tables of presence and of absence are set up. The research work proper consists of finding the relationship of the two natures of qualities. Here exclusion functions as the process of determination. Bacon's method starts from material determination in order to establish the formal determination of real causes, but does not stop there, because it aims at the progressive generalization of causes. Here, again, the central element of the inductive method is the procedure of exclusion.

Forms, as the final result of the methodical procedure, are:

nothing more than those laws and determinations of absolute actuality which govern and constitute any simple nature, as heat, light, weight, in every kind of matter and subject that is susceptible of them (Bacon IV [1901], 145–6);

They are not identical with natural law, but with definitions of simple natures (elements) or ultimate ingredients of things from which the basic material structure has been built (Gaukroger 2001, 140). Forms are the structures constituted by the elements in nature (microphysics). This evokes a cross-reference to Bacon's atomism, which has been called the “constructivist component” (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 116) of his system, including an alchemical theory about basic kinds of matter. He aims at “understanding the basic structures of things … as a means to transforming nature for human purposes” (Gaukroger 2001, 140; Clericuzio 2000, 78ff.); and thus he “ends” the unfinished Novum Organum with a list of things which still have to be achieved or with a catalogue of phenomena which are important and indispensable for a future natural history.

Historians of science, with their predilection for mathematical physics, used to criticize Bacon's approach, stating that “the Baconian concept of science, as an inductive science, has nothing to do with and even contradicts today's form of science” (Malherbe 1996, 75). In reaching this verdict, however, they overlooked the fact that a natural philosophy based on a theory of matter cannot be assessed on the grounds of a natural philosophy or science based on mechanics as the fundamental discipline. One can account for this chronic mode of misunderstanding as a specimen of the paradigmatic fallacy (Gaukroger 2001, 134ff.; see Rees 1986).

Bacon came to the fundamental insight that facts cannot be collected from nature, but must be constituted by methodical procedures, which have to be put into practice by scientists in order to ascertain the empirical basis for inductive generalizations. His induction, founded on collection, comparison, and exclusion of factual qualities in things and their interior structure, proved to be a revolutionary achievement within natural philosophy, for which no example in classical antiquity existed. His scala intellectus has two contrary movements “upwards and downwards: from axiomata to experimenta and opera and back again” (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 236). Bacon's induction was construed and conceived as an instrument or method of discovery. Above all, his emphasis on negative instances for the procedure of induction itself can claim a high importance with regard to knowledge acquisition and has been acclaimed as an innovation by scholars of our time. Some have detected in Bacon a forerunner of Karl Popper in respect of the method of falsification. Finally, it cannot be denied that Bacon's methodological program of induction includes aspects of deduction and abstraction on the basis of negation and exclusion. Contemporary scholars have praised his inauguration of the theory of induction. This theory has been held in higher esteem since the 1970s than it was for a long period before (see the work of Rees, Gaukroger and Pérez-Ramos 1988, 201–85). Nevertheless, it is doubtful that Bacon's critics, who were associated with the traditions of positivism and analytical philosophy, acquired sufficient knowledge of his writings to produce solid warrants for their criticisms (Cohen 1970, 124–34; Cohen 1985, 58ff.; on the general problem of induction see, e.g., Hempel 1966; Swinburne (ed.) 1974; Lambert and Brittan 1979 [1987]). In comparison to the neglect of Bacon in the twentieth century, a more recent and deeper assessment of his work has arisen in connection with the “Oxford Francis Bacon” project, which was launched in the late 1990s by Graham Rees, who directed it until his death in 2009; it is now under the general editorship of Brian Vickers.

In Bacon's thought we encounter a relation between science and social philosophy, since his ideas concerning a utopian transformation of society presuppose an integration into the social framework of his program concerning natural philosophy and technology as the two forms of the maker's knowledge. From his point of view, which was influenced by Puritan conceptions, early modern society has to make sure that losses caused by the Fall are compensated for, primarily by man's enlargement of knowledge, providing the preconditions for a new form of society which combines scientia nova and the millennium, according to the prophecy of Daniel 12:4 (Hill 1971, 85–130). Science as a social endeavor is seen as a collective project for the improvement of social structures. On the other hand, a strong collective spirit in society may function as a conditio sine qua non for reforming natural philosophy. Bacon's famous argument that it is wise not to confound the Book of Nature with the Book of God comes into focus, since the latter deals with God's will (inscrutable for man) and the former with God's work, the scientific explanation or appreciation of which is a form of Christian divine service. Successful operations in natural philosophy and technology help to improve the human lot in a way which makes the hardships of life after the Fall obsolete. It is important to note that Bacon's idea of a—to a certain extent—Christian society by no means conveys Christian pessimism in the vein of patristic thinkers but rather displays a clear optimism as the result of compounding the problem of truth with the scope of human freedom and sovereignty (Brandt 1979, 21).

With regard to Bacon's Two Books—the Book of God and the Book of Nature—one has to keep in mind that man, when given free access to the Book of Nature, should not content himself with merely reading it. He also has to find out the names by which things are called. If man does so, not only will he be restored to his status a noble and powerful being, but the Book of God will also lose importance, from a traditional point of view, in comparison to the Book of Nature. This is what Blumenberg referred to as the “asymmetry of readability” (Blumenberg 1981, 86–107). But the process of reading is an open-ended activity, so that new knowledge and the expansion of the system of disciplines can no longer be restricted by concepts such as the completeness and eternity of knowledge (Klein 2004a, 73).

According to Bacon, the Book of God refers to his will, the Book of Nature to his works. He never gives a hint in his works that he has concealed any message of unbelief for the sophisticated reader; but he emphasized: (1) that religion and science should be kept separate and, (2) that they were nevertheless complementary to each other. For Bacon, the attack of theologians on human curiosity cannot be founded on a rational basis. His statement that “all knowledge is to be limited by religion, and to be referred to use and action” (Bacon III [1887], 218) does not express a general verdict on theoretical curiosity, but instead provides a normative framework for the tasks of science in a universal sense. Already in the dedicatory letter to James I in his Advancement of Learning , Bacon attacks “the zeal and jealousy of divines” (Bacon III, 264) and in his manuscript Filum Labyrinthi of 1607, he “thought … how great opposition and prejudice natural philosophy had received by superstition, and the immoderate and blind zeal of religion” (Bacon VI [1863], 421). As Calvin had done long before him in the Institutes , Bacon stated that since God created the physical world, it was a legitimate object of man's knowledge, a conviction which he illustrated with the famous example of King Solomon in The Advancement of Learning (Zagorin 1999, 49–50; see also Kocher 1953, 27–8). Bacon praises Solomon's wisdom, which seems to be more like a game than an example of man's God-given thirst for knowledge:

The glory of God is to conceal a thing, but the glory of the king is to find it out; as if, according to the innocent play of children, the Divine Majesty took delight to hide his works, to the end to have them found out; and as if kings could not obtain a greater honour than to be God's playfellows in that game, considering the great commandment of wits and means, whereby nothing needeth to be hidden from them. (Bacon III [1887], 299; Blumenberg, 1973, 196–200)

From this perspective, the punishment of mankind on account of the very first disobedience by Adam and Eve can be seen in a different light from that of theological interpretations. In Bacon's view, this disobedience and its consequences can be remedied in two ways: (1) by religion and moral imperatives, and (2) by advancement in the arts and sciences: “the purpose in advancing arts and sciences is the glory of God and the relief of man's estate” (Wormald 1993, 82).

