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Essay on Human Rights: Samples in 500 and 1500

Updated on
Jun 20, 2024

Essay writing is an integral part of the school curriculum and various academic and competitive exams like IELTS , TOEFL , SAT , UPSC , etc. It is designed to test your command of the English language and how well you can gather your thoughts and present them in a structure with a flow. To master your ability to write an essay, you must read as much as possible and practise on any given topic. This blog brings you a detailed guide on how to write an essay on Human Rights , with useful essay samples on Human rights.

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Human rights mark everyone as free and equal, irrespective of age, gender, caste, creed, religion and nationality. The United Nations adopted human rights in light of the atrocities people faced during the Second World War. On the 10th of December 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Its adoption led to the recognition of human rights as the foundation for freedom, justice and peace for every individual. Although it’s not legally binding, most nations have incorporated these human rights into their constitutions and domestic legal frameworks. Human rights safeguard us from discrimination and guarantee that our most basic needs are protected.

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Human Rights

Human rights are norms that aspire to protect all people everywhere from severe political, legal, and social abuses. Examples of human rights are the right to freedom of religion, the right to a fair trial when charged with a crime, the right not to be tortured, and the right to education. The philosophy of human rights addresses questions about the existence, content, nature, universality, justification, and legal status of human rights. The strong claims often made on behalf of human rights (for example, that they are universal, inalienable, or exist independently of legal enactment as justified moral norms) have frequently provoked skeptical doubts and countering philosophical defenses (on these doubts see Lacroix & Pranchère 2016; Mutua 2002; and Waldron 1987). Reflection on these doubts and the responses that can be made to them has become a sub-field of political and legal philosophy with a very substantial literature (see the extensive Bibliography below). This entry addresses the concept of human rights, the existence and grounds of human rights, the question of which rights are human rights, and relativism about human rights.

1. The General Idea of Human Rights

2.1 how can human rights exist, 2.2 justifications for human rights, 3.1 civil and political rights, 3.2 economic and social rights, 3.3 human rights of women, minorities, and groups, 3.4 new human rights, 4. universal human rights in a world of diverse beliefs and practices, a. books and articles in the philosophy of human rights, b. legal declarations, other internet resources, related entries.

This section attempts to explain the general idea of human rights by identifying four defining features. The goal is to answer the question of what human rights are with a description of the concept rather than with a list of specific rights. Two people can have the same general idea of human rights even though they disagree about which rights are really human rights and even about whether universal human rights are a good idea. The four-part explanation just below attempts to cover all kinds of human rights including both moral and legal human rights as well as old and new human rights (e.g., both Lockean natural rights and contemporary human rights). The explanation anticipates, however, that particular kinds of human rights will have additional features. Starting with this general concept does not commit us to treating all kinds of human rights in a single unified theory (see Buchanan 2013 for an argument that we should not attempt to theorize together universal moral rights and international legal human rights).

Human rights are rights . Lest we miss the obvious, human rights are rights (see Cruft 2012 and the entry on rights ). Rights focus on a freedom, protection, status, immunity, or benefit for the rightholders. Most human rights are claim rights that impose duties or responsibilities on their addressees or dutybearers. The duties associated with human rights often require actions involving respect, protection, facilitation, and provision. Although human rights are usually mandatory in the sense of imposing duties on specified parties, some legal human rights seem to do little more than declare high-priority goals and assign responsibility for their progressive realization. One can argue, of course, that goalish rights are not real rights, but it may be better to recognize that they comprise a weak but useful notion of a right. (See Beitz 2009 for a defense of the view that not all human rights are rights in a strong sense. Also, see Feinberg 1973 for the idea of “manifesto rights” and Nickel 2013 for a discussion of “rightslike goals”.)

Human rights are plural and come in lists . If someone accepted that there are human rights but held that there is only one of them, this might make sense if she meant that there is one abstract underlying right that generates a list of specific rights (see Dworkin 2011 for a view of this sort). But if this person meant that there is just one specific right such as the right to peaceful assembly this would be a highly revisionary view. Some philosophers advocate very short lists of human rights but nevertheless accept plurality (see Ignatieff 2004).

Human rights are universal . All living humans—or perhaps we should say all living persons —have human rights. One does not have to be a particular kind of person or a member of some specific nation or religion to have human rights. Included in the idea of universality is some conception of independent existence. People have human rights independently of whether such rights are present in the practices, morality, or law of their country or culture. This idea of universality needs several qualifications, however. First, some rights, such as the right to vote, are held only by adult citizens or residents and apply only to voting in one’s own country. Second, some rights can be suspended. For example, the human right to freedom of movement may be suspended temporarily during a riot or a wildfire. And third, some human rights treaties focus not on the rights of everyone but rather on the rights of specific groups such as minorities, women, indigenous peoples, and children.

Human rights have high-priority . Maurice Cranston held that human rights are matters of “paramount importance” and their violation “a grave affront to justice” (Cranston 1967: 51, 52). If human rights were not very important norms they would not have the ability to compete with other powerful considerations such as national stability and security, individual and national self-determination, and national and global prosperity. High priority does not mean, however, that human rights are absolute. As James Griffin says, human rights should be understood as “resistant to trade-offs, but not too resistant” (Griffin 2008: 77). Further, there seems to be priority variation among human rights. For example, the right to life is generally thought to have greater importance than the right to privacy; when the two conflict the right to privacy will generally be outweighed.

Let’s now consider four other features or functions that might be added to these four.

Should human rights be defined as inalienable? Inalienability does not mean that rights are absolute or can never be overridden by other considerations. Rather it means that its holder cannot lose it temporarily or permanently by bad conduct or by voluntarily giving it up. It is doubtful that all human rights are inalienable in this sense. One who endorses both human rights and imprisonment as punishment for serious crimes must hold that people’s rights to freedom of movement can be forfeited temporarily or permanently by just convictions of serious crimes. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that human rights are very hard to lose. (For a stronger view of inalienability, see Donnelly 1989 [2020] and Meyers 1985.)

Should human rights be defined as minimal rights? A number of philosophers have proposed the view that human rights are minimal in the sense of not being too numerous (a few dozen rights rather than hundreds or thousands), and not too demanding (see Joshua Cohen 2004 and Ignatieff 2004). Their views suggest that human rights are—or should be—more concerned with avoiding the worst than with achieving the best. Henry Shue suggests that human rights concern the “lower limits on tolerable human conduct” rather than “great aspirations and exalted ideals” (Shue 1996: ix). When human rights are modest standards they leave most legal and policy matters open to democratic decision-making at the national and local levels. This allows human rights to have high priority, to accommodate a great deal of cultural and institutional variation among countries, and to leave open a large space for democratic decision-making at the national level. Still, there is no contradiction in the idea of an extremely expansive list of human rights and hence minimalism is not a defining feature of human rights (for criticism of the view that human rights are minimal standards see Brems 2009; Etinson forthcoming; and Raz 2010). Minimalism is best seen as a normative prescription for what international human rights should be. Moderate forms of minimalism have considerable appeal as recommendations, but not as part of the definition of human rights.

Should human rights be defined as always being or “mirroring” moral rights? Philosophers coming to human rights theory from moral philosophy sometimes assume that human rights must be, at bottom, moral rather than legal rights. There is no contradiction, however, in people saying that they believe in human rights, but only when they are legal rights at the national or international levels. As Louis Henkin observed,

Political forces have mooted the principal philosophical objections, bridging the chasm between natural and positive law by converting natural human rights into positive legal rights. (Henkin 1978: 19)

It has also been suggested that legal human rights can be justified without directly appealing to any corresponding moral human right (see Buchanan 2013).

Should human rights be defined in terms of serving some sort of political function? Instead of seeing human rights as grounded in some sort of independently existing moral reality, a theorist might see them as the norms of a highly useful political practice that humans have constructed. Such a view would see the idea of human rights as playing various political roles at the national and international levels and as serving thereby to protect urgent human and national interests. These political roles might include providing standards for international evaluations of how governments treat their people and specifying when use of economic sanctions or military intervention is permissible. This kind of view may be plausible for the very salient international human rights that have emerged in international law and politics in the last fifty years. But human rights can exist and function in contexts not involving international scrutiny and intervention such as a world with only one state. Imagine, for example, that a massive asteroid strike makes New Zealand the only remaining state in existence. Surely the idea of human rights along with many dimensions of human rights practice could continue in New Zealand, even though there would be no international relations, law, or politics (for an argument of this sort see Tasioulas 2012a). And if in the same scenario a few people were discovered to have survived in Iceland and were living without a government or state, New Zealanders would know that human rights governed how these people should be treated even though they were stateless. How deeply the idea of human rights must be rooted in international law and practice should not be settled by definitional fiat. We can allow, however, that the sorts of political functions that Rawls and Beitz describe are typically served by international human rights today.

2 The Existence and Grounds of Human Rights

The most obvious way in which human rights exist is as norms of national and international law. At the international level, human rights norms exist because of treaties that have turned them into international law. For example, the human right not to be held in slavery or servitude in Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights exists because these treaties establish it. At the national level, human rights norms exist because they have—through legislative enactment, judicial decision, or custom—become part of a country’s law. For example, the right against slavery exists in the United States because the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits slavery and servitude. When rights are embedded in international law, we are apt to speak of them as human rights; but when they are enacted in national law we more frequently describe them as civil or constitutional rights.

Although enactment in national and international law is one of the ways in which human rights exist, many have suggested that this is not the only way. If human rights exist only because of enactment, their availability is contingent on domestic and international political developments. Many people have looked for a way to support the idea that human rights have roots that are deeper and less subject to human decisions than legal enactment. One version of this idea is that people are born with rights, that human rights are somehow innate or inherent in human beings (see Morsink 2009). One way that a normative status could be inherent in humans is by being god-given. The American Declaration of Independence claims that people are “endowed by their Creator” with natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. On this view, god, the supreme lawmaker, enacted some basic human rights.

Rights plausibly attributed to divine decree must be very general and abstract (life, liberty, etc.) so that they can apply across thousands of years of human history, not just to recent centuries. But contemporary human rights are specific and many of them presuppose contemporary institutions (e.g., the right to a fair trial, the right to social security, and the right to education). Even if people are born with god-given natural rights, we need to explain how to get from those general and abstract rights to the specific rights found in contemporary declarations and treaties.

Attributing human rights to god’s commands may give them a secure status at the metaphysical level, but in a very diverse world it does not make them practically secure. Billions of people today do not believe in the god of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. If people do not believe in god, or in the sort of god that prescribes rights, then if you want to base human rights on theological beliefs you must persuade these people to accept a rights-supporting theological view. This is likely to be even harder than persuading them of human rights. Legal enactment at the national and international levels provides a far more secure status for practical purposes.

Human rights could also exist independently of legal enactment by being part of actual human moralities. All human groups seem to have moralities, that is, imperative norms of behavior backed by reasons and values. These moralities contain specific norms (for example, a prohibition on the intentional murder of innocent persons) and specific values (for example, valuing human life). One way in which human rights could exist apart from divine or human enactment is as norms accepted in almost all actual human moralities. If almost all human groups have moralities containing norms that prohibit murder, for example, these norms could constitute the human right to life.

This view is attractive but has serious difficulties. Although worldwide acceptance of human rights has increased in recent decades (see below section 4. Universal Human Rights in a World of Diverse Beliefs and Practices ), worldwide moral unanimity about human rights does not exist. Human rights declarations and treaties are intended to change existing norms, not just describe an existing moral consensus.

Yet another way of explaining the existence of human rights is to say that they exist most basically in true or justified ethical outlooks. On this account, to say that there is a human right against torture is mainly to assert that there are strong reasons for believing that it is always morally wrong to engage in torture and that protections should be provided against its practice. This approach would view the Universal Declaration as attempting to formulate a justified political morality: that is, as not merely trying to identify a preexisting moral consensus, but trying to create a consensus that could be supported by very plausible moral and practical reasons. This approach requires commitment to the objectivity of such reasons. It holds that just as there are reliable ways of finding out how the physical world works, or what makes buildings sturdy and durable, there are reliable ways of finding out what individuals may justifiably demand of each other and of governments. Even if unanimity about human rights is currently lacking, rational agreement is available to humans if they will commit themselves to open-minded and serious moral and political inquiry. If moral reasons exist independently of human construction, they can—when combined with premises about current institutions, problems, and resources—generate moral norms different from those currently accepted or enacted. The Universal Declaration seems to proceed on exactly this assumption (see Morsink 2009).

One problem with this view is that an existence based on good reasons seems a rather thin form of existence for human rights. But perhaps we can view this thinness as a practical rather than a theoretical problem—that is, as something to be remedied by the formulation and enactment of legal norms. The best form of existence for human rights would combine robust legal existence with the sort of moral existence that comes from being supported by strong moral and practical reasons.

Justifications for human rights should identify plausible starting points for defending the key features of human rights and offer an account of the transition from those starting points to a list of specific rights (see Nickel 2007). Further, justifying international human rights is likely to require additional steps (see Buchanan 2013). These requirements make the construction of a good justification a daunting task.

Recent attempts to justify human rights offer a dizzying variety of grounds. These include prudential reasons; linkage arguments (Shue 1996); agency and autonomy (Gewirth 1996; Griffin 2008); basic needs (D. Miller 2012); capabilities and positive freedom (Gould 2004; Nussbaum 2000; and Sen 2004) dignity (Gilabert 2018b; Kateb 2011, Tasioulas 2015); and fairness, status equality, and equal respect (Dworkin 2011; Buchanan 2013).

There is a lot of overlap between these approaches, but also important differences that are likely to make them yield different results. For example, an approach framed in terms of agency and autonomy will be more strongly and directly supportive of fundamental freedoms than one framed in terms of basic human needs. Justifications can be based on just one of these types of reasons or be pluralistic and appeal to several. Seeing so much diversity in philosophical approaches to justification may be discouraging (although great disagreement in approaches is common in philosophy) but its good side is that it suggests that there are at least several plausible ways of justifying human rights.

Philosophical justifications for human rights differ in how much credibility they attribute to contemporary lists of human rights, such as the one found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Some take fidelity to contemporary human rights practice as nearly imperative while others prioritize particular normative frameworks even if they can only justify some of the rights in contemporary lists.

Attempting to discuss all of these approaches would be a task for a large book, not an encyclopedic entry. The discussion here is limited to two approaches: agency/autonomy and dignity.

2.2.1 Agency and Autonomy

Grounding human rights in human agency and autonomy has had strong advocates in recent decades (Griffin 2008; Gould 2004). An important forerunner in this area was Alan Gewirth. In Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Application (1982), Gewirth argued that human rights are indispensable conditions of a life as an agent who survives and acts. Abstractly described, the conditions of such a life are basic freedom and well-being. A prudent rational agent who must have freedom and well-being will assert a “prudential right claim” (1982: 31)to them. But, having demanded that others must respect her freedom and well-being, consistency requires her to recognize and respect the freedom and well-being of all other persons, too. She “logically must accept” (1982: 20) that other people as agents have equal rights to freedom and well-being. These two abstract rights work alone and together to generate a list of more determinate human rights of familiar sorts (Gewirth 1978, 1982, 1996). Gewirth’s argument generated a large critical literature (see Beyleveld 1991 and Boylan 1999).

A more recent attempt to base human rights on agency and autonomy is found in James Griffin’s book, On Human Rights (2008). Griffin does not share Gewirth’s goal of providing a logically inescapable argument for human rights, but his overall view shares key structural features with Gewirth’s. These include basing the justification on the unique value of agency and autonomy, postulating some abstract rights, and making place for a right to well-being within an agency-based approach.

In the current dispute between “moral” (or “orthodox”) and “political” conceptions of human rights, Griffin strongly sides with those who see human rights as fundamentally moral rights (on this debate see Liao & Etinson 2012). Their defining role, in Griffin’s view, is protecting people’s ability to form and pursue conceptions of a worthwhile life—a capacity that Griffin variously refers to as “autonomy”, “normative agency”, and “personhood”. This ability to form, revise, and pursue conceptions of a worthwhile life is taken to be of paramount value, the exclusive source of human dignity, and thereby the basis of human rights. Griffin holds that people value this capacity “especially highly, often more highly than even our happiness” (2008: 32 [§2.3])

“Practicalities” also shape human rights in Griffin’s view. He describes practicalities as “a second ground” (2008: 37–39 [§2.5]) of human rights. They prescribe making the boundaries of rights clear by avoiding “too many complicated bends” (2008: 37 [§2.5]), enlarging rights a little to give them safety margins, and consulting facts about human nature and the nature of society. Accordingly, the justifying generic function that Griffin assigns to human rights is protecting normative agency while taking account of practicalities.

