attitude towards politics essay

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Attitudes toward women and the influence of gender on political decision making.

• Mary-Kate Lizotte Mary-Kate Lizotte Department of Social Sciences, Augusta University
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.771
• Published online: 28 August 2018

There is a great deal of research, spanning social psychology, sociology, and political science, on politically relevant attitudes toward women and the influence of gender on individual’s political decision making. First, there are several measures of attitudes toward women, including measures of sexism and gender role attitudes, such as the Attitudes Toward Women Scale, the Old-Fashioned Sexism Scale, the Modern Sexism Scale, and the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory. There are advantages and disadvantages of these existing measures. Moreover, there are important correlates and consequences of these attitudes. Correlates include education level and the labor force participation of one’s mother or spouse. The consequences of sexist and non-egalitarian gender role attitudes include negative evaluations of female candidates for political office and lower levels of gender equality at the state level. Understanding the sources and effects of attitudes toward women is relevant to public policy and electoral scholars.

Second, gender appears to have a strong effect on shaping men’s and women’s attitudes and political decisions. Gender differences in public opinion consistently arise across several issue areas, and there are consistent gender differences in vote choice and party identification. Various issues produce gender gaps, including the domestic and international use of force, compassion issues such as social welfare spending, equal rights, and government spending more broadly. Women are consistently more liberal on all of these policies. On average, women are more likely than men to vote for a Democratic Party candidate and identify as a Democrat. There is also a great deal of research investigating various origins of these gender differences. Comprehending when and why gender differences in political decision making emerge is important to policymakers, politicians, the political parties, and scholars.

• public opinion
• attitudes toward women
• political behavior
• gender role attitudes
• feminist identification
• party identification
• political ideology
• political decision making

Introduction

Historically, gendered attitudes toward women effectively excluded women from political participation, silencing women’s policy preferences and public opinion, and preventing them from contributing to political institutions. American women supporting the abolition of slavery attended the World Anti-Slavery Convention in London in 1840 . These women, including Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, were not allowed to participate in the conference proceedings. Realizing that their desire to effect change was hindered by their inability to participate in politics, a desire for change—via women’s rights and eventually suffrage—soon began to develop (Ford, 2017 ). Attitudes toward women were making it impossible for women’s policy preferences to be heard by other citizens or heeded by government officials. This historical example illustrates the importance of understanding attitudes toward women and the influence of gender on public opinion and other political decisions. Stanton and Mott epitomize the importance of studying gender and political decision making. This essay discusses both attitudes toward women and gender differences in political decision making. The first section provides an overview of politically relevant attitudes toward women. A discussion of the role of gender in shaping individuals’ political attitudes and decisions follows. This article focuses primarily on political decision makers as its unit of analysis. For more on how candidates are gender stereotyped and its implications, see Bauer (“Gender Stereotyping in Political Decision Making,” this work).

Attitudes Toward Women and Gender Equality

An abundance of research exists studying attitudes toward women, much of which has a particular focus on sexist attitudes and gender role attitudes. This research is predominantly from social psychology and sociology but is relevant to politics and political science because of the consequences such attitudes have for policy preferences and support for women in politics. This section provides a critical overview of several measures of attitudes toward women and their consequences. Gender differences are an important component of this research and are noted throughout this section on attitudes toward women. This section does not provide an exhaustive list of measures of attitudes toward women and does not discuss the reliability or validity of the measures (see McHugh & Frieze, 1997 , for a discussion).

Sexism, Gender Role Attitudes, and Feminism

One of the older measures is the Attitudes Toward Women Scale, which was developed in the early 1970s to measure attitudes about women’s rights, gender roles, proper behavior of women, and women’s responsibilities in the public and private spheres (Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1973 ). Women are consistently more egalitarian in their scores on the Attitudes Toward Women Scale (Spence & Hahn, 1997 ), meaning that women are more likely to endorse equal opportunity in the workplace, to advocate shared household and parenting duties between men and women, and to oppose a double standard for sex before marriage. Overtime, men’s and women’s attitudes have on average become more egalitarian (Spence & Hahn, 1997 ). Although its widespread usage over the decades makes it useful for comparisons over time, the scale may now be outdated and no longer properly discriminates between individuals with differing attitudes, particularly at the liberal end of the spectrum. This may be due to changes in attitudes and possibly also because of social desirability (Fassinger, 1994 ; Spence & Hahn, 1997 ). For example, this scale measures support for equal opportunity in the workplace, the acceptability for women to engage in sex before marriage, and the sharing of household and parenting responsibilities, all of which have become much more mainstream attitudes and behaviors compared to in the 1970s when the scale originated.