The two remedies, which are interconnected with the moral dimension, refer to the advancement of learning and religion. All three together (the advancement of learning, religion, and morality) are combined in such a way that they promote each other mutually; consequently, limited outlooks on coping with life and knowledge are ruled out completely in these three fields.

The ethical dimension of Bacon's thought has been underrated by generations of scholars. Time and again a crude utilitarianism has been derived from Book I, Aphorism 1 of the Novum Organum ; this cannot, however, withstand a closer analysis of his thought. Since Bacon's philosophy of science tries to answer the question of how man can overcome the deficiencies of earthly life resulting from the Fall, he enters the realm of ethical reflection. The improvement of mankind's lot by means of philosophy and science does not start from a narrow utilitarian point of view, involving sheer striving for profit and supporting the power or influence of select groups of men, but instead emphasizes the construction of a better world for mankind, which might come into existence through the ascertaining of truths about nature's workings (Bacon III [1887], 242). Thus, the perspective of the universal in Bacon's ethical thought is given predominance. The range of science and technology in their ethical meaning transcends the realm of the application of tools and/or instruments, in so far as the aim is the transformation of whole systems. Since causality and finality can interact on the basis of human will and knowledge, a plurality of worlds becomes feasible (Bacon V [1889], 506–7). Moral philosophy is closely connected to ethical reflections on the relationship between the nature of virtues—habitual or innate?—and their use in life, privately and collectively. Any application of the principles of virtue presupposes for Bacon the education of the mind, so that we learn what is good and what should be attained (Gaukroger 2006, 204–5 and passim):

The main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth to be into the Exemplar or Platform of Good, and the Regimen of Culture of the Mind; the one describing the nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto (Bacon III [1887], 419).

So, already in his Advancement of Learning Bacon studied the nature of good and distinguished various kinds of good. He insisted on the individual's duty to the public. Private moral self-control and the concomitant obligations are relevant for behavior and action in society. One's ethical persona is connected to morality by reference to acceptable behaviour. Though what we can do may be limited, we have to muster our psychological powers and control our passions when dealing with ourselves and with others. We need to apply self-discipline and rational assessment, as well as restraining our passions, in order to lead an active moral life in society.

Thus, for Bacon, the acquisition of knowledge does not simply coincide with the possibility of exerting power. Scientific knowledge is a condition for the expansion and development of civilization. Therefore, knowledge and charity cannot be kept separate:

I humbly pray … that knowledge being now discharged of that venom which the serpent infused into it, and which makes the mind of man to swell, we may not be wise above measure and sobriety, but cultivate truth in charity…. Lastly, I would address one general admonition to all; that they consider what are the true ends of knowledge, and that they seek it not either for pleasure of the mind, or for contention, or for superiority to others, or for profit, or fame, or power, or any of these inferior things; but for the benefit and use of life; and that they perfect and govern it in charity. For it was from the lust of power that the angels fell, from lust of knowledge that man fell; but of charity there can be no excess, neither did angel or man ever come in danger by it (Bacon IV [1901], 20f.: Instauratio Magna , Preface).

Finally, the view that Bacon's Nova Atlantis “concerns a utopian society that is carefully organized for the purposes of scientific research and virtuous living” (Urbach 1988, 10) holds true for his entire life's work. In Nova Atlantis, social, political, and scholarly life are all organized according to the maxim of efficiency; but the House of Solomon is a separate and highly esteemed institution for research, which nevertheless is closely connected to the overall system of Bensalem. In his utopian state, Bacon presents a thoroughgoing collective life in society and science, both of which are based on revealed religion. Religion—Christian in essence—is not dogmatic, but it instills into the people of Bensalem veneration for the wise and morally exemplary members of society, and—which is of the utmost importance—the strictest sense of discipline (Gaukroger 2001, 128–30). Discipline is indispensable for those involved in the religious life as well as for the researchers, since both must proceed methodically. The isomorphic structures of nature and science, on the one hand, society and religion, on the other, prescribe patterns of political procedure, social processes, and religious attitudes, which overcome any craving for individuality. If religion and scientific research are both shown as truthful in Bensalem, then, according to Bacon, the imagination functions as a means of illustrating scientific revelation: “Bacon's purpose is … to show that scientific research properly pursued is not inconsonant with religious propriety and social stability…” (Bierman 1963, 497). The scientists in Bensalem are sacred searchers for truth: ethics, religion, and science merge. Bacon's parabolic strategy, which we should not separate from the power of the idols, enables him to make much of his trick of introducing new ideas like a smuggler: his colored wares are smuggled into the minds of his readers by being visualized in terms of sacred and highly symbolic rituals (Peltonen 1996, 175). Science and religion are separated in Nova Atlantis, but they are also interrelated through the offices of the society of Bensalem. What Bacon obviously wants to make clear to his readers is that the example of Bensalem should free them from any fear that scientific progress will lead to chaos and upheaval. This crucial point has made by Jürgen Mittelstrass, who understands Bacon's Nova Atlantis as a utopia and regards utopias as

blueprints of practical reason, not of theoretical, that is: they set in exactly there, where the early modern idea of progress appears meagre with regards to the contents: within ethics and political theory. (Mittelstrass 1960, 369)