Griffin thinks that he can explain the universality of human rights by recognizing that normative agency is a threshold concept—once one is above the threshold one has the same rights as everyone else. One’s degree of agency above the threshold does not matter. There are no “degrees of being a person” (2008: 67 [§3.5]) among competent adults. Treating agency in this way, however, is a normative policy, not just a fact about concepts. An alternative policy is possible, namely proportioning people’s rights to their level of normative agency. This is what we do with children; their rights grow as they develop greater agency and responsibility. To exclude proportional rights, and to explain the egalitarian dimensions of human rights, including their character as universal and equal rights to be enjoyed without discrimination, some additional ground pertaining to fairness and equality seems to be needed.

This last point raises the question of whether agency-based approaches in general can adequately account for the universality, equality, and anti-discriminatory character of human rights. The idea that human rights are to be respected and protected without discrimination seems to be most centrally a matter of fairness rather than one of agency, freedom, or welfare. Discrimination often harms and hinders its victims, but even when it doesn’t it is still deeply unfair. For example, human rights that explicitly refer to fair wages and equal pay for equal work (ICESCR Articles 3 and 7.i) seem to be much more about fairness than about agency, freedom, or welfare—particularly since human rights to a wage that ensures a decent standard of living are often mentioned separately (ICESCR Article 7.ii).

2.2.2 Dignity

Many human rights declarations and treaties invoke human dignity as the ground of human rights. In recent decades numerous books and articles have been published that advocate dignitarian approaches to justifying human rights (for example, Gilabert 2018b; Kateb 2014; McCrudden 2013 and the many essays therein; Tasioulas 2015; Waldron 2012 and 2015). There have also been many critics, including Den Hartogh 2014; Etinson 2020; Green 2010; Macklin 2003; Rosen 2012; and Sangiovanni 2017.

A well-worked out conception of human dignity is likely to have at least three parts. The first describes the nature of human dignity, specifying for example whether it is a kind of value, status, or virtue (see Rosen 2012). The second explains the grounds of human dignity—that is, why, or in virtue of which shared capacities or features we all have the sort of dignity described in the first step. Finally, and third, there is the question of human dignity’s practical requirements, or what is concretely involved in “respecting” it. (See the entry on dignity for a broader discussion.)

Human dignity is often understood as a special worth or status which all human beings share in contrast to other animals (e.g., Kateb 2011). We can call this the “Special Worth Thesis”. Attempts to provide good explanatory grounds for the Special Worth Thesis identify one or more valuable features that all human persons share and that non-human animals mostly do not possess or have at much lower levels. The valuable features identified will presumably once again need to be “threshold concepts”, so that people can vary in how much of the feature or capacity they have without thereby losing, lessening, or increasing their human dignity in comparison to other persons. Human dignity is, after all, supposed to be a strongly egalitarian idea. Plausible candidates for such grounds might include moral abilities (to understand and follow moral values and norms and to reason and act in terms of them); thought, imagination, and rationality; self-consciousness and reflective capacities; and the use of complicated language and technologies, among others.

One worry about the Special Worth Thesis is its self-glorifying character. In claiming special worth we humans seem to excuse our many faults—including a terrible capacity for evil, routinely evidenced in our behavior towards other humans and towards non-human animals (Rosen 2013). Another closely associated and increasingly prominent worry is that the Special Worth Thesis is speciesist, arbitrarily ranking the interests, status, and/or value of human beings above that/those of non-human animals (Kymlicka 2018; Meyer 2001). In the context of these reasonable concerns, it is worth noting that support for, or a belief in, human dignity need not be prejudicial towards non-human animals; one can affirm the dignity of homo sapiens while also affirming the equal dignity of other species and forms of life (Etinson 2020; Gilabert 2018b). The Special Worth Thesis is optional and only defended by some theorists.

What attitudes, actions, policies, and rights follow from the duty or reason to respect human dignity? And are human rights among them? The answer will at least in part depend on what we think human dignity is. If it is a kind of virtue shared or shareable by all persons then its practical requirements will include things like praising and/or admiring those who possess it, and perhaps developing or cultivating “dignitarian” dispositions in one’s own character. If human dignity is, by contrast, a kind of value or worth (as in Immanuel Kant’s famous understanding of dignity as a worth “beyond all price” Kant 1785/1996: 43), then it is something we have reason to protect, promote, preserve, cherish, restore and perhaps even maximize, if possible. The human right to life, and its material conditions, is an intuitive product of human dignity understood in this way. If, on the other hand, we think of human dignity as a kind of legal (Waldron 2012 and 2015), moral (Gilabert 2018b; Lee & George 2008), or social status (Etinson 2020; Killmister 2020), then duties of “respect” more naturally follow.

These options are not mutually exclusive. In principle, human dignity can refer to all of these things: value, status, and virtue. If human dignity yields human rights, however, this is going to depend on exactly how we understand its practical requirements in light of its nature and grounds. This practical elaboration is the workhorse of a conception of human dignity. It normally results in one or more general maxims or guidelines: e.g., not to humiliate or degrade, never to treat persons merely as a means, to treat others in justifiable ways, to avoid severe cruelty, to respect autonomy, etc. The prospect of grounding human rights in human dignity faces critical challenges at this juncture. As we saw in the preceding discussion of agency-based approaches, the more specific and singular one’s dignitarian maxim is, the less plausible it will be as an exhaustive ground for standard lists of human rights in all their variety. On the other hand, a pluralistic set of grounding maxims will make human dignity a better source of human rights, but it is unclear whether in doing so we are simply explaining its implicit content or bringing in other values and norms to fill in its indeterminate scope. This raises the possibility that values and norms such as promoting human welfare; agency/autonomy; and fairness partially constitute the idea of human dignity rather than being derived from it (see Macklin 2003).

3. Which Rights are Human Rights?

This section discusses the question of which rights belong on lists of human rights. The Universal Declaration’s list, which has been very influential, consists of six families:

Security rights that protect people against murder, torture, and genocide;
Due process rights that protect people against arbitrary and excessively harsh punishments and require fair and public trials for those accused of crimes;
Liberty rights that protect people’s fundamental freedoms in areas such as belief, expression, association, and movement;
Political rights that protect people’s liberty to participate in politics by assembling, protesting, voting, and serving in public office;
Equality rights that guarantee equal citizenship, equality before the law, and freedom from discrimination; and
Economic and social rights that require that governments to forbid slavery and forced labor, enforce safe working conditions, ensure to all the availability of work, education, health services, and a standard of living that is adequate.

A seventh category, minority and group rights, has been created by subsequent treaties. These rights protect women, racial and ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, children, migrant workers, and the disabled. This list of human rights seems normatively diverse: the issues addressed cover include security, liberty, fairness, equality before the law, access to work and good working conditions, unduly cruel treatment, and political participation.

In spite of the ample list above, not every question of social justice or wise governance is a human rights issue. For example, a country could have too many lawyers or inadequate provision for graduate-level education without violating any human rights. Deciding which norms should be counted as human rights is a matter of considerable difficulty. And there is continuing pressure to expand lists of human rights to include new areas. Many political movements would like to see their main concerns categorized as matters of human rights, since this would publicize, promote, and legitimize their concerns at the international level. A possible result of this is “human rights inflation”, the devaluation of human rights caused by producing too much bad human rights currency (see Cranston 1973; Orend 2002; Wellman 1995; Griffin 2008).

One way to avoid rights inflation is to follow Cranston in insisting that human rights only deal with extremely important goods, protections, and freedoms. A supplementary approach is to impose several justificatory tests for specific human rights. For example, it could be required that a proposed human right not only protect some very important good but also respond to one or more common and serious threats to that good (Dershowitz 2004; Donnelly 1989 [2003]; Shue 1996; Talbott 2005), impose burdens on the addressees that are justifiable and no larger than necessary, and be feasible in most of the world’s countries (on feasibility see Gheaus 2022; Gilabert 2009; Nickel 2007; and Richards 2023). This approach restrains rights inflation with several tests, not just one master test.

In deciding which norms should be considered human rights it is possible to make either too little or too much of international documents such as the Universal Declaration and the European Convention. One makes too little of them by proceeding as if drawing up a list of important rights were a new question, never before addressed, and as if there were no practical wisdom to be found in the choices of rights that went into the historic documents. And one makes too much of them by presuming that those documents tell us everything we need to know about human rights. This approach involves a kind of fundamentalism: it holds that when a right is on the official lists of human rights that settles its status as a human right (“If it’s in the book that’s all I need to know”.) But the process of identifying human rights in the United Nations and elsewhere was a political process with plenty of imperfections. There is little reason to take international diplomats as the most authoritative guides to which human rights there are. Further, even if a treaty’s ratification by most countries can settle the question of whether a certain right is a human right within international law, such a treaty cannot settle its weight. The treaty may suggest that the right is supported by weighty considerations, but it cannot make this so. If an international treaty enacted a right to visit national parks without charge as a human right, the ratification of that treaty would make free access to national parks a human right within international law, but it may well fail to persuade us that national park access is important enough to be a genuine human right.

The least controversial family of human rights is civil and political rights. These rights are familiar from historic bills of rights such as the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) and the U.S. Bill of Rights (1791, with subsequent amendments). Contemporary sources include the first 21 Articles of the Universal Declaration , and treaties such as the European Convention , the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , the American Convention on Human Rights , and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights . Some representative formulations follow:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s choice. ( American Convention on Human Rights , Article 13.1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. ( European Convention , Article 11) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. (ICCPR Article 17)

Most civil and political rights are not absolute—they can sometimes be overridden by other considerations. For example, the right to freedom of movement can be restricted by public and private property rights, by restraining orders related to domestic violence, and by legal punishments. Further, after a disaster such as a hurricane or earthquake free movement is often appropriately suspended to keep out the curious, permit access of emergency vehicles and equipment, and prevent looting. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights permits most rights to be suspended during times “of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” (ICCPR Article 4). But it excludes some rights from suspension including the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the prohibition of slavery, the prohibition of ex post facto criminal laws, and freedom of thought and religion.

The Universal Declaration included economic and social rights (“ESRs”) that address matters such as education, food, health services, and employment. Their inclusion has been the source of much controversy (see Beetham 1995). The European Convention did not include them (although it was later amended to include the right to education). Instead ESRs were put into a separate treaty, the European Social Charter . When the United Nations began the process of putting the rights of the Universal Declaration into international law, it followed the same pattern by placing ESRs in a treaty separate from the one dealing with civil and political rights. This treaty, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966), treated these standards as rights—albeit rights to be progressively realized.

The ICESCR includes rights to: freedom from slavery and forced labor; adequate income or services to cover food, water, clothing, and shelter; basic health conditions and services; free public education; freedom to work, choose one's occupation, and have adequate opportunities for remunerative employment; fair pay and safe conditions of work; social security; equality for women in the workplace, including equal pay for equal work; freedom to form trade unions and to strike; special protections for mothers and children; adequate rest and leisure; and nondiscrimination in respecting, protecting, and fulfilling these rights. In terms of underlying values and norms, some of these rights are welfare-oriented, others are fairness-oriented, and still others are freedom-oriented (Nickel 2022b).

Article 2.1 of the ICESCR sets out what each of the parties commits itself to do about this list, namely to

take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation…to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant.

In contrast, the Civil and Political Covenant commits its signatories to immediate compliance, to

respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory the rights recognized in the present Covenant. (ICCPR Article 2.1)

The contrast between these two levels of commitment has led some people to suspect that ESRs are really just valuable goals. For many countries, noncompliance due to inability would have been certain if these standards had been treated as immediately binding.

ESRs have often been defended with linkage arguments which claim that ESRs provide indispensable support to the realization of civil and political rights. This approach was first developed philosophically by Henry Shue. He argued that security and subsistence are so indispensable to the full realization of other rights that anyone who endorses the realization of any other right must also endorse ESRs (Shue 1980; for analysis and critical assessments of linkage arguments see Nickel 2007, 2016, and 2022a).

Do ESRs protect sufficiently important human interests? Maurice Cranston opposed ESRs by suggesting that they are mainly concerned with matters such as holidays with pay which are not of deep and universal human interest (Cranston 1967, 1973; treatments of objections to ESRs include Beetham 1995; Howard 1983; and Nickel 2007). It is far from the case, however, that most ESRs pertain only to superficial interests. Consider two examples: the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to free public education. The former requires governments to work hard at remedying widespread and serious evils such as severe poverty, starvation and malnutrition, and ignorance. The importance of food and other basic material conditions of life is easy to show. These goods are essential to people’s ability to live, function, and flourish. Without adequate access to these goods, interests in life, health, and liberty are endangered and serious illness and death are probable. The unavailability of educational opportunities typically limits (both absolutely and comparatively) people’s abilities to participate fully and effectively in the political and economic life of their county

Are ESRs too burdensome? Another objection to ESRs is that they are too burdensome on their dutybearers. It is very expensive to guarantee everyone basic education and minimal material conditions. Frequently the claim that ESRs are too burdensome suggests that ESRs are substantially more burdensome or expensive than liberty rights. Suppose, however, that we use as a basis of comparison liberty rights such as freedom of communication, association, and movement. These rights require both respect and protection from governments. And people cannot be adequately protected in their enjoyment of liberties such as these unless they also have security and due process rights. The costs of liberty, as it were, include the costs of law and criminal justice. Once we see this, liberty rights start to look a lot more costly.

Further, we need not generally think of ESRs as simply giving everyone a free supply of the goods they protect. Guarantees of things like food and housing may be intolerably expensive and undermine productivity if everyone simply receives a free supply. A viable system of ESRs can require most people to provide these goods for themselves and their families through work, as long as they are given the necessary opportunities, education, and infrastructure. Government-implemented ESRs provide guarantees of availability (or “secure access”), but under many conditions governments should only have to supply the requisite goods in a small fraction of cases.

Countries that do not accept and implement ESRs must still somehow bear the costs of providing for the needy since these countries are unlikely to find it tolerable to allow sizable parts of the population to starve and be homeless. If government does not supply food, clothing, and shelter to those unable to provide for themselves, then families, friends, and communities will have to shoulder this burden. It is only in the last hundred or so years that government-sponsored ESRs have taken over a substantial part of the burden of providing for the needy. The taxes associated with ESRs are partial replacements for other burdensome duties, namely the duties of families and communities to provide adequate care for the unemployed, sick, disabled, and aged. Deciding whether to implement ESRs is not a matter of deciding whether to bear such burdens, but rather of deciding whether to continue with total reliance on systems of informal provision that distribute assistance in a very spotty way and whose costs fall very unevenly on families, friends, and communities.

Are ESRs feasible worldwide? Another objection to ESRs alleges that they are not feasible in many countries (on feasibility see Gheaus 2013, Gilabert 2009, and Nickel 2007). It is very expensive to provide guarantees of subsistence, measures to protect and restore people’s health, and education. Many governments will be unable to provide these guarantees while meeting other important responsibilities. Rights are not magical sources of supply (Holmes & Sunstein 1999). As we saw earlier, the ESR Covenant dealt with the issue of feasibility by calling for progressive implementation, that is, implementation as financial and other resources permit. Does this view of implementation turn ESRs into high-priority goals? And if so, is that a bad thing?

Standards that outrun the abilities of many of their addressees are good candidates for treatment as goals. Viewing them as largely aspirational rather than as imposing immediate duties avoids problems of inability-based noncompliance. One may worry, however, that this is too much of a demotion for ESRs because goals seem much weaker than rights (see O’Neill 2005 and Tomalty 2014). But goals can be formulated in ways that make them more like rights. They can be assigned addressees (the parties who are to pursue the goal), beneficiaries, scopes that define the objective to be pursued, and a high level of priority (see Langford, Sumner, & Yamin 2013 and Nickel 2013; see also OHCHR and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN ). Strong reasons for the importance of these goals can be provided. And supervisory bodies can monitor levels of progress and pressure low-performing addressees to attend to and work on realizing their goals.

Treating very demanding rights as goals has some advantages. Goals coexist easily with low levels of ability to achieve them. And goals are flexible: addressees with different levels of ability can choose ways of pursuing the goals that suit their circumstances and means. Because of these attractions it may be worth exploring sophisticated ways to transform very demanding human rights into goals. The transformation may be full or partial. It is possible to create right-goal mixtures that contain some mandatory elements (see Brems 2009). A right-goal mixture might include some rights-like goals, some mandatory steps to be taken immediately, and duties to realize the rights-like goals as quickly as possible.