Two more recent measures of sexism exist, which were developed to better capture contemporary sexist attitudes. First, the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory measures hostile sexism and benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996 ). Hostile sexism includes antagonism toward women seeking special favors in the workplace, the belief that women are overly sensitive to sexist remarks, and the belief that women use of their sexuality to control men. Benevolent sexism consists of the desire to protect women, placing women on a pedestal, and believing that women are morally superior. Men are more likely to endorse hostile sexism, and women often endorse benevolent sexism while opposing hostile sexism (Glick & Fiske, 2001 ).

The second category of contemporary measures of sexism, the Modern Sexism Scale and the Old-Fashioned Sexism Scale, measure nuances within contemporary sexist attitudes (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995 ). The Modern Sexism Scale is a measure of sexism including the denial of gender discrimination, a lack of understanding for the concerns of women’s groups, and denial of sexism on television (Swim et al., 1995 ). The Old-Fashioned Sexism Scale includes beliefs that women are not as smart as men, that mothers should take on the burden of child care to a greater extent than men, and that having a woman as a boss would be uncomfortable (Swim et al., 1995 ). Men are more likely than women to endorse the measures of Modern Sexism and Old-Fashioned Sexism (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005 ; Swim et al., 1995 ).

It may seem as though there has been an unnecessary proliferation of scales measuring attitudes toward women. While historical and contemporary sexism scales do correlate with one another, they are measuring somewhat distinct underlying beliefs. For example, the Attitudes Toward Women Scale and the Modern Sexism Scale are distinct but correlated measures (Swim & Cohen, 1997 ). The Old-Fashioned Sexism Scale, however, appears to measure the same underlying beliefs as the Attitudes Toward Women Scale (Swim & Cohen, 1997 ). The Hostile Dimension of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory moderately correlates with the Attitudes Toward Women Scale, the Modern Sexism Scale, and the Old-Fashioned Sexism Scale (Glick & Fiske, 1997 ). There is a low correlation between the benevolent dimension and these other measures of sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1997 ). As time goes on, attitudes of interest to researchers change, as does how to best capture culturally prevalent attitudes.

Feminist identity, endorsement of feminist beliefs, or support for the feminist movement are other ways to measure politically relevant attitudes toward women. Gender differences are significant, particularly for male respondents who are less likely to identify as feminists, shaping their attitudes toward women in general. Analysis of 1996 General Social Survey (GSS) data reveals that women are more likely than men to identify as a feminist (McCabe, 2005 ; Schnittker, Freese, & Powell, 2003 ). In the 1996 ANES, men were 8 percentage points less likely to support equal rights for women and 11 percentage points less likely to report favorable views toward the women’s movement (Clark & Clark, 2009 ). In the 2004 ANES, men were 4 percentage points less likely to support equal rights (Clark & Clark, 2009 ). The gender gap in feminist identification appears to range between 9 to 40 percentage points depending on available response options (Huddy, Neely, & Lafay, 2000 ). Attitudes around feminism even shape men’s attitudes toward women who self-identify as feminists: according to feeling thermometer ratings in the 1988 American National Election Study (ANES), men rated feminists less favorably than women (Cook & Wilcox, 1991 ). It is important to note that researchers do not always find gender differences in feminist identification or feminist beliefs (Clark & Clark, 2009 ; Rhodebeck, 1996 ).

Gender ideology, the belief in separate spheres for men and women, and gender role attitudes may be rooted in interest-based or exposure-based explanations (Davis & Greenstein, 2009 ). The interest-based explanation is that women benefit from more egalitarian attitudes and are therefore more likely than men to hold egalitarian gender attitudes, and the exposure-based explanation includes that socialization, like being raised by an educated and/or working mother, leads to more egalitarian gender views (Davis & Greenstein, 2009 ). There is support for the interest-based explanation as women are more likely to identify as feminist, endorse feminist beliefs, and feel positively toward the feminist movement (Clark & Clark, 2009 ; Huddy et al., 2000 ; McCabe, 2005 ; Schnittker et al., 2003 ). Additionally, women have less sexist/more egalitarian views than men on the Attitudes Toward Women Scale, the Ambivalence Sexism Inventory, the Modern Sexism Scale, and the Old-Fashioned Sexism Scale (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005 ; Glick & Fiske, 2001 ; Spence & Hahn, 1997 ; Swim et al., 1995 ).

There is also evidence to support the interest-based explanation using other measures of gender role attitudes. Generally, women have more egalitarian gender attitudes than men (Brewster & Padavic, 2000 ). In one study of GSS data from 1974 to 2006 , black females are the most liberal on gender role attitudes, measured as women’s suitability for politics and women’s traditional family responsibilities, than white females, white males, and black males; there is also a main effect of gender, with females more liberal than males (Carter, Corra, & Carter, 2009 ). Among women, working outside the home and higher education levels lead to greater support for equal gender roles, while frequent church attendance predicts more conservative views (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004 ). Using a two-wave study of married individuals across both waves, support exists for the interest-based explanation, including female employment and the presence of a small child positively related to women’s levels of egalitarianism (Kroska & Elman, 2009 ).