• 1857–74, The Works , edited by J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath, 14 vols. London.
• 1861, The Works , edited by J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath, 15 vols. Boston: Taggard and Thompson.
• 1861–74, The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon , edited by J. Spedding, 7 vols. London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts.
• 1889–1901, The Works , edited by J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath. Volumes I (1889), II (1887), III (1887), IV (1901), V (1889), VI (1890), VII (1892).
• 1898, Novum Organum or True Suggestions for the Interpretation of Nature , London and New York.
• 1958, Essays , intr. by O. Smeaton. London and New York.
• 1962, The Advancement of Learning , edited by G. W. Kitchin, London and New York: Dent.
• 1982, Neu Atlantis , transl. by G. Bugge, edited by Jürgen Klein, Stuttgart.
• 1996–, The Oxford Francis Bacon [OFB], General Editors: Graham Rees and Lisa Jardine; Brian Vickers; Oxford University Press. In order of publication: Volume VI (1996), Philosophical Studies c. 1611–c. 1619 , edited by G. Rees; Volume IV (2000), The Advancement of Learning , edited by M. Kiernan; Volume XIII (2000), The Instauratio Magna: Last Writings , edited by G. Rees; Volume XV (2000), The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall edited by M. Kiernan; Volume XI (2004), The Instauratio Magna: Part II. Novum Organum , edited by G. Rees and M. Wakely; Volume XII (2007), The Instauratio Magna. Part 3, Historia naturalis et experimentalis, Historia ventorum and Historia vitæ & mortis , edited by G. Rees and M. Wakely; Volume VIII (2011), The Historie of the Raigne of King Henry the Seuenth and Other Works of the 1620s , edited by M. Kiernan.
• 2000, A Critical Edition of the Major Works , edited by Brian Vickers. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
• Anderson, F. H., 1948, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Bierman, J., 1963, “Science and Society in the New Atlantis and other Renaissance Utopias”, PMLA , 78(5): 492–500.
• Blumenberg, H., 1973, Der Prozess der theoretischen Neugierde , Frankfurt am Main.
• Bowen, C. D., 1963 [1993], Francis Bacon. The Temper of a Man , New York: Fordham University Press. First edition 1963, Boston: Little, Brown.
• Brandt, R., 1979, “Francis Bacon, Die Idolenlehre”, in Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen. Philosophie der Neuzeit I , edited by Josef Speck. Göttingen, pp. 9–34.
• Burtt, E. A., 1924 [1932], The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science , London. First Edition, April 1924; Second Edition (revised) January 1932; reprinted 1972.
• Cassirer, E., 1922 [reprint 1994], Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Neueren Zeit , Darmstadt.
• Clericuzio, A., 2000, Elements, Principles, and Corpuscles , Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
• Dampier, W. C., 1929 [1948], A History of Science and its relations with Philosophy and Religion , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fourth edition, 1948; reprinted with postscript by I. Bernard Cohen 1966.
• Dijksterhuis, E. J., 1969, The Mechanization of the World Picture , Oxford.
• Farrington, B., 1964, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon , Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
• Fischer, K., 1923, Francis Bacon und seine Schule , Entwicklungsgeschichte der Erfahrungsphilosophie , Heidelberg.
• Gaukroger, S., 2001, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2006, The Emergence of a Scientific Culture. Science and the Shaping of Modernity 1210–1685 , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Giglioni, G., 2011, Francesco Bacone , Rome.
• Henry, J., 2002, Knowledge is Power. Francis Bacon and the Method of Science , Cambridge: Icon Books.
• Hesse, M. B., 1964, “Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science”, in A Critical History of Western Philosophy , edited by D. J. O'Connor, New York: Free Press, pp. 141–52.
• Hill, C., 1965, Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Jardine, L., 1974, Francis Bacon. Discovery and the Art of Discourse , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Jardine, L. and A. Stewart, 1999, Hostage to Fortune. The Troubled Life of Francis Bacon 1561–1626 , London: Victor Gollancz.
• Kargon, R. H., 1966, Atomism in England , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Klein, J., 1984, Radikales Denken in England: Neuzeit , Frankfurt, Berne and New York.
• –––, 1987, Francis Bacon oder die Modernisierung Englands , Hildesheim, Zurich and New York.
• –––, 2003a “Bacon's Quarrel with the Aristotelians”, Zeitsprünge , 7: 19–31.
• –––, 2003b, “Francis Bacon (1561–1626)”, in Metzler Philosophen Lexikon , B. Lutz (ed.), Stuttgart.
• –––, 2003c, “Nachwort”, in Francis Bacon, Neu-Atlantis , Stuttgart, 64–9.
• –––, 2004a, “Francis Bacon's The Advancement of Learning . An Early Modern Programme for the Revision of the Systems of Disciplines”, in Scholarly Environments. Centres of Learning and Institutional Contexts 1560–1960 , edited by Alasdair A. MacDonald and Arend H. Huusen. Leuven, Paris, and Dudley, MA, pp. 65–73.
• –––, 2004b, “Francis Bacons Essays von 1597: Der politische Subtext”, in Against the Grain/Gegenden Strich gelesen. Studies in English and American Literature and Literary Theory. Festschrift für Wolfgang Wicht , Peter Drexler and Rainer Schnoor (eds.), Berlin, pp.201–223.
• –––, 2008, “Francis Bacon's Scientia Operativa , The Tradition of the Workshops, and the Secrets of Nature”, in Philosophies of Technology. Francis Bacon and His Contemporaries , Claus Zittel, Gisela Engel, Romano Nanni, and Nicole C. Karafyllis (eds.), Leiden and Boston, pp.21–49.
• –––, 2010, Elisabeth I und ihre Zeit , 2nd ed., Munich.
• Krohn, W., 1987, Francis Bacon , Munich.
• Lange, F. A., 1898, Geschichte des Materialismus , Bd 1. Leipzig.
• Losee, J., 1972, A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Malherbe, M., 1996, “Bacon's Method of Science”, in Peltonen (ed.) 1996, pp. 75–98.
• Martin, J., 1992, Francis Bacon, the State, and the Reform of Natural Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Mathews, N., 1996, Francis Bacon. The History of a Character Assassination , New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
• Matthews, S., 2008, Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis Bacon , Aldershot: Ashgate.
• Mittelstrass, J., 1960, Neuzeit und Aufklärung. Studien zur Entstehung der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft und Philosophie , Berlin and New York.
• Peltonen, M. (ed.), 1996, The Cambridge Companion to Bacon , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Peltonen, M., 2007, “Bacon; Francis, Viscount St Alban (1561–1626)”, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
• Pérez-Ramos, A., 1988, Francis Bacon's Idea of Science and the Maker's Knowledge Tradition , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Price, B. (ed.), 2002, Francis Bacon's New Atlantis. New Interdisciplinary Essays , Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