Do ESRs yield a sufficient commitment to equality? Objections to ESRs as human rights have come from both the political right and the political left. A common objection from the left, including liberal egalitarians and socialists, is that ESRs as enumerated in human rights documents and treaties provide too weak of a commitment to material equality (Gilabert 2018a and Moyn 2018). Realizing ESRs requires governments to ensure everyone an adequate minimum of resources in some key areas but does not require strong commitments to equality of opportunity, redistributive taxation, or wealth ceilings (see the entries on equality , distributive justice , and liberal feminism ).

The egalitarian objection cannot be that human rights documents and treaties show no concern for people living in poverty and misery. One of the main purposes of including ESRs in human rights documents and treaties was to promote serious efforts to combat poverty, lack of education, and unhealthy living conditions in countries all around the world (see also Langford, Sumner, & Yamin 2013 on the UN Millennium Development Goals). The objection also cannot be that human rights facilitated the hollowing out of systems of welfare rights in many developed countries that occurred after 1980 (for criticism of this view see Song 2019). Those cuts in welfare programs were often in violation of the requirements of realizing ESRs.

Perhaps it should be conceded that human rights documents and treaties have not said enough about positive measures to promote equal opportunity in education and work. A positive right to equal opportunity, like the one Rawls proposed, would require countries to take serious measures to reduce disparities between the opportunities effectively available to children of high-income and low-income parents (see Rawls 1971 and the entry on equality of opportunity ).

A strongly egalitarian political program is probably best pursued partially within but mostly beyond the human rights framework. One reason for this is that the human rights movement will have better prospects for ongoing acceptance and support if it has widespread political acceptance. To achieve this, the rights it endorses must appeal to people with a variety of political views, ranging from center-left to center-right. Support from the broad political center is less likely to emerge and survive if the human rights platform is perceived as mostly a leftist program.

Equality of rights for historically disadvantaged or subordinated groups is a longstanding concern of the human rights movement. Human rights documents repeatedly emphasize that all people, including women and members of minority ethnic and religious groups, have equal human rights and should be able to enjoy them without discrimination. The right to freedom from discrimination figures prominently in the Universal Declaration and subsequent treaties. The Civil and Political Covenant, for example, commits participating states to respect and protect their people’s rights without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or social status (ICCPR Article 2.1). On minority and group rights see Kymlicka 1995.

A number of standard civil and political rights are especially important to ethnic and religious minorities, including rights to freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom from discrimination. Human rights documents also include rights that refer to minorities explicitly and give them special protections. For example, the Civil and Political Covenant in Article 27 says that persons belonging to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities

shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. (ICCPR Article 27)

Feminists have often protested that standard lists of human rights do not sufficiently take into account the unique risks faced by women. For example, issues like domestic violence, reproductive choice, and the trafficking of women and girls for sex work did not have a prominent place in early human rights documents and treaties. Lists of human rights have had to be expanded “to include the degradation and violation of women” (Bunch 2006; see also Okin 1998). Violations of women’s human rights often occur in the “private” sphere, i.e., in the home at the hands of other family members. This suggests that governments cannot be seen as the only addressees of human rights and that the right to privacy of home and family needs qualification to allow police to protect women within the home.

The issue of how formulations of human rights should respond to variations in the sorts of risks and dangers that different people face is difficult and arises not just in relation to gender but also in relation to age, race, sexual orientation, profession, political affiliation, religion, and personal interests. Due process rights, for example, are much more useful to young people (and particularly young men) than they are to older people since the latter are far less likely to run afoul of the criminal law.

Since 1964 the United Nations has mainly dealt with the rights of women and minorities through specialized treaties such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2007). See also the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007). Specialized treaties allow international norms to address unique problems of particular groups such as assistance and care during pregnancy and childbearing in the case of women, custody issues in the case of children, and the loss of historic territories by indigenous peoples.

Minority groups are often targets of violence. Human rights norms call upon governments to refrain from such violence and to provide protections against it. This work is partly done by the right to life, which is a standard individual right. It is also done by the right against genocide which protects groups from attempts to destroy or decimate them. The Genocide Convention was one of the first human rights treaties after World War II. The right against genocide is clearly a group right. It is held by both individuals and groups and provides protection to groups as groups. It is largely negative in the sense that it requires governments and other agencies to refrain from destroying groups; but it also requires that legal and other protections against genocide be created at the national level.

As a group right, can the right against genocide be a human right? More generally, can a group right fit the general idea of human rights as rights of individual persons proposed earlier? Perhaps it can if we broaden our conception of who can hold human rights to include important groups that people form and cherish (see the entry on group rights ). This can be made more palatable, perhaps, by recognizing that the beneficiaries of the right against genocide are individual humans who enjoy greater security against attempts to destroy the group to which they belong (Kymlicka 1989).

Although contemporary lists of human rights are already long, there are doubtless norms that should be counted as human rights but are not generally recognized as such. After all, there are lots of areas in which people’s basic welfare, dignity, and fundamental interests are threatened by the actions and omissions of individuals and governments. New technologies create new problems and require us to rethink old solutions. And new political movements emerge and create demands for their goals and norms as human rights.

Prominent recent proposals of new human rights include Kimberley Brownlee’s advocacy of a right against social deprivation that would address severe unwanted loneliness (Brownlee 2020 and 2022), the proposal of a universal right to internet access that was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2016 (UN Resolution 32/13), and the similar endorsement in 2022 of a right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment (UN Resolution 76/300; see also the entry on environmental ethics ).

The right to a healthy environment provides a good example of how new human rights can slowly emerge. After a right of this sort was added to many national bills of rights, environmental NGOs began to promote it within international organizations. In 2000 the European Union’s Bill of Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union , included in Article 37 an environmental protection norm:

A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development.

In 2012 the UN Human Rights Council created a Special Rapporteur (independent expert) on the Environment, eventually approved the right to “a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment”, and forwarded it to the General Assembly—where 80 percent of the world’s countries voted for it (UN Resolution 76/300). Human rights approaches to climate change have also been developed in recent decades (see Bodansky 2009; Caney 2009; Gardiner 2013; and Vanderheiden 2008).

Worries about the proliferation of human rights have not disappeared. Lawyers and international organizations have proposed standards to limit the introduction of new human rights (for example, Alston 1984 and the UN General Assembly 1986). And human rights treaty-making has slowed. After the approval of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1999, the only human rights treaty approved by the UN is the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In 2007 a declaration (not a treaty) on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was approved by the General Assembly. Prominent philosophers have also advocated smaller lists of human rights (see, for example, Cranston 1967 and 1973; Rawls 1999; and Griffin 2008). Griffin also opposed squeezing new content into existing human rights—which he described as the “ballooning” of rights.

Two familiar philosophical worries about human rights are that they are based on beliefs and attitudes that are culturally relative and that their creation and advocacy involves ethnocentrism. Human rights prescribe universal standards in areas such as security, law enforcement, equality, political participation, and education. The peoples and countries of planet Earth are, however, enormously varied in their practices, traditions, religions, and levels of economic and political development. Putting these two propositions together may be enough to justify the worry that universal human rights do not sufficiently accommodate the diversity of Earth’s peoples. A theoretical expression of this worry is “relativism”, the idea that ethical, political, and legal standards are only true or justified relative to the traditions, beliefs, and conditions of a particular country, culture or region (see the entry on moral relativism ).

During the drafting in 1947 of the Universal Declaration, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association (“AAA”) warned of the danger that the Declaration would be “a statement of rights conceived only in terms of the values prevalent in Western Europe and America”. A central concern of the AAA Board in the period right after World War II was to condemn intolerant colonialist attitudes of the day and to advocate cultural and political self-determination. But the Board also made the stronger assertion that “standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive” and thus “what is held to be a human right in one society may be regarded as anti-social by another people” (AAA 1947).

Such assertions have continued to fuel accusations that human rights are instruments of ethnocentrism, arrogance, and cultural imperialism (Renteln 1990). Ethnocentrism is the assumption, usually unconscious, that “one’s own group is the center of everything” and that its beliefs, practices, and norms provide the standards by which other groups are “scaled and rated” (Sumner 1906; see also Etinson 2018a who argues that ethnocentrism is best understood as a kind of cultural bias rather than a belief in cultural superiority). Ethnocentrism can lead to arrogance and intolerance in dealings with other countries, ethical systems, and religions. Finally, cultural imperialism occurs when the economically, technologically, and militarily strongest countries impose their beliefs, values, and institutions on the rest of the world (for a useful discussion of several power-related concerns about human rights, see Gilabert 2018a).

As in the AAA Board’s case, relativists often combine these charges with a prescription, namely that tolerance of varied practices and traditions ought to be instilled and practiced through measures that include extended learning about other cultures. The idea that relativism and exposure to other cultures promote tolerance may be correct from a psychological perspective. People who are sensitive to differences in beliefs, practices, and traditions, and who are suspicious of the grounds for extending norms across borders, may be more inclined to be tolerant of other countries and peoples than those who believe in an objective universal morality. Still, philosophers have been generally critical of attempts to argue from relativism to a prescription of tolerance (see Williams 1972 [1993] and Talbott 2005). If the culture and religion of one country has long fostered intolerant attitudes and practices, and if its citizens and officials act intolerantly towards people from other countries, they are simply following their own traditions and cultural norms. Accordingly, a relativist from a tolerant country will be hard-pressed to find a basis for criticizing the citizens and officials of the intolerant country. To do so the relativist will have to endorse a transcultural principle of tolerance and to advocate as an outsider cultural change in the direction of greater tolerance. Because of this, relativists who are deeply committed to tolerance may find themselves attracted to a qualified commitment to human rights.

Perhaps for these reasons, relativism is not the stance of most anthropologists today. Currently the AAA has a central Committee whose objectives include promoting, protecting, and developing an anthropological perspective on human rights. While still emphasizing the importance of cultural differences, anthropologists now often support the protection of vulnerable cultures, non-discrimination, and the rights and land claims of indigenous peoples (see the AAA’s 2020 Statement on Anthropology and Human Rights).

The conflict between relativists and human rights advocates may be partially based on differences in their underlying philosophical beliefs, particularly in metaethics. Relativists are often subjectivists or noncognitivists and think of morality as entirely socially constructed and transmitted. In contrast, philosophically-inclined human rights advocates are more likely to adhere to or presuppose cognitivism, moral realism, and intuitionism.

As the AAA’s 1947 Statement shows, the accommodation of diversity has been a concern facing the contemporary human rights regime since its inception. As part of a 1946–47 UNESCO inquiry into the theoretical basis of human rights, the French philosopher, Jacques Maritain, famously suggested that universal agreement on human rights was possible so long as questions of underlying justification were ignored: “Yes… we agree about the rights but on condition no one asks us why” (Maritain 1949: 9). The International Bill of Human Rights appears to violate this embargo when it asserts, in the Preamble to both major Covenants, that “these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”. Nonetheless, Maritain’s idea has strong echoes in contemporary philosophical work (see Taylor 1999), including John Rawls’ idea that human rights can have a minimal public or “political” justification which may be accepted from various “comprehensive” religious, moral, and philosophical points of view (Rawls 1999; Beitz 2009). Indeed, some have argued that international human rights law’s justificatory appeal to human dignity should be understood in precisely this ecumenical way (McCrudden 2008).

Other important methods of accommodating diversity include the abstract formulation of human rights norms, which allows for diverse, context-sensitive modes of social and institutional implementation (see Etinson 2013). As discussed in section 1 , a modest understanding of the aims of human rights would leave more room for democratic decision-making at the domestic level, and for cultural and political variation across countries (see also the European Court of Human Rights’ notion of a “margin of appreciation”, discussed in Letsas 2006). And it is worth noting that, within limits, state parties to international human rights treaties are entitled to submit “reservations” that alter the legal effect of treaty provisions as they pertain to that state. This provides a further avenue for legal variation and accommodation.

In the 1990s, Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew and others argued that international human rights as found in United Nations declarations and treaties were insensitive to distinctive “Asian values”, such as prizing families and community (in contrast to strong individualism); putting social harmony over personal freedom; respect for political leaders and institutions; and emphasizing responsibility, hard work, and thriftiness as means of social progress (on the Asian Values debate see Bauer & Bell [eds] 1999; Bell 2000; and Sen 1997). Proponents of the Asian values idea did not wish to abolish all human rights; they rather wanted to deemphasize some families of human rights, particularly the fundamental freedoms and rights of democratic participation (and in some cases the rights of women). They also wanted Western governments and NGOs to stop criticizing them for human rights violations in these areas.

At the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, countries including Singapore, Malaysia, China, and Iran advocated accommodations within human rights practice for cultural and economic differences. Western representatives tended to view the position of these countries as excuses for repression and authoritarianism. The Conference responded by approving the Vienna Declaration . It included in Article 5 the assertion that countries should not pick and choose among human rights:

All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

In recent decades widespread acceptance of human rights has occurred in most parts of the world. Three quarters of the world’s countries have ratified the major human rights treaties, and many countries in Africa, the Americas, and Europe participate in regional human rights regimes that have international courts (see the Georgetown University Human Rights Law Research Guide in the Other Internet Resources below). Ratification does not, of course, guarantee compliance. Further, all of the world’s countries now use similar political institutions (law, courts, legislatures, executives, militaries, bureaucracies, police, prisons, taxation, and public schools) and these institutions carry with them characteristic problems and abuses (Donnelly 1989 [2020]). Finally, globalization has diminished the differences among peoples. Today’s world is not the one that early anthropologists and missionaries found. National and cultural boundaries are breached not just by international trade but also by millions of travelers and migrants, electronic communications, international law covering many areas, and the efforts of international governmental and non-governmental organizations. International influences and organizations are everywhere and countries borrow freely and regularly from each other’s inventions and practices.

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Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR), adopted 7 December 2007, came into force 1 December 2009. [ Fundamental Rights available online ]
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), proclaimed 10 December 1948. [ UDHR available online ]
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted 21 December 1965. [ available online ]
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted 16 December 1966. ICCPR available online ]
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted 16 December 1966. [ ICESCR available online ]
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), adopted 1979. [ CEDAW available online ]
Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted 20 November 1989. [ CRC available online ]
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), adopted 13 December 2006, opened for signing 2007. [ CRPD available online ]
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP), adopted 13 September 2007. [ DRIP available online ]
A/RES/76/300 The human right to a clean, healthy and substainable environment, adopted 28 July 2022. [ A/RES/76/300 available online (pdf) ]
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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

The International (UN) Human Rights System , Georgetown Law Library Human Rights Law Research Guide
International Human Rights Law , United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Human Rights entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .

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What helps protect human rights: human rights theory and evidence.

Jessica Anderson Jessica Anderson Department of Political Science, University of Missouri
and Amanda Murdie Amanda Murdie Department of International Affairs, University of Georgia
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.513
Published online: 24 May 2017

Empirical international relations (IR) theory developed three generalized statements regarding why human rights abuses occur. First, human rights abuses are a way for an unrestrained state, especially the executive branch and its agents, to try to control individuals and hold on to power. Second, respect for human rights is an international norm, and international socialization and pressure about this norm can, in certain situations, affect behavior. Third, the codification of human rights norms into international treaties may influence behavior but, similar to our understanding of the effect of other treaties on state behavior, states only bind themselves weakly, and certain conditions are necessary for treaties to affect human rights.

Human rights
norm life cycle
human rights treaties
international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs)
empirical international relations theory

Introduction

Amnesty International, a leading organization specializing in advocacy to end human rights abuses, recently released accounts of horrendous abuses to political prisoners in Vietnam (Amnesty International, 2016 ). Peaceful demonstrators and outspoken minorities had been imprisoned, tortured, and “disappeared” for their beliefs and the supposed threat that they posed to the regime. Even though Vietnam ratified the United Nation’s Convention Against Torture (CAT) in 2015 , dozens of individuals are still imprisoned and tortured there for the peaceful expression of their political beliefs.

Since the end of World War II, much attention has been paid to stopping abuses like those that occurred in Vietnam. Global and regional human rights treaties have been ratified, and concerns about human rights abuses have sparked many foreign policy actions. A vibrant and connected network of human rights advocates and organizations has fought tirelessly for the abused and have expanded our understanding of what human rights means and what protections should be expected. Despite all of this, most countries in the world still have evidence of abuses within their borders.

This article examines why human rights abuse occurs and what can be done to help protect human rights. In the last 30 years, there has been an explosion of human rights–related scholarship in leading international relations (IR) journals (Murdie, 2015 ). This literature has drawn on many theoretical traditions and paradigms and has enriched both the general IR literature and more human rights–specific scholarship.