• Quinton, A., 1980, Francis Bacon , Oxford, Toronto, and Melbourne: Hill and Wang.
• Rees, G., 1975a,b, “Francis Bacon's Semi-Paracelsian Cosmology”, Ambix , XXII: 82–101; 165–73.
• –––, 1977, “Matter Theory: A Unifying factor in Bacon's Natural Philosophy?”, Ambix , XXIV: 110–25.
• –––, 1980, “Atomism and ‘Subtlety’ in Francis Bacon's Philosophy”, Annals of Science , XXXVII: 549–71.
• –––, 1985, “Quantitative Reasoning in Francis Bacon's Natural Philosophy”, Nouvelle de la republique des lettres : 27–48.
• –––, 1986, “Mathematics in Francis Bacon's Natural Philosophy”, Revue internationale de philosophie , 159(4): 399–426.
• –––, 1996, “Bacon's Speculative Philosophy”, in Peltonen (ed.) 1996, pp.121–45.
• –––, 2000, “Francis Bacon (1561–1626)”, in W. Applebaum (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Scientific Revolution From Copernicus to Newton , New York and London, pp. 65– 69.
• –––, 2004, “On Francis Bacon's Originality”, ISIH: Intellectual News , 14: 69–73.
• Rees, G. and C. Upton, 1984, Francis Bacon's Natural Philosophy: A New Source. A transcription of manuscript Hardwick 72A with Translation and Commentary (The British Society for the History of Science Monographs, 5), Chalfont St Giles.
• Rossi, P., 1968, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science , translated by S. Rabinovitch, London: University of Chicago Press.
• Schäfer, L., 1993, Das Bacon-Programm . Von der Erkenntnis , Nutzung und Schonung der Natur , Frankfurt am Main.
• Schmidt-Biggemann, W., 1983, Topica Universalis. Eine Modellgeschichte humanistischer und barocker Wissenschaft , Hamburg.
• Sessions, W. A. (ed.), 1990, Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts , New York: AMS Press.
• –––, 1996, Francis Bacon Revisited , New York and London: Twayne Publishers.
• Urbach, P., 1987, Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science: An Account and a Reappraisal , La Salle, IL: Open Court.
• Vickers, B., 1968a, Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• ––– (ed.), 1968b, Essential Articles for the Study of Francis Bacon , Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books.
• –––, 1978, Francis Bacon , Harlow: Longman Group.
• Webster, C., 1975, The Great Instauration. Science, Medicine, and Reform 1626–1660 , London: Duckworth.
• Zaller, R., 1971, The Parliament of 1621: A Study in Constitutional Conflict , Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
• Zagorin, P., 1999, Francis Bacon , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Ayer, A. J., 1973, The Central Questions of Philosophy , London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
• Blumenberg, H., 1981, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt , Frankfurt am Main.
• Carnap, R. and W. Stegmüller, 1959, Induktive Logik und Wahrscheinlichkeit , Vienna.
• Cohen, I. B., 1985, Revolution in Science , Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
• Cohen, J. L., 1970, The Implications of Induction , London: Methuen.
• Curd, M. and J. A. Cover (eds.), 1998, Philosophy of Science. The Central Issues , London and New York: W.W. Norton.
• Dijksterhuis, E. J., 1956, Die Mechanisierung des Weltbildes , Berlin etc.
• Duhem, P., 1904–5, The Aims and Structure of Physical Theory , English translation by Philip P. Wiener, New York, 1954.
• –––, 1998, Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien , übersetzt von Friedrich Adler, mit einem Vorwort von Ernst Mach, herausgegeben mit einer Einleitung von Lothar Schäfer, Hamburg.
• Foucault, M., 1966 [1970], The Order of Things: The Archaeology of the Human Sciences , London: Tavistock; English translation 1970.
• Gillies, D., 1998, “The Duhem Thesis and the Quine Thesis”, in Curd and Cover 1998, pp. 302–319.
• Godfrey-Smith, P., 2003, Theory and Reality. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science , Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press.
• Grant, E., 1994, Planets, Stars, & Orbs. The Medieval Cosmos 1200–1687 , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Haack, S., 1993, Evidence and Inquiry. Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology , Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
• Hacking, I. (ed.), 1981, Scientific Revolutions , Oxford: Oxford Univerity Press.
• Hempel, C. G., 1966, Philosophy of Natural Science , Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
• Huggett, N., 2010, Everywhere and Everywhen. Adventures in Physics and Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Hylton, P., 2010, “Willard Van Orman Quine”, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/quine/ >.
• Kocher, P. H., 1953, Science and Religion in Elizabethan England , San Marino, CA: Huntington Library.
• Kuhn, Th. S., 1962, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Lakatos, I., 1970, “Falsificationism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge , edited by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 91–196.
• –––, 1981, “History of Science and Its Rational reconstructions”, in Hacking (ed.) 1981, pp. 107–27.
• Lambert, K. and G. C. Brittan, 1979 [1987], An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science , Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. Third edition 1987.
• Müller-Jahncke, W. D., 1985, Astrologisch-Magische Theorie in der Heilkunde der Frühen Neuzeit , Stuttgart.
• O'Hear, A., 1995, “Conventionalism”, in Oxford Companion to Philosophy , T. Honderich (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 165.
• Poincaré, H., 1905 [reprint 1952], Science and Hypothesis , translated by W. J. Greenstreet, New York: Dover Publications.
• Popper, K. R., 1969, Logik der Forschung , Tübingen, 3 rd edition.
• Quine, W. V. Q., 1951, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, The Philosophical Review 60: 20–43. Reprinted in Quine, 1963, From a Logical Point of View , New York: Harper Torchbook, pp. 20–46.
• Rae, A. I. M., 1986 [2000], Quantum physics: Illusion or Reality? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fourth Canto edition, 2000.
• Russell, B., 1948, Human Knowledge. Its Scope and its Limits , London: Allen & Unwin.
• Schäfer, L., 1998, “Duhems Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der Wissenschaftstheorie”, in: Duhem (1998), pp. X–XXXIII.
• Shell, H. R., 2004, “Casting Life, Recasting Experience: Bernard Palissy's Occupation between Maker and Nature”, Configurations , 12(1): 1–40.
• Stegmüller, W., 1973, Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie, Band II: Theorie und Erfahrung. Zweiter Halbband. Theorienstruktur und Theoriendynamik , Berlin, Heidelberg, New York.
• Swinburne, R. (ed.), 1974, The Justification of Induction , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Von Weizsäcker, C. F. and J. Juilfs, 1958, Physik der Gegenwart , Göttingen.
• Wright, G. H. von, 1951, A Treatise of Induction and Probability , London: Routledge and K. Pau.
• Zinner, E., 1988, Entstehung und Ausbreitung der copernicanischen Lehre , Munich.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Francis Bacon , entry by David Simpson in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .

[Please contact the author with other suggestions.]

Aristotelianism: in the Renaissance | Boyle, Robert | induction: problem of | Whewell, William

Acknowledgments

Some of the passages in this entry are borrowed from Klein 2008.

Copyright © 2012 by Jürgen Klein

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2023 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Class with Mason - School of Literary Studies

• Landing Page
• Sub Menu 01
• Sub Menu 02
• Sub Menu 03
• Sub Menu 04
• Sub Menu 05
• Try RTL Mode
• Literary Terms

Of Truth, Sir Francis Bacon, Analysis & Summary

Sir Francis Bacon, renowned for his profound worldly wisdom, offers a compelling analysis of the human condition in his essay "Of Truth." Although criticized by some, such as Alexander Pope, for his emphasis on worldly pursuits, Bacon's guidance in navigating critical situations remains invaluable. In this essay, he espouses the virtues of truth and provides practical advice on how to attain success even in the face of adversity.

While Bacon's philosophy often focuses on earthly benefits, it is important to note that he does not neglect the spiritual realm or the fruits of eternal life. In "Of Truth," he places great importance on the pursuit of truth itself, distinguishing it from falsehood and advocating for its consistent presence in all aspects of our lives. Drawing upon solid quotations, he presents a compelling case for the inherent value and necessity of truth.

Furthermore, Bacon directly addresses the skepticism of those who question the nature of truth. Rather than embellishing truth with excessive claims, he presents reality as it is, urging his readers to embrace honesty as the foundation of personal integrity. He emphasizes that only through a commitment to truth can one truly embody honesty, highlighting the inherent honor that comes from speaking the truth.

As we delve further into Bacon's essay, we will uncover the intricacies of his thoughts and the significance of his teachings on truth, which serve as a guiding light for navigating the complexities of life.

Unveiling the Essence of Truth: A Summary and Critical Analysis of "Of Truth" by Sir Francis Bacon

In his thought-provoking essay, "Of Truth," Sir Francis Bacon initiates the discourse by alluding to the historical figure of Pilate, the Ancient Roman Governor. Pilate's failure to fully comprehend and analyze the truth led him to make a critical decision without patiently awaiting its revelation. Bacon suggests that had Pilate possessed a deeper understanding of the truth, he might have refrained from passing judgment on the crucifixion of Christ.

Turning his attention to skeptical minds, Bacon contemplates whether Pilate himself exhibited such skepticism. He acknowledges the existence of individuals who possess wavering beliefs, constantly shifting their perspectives. These individuals perceive steadfast beliefs as a form of mental enslavement and pride themselves on their free-thinking nature. These echoes of skepticism can still be found in the world today, despite the passage of time and the decline of ancient schools of skeptical philosophy.

Bacon's insights shed light on the intricate dynamics of truth and belief, challenging readers to reflect on the nature of certainty and the influence of skepticism in shaping human thought. By delving into the depths of skepticism and its impact on our perception of truth, Bacon encourages us to critically examine our own beliefs and biases.

As we delve further into Bacon's essay, we will explore his nuanced perspectives on truth and its implications for human understanding, ultimately unraveling the multifaceted nature of truth itself.

The Veil of Untruth: Reasons for Withholding the Truth

The reluctance to speak the truth can be attributed to various underlying factors. Sir Francis Bacon delves into this complex phenomenon, offering a critical analysis of the reasons behind people's aversion to truth. One prominent explanation lies in the arduous and time-consuming nature of truth discovery. Bacon's astute observation finds resonance in real-life examples, such as the extensive legal processes that courts undertake to uncover the truth in countless cases. Years of diligent examination and scrutiny are necessary to discern who is truly speaking the truth.

Intriguingly, both the plaintiff and defendant passionately strive to prove their respective claims, underscoring the substantial effort and time required in the pursuit of truth. Bacon's assertion gains credibility as he highlights the challenging nature of unearthing the truth and the inherent complexities surrounding it.

A second reason, as postulated by Bacon, revolves around the inherent difficulty in accepting the truth once it is revealed. People often find it hard to digest and assimilate the truth into their worldview. This hesitance to embrace the truth can be attributed to various psychological and cognitive factors, underscoring the depth of human complexity and the innate resistance to transformative truths.

Bacon also ponders the paradoxical allure of lies and their appeal to human beings. He acknowledges that lies possess a certain magnetic pull, capturing the attention and interest of individuals. Yet, he expresses perplexity over why people would fabricate falsehoods merely for the sake of deceit. While understanding the motives behind poets and traders who employ lies for pleasure or profit, the concept of lying for its own sake remains an enigma to Bacon, challenging the very essence of human behavior.

In this profound exploration of truth and deception, Bacon presents a compelling analysis of the intricate web of motives and complexities that underlie the reluctance to embrace and speak the truth.

The Dichotomy of Truth and Lie: A Delicate Balance

Sir Francis Bacon explores the contrasting nature of truth and lies, shedding light on the allure and appeal of deception. Drawing upon a vivid real-life analogy, Bacon evokes the imagery of a spectacle presented under different lighting conditions. He posits that while the same show in broad daylight appears as it is, the introduction of candlelight transforms it into a captivating experience that entices a larger audience and provides pleasure. Similarly, lies possess an attractive facade, adorned with beauty and charm, captivating the minds of individuals.

Furthermore, Bacon delves into the intricate relationship between truth and lies. He muses that if the truth were blended with a lie, it would still possess the power to delight. This observation highlights the complex interplay between the two, suggesting that the allure of falsehoods can permeate even when intertwined with elements of truth.

Intriguingly, Bacon delves into the human propensity for constructing false beliefs, judgments, and opinions. These self-created constructs provide individuals with hope and a peculiar form of pleasure. Were these illusions to be stripped away, Bacon suggests that individuals would find themselves in a state of misery, deprived of the comforting illusions that afford them solace and gratification.

In this contemplation of truth and lies, Bacon offers a nuanced understanding of their intertwined existence, illuminating the seductive nature of deception and the delicate balance between truth and falsehood that shapes human perceptions and experiences.

The Paradox of Poetry: A Delicate Deception

Sir Francis Bacon delves into the controversial realm of poetry, acknowledging the accusations leveled against it by early writers of the church who deemed it as a dangerous elixir, aptly labeled as the "devil's wine." These writers argued that poetry, with its embellishments and flights of fancy, was inherently deceitful and led individuals astray into a realm of imagination. While Bacon acknowledges the inherent deceptive nature of poetry, he refutes the notion that it is inherently harmful.

Bacon acknowledges that poetry indeed presents a form of artistic falsehood, weaving tales that deviate from reality. However, he argues that the harm lies not in the art form itself, but rather in the lasting impact of lies on the human psyche. He categorizes lies into two distinct types: those that are short-lived and those that linger in the mind, difficult to forget. In Bacon's view, poetry falls into the former category. The lies presented within poetic verses may captivate and entrance momentarily, but they are transient in their influence. As a result, they do not inflict lasting harm upon individuals.

By distinguishing between the transient nature of poetic falsehoods and the enduring impact of lies that embed themselves within the human mind, Bacon challenges the notion that poetry is inherently harmful. He recognizes the allure of poetic deception, yet contends that its fleeting nature ultimately prevents it from causing lasting damage.

In this analysis, Bacon engages with the paradoxical nature of poetry, acknowledging its deceptive qualities while disputing the assertion that it is fundamentally detrimental to the human experience.

The Power of Truth: Humbling Pride

Sir Francis Bacon highlights the profound significance of truth, emphasizing its role in guiding human decision-making and illuminating the depths of our understanding. Drawing upon the notion of light as the initial creation of God, Bacon emphasizes the inherent connection between truth and enlightenment.

Bacon urges individuals to rely upon their rational faculties when making decisions, emphasizing the importance of basing one's actions on truth. He cites the words of Lucretius, who proclaims that the realization of truth is the pinnacle of human pleasure. Through this realization, one becomes acutely aware of the falsehoods that have clouded their beliefs and the frivolous hopes that once gripped them. Truth, in its essence, has the power to dismantle the veils of ignorance and arrogance.

By recognizing and embracing the truth, individuals are humbled and liberated from the shackles of pride. The revelation of truth reveals the fallibility of one's own judgments and dispels illusions of grandeur, fostering a sense of humility and compassion.

In this perspective, Bacon underscores the transformative potential of truth, highlighting its capacity to humble pride and open the path to self-awareness and empathy.

The Significance of Truth: Honoring the Virtuous

Sir Francis Bacon's profound exploration of truth in "Of Truth" highlights its immense significance in various aspects of life. Through a critical analysis of his ideas, we come to recognize the inherent worth of truth and the detrimental consequences of falsehood.

Bacon asserts that falsehood brings disgrace, while truth bestows honor. Even those who are inclined to lie are aware of the value and importance of truth. The recognition of truth extends beyond the realms of theology and philosophy; it permeates every facet of human existence.

Bacon references Montaigne, who remarks that a liar may exhibit bravery in the face of God but cowardice in their interactions with fellow humans. By engaging in falsehood, a liar directly challenges the divine. Despite their awareness of the impending judgment they will face on the Day of Judgment, they persist in promoting deception. This audacity to willingly endure eternal punishment displays a twisted form of courage.

In the concluding part of the essay, Bacon introduces a moral dimension, seeking to persuade and compel his readers to embrace truthfulness. He presents the "fear of doomsday" as a powerful motivator. According to Bacon, liars will ultimately face punishment on the Day of Judgment.

Thus, Bacon underscores the significance of truth, not only as a moral imperative but also as a means to honor and virtuous living, reminding individuals of the consequences they will face for their actions in the eternal realm.

Post a Comment

Ad-blocker detected.

Sorry, we detected that you have activated Ad-Blocker. Please consider supporting us by disabling your Ad-Blocker, it helps us in developing this Website. Thank you!

(92) 336 3216666

[email protected]

Francis Bacon

A short biography of francis bacon.

Francis Bacon was born on 22 nd of January, 1561 in London. Bacon worked as attorney general and Lord Chancellor of England resigning after he was found guilty of bribery. This unfortunate twist in his life brought him together with his true passions i.e. Humanism and natural philosophy. Francis Bacon was an English man who was inclined towards the age of Renaissance and arts. He negated the old fashioned traditions of teachings and believed in the newness of the age. His inspirations revolved around the Aristotelian ideas of philosophical quest. Bacon negated the Aristotelianism and idealized the new teachings of renaissance humanism. He observed the world through the lens of empiricism.

He believed that one needs to experience the reality of existence in order to completely understand life. This is known to be Francis Bacon’s method of understanding science and humanity. Francis Bacon was given the title “Father of Scientific method” . In the literary world Bacon is remembered as an all-rounder.  He was a lawyer, statesman and a philosopher. Francis Bacon is remembered as a source of wisdom in the literary world.

Bacon teaches a certain principles of science in order to understand life and the world we live in we have to experience the life by living it. He stated this as the empirical scientific method. According to him this scientific method will shed light upon the important characteristics of the nature that would “eventually disclose and bring into sight all that is most hidden and secret in the universe.”

Francis Bacon’s Writing Style

Francis Bacon being an all-rounder wrote in a way that was suitable for every profession. He understood the multidimensional society very well.

Bacon often wrote for the court during his career as a statesman and counsel. In the ear 1584 Francis Bacon wrote his first political memorandum, a letter of advice to Queen Elizabeth. He even wrote a speech for entertainment purpose in the year 1592 to celebrate the anniversary of queen’s coronation. The year 1597 was the year when Bacon’s first publication, a collection of essays about politics came into the literary world. The collection was later extended and republished in 1612 and 1625.

He wrote in prose style that fitted every profession. Bacon’s take on different aspects of life such as Love, Truth and religion is evident in the literary world. The way Bacon adapted to the society around him is marvelous and a very evident feature of his writing style. Bacon stands out in the literary world due to his unique approach towards thinking.

In England three types of thought triumphed in the late 16th century: the Aristotelian teachings and Scholasticism, intellectual and aesthetic humanism, and occultism. Aristotle is considered as the epitome of knowledge and wisdom. He contributed his genius in different spheres of life and the world. In England Aristotle remained the master of philosophical teachings, despite the criticism of Aristotle’s theory of logics.

Bacon grew up studying Aristotle’s philosophical teachings. The desire of finding answers led him to understand life closely with a different prism. Opposing the Aristotelian teachings Bacon came up with his philosophical approach of trying to understand life closely by experiencing different situations. Bacon simplifies the philosophical approach for a man to understand properly. His writing is direct and to the point. His style of writing prose is easily understandable for example, in “Of Studies,” he writes “Crafty men condemn studies; simple men admire them; and wise men use them.” This phrase by Francis Bacon doesn’t require of any analysis in order to understand the meaning. His writings are self-explanatory and that proves his genius in the literary world. Bacon writes in a systematic way, without wasting his words on unnecessary information. His writings showcase how he moves logically from on subject to another.

He is considered as one of the most important Empiricists in the philosophical as well as literary world. He takes up his ideas after experiencing from life and observing it closely. For example in his essay “Of Love,” he showcases the reality of this emotion that is not just a fantasy but comprises of both good and bad attributes. He puts forth a clear vision regarding different subjects of life. Bacon’s take on life is unique and interesting as his essays are an amalgamation of both Greek and Latin phrases. A person who is decently educated would be able to understand his essays as well as the homey imagery took out from everyday life. He deliberately writes in this manner so that he reaches out to the masses equally. Be it highly educated or moderately educated. Bacon was attracted by the beauty of the nature. He merged the beauty and knowledge of nature in a manner which allows the reader to have a multidimensional vision of his teachings.