We do not attempt to review all the international relations literature on human rights abuses; other scholars have recently produced very thorough reviews of the extant literature (Davenport, 2007 ; Goodman, Jinks, & Woods, 2012 ; Hafner-Burton & Ron, 2009 ; Hafner-Burton, 2012 , 2014 Landman, 2005 ; Morgan, 2009 ; ). Instead, this article attempts to review some of the human rights empirical literature in international relations and situate this literature into a set of general theoretical statements about why human rights abuses occur. We hope that this exercise will help in improving and expanding empirical IR theory related to this topic.

In general, IR scholars have made three large-scale theoretical statements:

Human rights abuses are a way for an unrestrained state, especially the executive branch and its agents, to try to control individuals and hold on to power.

Respect for human rights is an international norm, and international socialization and pressure about this norm can affect behavior in certain situations.

The codification of human rights norms into international treaties may influence behavior but, similar to our understanding of the effect of other treaties on state behavior, states only bind themselves weakly, and certain conditions are necessary for treaties to affect human rights.

After defining human rights in more detail, we outline the empirical literature that supports these theoretical statements. To note, however, human rights research is not confined to IR or political science; rather, it is also examined through the fields of sociology, anthropology, economics, history, psychology, and law (Morgan, 2009 ). Thus, the study of human rights is an interdisciplinary study in a way that most fields within international relations are not. Within political science, human rights research reaches across the boundary between international relations and comparative politics. Full understanding of human rights situations requires understanding the domestic factors and characteristics of bureaucracies more commonly discussed in research within the comparative politics subfield. At the same time, attempts to limit or prevent human rights often involve the international community in the drafting of treaties, the foreign policy between states, and the flow of global norms about human rights practices. Thus, understanding why human rights abuses occur requires understanding the elements of both comparative politics and international relations. We see this as an advantage in the study of human rights. IR scholars can utilize theories from comparative politics and disciplines outside of political science to create a more complete understanding of human rights situations and produce research that speaks to a broad audience of scholars and individuals outside the academic world.

What Are Human Rights?

Much of our current understanding of human rights is based on international law, especially on the conception of rights included within the United Nation’s nonbinding Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted in 1948 . This document creates a list of what is now commonly accepted as individual rights, including political rights; civil rights; social, economic, and cultural rights; and more broadly conceptualized rights of development and freedom from poverty, which also fit under the umbrella term of human rights (Landman, 2006 ).

The Emphasis on Physical Integrity Rights

The UDHR specifies the rights of individuals in 30 separate articles, addressing a range of rights from the “right to life, liberty, and security of person” (art. 3) to “the right to rest and leisure” (art. 23). Our collective understanding of which rights are included as human rights has expanded over time. Recently, advocacy related to human rights has included rights related to access to the Internet and sexual minority rights [i.e., lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning (LGBTQ) rights], among others.

Although the concept of human rights includes a wide range of rights, much of the research on human rights within IR focuses on a very narrow set of rights, often referred to as physical integrity or bodily integrity rights . In addition, most of the focus within international relations has focused specifically on abuses of these rights on citizens of a specific state by governmental actors from this state. Abuses by fellow citizens or nonstate actors, like corporations or rebel movements, have often been ignored. 1 Similarly, abuses by government actors beyond their own state borders have also received little attention in the IR scholarship, despite horrific accounts of abuses by military interveners and peacekeepers, among others.

Physical integrity rights are conceptualized as “freedom from” rights, and they typically include being free from extrajudicial killing, the use of torture, political imprisonment, and disappearance. To respect these rights, governments need only restrain from violating them; hence, they are sometimes called negative rights . On the other hand, in order to respect positive rights , like the right to education or the right to health, the state must provide resources or services. The study of these positive rights has primarily been done by political economists, often without a human rights frame. It is worth noting, however, that there is a growing number of IR studies on rights beyond physical integrity rights, like women’s rights and labor rights (e.g., Detraz & Peksen, 2016 ; Peksen & Blanton, 2017 ). This expansion of the types of rights examined by IR scholars holds great promise for a more encompassing theory of human rights practices and for additional inquiry into why some states may perform well on certain rights, but not on others.

Many human rights scholars rely on a small number of quantitative measures to capture physical integrity rights practices. One of the most prominent is the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index (Cingranelli, Richards, & Clay, 2014 ). This composite measure captures observable state practices regarding the use of torture, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and political imprisonment during a given year (Cingranelli & Richards, 2010 ). The Political Terror Scale (PTS) is a similar measure that is widely used (Wood & Gibney, 2010 ). Both of these measures are created by using information from yearly reports released by the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International. The use of such measures makes it much easier to conduct empirical analyses across a global sample of states for a long period of time. However, it is important to remember that these measures capture only a small range of human rights practices. Although this is a limitation, current research has allowed scholars to understand many of the reasons why states abuse these physical integrity rights and propose solutions to prevent abuses. Similarly, these measures may not account for the changing standard of accountability over time, leading scholars to conclude (erroneously) that there have been no improvements in state practices over time (Fariss, 2014 ). 2

Human Rights Abuses and the State

One of the most common assumptions in international relations and comparative politics concerns the desire of a regime leader to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003 ; Chiozza & Goemans, 2004 ). A leader makes calculated decisions to remain in power or to ensure that his or her political party does. Human rights abuses are one “tool” that leaders can use to try to hold on to political power. If a regime is threatened, a leader can use his or her control of security forces to violate the human rights of citizens within the state. Abuses are designed to increase the cost that a possible dissident would face for violently (or even nonviolently) challenging the leader, hopefully cutting off dissent before it occurs (Ritter & Conrad, 2016 ). Davenport ( 2007 , p. 7) calls this the “law of coercive responsiveness.” In general, the law leads us to expect to see repression increase as opposition to the regime leadership increases within a state, and to expect to see repression increase as the regime faces threats to its power from abroad, especially in cases involving international war. States engaged in international war must respond to these external threats and any internal threats at the same time, constraining the resources available to the state. This means that even states that otherwise may have granted concessions to citizens will be more likely to respond to their demands with repression while engaged in international conflict due to the need to commit resources to facing international foes (Rasler, 1986 ). In general, this logic explains why there is such a strong empirical link between international and civil war and repression; when a state is threatened militarily, a government will respond with repression in order to control the population, try to extract information from that population that could help it remain in power, or both (Poe & Tate, 1994 ).

Given that the law of coercive responsiveness would lead us to expect an increase in repression whenever a leader is threatened, perhaps the question is not so much why states abuse human rights as it is why some states abuse the human rights of their citizens more than other states. Abuses are a common response by a threatened leader who has the power to control security forces. It is with this thought in mind that we now turn to a variety of state characteristics that are associated with differences in human rights performance and reflect this underlying theoretical logic.

Regime Type

It has long been suggested that democratic regimes are associated with better human rights, and this suggestion has received a great deal of empirical support. There are a number of explanations for why democracies might have greater respect for human rights. First, democracies allow the peaceful turnover of power. The political institutions of a democratic government are composed of citizens, and they are approved by citizens through the process of voting. Elections provide citizens with a legitimate channel through which to remove leaders from power without resorting to political violence (Davenport, 1999 ). When leaders regularly face the possibility of being removed from power by their constituents, they are more beholden to their constituents’ wishes. This will force leaders to show greater respect for human rights because there is a regular risk of being removed from office if citizens are unhappy with their leadership and their use of repression.

However, not all democratic regimes are equal (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005 ). Simply holding an election does not necessarily make a state a democracy. If elections are not free and fair, then they fail to hold leaders accountable or to convey the grievances of the population to the regime’s leadership. Only when elections are free and fair with more than one choice do they force leaders to be accountable to their citizens and potentially limit human rights abuses. Further, there is much research questioning whether elections alone are enough to affect human rights practices (Cingranelli & Filippov, 2010 ; Davenport, 1997 ; Richards, 1999 ; ). Richards and Gelleny ( 2007 ), for example, find that national legislative elections improve human rights only in the year following the election. Presidential elections are associated with less respect for human rights, something that Richard and Gelleny ( 2007 , p. 520) claim is linked to the “rigidity and winner-take-all structure of many presidential systems.”

Elections are only one aspect of democracies that has been potentially linked to better human rights practices. Institutional constraints and channels of regularized communication also matter. Democracy is often conceptualized not only by free elections, but also by constraints on an executive’s power. As Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski ( 2012 ) show, an unconstrained leader may be more likely to use violence around an election. Judicial constraints have been found to limit the use of torture; although these same constraints may make leaders less likely to ratify the CAT (Powell & Staton, 2009 ). Conrad and Moore ( 2010 ), however, conclude that institutions that constrain executives, such as freedom of expression or institutional checks, may not be enough to stop torture when a regime is threatened. Recent work has highlighted how the creation of national human rights ombudsmen or institutional offices can constrain executives by providing a regularzed way for abuses to be publicized and adjudicated (Smith, 2006 ; Welch, 2017 ).

Democracies have more channels for communication and compromise between regime leaders and the opposition than do autocracies, meaning that there are usually more available alternatives to repression that would still limit the possibility of threat to the leadership (Henderson, 1991 ). Political opposition is theorized to develop through grievances from citizens who feel that they are receiving less than they expect and that the government is responsible for their plight (Gurr, 1968 ). In democracies, citizens have more institutionalized channels through which to get their grievances heard by the regime. Citizens in democracies are also much more likely to have their demands met, as leaders in democracies that do not address such grievances are unlikely to stay in office. Citizens in autocracies may demand greater participation in decision-making, greater freedom in criticizing leadership, or pressure for more transparent government, but these calls for reform are unlikely to be met, as that would require autocratic leaders to relinquish power. Further, autocracies draw their power from a very small group of political elites and must provide private goods to these elites in order to stay in power. Democratic leaders have a greater incentive to pursue policies that benefit large segments of society, as they need the political support of a much larger group (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 ). As demands are less likely to be met though concessions in autocracies, political opposition is more likely to be handled with repression (Davis & Ward, 1990 ).

When opposition threatens the power of autocratic leaders, who may not depend at all on winning the votes of members of the opposition, they will likely use repression in an attempt to silence this opposition; this was part of what Davenport ( 2007 , p. 7) calls the “law of coercive responsiveness.” However, as he continues, there is a “puzzle” (p. 8) about whether the abuse will actually limit dissent: even though leaders utilize repression to coerce political opposition into submission, these actions can paradoxically incite further opposition. This reveals an endogenous relationship between protest and repression that is found in many autocratic states. Political opposition feeds into higher degrees of repression, which increases political opposition, leading the cycle to repeat (Pierskalla, 2010 ; Rasler, 1996 ; Ritter, 2014 ; Thoms & Ron, 2007 ). Repression also increases the grievances formed by citizens, possibly causing them to engage in more violent forms of opposition. When repression against citizens is severe, it can lead to terrorism against the state and even full-fledged civil war (Bell, Cingranelli, Murdie, & Caglayan, 2013 ; Thoms & Ron, 2007 ). In response, the government will utilize more severe forms of repression in an attempt to quash the rebellion, continuing until either the opposition is completely eradicated or the government is forced from power.

Another argument for the empirical connection between democracy and better human rights performance centers on the norms and expectations of behavior in democratic regimes. Democratic regimes have strong norms of nonviolence; these norms could influence how leaders in democratic regimes use violence, both domestically and internationally (Hegre, 2001 ; Maoz & Russett, 1993 ; Risse-Kappen, 1995 ). Research also suggests that better human rights practices domestically may create norms of engagement that limit international conflict (Caprioli & Trumbore, 2003 , 2006 ; Peterson & Graham, 2011 ; Sobek, Abouharb, & Ingram, 2006 ; Tomz & Weeks, 2016 ).

Although there are many empirical theories about the relationship between democracy and human rights practices, extant research suggests a few important caveats. First, this relationship is not necessarily linear. Scholars have noted that complete autocracies—those that we would expect to exercise the most political repression—tend to exercise relatively little repression (Davenport & Armstrong, 2004 ; Fein, 1995 ). Fein ( 1995 , p. 170) argues that there is “more murder in the middle,” in that there is a U-shaped relationship between regime type and repression, suggesting that states that are neither strong democracies nor strong autocracies have the greatest likelihood to use repression. Davenport and Armstrong ( 2004 ) point out, however, that it is more of a threshold relationship, with only consolidated democracies limiting repression.

Second, just as not all democracies are equal in their human rights performance, there also are differences between authoritarian regimes. Vreeland ( 2008 ) finds that dictatorships with multiple political parties, indicative of shared power, are more likely to both commit torture and ratify the CAT. Vreeland ( 2008 ) argues that this is due to how shared power emboldens potential dissidents, creating opportunities for torture, but also likely leading to concessions like treaty ratification. Conrad ( 2011 ) finds, however, that effective judiciaries can constrain dictators in their use of torture.

Finally, it is important to acknowledge that democracy and human rights, especially the physical integrity rights most typically studied by IR scholars, are conceptually related. Hill ( 2016 ) argues that some definitions of democracy include freedom from repression as a key component, cautioning scholars to be careful about their definition of democracy and that this definition is conceptually distinct from physical integrity rights performance.

State Wealth

Beyond regime type, one of the most consistent findings within the literature on human rights suggests that wealthy states abuse human rights less often than poor states. 3 However, scholars have disagreed on exactly why economic development is associated with better protection of human rights. First, wealthy states might have less need to use repression. As Henderson ( 1991 ) states, we expect to see fewer grievances in wealthy states, since citizens should be more satisfied with their standard of living. As discussed previously, repression is often used as a response to opposition, making it unnecessary when opposition is lacking. Also, wealthier states have a greater ability to grant concessions to citizens in the form of goods and services rather than resorting to repression (Conrad, 2011 ; Davenport, 2007 ). Thus, wealthier states should see less political opposition and also have means of dealing with opposition other than resorting to repression.

Economic development, especially development tied to globalization, is also linked to changes in the way that society is structured within a state, which can affect human rights practices. Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko ( 2001 ) discuss the two main schools that provide expectations about the relation between globalized economic development and human rights practices, referred to as the liberal neoclassical and dependency schools. The liberal neoclassical school suggests that a globalized economy will lead to enhanced wealth across a society, leading to the creation of a middle class. When the middle class develops greater wealth, they are able to devote more time and resources to their demands against the state. This access to greater resources is necessary for a social opposition movement to succeed (Zald & McCarthy, 1987 ). While this increase in the strength of opposition may initially lead to enhanced use of repression, eventually the government will be unable to effectively quash opposition that is well funded and supported throughout society. Thus, grievances in countries that are amassing wealth are more likely to be addressed by governments, and human rights behavior is more likely to improve.

The second main school that links a globalized economy and human rights practices is the dependency school, which argues that poor states often do not evenly distribute the gains from globalization to the general population, instead concentrating increased wealth in the hands of political elites. This allows these elites to expand their use of repression as a response to political opposition, increasing human rights violations. In addition, by increasing the wealth of only the elites, those living in poverty develop stronger grievances about their deprivation, leading to more low-level opposition as a response, followed by more repression (Davenport, 2007 ).

Dependency theory is a particularly powerful tool in explaining the human rights records of states that draw their wealth from natural resources such as oil (DeMeritt & Young, 2013 ). Oil is extremely expensive to extricate, meaning that the ability to control oilfields is limited to those with substantial economic and human resources. This, coupled with the tremendous wealth that can be gained from the sale of oil, provides a unique opportunity for governments in such states to greatly enhance the wealth of a small group of political elites. Research supports dependency theory in oil-rich states, showing that such states have significantly higher levels of human rights abuses than poor states that do not have oil wealth (DeMeritt & Young, 2013 ).

These two schools may seem contradictory, but they can be understood as being complementary to each other. The liberal neoclassical school holds that economic development leads to the formation of a middle class, but this middle class cannot form in states where wealth is isolated in the hands of the elite. Only when wealth is distributed across society and can lead to the development of a middle class will we see opposition movements that are powerful enough to effectively demand changes in human rights practices.

State Capacity

There are many similarities between theories of state wealth and human rights and those of state capacity and human rights. State capacity can be thought of as the centralized power within a state, and weak states are characterized by a lack of centralized power. Englehart ( 2009 ) describes weak states as those with low ability to collect taxes, high corruption, and/or a lack of law and order. Some scholars have captured state capacity with indicators of economic development, implying that wealthy states are more capable than others (Hendrix, 2010 ).

Many scholars have found that capable states are less likely to abuse physical integrity rights (Englehart, 2009 ; Cole, 2015 ; Young, 2009 ). State capacity is necessary to be able to monitor the behavior of security forces and other government agents. Human rights abuses can occur not because they were authorized by the regime leadership, but because state agents are not trained and/or monitored. Without training and monitoring, human rights abuses often occur as part of control or interrogation tactics (Muñoz, 2009 ). A capable state can limit these unauthorized abuses, limiting the overall levels of human rights abuses within the state.