Another very important phenomenon of Bacon’s life was the teachings of occultism that is the quest of mystical parallels between man and the cosmos. It allows an individual to understand the magical elements possessed in the world by relating it to the reality. Bacon himself is known to be an occultist. His teachings revolve around the “natural magic” that the nature possesses. He provokes his readers to be vigilant on their surroundings and observe the nature closely. One should open the inner eye to feel the magical attributes of the world. Bacon believed that the human mind is fit enough to possess the worldly knowledge and must strive to decipher the knowledge by keeping an observing eye open. Even though Bacon’s literary works covered quite an extensive range of topics, all of his writings have one thing in common i.e. Bacon’s desire to make an impact through his teachings and research. He wanted to change the system of old fashion education. He believed that tradition can breathe in the air of modernity; a little acceptance is all that is required.

Bacon states “true directions concerning the interpretation of nature,” in other words he is trying to make his reader understand that the method of acquiring true knowledge is by observing and understanding the nature. Bacon researched and gathered knowledge keeping in mind the next generations. He modified the old fashion knowledge into an accessible mode of knowledge.

In the first book of Novum Organum Bacon debates the reasons of human flaw in the quest of knowledge. Earlier Aristotle discussed logical fallacies, usually found in human rationality, but Bacon was unique in observing the methods of reasoning. He invented the metaphor of “idol” to state such causes of human flaw.

Bacon played an important role as a linguist in the literary world. Language is the means of understanding the world around us. Language, like other human accomplishments, partakes of human limitations. This aspect of Bacon’s thought has been almost as persuasive as his account of natural knowledge, inspiring a long tradition of cynical rationalism, from the Enlightenment.

Bacon lived in a time when new worlds were being discovered on Earth. He negated the perception that everything is either revealed by religion or Aristotle. He challenged the grand narrative of religion and researched himself to find answers. Bacon protected the study of nature against those who measured it as either improper or perilous. He argued for a supportive and systematic method against individualism and instinct. Today Bacon is known among great philosophers as an emblem of the notion that is widely held to be misunderstood, that science is inductive.

Works Of Francis Bacon

• Of Adversity
• Of Ambition
• Of Discourse
• Of Followers and Friends
• Of Friendship
• Of Great Place
• Of Marriage and Single Life
• Of Nobility
• Of Parents and Children
• Of Simulation and Dissimulation
• Of Superstition
• Of Goodness and Goodness of Nature

Francis Bacon on the Moral and Political Character of the Universe

• First Online: 26 April 2016

Cite this chapter

• James A. T. Lancaster 6  

Part of the book series: International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées ((ARCH,volume 218))

346 Accesses

1 Citations

The following chapter seeks to outline a prominent feature of Bacon’s view of the natural world – namely, its profoundly moral character – and to suggest that his model of natural philosophy is based not only upon principles drawn from earlier natural philosophers, but also from the spheres of moral and political philosophy. Rather than looking forward to the mechanical and mathematical explanations of Descartes, Newton and the seventeenth century, this chapter will attempt to show how Bacon’s understanding of the universe was indebted, at least in part, to the historical, political and moral ideas he found in the works of Tacitus, Machiavelli, Guicciardini and Lipsius. It will then elaborate upon the manner in which Bacon thought the moral and political character of material nature manifested itself in humans, as well as how he thought it should ideally serve as the foundation of law and society.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

• Available as PDF
• Read on any device
• Instant download
• Own it forever
• Available as EPUB and PDF
• Compact, lightweight edition
• Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
• Free shipping worldwide - see info
• Durable hardcover edition

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

See Harrison 2007 , 180–181.

For alternative, contemporaneous interpretations -->of the Fall-->, see Harrison 2007 . Scholars -->have largely placed Bacon within the standard view that the Fall affected the human mind, but not the natural world, thus offering a theological motivation for empiricism --> (for instance, Lewis 2007 ).

Bacon 1857 –1874, VI, 637: ‘sed post lapsum -->Adami, morti et corruptioni expositum et obnoxium factum’.

Beza is not the source of Bacon’s views about the consequences of the Fall--> for nature, as he rejected this aspect of Calvin’s -->interpretation (see Mallinson 2003 , 118).

On the appetites of -->matter, see Giglioni 2010 ; 2011a ; 2013a .

In later works, such as the Novum organum (1620) and the Abecedarium novum naturae (1622), Bacon writes that material self-->-preservation is the foremost appetite. This may be in relation to those appetites matter possessed prior to the introduction of the summary law.

Bacon 1857 –1874, VI, 730. Bacon’s identification of Christian charity with the summary law of nature is not merely rhetorical, as is suggested in the following passage from the Advancement of Learning : ‘there was never any philosophy, religion-->, or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which is communicative, and depress the good which is private and particular, as the Holy Faith; well declaring, that it was the same God--> that gave the Christian law to men, who gave those laws of nature to inanimate creatures that we spake of before; for [we] read that the elected saints of God have wished themselves anathematised and razed out of the book of life-->, in an ecstasy of charity and infinite feeling of communion’ (Bacon 1996b , 246). Here, again, Bacon is heavily influenced by Calvin -->, whose opinion, that ‘charity is the bond of perfection’, he will repeat throughout his entire career. --> See Calvin 1845 [1559], II, 126–127.

See Giglioni 2010 , 2011a , 2013a ; Margolin 1989 ; De Mas 1990 ; Posseur 1990 ; Rees 1975 .

See Tuck 1993 , 108–109, who --> has argued that Bacon represents English Taciteanism at its most concentrated in the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries. Bacon was first exposed to the writings of Guicciardini --> and Lipsius --> through his association with Robert Devereux -->.

Giglioni 2012 ; Norbrook 2002 , 153; Tuck 1993 , 36.

Giglioni 2012 , 159–164.

Tuck 1993 , 95–96: Guicciardini -->first employed -->the term ‘balance of -->power’ in the context of --> foreign affairs rather than that of civil conflict.

See Keller’s chapter in this volume.

For Bacon’s admiration of Tacitus, see Bacon 1996b , 105.

See also Giglioni 2011b , 42 and Tuck 1993 , 53–54.

Bacon shared with --> Lipsius a great love--> of gardens: see Lipsius 2006 , 124–127; Bacon 2000 , 139–145.

In a number of significant ways, Bacon’s view of the universe is much more indebted to the natural philosophical ideas of Telesio -->. Some of Telesio’s views about self-->-preservation, appetite and balance overlap with the political theorists whose influence we have been considering. Still, even if Bacon’s views are ultimately more Telesian in tenor, the contribution of Tacitus, Guicciardini --> and Lipsius --> should not be dismissed, as – at the very least – it would have reinforced Telesio’s influence on Bacon. For a succinct account of Telesio’s -->natural philosophy, see Leijenhorst 1999 . For -->Telesio’s impact on Bacon’s view of the natural world, --> see Giglioni (2011a , 2013a) .