The relationship between the state and its agents can be understood through principal-agent theory, in which the state acts as the principal and holds the authority to command security agents (Englehart, 2009 ). However, agents do not necessarily follow the commands of the principal. Weak states lack the ability to provide oversight of state agents, making them more independent. This can make it difficult for weak states to change human rights practices, even when they have a desire to do so. As Cole ( 2015 ) explains, many states that sign human rights treaties have the desire to improve practices but lack the ability to enforce new standards among state agents. This highlights the idea that human rights abuses are not always state-sanctioned; in fact, they often directly contradict state policy.

State capacity also affects the perceived need to resort to repression. Strong state capacity can prevent political dissatisfaction from erupting into violent political unrest. Weak states (those with an unstable hold on state power) are inherently more threatened by opposition and will thus resort to more resorting to human rights abuses to control the population (Young, 2009 ). Limited state capacity is also tied to the emergence of violent rebel groups (Fearon & Laitin, 2003 ). This makes weak states more susceptible to civil war, and civil war is linked to increases in human rights violations by the state (Poe & Tate, 1994 ).

Human Rights and International Dynamics

In the previous section, we examined how characteristics of the state (namely, its regime type, its economic wealth, and its capacity) matter for its human rights performance. The basic insight from this research is that human rights abuses occur as a mechanism of population control when a regime or its agents are unrestrained by domestic institutions, an organized and developed domestic opposition, or both. However, human rights concerns are not a wholly domestic matter. The rights outlined in the UDHR were the result of international collaboration and joint advocacy efforts. They fit the classic definition of a norm: a “standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 , p. 889). The protection of human rights norms since the UDHR’s crafting has been heavily influenced by international dynamics and actors. Foreign policy actions of states, transnational organizations of all stripes, and the involvement of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) can pressure and socialize states to adopt human rights norms. However, these actions can also backfire, leading to an often-unintended worsening of human rights conditions. We explore these dynamics next.

Norm Entrepreneurs and Advocacy Actors

The adoption of human rights language and the internalization of human rights ideals are the results of a process of normative development and diffusion. Both in the case of now well-accepted norms (like bodily integrity rights) and in the case of newer and developing norms (like sexual minority rights or the right to development), norm entrepreneurs help in articulating and spreading these human rights ideas. According to Finnemore and Sikkink’s ( 1998 ) theory of the norm life cycle, these entrepreneurs work to get sympathetic regime leaders and other key constituents to adopt a norm as a general expectation of behavior. This larger group then helps in codifying and socializing other state actors about the norm. Finnemore and Sikkink ( 1998 , p. 900) see IGOs as important at this stage; the norm is “institutionalized in international rules.” If a critical mass of supporters is reached, often requiring the support of key states, a tipping point occurs, where the norm cascades and additional state and nonstate actors are socialized to adopt the norm.

It is at this stage in the norm socialization process where international actors often use a host of techniques and tactics to try to pressure governments to change their behavior. Advocates can point out that “legitimate” states do not abuse human rights (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 , p. 902). Material and nonmaterial carrots and sticks can be used to pressure a state to change its behavior. In some situations, this process of socialization can lead to the state “internalizing” the norm, giving it “taken-for-granted” status (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 , p. 904).

Although Finnemore and Sikkink ( 1998 )’s theory of the norm life cycle is often not explicitly mentioned in current empirical work on how international actors influence domestic human rights practices, it aptly applies. International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), like Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International, are often critical actors at the early stages of the life cycle. They help in spreading or educating local populations about a norm, as well as being crucial to getting the norm on the international agenda. Once key states have adopted the norm and it has been institutionalized, INGOs work to bring abuses to the attention of sympathetic states and advocates. The media attention that INGOs bring to abusive regimes, often termed “shaming and blaming” or “naming and shaming” by scholars, can be key to getting third-party states and INGOs to start pressuring the country to change their human rights practices.

INGOs can also help heighten domestic pressure on the regime. This combination of domestic and international pressure is what Keck and Sikkink ( 1998 ) term a transnational advocacy network . Later work by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink ( 1999 , 2013 ) further laid out the iterative process through which advocates work to socialize states about human rights; this process was named the spiral model . In this model, if international pressure is concentrated on an abusive regime, “tactical concessions” can be made by the abusive regime, leading to some limited and short-term improvements in human rights practices and, perhaps, the adoption of human rights laws (Risse & Sikkink 1999 , p. 12). If pressure continues, these concessions can turn into internalized human rights norms, completing the norm life cycle.

In line with these theoretical arguments, human rights INGOs have been linked to changes in human rights opinions and mobilization (Ausderan, 2014 ; Davis, Murdie, & Steinmetz, 2012 ; McEntire, Leiby, & Krain, 2015 ; Murdie & Bhasin, 2011 ). Their “naming and shaming” activities have also been linked to many forms of international pressure and involvement, including humanitarian intervention (Murdie & Peksen, 2013a ), international sanctions (Murdie & Peksen, 2013b ), drops in foreign direct investment (Barry, Clay, & Flynn, 2013 ), trade (Peterson, Murdie, & Asal, 2017 ), and the bypassing of foreign aid (Dietrich & Murdie, 2017 ). Some studies have found direct links between shaming by human rights INGOs and drops in certain human rights abuses (DeMeritt, 2012 ; Krain, 2012 ; Murdie, 2014 ), although this relationship has also been found to be conditional on domestic and/or international mobilization (Murdie & Davis, 2012 ) and domestic regime type (Hendrix & Wong, 2013 ; Murdie, 2014 ).

Worth mentioning, there are concerns that shaming of one type of abuse by human rights INGOs and IGOs could lead states to change their abusive tactics (DeMeritt, Conrad, & Fariss, 2016 ; Hafner-Burton, 2008 ). Further, there is work that is highly critical of certain behaviors of INGOs, highlighting the negative consequences of their often-overlooked, nonprincipled behavior (Clifford, 2005 ; Cooley & Ron, 2002 ; Murdie, 2014 ). Further work is necessary to understand the conditions when INGOs and other advocates are most likely to be successful and when they are likely to be ineffective or counterproductive to human rights goals.

State and IGO Foreign Policy Actions

There is a growing body of empirical work that looks at whether certain foreign policy actions improve human rights in a targeted state. Although this work does occasionally find that international actions can improve certain human rights practices, there is much work that shows that some international pressure tactics are counterproductive to human rights goals. To the extent that these actions are encouraged or influenced by human rights advocates, this could diminish the overall effects of advocates on human rights practices (Allendoerfer & Murdie, 2015 ).

On the positive side, there is some research that finds that certain types of foreign military interventions can improve certain human rights practices. For example, Krain ( 2005 ) finds that foreign military interventions against the perpetrator can help limit the severity of mass killings. DeMeritt ( 2015 ) concludes that interventions in support of the government can limit the onset of mass killings. Murdie and Davis ( 2010 ) find that only peacekeeping interventions with a strong humanitarian focus can improve human rights in countries after civil wars. However, Peksen ( 2012 ) finds that foreign military interventions do not generally improve human rights.

Another potential positive international action for human rights improvement is the support that international actors provide for transitional justice mechanisms, like the use of truth commissions after civil wars or human rights atrocities. Many studies have found that these mechanisms, especially in certain combinations, can improve some human rights outcomes, even after accounting for the factors that led to the implementation of these mechanisms in the first place (Dancy & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2015 ; Kim & Sikkink, 2010 ; Olsen, Payne, & Reiter, 2010 ; Polizzi, 2016 ).

On the negative side, however, there are many international foreign policy actions that are not associated with improved human rights. Foreign aid is not often associated with improved human rights (Barratt, 2007 ) and repressive regimes are rarely punished for poor human rights records (Esarey & DeMeritt, 2016 ; Nielsen, 2013 ). Economic sanctions can exasperate human rights abuses (Peksen, 2009 ; Wood, 2008 ). Actions by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank often harm human rights (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2007 ). Most of this work explains the negative or null findings as the unintended consequences of international foreign policy action. These actions can limit the general public’s ability or willingness to pressure their leaders and can make abusive leaders feel threatened, heightening their desire to use repressive practices to stay in power. Another important issue in this research concerns the selection of states to receive international action and the geopolitical concerns that can complicate whether these actions are designed with human rights goals.

In short, there is a well-established theoretical lens through which to examine how international actors influence the adoption and internalization of human rights norms. Although much current empirical work has shown that advocacy actors (particularly human rights INGOs) do influence human rights outcomes in the ways outlined in the extant theoretical literature, there is much work to be done to understand the types of international foreign policy pressure that can stop human rights abuses.

Human Rights Treaties

The previous section on how international pressure is associated with human rights practices ignores an important international pressure source: international human rights law. This was intentional; the international human rights treaty regime is a very specific type of international pressure that does not nicely conform to the theoretical and empirical literature concerning many of the international foreign policy actions discussed earlier in this article. Instead, the study of how the international human rights treaty regime influences human rights practices has drawn heavily on earlier theoretical arguments on international cooperation and compliance ( Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter, & Snidal, 2000 ; Downs, Rocke, & Barsoom, 1996 ; Morrow, 1994 ; von Stein, 2005 ) and the role of domestic institutions in encouraging compliance with international agreements (Dai, 2005 ).

Although much of the work within this area has focused on the human rights treaties drafted within the United Nations (UN) that followed the UDHR, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or the CAT, which we refer to here as UN human rights treaties , there is also a rich literature on regional human rights treaties and courts (Hawkins & Jacoby, 2010 ; Helfer & Voeten, 2014 ; Hillebrecht, 2012 ; Tallberg, 2002 ), as well as a growing literature on the International Criminal Court (Chapman & Chaudoin, 2013 ; Ritter & Wolford, 2012 ). Due to space constraints, the discussion here focuses on the literature concerning UN human rights treaties, where there has recently been a surge of empirical work concerning whether treaty ratification affects human rights practices.

Many early empirical works argued and found that various UN international human rights treaties are not generally associated with unconditional improvements in various human rights practices (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005 ; Hathaway, 2002 ; Keith, 1999 ). As such, there was much early evidence that UN human rights treaties alone were not sufficient to lead to greater respect for human rights. In line with general arguments on the limits of international cooperation, the existing treaty system was created with weak enforcement mechanisms and states are unlikely to voluntarily bind themselves in ways that would limit their ability to control their populations. There are tremendous issues of self-selection as well: states may be ratifying treaties after a war or as part of their transition to democracy. As such, it is difficult to ascertain whether any improvements in human rights practices are causally linked to the treaty or are linked to the underlying conditions that led the state to ratify the treaty in the first place.

Much of the scholarship that followed has (a) taken issues of self-selection seriously, (b) examined the domestic conditions that could make treaties more likely to affect human rights practices (Conrad & Ritter, 2013 ; Hill, 2010 ; Lupu, 2013 ; Neumayer, 2005 ; Simmons, 2009 ), or both. As to the first issue, many studies are using advanced statistical treatment effects or “matching” techniques to account for the underlying self-selection issue. Some of these studies have found that certain treaties cause improvements in certain human rights, and explanations have been given for these unique causal effects. For example, Hill ( 2010 ) finds that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) causes better human rights performance on women’s political rights, something Hill ( 2010 ) explains is due to the nonthreatening nature of women’s political rights to the regime leadership. Lupu ( 2013 ) uses a slightly different method to account for self-selection and finds that CEDAW causes improved women’s political, social, and economic rights.

The newer literature has also found that treaties can be effective in some situations. In line with the spiral model outlined previously, Neumayer ( 2005 ) finds, for example, that treaties are associated with improved human rights in democratic regimes and where there are large numbers of INGOs with members present within the state. Similarly, Simmons ( 2009 ) finds that treaties can be a useful tool for dissidents to use to try to get concessions from a repressive regime. And, as mentioned, Powell and Staton ( 2009 ) highlight the utility of an independent judiciary in leading states where the CAT is ratified to lessen their use of torture. Recent work by Conrad and Ritter ( 2013 ) connects the effectiveness of treaties to the characteristics of the judiciary and the security of the leader.

Although these findings provide a small glimmer of hope for the usefulness of the international human rights regime in certain situations, Fariss ( 2014 ) argues that there may be more reasons to be hopeful. As mentioned, Fariss ( 2014 ) contends that there is a changing standard of accountability for physical integrity rights abuses over time. Using his corrected measure, Fariss ( 2014 , 2017a ) shows a general association between treaty ratification and improved human rights practices. Cingranelli and Filippov ( 2017 ), however, question the empirical validity of this finding, arguing that the Fariss ( 2014 ) results are time dependent. Nonetheless, future work should examine how changing standards of accountability (some changing standards perhaps even aided by the human rights regime) affect the relationship between treaty ratification and human rights practices.

Why do state actors abuse human rights? In this article, we outlined three stylized theoretical statements that are supported in the empirical literature:

Respect for human rights is an international norm, and international socialization and pressure about this norm can, in certain situations, affect behavior.

The codification of human rights norms into international treaties may influence behavior but, like our understanding of the effect of other treaties on state behavior, states only bind themselves weakly and certain conditions are necessary for treaties to affect human rights.

This is an especially great juncture in the study of human rights. First, more detailed and rich data are now available; this data will allow future scholars to examine rights beyond the conventional focus on physical integrity violations by state actors and allow much more nuance in the particularities of the abuse and the abuser (e.g., Conrad, Haglund, & Moore, 2014 ; Cornett, Gibney, & Haschke, 2016 ). In addition, automated events data also hold much promise for near real-time analysis and for more nuanced study of the state-society dynamics that exasperate human rights abuses (Boschee et al., 2015 ; Fariss et al., 2015 ; Quinn, Monroe, Colaresi, Crespin, & Radev, 2010 ). The combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques also will continue to contribute to the breadth and depth of our knowledge on why abuses occur (Hafner-Burton & Ron, 2009 ).

Second, advances in empirical techniques now allow scholars to take self-selection seriously and examine more directly the causal process connecting certain interventions and institutions to changes in human rights outcomes (Allendoerfer & Murdie, 2015 ; Hill, 2010 ; Lupu, 2013 ; Murdie & Peksen, 2013b ). These techniques will help us determine how certain actions could mediate the effects of advocacy, or perhaps lead to unintended consequences that could harm human rights.

Third, a growing number of scholars are focusing on public opinion related to human rights (Ausderan, 2014 ; Bracic, 2016 ; Murdie & Purser, 2017 ; Ron, Golden, Crow, & Pandya, 2017 ; Wallace, 2013 ). Although these studies have not yet been extended to focusing on how public opinion relates to human rights outcomes in a cross-national sample of states, work is this area is critical for building our microfoundations for how human rights improvements occur and the potential role of public opinion in this process.

Finally, there have been recent advances in the practice of human rights promotion and the strategies of human rights advocates. Human rights performance within a country could be influenced by current increases in training on nonviolent resistance, a renewed focus on transitional justice and nonstate actors, and the use of technology to aid in the recording of abuses. Future studies should incorporate these advances into our theoretical understanding of the process by which human rights improve. The efficacy of these tactics should also be tested empirically.

In sum, the existing IR literature on why states abuse human rights has highlighted the nuanced relationships between international and domestic factors and human rights practices. There are few laws in human rights theories, but the works discussed in this article do point to a general theory of why states abuse human rights. The literature draws heavily on theories related to domestic constraints on leaders, on how norms diffuse, and on when international agreements affect state behavior. By drawing on this generalized set of knowledge, as well as current advances in the field, future work holds much potential to contribute to both our scholarly understanding of human rights practices and the growing practice of human rights advocacy outside academia.

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Tomz, M. , & Weeks, J. L. (2016). Human rights, democracy, and international conflict. Available from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1a4a/a131560e478733ba6cd15098cc678a5809f2.pdf .
von Stein, J. (2005). Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance. American Political Science Review , 99 (4), 611–622.
Vreeland, J. R. (2008). Political institutions and human rights: Why dictatorships enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture. International Organization , 62 (1), 65–101.
Wallace, G. P. R. (2013). International law and public attitudes toward torture: An experimental study. International Organization , 67 (1), 105–140.
Welch, R. M. (2017). National human rights institutions: Domestic implementation of international human rights law. Journal of Human Rights , 16 (1), 96–116.
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Wood, R. M. , & Gibney, M. (2010). The Political Terror Scale (PTS), A re-introduction and a comparison to CIRI. Human Rights Quarterly , 32 (2), 367–400.
Young, J. K. (2009) State capacity, democracy, and the violation of personal integrity rights. Journal of Human Rights , 8 (4), 283–300.
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1. Recently, principal investigators of the Political Terror Scale (PTS) have introduced a new measure of violence by nonstate actors: the Societal Violence Scale (SVS). As the authors of this scale remark in their explanation of the scale, the role of the state in abuses by nonstate actors is not trivial: “the state is obliged not only to refrain from human rights abuses itself, but also has the duty to prevent abuses by third parties, including private actors, and to take positive measures for the provision of rights to everyone under the state’s jurisdiction” (Cornett, Gibney, & Haschke, 2016 , n.p.).