Remember that, for Bacon, nature often appears to man--> as a ‘labyrinth’.

See, for instance, Corneanu --> in this volume; Wallace 1967 .

See Methuen 2000 and Harrison 2007 , 101.

Calvin 1845 [1559], I, 43; Greene 1991 , 204.

Bacon 1857 –1874, VI, 674: ‘Atque -->pervulgatum -->est illud, et tamen recte positum, per -->Pandoram significari Voluptatem et Libidinem’.

Ashworth, William B. 1990. Natural history and the emblematic world view. In Reappraisals of the scientific revolution , ed. David Lindberg and Robert Westman, 303–332. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Google Scholar  

Bacon, Francis. 1857–1874. Works , ed. James Spedding, Robert L. Ellis and Douglas D. Heath, 14 vols. London: Longman [repr. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1961–1963; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012].

Bacon, Francis. 1996a. Philosophical studies, c. 1611–c.1619 , ed. Graham Rees. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bacon, Francis. 1996b. Francis Bacon: The major works , ed. Brian Vickers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bacon, Francis. 2000. The advancement of learning , ed. Michael Kiernan. Oxford: Clarendon.

Bacon, Francis. 2004. The Instauratio Magna Part II: Novum Organum and associated texts , ed. Graham Rees and Maria Wakely. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Calvin, Jean. 1844–1856. Commentaries on the first book of Moses called Genesis . Trans. John King. Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society [repr. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1963].

Calvin, Jean. 1845 [1559]. Institutes of the Christian religion . Trans. Henry Beveridge. Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society [repr. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1962].

De Mas, Enrico. 1990. Bernardino Telesio e la falsità di Aristotele: Il giudizio di Bacone e Tobia Adami. In Atti del convegno internazionale di studi su Bernardino Telesio , 167–179. Cosenza: Accademia Cosentina.

Derrin, Daniel. 2013. Rhetoric and the familiar in Francis Bacon and John Donne . Madison/Teaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.

Giglioni, Guido. 2010. Mastering the appetites of matter: Francis Bacon’s Sylva sylvarum . In The body as object and instrument of knowledge: Embodied empiricism in early modern science , ed. Charles Wolfe and Ofer Gal, 149–167. Dordrecht: Springer.

Chapter   Google Scholar  

Giglioni, Guido. 2011a. Francesco Bacone . Roma: Carocci.

Giglioni, Guido. 2011b. Justus Lipsius and the notion of oἰκείωσις: A note on the early modern notion of self-preservation. In Justus Lipsius and natural philosophy , ed. Hiro Hirai and Jan Papy, 33–52. Brussels: Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgie.

Giglioni, Guido. 2012. Philosophy according to Tacitus: Francis Bacon and the inquiry into the limits of human self-delusion. Perspectives on Science 20: 159–182.

Article   Google Scholar  

Giglioni, Guido. 2013a. Francis Bacon. In The Oxford handbook of British philosophy in the seventeenth century , ed. Peter R. Anstey, 41–72. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Giglioni, Guido. 2013b. The uncomfortable biformitas of being: Bacon on the animal soul. In The animal soul and the human mind: Renaissance debates , ed. Cecilia Muratori. Pisa: Fabrizio Serra.

Greene, Robert. 1991. Synderesis, the spark of conscience, in the English Renaissance. Journal of the History of Ideas 52: 195–219.

Harrison, Peter. 2007. The fall of man and the foundations of science . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Book   Google Scholar  

Jardine, Lisa, and Alan Stewart. 1999. Hostage to fortune: The troubled life of Francis Bacon . London: Pheonix.

Leijenhorst, Cees. 1999. Bernardino Telesio. In Philosophers of the Renaissance , ed. Paul Richard Blum, 168–181. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press.

Lewis, Rhodri. 2007. Language, mind and nature: Artificial languages in England from Bacon to Locke . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lipsius, Justus. 2006 [1595]. De constantia . Trans. Sir John Stradling, ed. John Sellars. Exeter: Bristol Pheonix Press.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. 1999. Machiavelli. The chief works and others . Trans. Allan Gilbert, 3 vols. Durham: Duke University Press.

Mallinson, Jeffrey. 2003. Faith, reason, and revelation in Theodore Beza, 1519–1605 . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Margolin, Jean-Claude. 1989. Atti del convegno internazionale di studi su Bernardino Telesio , 135–166. Cosenza: Accademia Cosentina.

McKnight, Stephen. 2006. The religious foundations of Francis Bacon’s thought . Columbia: University of Missouri Press.

Methuen, Charlotte. 2000. Lex naturae and ordo naturae in the thought of Philip Melanchthon. Review of Religion Research 3: 110–125.

Norbrook, David. 2002. Poetry and politics in the English Renaissance . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pesic, Peter. 1999. Wrestling with Proteus: Francis Bacon and the ‘torture’ of nature. Isis 90: 81–94.

Pousseur, Jean-Marie. 1990. Bacon, a critic of Telesio. In Francis Bacon’s legacy of texts: The art of discovery grows with discovery , ed. William A. Sessions, 105–117. New York: AMS Press.

Rees, Graham. 1975. Francis Bacon’s semi-Paracelsian cosmology. Ambix 22: 81–101.

Thomas, Keith. 1984. Religion and the decline of magic . London: Penguin.

Tuck, Richard. 1993. Philosophy and government 1572–1651 . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wallace, Karl Richards. 1967. Francis Bacon on the nature of man . Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Download references

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Royal Holloway, University of London, London, UK

James A. T. Lancaster

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to James A. T. Lancaster .

Editor information

Editors and affiliations.

Warburg Institute, London, United Kingdom

Guido Giglioni

Royal Holloway, University of London, London, United Kingdom

James A.T. Lancaster

University of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania

Sorana Corneanu

Institute for Research in the Humanities, University of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania

Dana Jalobeanu

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Lancaster, J.A.T. (2016). Francis Bacon on the Moral and Political Character of the Universe. In: Giglioni, G., Lancaster, J., Corneanu, S., Jalobeanu, D. (eds) Francis Bacon on Motion and Power. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 218. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27641-0_10

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27641-0_10

Published : 26 April 2016

Publisher Name : Springer, Cham

Print ISBN : 978-3-319-27639-7

Online ISBN : 978-3-319-27641-0

eBook Packages : Religion and Philosophy Philosophy and Religion (R0)

Share this chapter

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Publish with us

Policies and ethics

• Find a journal
• Track your research