2. For more discussion about this still controversial idea, see Clark and Sikkink ( 2013 ), Richards ( 2016 ), Fariss ( 2017a , 2017b ), and Cingranelli and Filippov ( 2017 ).

3. It is necessary for economic wealth to be distributed throughout society before we can expect to see a link between economic development and improved human rights practices. As such, a high gross domestic product (GDP), coupled with a low GDP per capita, reflect a society that has not achieved economic advancement throughout the population. When we refer to “wealthy states,” we are discussing states with a high GDP coupled with a relatively high GDP per capita.

Global Anti-LGBT Politics

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Doha Declaration

Education for justice.

Agenda Day 1
Agenda Day 2
Agenda Day 3
Agenda Day 4
Registration
Breakout Sessions for Primary and Secondary Level
Breakout Sessions for Tertiary Level
E4J Youth Competition
India - Lockdown Learners
Chuka, Break the Silence
The Online Zoo
I would like a community where ...
Staying safe online
Let's be respectful online
We can all be heroes
Respect for all
We all have rights
A mosaic of differences
The right thing to do
Solving ethical dilemmas
UNODC-UNESCO Guide for Policymakers
UNODC-UNESCO Handbooks for Teachers
Justice Accelerators
Introduction
Organized Crime
Trafficking in Persons & Smuggling of Migrants
Crime Prevention & Criminal Justice Reform
Crime Prevention, Criminal Justice & SDGs
UN Congress on Crime Prevention & Criminal Justice
Commission on Crime Prevention & Criminal Justice
Conference of the Parties to UNTOC
Conference of the States Parties to UNCAC
Rules for Simulating Crime Prevention & Criminal Justice Bodies
Crime Prevention & Criminal Justice
Engage with Us
Contact Us about MUN
Conferences Supporting E4J
Cyberstrike
Play for Integrity
Running out of Time
Zorbs Reloaded
Developing a Rationale for Using the Video
Previewing the Anti-Corruption Video
Viewing the Video with a Purpose
Post-viewing Activities
Previewing the Firearms Video
Rationale for Using the Video
Previewing the Human Trafficking Video
Previewing the Organized Crime Video
Previewing the Video
Criminal Justice & Crime Prevention
Corruption & Integrity
Human Trafficking & Migrant Smuggling
Firearms Trafficking
Terrorism & Violent Extremism
Introduction & Learning Outcomes
Corruption - Baseline Definition
Effects of Corruption
Deeper Meanings of Corruption
Measuring Corruption
Possible Class Structure
Core Reading
Advanced Reading
Student Assessment
Additional Teaching Tools
Guidelines for Stand-Alone Course
Appendix: How Corruption Affects the SDGs
What is Governance?
What is Good Governance?
Corruption and Bad Governance
Governance Reforms and Anti-Corruption
Guidelines for Stand-alone Course
Corruption and Democracy
Corruption and Authoritarian Systems
Hybrid Systems and Syndromes of Corruption
The Deep Democratization Approach
Political Parties and Political Finance
Political Institution-building as a Means to Counter Corruption
Manifestations and Consequences of Public Sector Corruption
Causes of Public Sector Corruption
Theories that Explain Corruption
Corruption in Public Procurement
Corruption in State-Owned Enterprises
Responses to Public Sector Corruption
Preventing Public Sector Corruption
Forms & Manifestations of Private Sector Corruption
Consequences of Private Sector Corruption
Causes of Private Sector Corruption
Responses to Private Sector Corruption
Preventing Private Sector Corruption
Collective Action & Public-Private Partnerships against Corruption
Transparency as a Precondition
Detection Mechanisms - Auditing and Reporting
Whistle-blowing Systems and Protections
Investigation of Corruption
Introduction and Learning Outcomes
Brief background on the human rights system
Overview of the corruption-human rights nexus
Impact of corruption on specific human rights
Approaches to assessing the corruption-human rights nexus
Human-rights based approach
Defining sex, gender and gender mainstreaming
Gender differences in corruption
Theories explaining the gender–corruption nexus
Gendered impacts of corruption
Anti-corruption and gender mainstreaming
Manifestations of corruption in education
Costs of corruption in education
Causes of corruption in education
Fighting corruption in education
Core terms and concepts
The role of citizens in fighting corruption
The role, risks and challenges of CSOs fighting corruption
The role of the media in fighting corruption
Access to information: a condition for citizen participation
ICT as a tool for citizen participation in anti-corruption efforts
Government obligations to ensure citizen participation in anti-corruption efforts
Teaching Guide
Brief History of Terrorism
19th Century Terrorism
League of Nations & Terrorism
United Nations & Terrorism
Terrorist Victimization
Exercises & Case Studies
Radicalization & Violent Extremism
Preventing & Countering Violent Extremism
Drivers of Violent Extremism
International Approaches to PVE &CVE
Regional & Multilateral Approaches
Defining Rule of Law
UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
International Cooperation & UN CT Strategy
Legal Sources & UN CT Strategy
Regional & National Approaches
International Legal Frameworks
International Human Rights Law
International Humanitarian Law
International Refugee Law
Current Challenges to International Legal Framework
Defining Terrorism
Criminal Justice Responses
Treaty-based Crimes of Terrorism
Core International Crimes
International Courts and Tribunals
African Region
Inter-American Region
Asian Region
European Region
Middle East & Gulf Regions
Core Principles of IHL
Categorization of Armed Conflict
Classification of Persons
IHL, Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism
Relationship between IHL & intern. human rights law
Limitations Permitted by Human Rights Law
Derogation during Public Emergency
Examples of States of Emergency & Derogations
International Human Rights Instruments
Regional Human Rights Instruments
Extra-territorial Application of Right to Life
Arbitrary Deprivation of Life
Death Penalty
Enforced Disappearances
Armed Conflict Context
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Convention against Torture et al.
International Legal Framework
Key Contemporary Issues
Investigative Phase
Trial & Sentencing Phase
Armed Conflict
Case Studies
Special Investigative Techniques
Surveillance & Interception of Communications
Privacy & Intelligence Gathering in Armed Conflict
Accountability & Oversight of Intelligence Gathering
Principle of Non-Discrimination
Freedom of Religion
Freedom of Expression
Freedom of Assembly
Freedom of Association
Fundamental Freedoms
Definition of 'Victim'
Effects of Terrorism
Access to Justice
Recognition of the Victim
Human Rights Instruments
Criminal Justice Mechanisms
Instruments for Victims of Terrorism
National Approaches
Key Challenges in Securing Reparation
Topic 1. Contemporary issues relating to conditions conducive both to the spread of terrorism and the rule of law
Topic 2. Contemporary issues relating to the right to life
Topic 3. Contemporary issues relating to foreign terrorist fighters
Topic 4. Contemporary issues relating to non-discrimination and fundamental freedoms
Module 16: Linkages between Organized Crime and Terrorism
Thematic Areas
Content Breakdown
Module Adaptation & Design Guidelines
Teaching Methods
Acknowledgements
1. Introducing United Nations Standards & Norms on CPCJ vis-à-vis International Law
2. Scope of United Nations Standards & Norms on CPCJ
3. United Nations Standards & Norms on CPCJ in Operation
1. Definition of Crime Prevention
2. Key Crime Prevention Typologies
2. (cont.) Tonry & Farrington’s Typology
3. Crime Problem-Solving Approaches
4. What Works
United Nations Entities
Regional Crime Prevention Councils/Institutions
Key Clearinghouses
Systematic Reviews
1. Introduction to International Standards & Norms
2. Identifying the Need for Legal Aid
3. Key Components of the Right of Access to Legal Aid
4. Access to Legal Aid for Those with Specific Needs
5. Models for Governing, Administering and Funding Legal Aid
6. Models for Delivering Legal Aid Services
7. Roles and Responsibilities of Legal Aid Providers
8. Quality Assurance and Legal Aid Services
1. Context for Use of Force by Law Enforcement Officials
2. Legal Framework
3. General Principles of Use of Force in Law Enforcement
4. Use of Firearms
5. Use of “Less-Lethal” Weapons
6. Protection of Especially Vulnerable Groups
7. Use of Force during Assemblies
1. Policing in democracies & need for accountability, integrity, oversight
2. Key mechanisms & actors in police accountability, oversight
3. Crosscutting & contemporary issues in police accountability
1. Introducing Aims of Punishment, Imprisonment & Prison Reform
2. Current Trends, Challenges & Human Rights
3. Towards Humane Prisons & Alternative Sanctions
1. Aims and Significance of Alternatives to Imprisonment
2. Justifying Punishment in the Community
3. Pretrial Alternatives
4. Post Trial Alternatives
5. Evaluating Alternatives
1. Concept, Values and Origin of Restorative Justice
2. Overview of Restorative Justice Processes
3. How Cost Effective is Restorative Justice?
4. Issues in Implementing Restorative Justice
1. Gender-Based Discrimination & Women in Conflict with the Law
2. Vulnerabilities of Girls in Conflict with the Law
3. Discrimination and Violence against LGBTI Individuals
4. Gender Diversity in Criminal Justice Workforce
1. Ending Violence against Women
2. Human Rights Approaches to Violence against Women
3. Who Has Rights in this Situation?
4. What about the Men?
5. Local, Regional & Global Solutions to Violence against Women & Girls
1. Understanding the Concept of Victims of Crime
2. Impact of Crime, including Trauma
3. Right of Victims to Adequate Response to their Needs
4. Collecting Victim Data
5. Victims and their Participation in Criminal Justice Process
6. Victim Services: Institutional and Non-Governmental Organizations
7. Outlook on Current Developments Regarding Victims
8. Victims of Crime and International Law
1. The Many Forms of Violence against Children
2. The Impact of Violence on Children
3. States' Obligations to Prevent VAC and Protect Child Victims
4. Improving the Prevention of Violence against Children
5. Improving the Criminal Justice Response to VAC
6. Addressing Violence against Children within the Justice System
1. The Role of the Justice System
2. Convention on the Rights of the Child & International Legal Framework on Children's Rights
3. Justice for Children
4. Justice for Children in Conflict with the Law
5. Realizing Justice for Children
1a. Judicial Independence as Fundamental Value of Rule of Law & of Constitutionalism
1b. Main Factors Aimed at Securing Judicial Independence
2a. Public Prosecutors as ‘Gate Keepers’ of Criminal Justice
2b. Institutional and Functional Role of Prosecutors
2c. Other Factors Affecting the Role of Prosecutors
Basics of Computing
Global Connectivity and Technology Usage Trends
Cybercrime in Brief
Cybercrime Trends
Cybercrime Prevention
Offences against computer data and systems
Computer-related offences
Content-related offences
The Role of Cybercrime Law
Harmonization of Laws
International and Regional Instruments
International Human Rights and Cybercrime Law
Digital Evidence
Digital Forensics
Standards and Best Practices for Digital Forensics
Reporting Cybercrime
Who Conducts Cybercrime Investigations?
Obstacles to Cybercrime Investigations
Knowledge Management
Legal and Ethical Obligations
Handling of Digital Evidence
Digital Evidence Admissibility
Sovereignty and Jurisdiction
Formal International Cooperation Mechanisms
Informal International Cooperation Mechanisms
Data Retention, Preservation and Access
Challenges Relating to Extraterritorial Evidence
National Capacity and International Cooperation
Internet Governance
Cybersecurity Strategies: Basic Features
National Cybersecurity Strategies
International Cooperation on Cybersecurity Matters
Cybersecurity Posture
Assets, Vulnerabilities and Threats
Vulnerability Disclosure
Cybersecurity Measures and Usability
Situational Crime Prevention
Incident Detection, Response, Recovery & Preparedness
Privacy: What it is and Why it is Important
Privacy and Security
Cybercrime that Compromises Privacy
Data Protection Legislation
Data Breach Notification Laws
Enforcement of Privacy and Data Protection Laws
Intellectual Property: What it is
Types of Intellectual Property
Causes for Cyber-Enabled Copyright & Trademark Offences
Protection & Prevention Efforts
Online Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
Cyberstalking and Cyberharassment
Cyberbullying
Gender-Based Interpersonal Cybercrime
Interpersonal Cybercrime Prevention
Cyber Organized Crime: What is it?
Conceptualizing Organized Crime & Defining Actors Involved
Criminal Groups Engaging in Cyber Organized Crime
Cyber Organized Crime Activities
Preventing & Countering Cyber Organized Crime
Cyberespionage
Cyberterrorism
Cyberwarfare
Information Warfare, Disinformation & Electoral Fraud
Responses to Cyberinterventions
Framing the Issue of Firearms
Direct Impact of Firearms
Indirect Impacts of Firearms on States or Communities
International and National Responses
Typology and Classification of Firearms
Common Firearms Types
'Other' Types of Firearms
Parts and Components
History of the Legitimate Arms Market
Need for a Legitimate Market
Key Actors in the Legitimate Market
Authorized & Unauthorized Arms Transfers
Illegal Firearms in Social, Cultural & Political Context
Supply, Demand & Criminal Motivations
Larger Scale Firearms Trafficking Activities
Smaller Scale Trafficking Activities
Sources of Illicit Firearms
Consequences of Illicit Markets
International Public Law & Transnational Law
International Instruments with Global Outreach
Commonalities, Differences & Complementarity between Global Instruments
Tools to Support Implementation of Global Instruments
Other United Nations Processes
The Sustainable Development Goals
Multilateral & Regional Instruments
Scope of National Firearms Regulations
National Firearms Strategies & Action Plans
Harmonization of National Legislation with International Firearms Instruments
Assistance for Development of National Firearms Legislation
Firearms Trafficking as a Cross-Cutting Element
Organized Crime and Organized Criminal Groups
Criminal Gangs
Terrorist Groups
Interconnections between Organized Criminal Groups & Terrorist Groups
Gangs - Organized Crime & Terrorism: An Evolving Continuum
International Response
International and National Legal Framework
Firearms Related Offences
Role of Law Enforcement
Firearms as Evidence
Use of Special Investigative Techniques
International Cooperation and Information Exchange
Prosecution and Adjudication of Firearms Trafficking
Teaching Methods & Principles
Ethical Learning Environments
Overview of Modules
Module Adaption & Design Guidelines
Table of Exercises
Basic Terms
Forms of Gender Discrimination
Ethics of Care
Case Studies for Professional Ethics
Case Studies for Role Morality
Additional Exercises
Defining Organized Crime
Definition in Convention
Similarities & Differences
Activities, Organization, Composition
Thinking Critically Through Fiction
Excerpts of Legislation
Research & Independent Study Questions
Legal Definitions of Organized Crimes
Criminal Association
Definitions in the Organized Crime Convention
Criminal Organizations and Enterprise Laws
Enabling Offence: Obstruction of Justice
Drug Trafficking
Wildlife & Forest Crime
Counterfeit Products Trafficking
Falsified Medical Products
Trafficking in Cultural Property
Trafficking in Persons
Case Studies & Exercises
Extortion Racketeering
Loansharking
Links to Corruption
Bribery versus Extortion
Money-Laundering
Liability of Legal Persons
How much Organized Crime is there?
Alternative Ways for Measuring
Measuring Product Markets
Risk Assessment
Key Concepts of Risk Assessment
Risk Assessment of Organized Crime Groups
Risk Assessment of Product Markets
Risk Assessment in Practice
Positivism: Environmental Influences
Classical: Pain-Pleasure Decisions
Structural Factors
Ethical Perspective
Crime Causes & Facilitating Factors
Models and Structure
Hierarchical Model
Local, Cultural Model
Enterprise or Business Model
Groups vs Activities
Networked Structure
Jurisdiction
Investigators of Organized Crime
Controlled Deliveries
Physical & Electronic Surveillance
Undercover Operations
Financial Analysis
Use of Informants
Rights of Victims & Witnesses
Role of Prosecutors
Adversarial vs Inquisitorial Legal Systems
Mitigating Punishment
Granting Immunity from Prosecution
Witness Protection
Aggravating & Mitigating Factors
Sentencing Options
Alternatives to Imprisonment
Death Penalty & Organized Crime
Backgrounds of Convicted Offenders
Confiscation
Confiscation in Practice
Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA)
Extradition
Transfer of Criminal Proceedings
Transfer of Sentenced Persons
Module 12: Prevention of Organized Crime
Adoption of Organized Crime Convention
Historical Context
Features of the Convention
Related international instruments
Conference of the Parties
Roles of Participants
Structure and Flow
Recommended Topics
Background Materials
What is Sex / Gender / Intersectionality?
Knowledge about Gender in Organized Crime
Gender and Organized Crime
Gender and Different Types of Organized Crime
Definitions and Terminology
Organized crime and Terrorism - International Legal Framework
International Terrorism-related Conventions
UNSC Resolutions on Terrorism
Organized Crime Convention and its Protocols
Theoretical Frameworks on Linkages between Organized Crime and Terrorism
Typologies of Criminal Behaviour Associated with Terrorism
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Terrorism and Trafficking in Weapons
Terrorism, Crime and Trafficking in Cultural Property
Trafficking in Persons and Terrorism
Intellectual Property Crime and Terrorism
Kidnapping for Ransom and Terrorism
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Terrorism
Review and Assessment Questions
Research and Independent Study Questions
Criminalization of Smuggling of Migrants
UNTOC & the Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants
Offences under the Protocol
Financial & Other Material Benefits
Aggravating Circumstances
Criminal Liability
Non-Criminalization of Smuggled Migrants
Scope of the Protocol
Humanitarian Exemption
Migrant Smuggling v. Irregular Migration
Migrant Smuggling vis-a-vis Other Crime Types
Other Resources
Assistance and Protection in the Protocol
International Human Rights and Refugee Law
Vulnerable groups
Positive and Negative Obligations of the State
Identification of Smuggled Migrants
Participation in Legal Proceedings
Role of Non-Governmental Organizations
Smuggled Migrants & Other Categories of Migrants
Short-, Mid- and Long-Term Measures
Criminal Justice Reponse: Scope
Investigative & Prosecutorial Approaches
Different Relevant Actors & Their Roles
Testimonial Evidence
Financial Investigations
Non-Governmental Organizations
‘Outside the Box’ Methodologies
Intra- and Inter-Agency Coordination
Admissibility of Evidence
International Cooperation
Exchange of Information
Non-Criminal Law Relevant to Smuggling of Migrants
Administrative Approach
Complementary Activities & Role of Non-criminal Justice Actors
Macro-Perspective in Addressing Smuggling of Migrants
Human Security
International Aid and Cooperation
Migration & Migrant Smuggling
Mixed Migration Flows
Social Politics of Migrant Smuggling
Vulnerability
Profile of Smugglers
Role of Organized Criminal Groups
Humanitarianism, Security and Migrant Smuggling
Crime of Trafficking in Persons
The Issue of Consent
The Purpose of Exploitation
The abuse of a position of vulnerability
Indicators of Trafficking in Persons
Distinction between Trafficking in Persons and Other Crimes
Misconceptions Regarding Trafficking in Persons
Root Causes
Supply Side Prevention Strategies
Demand Side Prevention Strategies
Role of the Media
Safe Migration Channels
Crime Prevention Strategies
Monitoring, Evaluating & Reporting on Effectiveness of Prevention
Trafficked Persons as Victims
Protection under the Protocol against Trafficking in Persons
Broader International Framework
State Responsibility for Trafficking in Persons
Identification of Victims
Principle of Non-Criminalization of Victims
Criminal Justice Duties Imposed on States
Role of the Criminal Justice System
Current Low Levels of Prosecutions and Convictions
Challenges to an Effective Criminal Justice Response
Rights of Victims to Justice and Protection
Potential Strategies to “Turn the Tide”
State Cooperation with Civil Society
Civil Society Actors
The Private Sector
Comparing SOM and TIP
Differences and Commonalities
Vulnerability and Continuum between SOM & TIP
Labour Exploitation
Forced Marriage
Other Examples
Children on the Move
Protecting Smuggled and Trafficked Children
Protection in Practice
Children Alleged as Having Committed Smuggling or Trafficking Offences
Basic Terms - Gender and Gender Stereotypes
International Legal Frameworks and Definitions of TIP and SOM
Global Overview on TIP and SOM
Gender and Migration
Key Debates in the Scholarship on TIP and SOM
Gender and TIP and SOM Offenders
Responses to TIP and SOM
Use of Technology to Facilitate TIP and SOM
Technology Facilitating Trafficking in Persons
Technology in Smuggling of Migrants
Using Technology to Prevent and Combat TIP and SOM
Privacy and Data Concerns
Emerging Trends
Demand and Consumption
Supply and Demand
Implications of Wildlife Trafficking
Legal and Illegal Markets
Perpetrators and their Networks
Locations and Activities relating to Wildlife Trafficking
Environmental Protection & Conservation
CITES & the International Trade in Endangered Species
Organized Crime & Corruption
Animal Welfare
Criminal Justice Actors and Agencies
Criminalization of Wildlife Trafficking
Challenges for Law Enforcement
Investigation Measures and Detection Methods
Prosecution and Judiciary
Wild Flora as the Target of Illegal Trafficking
Purposes for which Wild Flora is Illegally Targeted
How is it Done and Who is Involved?
Consequences of Harms to Wild Flora
Terminology
Background: Communities and conservation: A history of disenfranchisement
Incentives for communities to get involved in illegal wildlife trafficking: the cost of conservation
Incentives to participate in illegal wildlife, logging and fishing economies
International and regional responses that fight wildlife trafficking while supporting IPLCs
Mechanisms for incentivizing community conservation and reducing wildlife trafficking
Critiques of community engagement
Other challenges posed by wildlife trafficking that affect local populations
Global Podcast Series
Apr. 2021: Call for Expressions of Interest: Online training for academics from francophone Africa
Feb. 2021: Series of Seminars for Universities of Central Asia
Dec. 2020: UNODC and TISS Conference on Access to Justice to End Violence
Nov. 2020: Expert Workshop for University Lecturers and Trainers from the Commonwealth of Independent States
Oct. 2020: E4J Webinar Series: Youth Empowerment through Education for Justice
Interview: How to use E4J's tool in teaching on TIP and SOM
E4J-Open University Online Training-of-Trainers Course
Teaching Integrity and Ethics Modules: Survey Results
Grants Programmes
E4J MUN Resource Guide
Library of Resources
Counter-Terrorism
Module 7: Counter-Terrorism & Situations of Public Emergency
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E4J University Module Series: Counter-Terrorism

Module 7: counter-terrorism and situations of public emergency, introduction and learning outcomes, limitations permitted by human rights law.

Derogation in times of public emergency
Examples of terrorism related states of emergency and derogations

Exercises and case studies

Possible class structure, core reading, advanced reading, student assessment, additional teaching tools.

Published in July 2018.

This module is a resource for lecturers

Not all human rights principles enjoy the same level of protection. Instead, they can have different legal characteristics, being absolute or non-absolute in nature or having inherent limitations.

Some of the most fundamental human rights are "absolute". Such rights include the prohibitions on torture, on slavery and on retroactive criminal laws. The absolute character of these rights means that it is not permitted to restrict these rights by balancing their enjoyment against the pursuit of a legitimate aim. For example, article 2 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides that "[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture". Similarly, in response to the practice of some States, the Human Rights Committee has stated that "[t]he prohibitions against the taking of hostages, abductions or unacknowledged detention are not subject to derogation. The absolute nature of these prohibitions, even in times of emergency, is justified by their status as norms of general international law" (Human Rights Committee General Comment CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, para. 13(b)).

Most rights, however, are not absolute in character. States can limit the exercise of these rights for valid reasons, including the needs of countering terrorism, as long as they respect a number of conditions.

In the case of some rights, the conditions for legitimate limitations are spelled out in the treaty provisions enshrining the right. Examples are the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of movement, and the requirement of publicity of court hearings. These rights are accompanied by various grounds, such as national security or public order, as well as conditions to be met in order for them to be legitimately limited. Notably, the restrictions provided for in the text, such as in articles 18(3) and 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), exist and may be relied upon independently of any declaration of a state of emergency. Indeed, even in times of public emergencies as understood in article 4 ICCPR explained below, States may elect to rely upon these restrictions instead of seeking derogations.

In the case of some other rights, the human rights treaty provision limits itself to stating that the right may not be interfered with "arbitrarily". This is, for instance, the case of article 9, which requires that deprivation of liberty must not be arbitrary (discussed at length in Module 10). The notion of "arbitrariness" is not to be equated with "against the law", but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law.

On the basis of provisions such as article 19 of the protecting the right to freedom of expression (other examples include articles 18, 21, and 22), human rights courts and treaty bodies have developed a test to establish whether a measure limiting a non-absolute right is legitimate. The following questions must be asked:

Only if all of these questions can be answered in the affirmative in a specific case will a restriction on a non-absolute right be permissible under international human rights law.

Note that this test was developed to examine the permissibility of measures interfering with rights explicitly permitting restrictions and spelling out the legitimate aims justifying restrictions (e.g. articles 18(3) and 19(3)). However, very similar reasoning is in fact used to assess whether measures limiting other non-absolute rights are permissible. An example is that detention will be considered arbitrary not only if it is devoid of a legal basis, but also if it is discriminatory, or completely disproportionate to the legitimate aim to be achieved. (See, e.g., Human Rights Committee (1994). Views: . 10 August. Communication No 458/1991).

Finally, some rights are subject to what could be termed 'inherent' limitations. The right of an accused person in a criminal case to be tried without "undue delay" is an example. What is a reasonable delay is to be assessed in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the complexity of the case (which in terrorism cases may be considerable), the conduct of the accused, and the manner in which the matter was dealt with by the investigating and judicial authorities. These limitations are not articulated in the texts of human rights treaties, rather have been developed by national and international courts and other treaty monitoring bodies applying human rights norms to specific cases before them.

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Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a milestone document in the history of human rights. Drafted by representatives with different legal and cultural backgrounds from all regions of the world, the Declaration was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 ( General Assembly resolution 217 A ) as a common standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations. It sets out, for the first time, fundamental human rights to be universally protected and it has been translated into over 500 languages . The UDHR is widely recognized as having inspired, and paved the way for, the adoption of more than seventy human rights treaties, applied today on a permanent basis at global and regional levels (all containing references to it in their preambles).

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, therefore,

The General Assembly,

Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Everyone has the right to a nationality.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.
Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.
Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

Text of the Declaration
History of the Declaration
Drafters of the Declaration
The Foundation of International Human Rights Law
Human Rights Law

2023: UDHR turns 75

What is the Declaration of Human Rights? Narrated by Morgan Freeman.

UN digital ambassador Elyx animates the UDHR

cards with stick figure illustrating human rights

To mark the 75th anniversary of the UDHR in December 2023, the United Nations has partnered once again with French digital artist YAK (Yacine Ait Kaci) – whose illustrated character Elyx is the first digital ambassador of the United Nations – on an animated version of the 30 Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

UDHR Illustrated

Cover of the illustrated version of the UDHR.

Read the Illustrated edition of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UDHR in 80+ languages

Watch and listen to people around the world reading articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in more than 80 languages.

Women Who Shaped the Declaration

Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, seated at right speaking with Mrs. Hansa Mehta who stands next to her.

Women delegates from various countries played a key role in getting women’s rights included in the Declaration. Hansa Mehta of India (standing above Eleanor Roosevelt) is widely credited with changing the phrase "All men are born free and equal" to "All human beings are born free and equal" in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

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Home — Essay Samples — Social Issues — Individual Rights — Protection of Human Rights

Protection of Human Rights

Categories: Civil Rights Violation Individual Rights

About this sample

Words: 616 |

Published: Jan 31, 2024

Words: 616 | Page: 1 | 4 min read

International instruments for human rights protection, national mechanisms for human rights protection, regional mechanisms for human rights protection, non-governmental organizations (ngos) and civil society, challenges and limitations in protecting human rights.

United Nations. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (1966). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (1966). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx
European Court of Human Rights. Retrieved from https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=home
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. Retrieved from https://www.achpr.org/
Amnesty International. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/
Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/

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Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction (1st edn)

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5 (page 96) p. 96 Legitimate restrictions on freedom

Published: June 2007
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Many international crimes, such as genocide, slavery, torture, and crimes against humanity do not allow for limitations or exceptions. The human rights for these are absolute. ‘Legitimate restrictions on freedom’ looks at rights that may be limited through legal restrictions designed to protect a defined legitimate objective, such as the right to life and freedom from incarceration. Freedom of speech is another example of a right that is not absolute. Some freedoms are deemed to violate human rights so the law here is blurred. Can we meaningfully talk about rights in these sorts of contexts? The right to life seems like it should be absolute, but some deliberate acts which result in death are not always human rights violations.

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Introduction

Origins in ancient Greece and Rome

Natural law transformed into natural rights
“Nonsense upon stilts”: the critics of natural rights
The persistence of the notion
The nature of human rights: commonly accepted postulates
Liberté : civil and political rights
Égalité : economic, social, and cultural rights
Fraternité : solidarity or group rights
Liberté versus égalité
The relevance of custom and tradition: the universalist-relativist debate
Inherent risks in the debate
Developments before World War II
The UN Commission on Human Rights and its instruments
The UN Human Rights Council and its instruments
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Its Optional Protocols
Other UN human rights conventions and declarations
Human rights and the Helsinki process
Human rights in Europe
Human rights in the Americas
Human rights in Africa
Human rights in the Arab world
Human rights in Asia
International human rights in domestic courts
Human rights in the early 21st century

human rights

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U. S. Department of State - Human Rights
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Table Of Contents

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human rights , rights that belong to an individual or group of individuals simply for being human, or as a consequence of inherent human vulnerability, or because they are requisite to the possibility of a just society. Whatever their theoretical justification, human rights refer to a wide continuum of values or capabilities thought to enhance human agency or protect human interests and declared to be universal in character, in some sense equally claimed for all human beings, present and future.

It is a common observation that human beings everywhere require the realization of diverse values or capabilities to ensure their individual and collective well-being. It also is a common observation that this requirement—whether conceived or expressed as a moral or a legal demand—is often painfully frustrated by social as well as natural forces, resulting in exploitation, oppression, persecution, and other forms of deprivation. Deeply rooted in these twin observations are the beginnings of what today are called “human rights” and the national and international legal processes associated with them.

Historical development

The expression human rights is relatively new, having come into everyday parlance only since World War II , the founding of the United Nations in 1945, and the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. It replaced the phrase natural rights, which fell into disfavour in the 19th century in part because the concept of natural law (to which it was intimately linked) had become controversial with the rise of legal positivism . Legal positivism rejected the theory, long espoused by the Roman Catholic Church , that law must be moral to be law. The term human rights also replaced the later phrase the rights of Man, which was not universally understood to include the rights of women.

Most students of human rights trace the origins of the concept of human rights to ancient Greece and Rome , where it was closely tied to the doctrines of the Stoics , who held that human conduct should be judged according to, and brought into harmony with, the law of nature . A classic example of this view is given in Sophocles ’ play Antigone , in which the title character, upon being reproached by King Creon for defying his command not to bury her slain brother, asserted that she acted in accordance with the immutable laws of the gods.

In part because Stoicism played a key role in its formation and spread, Roman law similarly allowed for the existence of a natural law and with it—pursuant to the jus gentium (“law of nations”)—certain universal rights that extended beyond the rights of citizenship. According to the Roman jurist Ulpian , for example, natural law was that which nature, not the state, assures to all human beings, Roman citizens or not.

It was not until after the Middle Ages , however, that natural law became associated with natural rights. In Greco-Roman and medieval times, doctrines of natural law concerned mainly the duties, rather than the rights, of “Man.” Moreover, as evidenced in the writings of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas , these doctrines recognized the legitimacy of slavery and serfdom and, in so doing, excluded perhaps the most important ideas of human rights as they are understood today—freedom (or liberty) and equality .

The conception of human rights as natural rights (as opposed to a classical natural order of obligation) was made possible by certain basic societal changes, which took place gradually beginning with the decline of European feudalism from about the 13th century and continuing through the Renaissance to the Peace of Westphalia (1648). During this period, resistance to religious intolerance and political and economic bondage; the evident failure of rulers to meet their obligations under natural law; and the unprecedented commitment to individual expression and worldly experience that was characteristic of the Renaissance all combined to shift the conception of natural law from duties to rights. The teachings of Aquinas and Hugo Grotius on the European continent, the Magna Carta (1215) and its companion Charter of the Forests (1217), the Petition of Right (1628), and the English Bill of Rights (1689) in England were signs of this change. Each testified to the increasingly popular view that human beings are endowed with certain eternal and inalienable rights that never were renounced when humankind “contracted” to enter the social order from the natural order and never were diminished by the claim of the “ divine right of kings .”

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Limiting Limitations of Human Rights under the FDRE and Regional Constitutions

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Human Rights States and Societies: A Reflection from Kenya

First Online: 05 January 2019

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Willy Mutunga 3

Part of the book series: Contemporary African Political Economy ((CONTAPE))

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This chapter by Willy Mutunga, Kenya’s former Chief Justice and President of the Supreme Court, highlights debates on human rights by African intellectuals and dynamics of Kenya’s human rights movement. Further, it explores the transformation of the Judiciary and envisions the possibility of a human rights state in the context of Kenya’s 2010 transformative Constitution. Overall, Mutunga posits that Kenya’s Constitution and the new judiciary provides a firm foundation for the country’s transformation.

This chapter is a revised version of my 2015 article titled “Human Rights States and Societies: A Reflection From Kenya,” The Transnational Human Rights Review 2: 63–102. I thank Professors Jill Ghai, Yash Ghai, Makau Mutua, Joel Ngugi, Joe Oloka Onyango, and Duncan Okello for their brilliant comments on earlier drafts of this article.

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Human rights and its future: some reflections

Human Rights in Central Asia: Challenges and Perspectives

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Mutunga, W. (2019). Human Rights States and Societies: A Reflection from Kenya. In: Sahle, E. (eds) Human Rights in Africa. Contemporary African Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51915-3_2

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Why A.I. Isn’t Going to Make Art

In 1953, Roald Dahl published “ The Great Automatic Grammatizator ,” a short story about an electrical engineer who secretly desires to be a writer. One day, after completing construction of the world’s fastest calculating machine, the engineer realizes that “English grammar is governed by rules that are almost mathematical in their strictness.” He constructs a fiction-writing machine that can produce a five-thousand-word short story in thirty seconds; a novel takes fifteen minutes and requires the operator to manipulate handles and foot pedals, as if he were driving a car or playing an organ, to regulate the levels of humor and pathos. The resulting novels are so popular that, within a year, half the fiction published in English is a product of the engineer’s invention.

Is there anything about art that makes us think it can’t be created by pushing a button, as in Dahl’s imagination? Right now, the fiction generated by large language models like ChatGPT is terrible, but one can imagine that such programs might improve in the future. How good could they get? Could they get better than humans at writing fiction—or making paintings or movies—in the same way that calculators are better at addition and subtraction?

Art is notoriously hard to define, and so are the differences between good art and bad art. But let me offer a generalization: art is something that results from making a lot of choices. This might be easiest to explain if we use fiction writing as an example. When you are writing fiction, you are—consciously or unconsciously—making a choice about almost every word you type; to oversimplify, we can imagine that a ten-thousand-word short story requires something on the order of ten thousand choices. When you give a generative-A.I. program a prompt, you are making very few choices; if you supply a hundred-word prompt, you have made on the order of a hundred choices.

If an A.I. generates a ten-thousand-word story based on your prompt, it has to fill in for all of the choices that you are not making. There are various ways it can do this. One is to take an average of the choices that other writers have made, as represented by text found on the Internet; that average is equivalent to the least interesting choices possible, which is why A.I.-generated text is often really bland. Another is to instruct the program to engage in style mimicry, emulating the choices made by a specific writer, which produces a highly derivative story. In neither case is it creating interesting art.

I think the same underlying principle applies to visual art, although it’s harder to quantify the choices that a painter might make. Real paintings bear the mark of an enormous number of decisions. By comparison, a person using a text-to-image program like DALL-E enters a prompt such as “A knight in a suit of armor fights a fire-breathing dragon,” and lets the program do the rest. (The newest version of DALL-E accepts prompts of up to four thousand characters—hundreds of words, but not enough to describe every detail of a scene.) Most of the choices in the resulting image have to be borrowed from similar paintings found online; the image might be exquisitely rendered, but the person entering the prompt can’t claim credit for that.

Some commentators imagine that image generators will affect visual culture as much as the advent of photography once did. Although this might seem superficially plausible, the idea that photography is similar to generative A.I. deserves closer examination. When photography was first developed, I suspect it didn’t seem like an artistic medium because it wasn’t apparent that there were a lot of choices to be made; you just set up the camera and start the exposure. But over time people realized that there were a vast number of things you could do with cameras, and the artistry lies in the many choices that a photographer makes. It might not always be easy to articulate what the choices are, but when you compare an amateur’s photos to a professional’s, you can see the difference. So then the question becomes: Is there a similar opportunity to make a vast number of choices using a text-to-image generator? I think the answer is no. An artist—whether working digitally or with paint—implicitly makes far more decisions during the process of making a painting than would fit into a text prompt of a few hundred words.

We can imagine a text-to-image generator that, over the course of many sessions, lets you enter tens of thousands of words into its text box to enable extremely fine-grained control over the image you’re producing; this would be something analogous to Photoshop with a purely textual interface. I’d say that a person could use such a program and still deserve to be called an artist. The film director Bennett Miller has used DALL-E 2 to generate some very striking images that have been exhibited at the Gagosian gallery; to create them, he crafted detailed text prompts and then instructed DALL-E to revise and manipulate the generated images again and again. He generated more than a hundred thousand images to arrive at the twenty images in the exhibit. But he has said that he hasn’t been able to obtain comparable results on later releases of DALL-E . I suspect this might be because Miller was using DALL-E for something it’s not intended to do; it’s as if he hacked Microsoft Paint to make it behave like Photoshop, but as soon as a new version of Paint was released, his hacks stopped working. OpenAI probably isn’t trying to build a product to serve users like Miller, because a product that requires a user to work for months to create an image isn’t appealing to a wide audience. The company wants to offer a product that generates images with little effort.

It’s harder to imagine a program that, over many sessions, helps you write a good novel. This hypothetical writing program might require you to enter a hundred thousand words of prompts in order for it to generate an entirely different hundred thousand words that make up the novel you’re envisioning. It’s not clear to me what such a program would look like. Theoretically, if such a program existed, the user could perhaps deserve to be called the author. But, again, I don’t think companies like OpenAI want to create versions of ChatGPT that require just as much effort from users as writing a novel from scratch. The selling point of generative A.I. is that these programs generate vastly more than you put into them, and that is precisely what prevents them from being effective tools for artists.

The companies promoting generative-A.I. programs claim that they will unleash creativity. In essence, they are saying that art can be all inspiration and no perspiration—but these things cannot be easily separated. I’m not saying that art has to involve tedium. What I’m saying is that art requires making choices at every scale; the countless small-scale choices made during implementation are just as important to the final product as the few large-scale choices made during the conception. It is a mistake to equate “large-scale” with “important” when it comes to the choices made when creating art; the interrelationship between the large scale and the small scale is where the artistry lies.

Believing that inspiration outweighs everything else is, I suspect, a sign that someone is unfamiliar with the medium. I contend that this is true even if one’s goal is to create entertainment rather than high art. People often underestimate the effort required to entertain; a thriller novel may not live up to Kafka’s ideal of a book—an “axe for the frozen sea within us”—but it can still be as finely crafted as a Swiss watch. And an effective thriller is more than its premise or its plot. I doubt you could replace every sentence in a thriller with one that is semantically equivalent and have the resulting novel be as entertaining. This means that its sentences—and the small-scale choices they represent—help to determine the thriller’s effectiveness.

Many novelists have had the experience of being approached by someone convinced that they have a great idea for a novel, which they are willing to share in exchange for a fifty-fifty split of the proceeds. Such a person inadvertently reveals that they think formulating sentences is a nuisance rather than a fundamental part of storytelling in prose. Generative A.I. appeals to people who think they can express themselves in a medium without actually working in that medium. But the creators of traditional novels, paintings, and films are drawn to those art forms because they see the unique expressive potential that each medium affords. It is their eagerness to take full advantage of those potentialities that makes their work satisfying, whether as entertainment or as art.

Of course, most pieces of writing, whether articles or reports or e-mails, do not come with the expectation that they embody thousands of choices. In such cases, is there any harm in automating the task? Let me offer another generalization: any writing that deserves your attention as a reader is the result of effort expended by the person who wrote it. Effort during the writing process doesn’t guarantee the end product is worth reading, but worthwhile work cannot be made without it. The type of attention you pay when reading a personal e-mail is different from the type you pay when reading a business report, but in both cases it is only warranted when the writer put some thought into it.

Recently, Google aired a commercial during the Paris Olympics for Gemini, its competitor to OpenAI’s GPT-4 . The ad shows a father using Gemini to compose a fan letter, which his daughter will send to an Olympic athlete who inspires her. Google pulled the commercial after widespread backlash from viewers; a media professor called it “one of the most disturbing commercials I’ve ever seen.” It’s notable that people reacted this way, even though artistic creativity wasn’t the attribute being supplanted. No one expects a child’s fan letter to an athlete to be extraordinary; if the young girl had written the letter herself, it would likely have been indistinguishable from countless others. The significance of a child’s fan letter—both to the child who writes it and to the athlete who receives it—comes from its being heartfelt rather than from its being eloquent.

Many of us have sent store-bought greeting cards, knowing that it will be clear to the recipient that we didn’t compose the words ourselves. We don’t copy the words from a Hallmark card in our own handwriting, because that would feel dishonest. The programmer Simon Willison has described the training for large language models as “money laundering for copyrighted data,” which I find a useful way to think about the appeal of generative-A.I. programs: they let you engage in something like plagiarism, but there’s no guilt associated with it because it’s not clear even to you that you’re copying.

Some have claimed that large language models are not laundering the texts they’re trained on but, rather, learning from them, in the same way that human writers learn from the books they’ve read. But a large language model is not a writer; it’s not even a user of language. Language is, by definition, a system of communication, and it requires an intention to communicate. Your phone’s auto-complete may offer good suggestions or bad ones, but in neither case is it trying to say anything to you or the person you’re texting. The fact that ChatGPT can generate coherent sentences invites us to imagine that it understands language in a way that your phone’s auto-complete does not, but it has no more intention to communicate.

It is very easy to get ChatGPT to emit a series of words such as “I am happy to see you.” There are many things we don’t understand about how large language models work, but one thing we can be sure of is that ChatGPT is not happy to see you. A dog can communicate that it is happy to see you, and so can a prelinguistic child, even though both lack the capability to use words. ChatGPT feels nothing and desires nothing, and this lack of intention is why ChatGPT is not actually using language. What makes the words “I’m happy to see you” a linguistic utterance is not that the sequence of text tokens that it is made up of are well formed; what makes it a linguistic utterance is the intention to communicate something.

Because language comes so easily to us, it’s easy to forget that it lies on top of these other experiences of subjective feeling and of wanting to communicate that feeling. We’re tempted to project those experiences onto a large language model when it emits coherent sentences, but to do so is to fall prey to mimicry; it’s the same phenomenon as when butterflies evolve large dark spots on their wings that can fool birds into thinking they’re predators with big eyes. There is a context in which the dark spots are sufficient; birds are less likely to eat a butterfly that has them, and the butterfly doesn’t really care why it’s not being eaten, as long as it gets to live. But there is a big difference between a butterfly and a predator that poses a threat to a bird.

A person using generative A.I. to help them write might claim that they are drawing inspiration from the texts the model was trained on, but I would again argue that this differs from what we usually mean when we say one writer draws inspiration from another. Consider a college student who turns in a paper that consists solely of a five-page quotation from a book, stating that this quotation conveys exactly what she wanted to say, better than she could say it herself. Even if the student is completely candid with the instructor about what she’s done, it’s not accurate to say that she is drawing inspiration from the book she’s citing. The fact that a large language model can reword the quotation enough that the source is unidentifiable doesn’t change the fundamental nature of what’s going on.

As the linguist Emily M. Bender has noted, teachers don’t ask students to write essays because the world needs more student essays. The point of writing essays is to strengthen students’ critical-thinking skills; in the same way that lifting weights is useful no matter what sport an athlete plays, writing essays develops skills necessary for whatever job a college student will eventually get. Using ChatGPT to complete assignments is like bringing a forklift into the weight room; you will never improve your cognitive fitness that way.

Not all writing needs to be creative, or heartfelt, or even particularly good; sometimes it simply needs to exist. Such writing might support other goals, such as attracting views for advertising or satisfying bureaucratic requirements. When people are required to produce such text, we can hardly blame them for using whatever tools are available to accelerate the process. But is the world better off with more documents that have had minimal effort expended on them? It would be unrealistic to claim that if we refuse to use large language models, then the requirements to create low-quality text will disappear. However, I think it is inevitable that the more we use large language models to fulfill those requirements, the greater those requirements will eventually become. We are entering an era where someone might use a large language model to generate a document out of a bulleted list, and send it to a person who will use a large language model to condense that document into a bulleted list. Can anyone seriously argue that this is an improvement?

It’s not impossible that one day we will have computer programs that can do anything a human being can do, but, contrary to the claims of the companies promoting A.I., that is not something we’ll see in the next few years. Even in domains that have absolutely nothing to do with creativity, current A.I. programs have profound limitations that give us legitimate reasons to question whether they deserve to be called intelligent at all.

The computer scientist François Chollet has proposed the following distinction: skill is how well you perform at a task, while intelligence is how efficiently you gain new skills. I think this reflects our intuitions about human beings pretty well. Most people can learn a new skill given sufficient practice, but the faster the person picks up the skill, the more intelligent we think the person is. What’s interesting about this definition is that—unlike I.Q. tests—it’s also applicable to nonhuman entities; when a dog learns a new trick quickly, we consider that a sign of intelligence.

In 2019, researchers conducted an experiment in which they taught rats how to drive. They put the rats in little plastic containers with three copper-wire bars; when the mice put their paws on one of these bars, the container would either go forward, or turn left or turn right. The rats could see a plate of food on the other side of the room and tried to get their vehicles to go toward it. The researchers trained the rats for five minutes at a time, and after twenty-four practice sessions, the rats had become proficient at driving. Twenty-four trials were enough to master a task that no rat had likely ever encountered before in the evolutionary history of the species. I think that’s a good demonstration of intelligence.

Now consider the current A.I. programs that are widely acclaimed for their performance. AlphaZero, a program developed by Google’s DeepMind, plays chess better than any human player, but during its training it played forty-four million games, far more than any human can play in a lifetime. For it to master a new game, it will have to undergo a similarly enormous amount of training. By Chollet’s definition, programs like AlphaZero are highly skilled, but they aren’t particularly intelligent, because they aren’t efficient at gaining new skills. It is currently impossible to write a computer program capable of learning even a simple task in only twenty-four trials, if the programmer is not given information about the task beforehand.

Self-driving cars trained on millions of miles of driving can still crash into an overturned trailer truck, because such things are not commonly found in their training data, whereas humans taking their first driving class will know to stop. More than our ability to solve algebraic equations, our ability to cope with unfamiliar situations is a fundamental part of why we consider humans intelligent. Computers will not be able to replace humans until they acquire that type of competence, and that is still a long way off; for the time being, we’re just looking for jobs that can be done with turbocharged auto-complete.

Despite years of hype, the ability of generative A.I. to dramatically increase economic productivity remains theoretical. (Earlier this year, Goldman Sachs released a report titled “Gen AI: Too Much Spend, Too Little Benefit?”) The task that generative A.I. has been most successful at is lowering our expectations, both of the things we read and of ourselves when we write anything for others to read. It is a fundamentally dehumanizing technology because it treats us as less than what we are: creators and apprehenders of meaning. It reduces the amount of intention in the world.

Some individuals have defended large language models by saying that most of what human beings say or write isn’t particularly original. That is true, but it’s also irrelevant. When someone says “I’m sorry” to you, it doesn’t matter that other people have said sorry in the past; it doesn’t matter that “I’m sorry” is a string of text that is statistically unremarkable. If someone is being sincere, their apology is valuable and meaningful, even though apologies have previously been uttered. Likewise, when you tell someone that you’re happy to see them, you are saying something meaningful, even if it lacks novelty.

Something similar holds true for art. Whether you are creating a novel or a painting or a film, you are engaged in an act of communication between you and your audience. What you create doesn’t have to be utterly unlike every prior piece of art in human history to be valuable; the fact that you’re the one who is saying it, the fact that it derives from your unique life experience and arrives at a particular moment in the life of whoever is seeing your work, is what makes it new. We are all products of what has come before us, but it’s by living our lives in interaction with others that we bring meaning into the world. That is something that an auto-complete algorithm can never do, and don’t let anyone tell you otherwise. ♦

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It was one of the oldest buildings left downtown. Why not try to save it ?

The religious right’s leading ghostwriter .

After high-school football stars were accused of rape, online vigilantes demanded that justice be served .

A comic strip by Alison Bechdel: the seven-minute semi-sadistic workout .

The Story That “Hillbilly Elegy” Doesn’t Tell

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