Evidence exists supporting the exposure-based explanation as well. First, exposure via parents or a spouse appears to lead to more egalitarian gender role attitudes. Among men, having a spouse in the labor force and higher education of one’s mother are associated with more liberal views toward gender roles, while church attendance is associated with more conservative views (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004 ). A two-wave study of married individuals finds support for the exposure-based explanation with a positive relationship between spouse and individual levels of gender role egalitarianism (Kroska & Elman, 2009 ). For men, having an employed mother is positively associated with feminist identity and holding feminist opinions (Rhodebeck, 1996 ).

Second, exposure via higher levels of education or liberal/Democratic identification leads to attitudes that are more egalitarian on gender roles. For men and women higher education levels predict more egalitarian gender attitudes (Brewster & Padavic, 2000 ). Among men, higher levels of education are positively associated with feminist identity and holding feminist opinions (Rhodebeck, 1996 ). In the 1996 GSS, men and women with higher levels of education, liberal ideology, and Democratic partisanship are also more likely to identify as feminist (McCabe, 2005 ). It is possible that egalitarian gender role attitudes lead to liberal/Democratic identification and not vice versa. Additionally, it may be the case that African Americans are more likely exposed to egalitarian gender roles because of a longer history of black women working outside the home. There are racial and gender differences, with whites and men being less liberal (Carter et al., 2009 ). 1

Consequences

Understanding how sexism, feminist identity, and gender role attitudes correlate with or predict other attitudes and outcomes is important in shaping attitudes toward women in the public sphere, particularly in politics. This section also discusses other evidence of politically relevant attitudes toward women, such as women’s suitability for politics.

With respect to policy preferences, less research has focused on these attitudes as predictors of issue positions. Benevolent sexism predicts support for and hostile sexism predicts opposition to affirmative action policies to promote the hiring of women among New Zealanders (Fraser, Osborne, & Sibley, 2015 ). A recent study employing 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study data finds that “modern sexism” predicts anti-abortion attitudes, support for the Iraq War, and less support for employment discrimination legislation to protect women; support for traditional women’s roles also predicts opposition to abortion and support for the war in Iraq (Burns, Jardina, Kinder, & Reynolds, 2016 ).

More research has investigated these attitudes as predictors of candidate evaluations (see “Gender Stereotyping in Political Decision Making,” this work). In an experiment, individuals with more egalitarian scores on the Attitudes Toward Women Scale rated female candidates as more effective at solving problems of the disabled, the aged, and the educational system as well as at guaranteeing rights for racial minorities (Rosenwasser, Rogers, Fling, Silvers-Pickens, & Butemeyer, 1987 ). Individuals with less egalitarian scores on the Attitudes Toward Women Scale rated male candidates as more effective at dealing with military issues (Rosenwasser et al., 1987 ). Men possessing hostile sexist attitudes evaluate women in nontraditional roles such as career women more negatively than women in traditional roles (Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner, & Zhu, 1997 ). “Hostile sexism” influences competence ratings of female political candidates in an experiment (Carey & Lizotte, 2017 ). Modern sexism and hostile sexism are associated with a greater likelihood of favorability and voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election (Blair, 2017 ; Bock, Byrd-Craven, & Burkley, 2017 ; Cassese & Holman, 2016 ; Valentino, Wayne, & Oceno, 2018 ) and voting for Romney among men in the 2012 presidential election (Simas & Bumgardner, 2017 ). In slight contrast, “benevolent sexism” predicted greater support for Clinton after exposure to a Trump attack on Clinton for “playing the woman’s card” (Cassese & Holman, 2016 ).

In the 1996 GSS, feminist identifiers, which are more likely to be women, are more likely to support abortion legality, affirmative action for women, and gender equality in employment as well as in the home (Schnittker et al., 2003 ). For men, feminist identification is associated with positive views toward women in politics, mothers working outside the home, and career-focused women but is not associated with those attitudes for women according to analysis of the 1996 GSS (McCabe, 2005 ). Perceptions of candidate positions on the issue of equal gender roles leads to greater support for Democratic presidential candidates in the 1988 through 2012 presidential elections (Hansen, 2016 ). Feminism appears to have a substantial influence on partisanship particularly among women, with feminist women being very likely to identify as Democrats and anti-feminist women being increasingly likely to identify as Republican (Beinart, 2017 ; Huddy & Willmann, 2017 ).

There is comparative cross-country data showing that individual attitudes toward women correlate with or predict gender inequality at the national level. Sexism at the individual level, measured as a belief that men make better political leaders and business executives than women, is associated with gender inequality at the nation level across 57 different countries including the United States (Brandt, 2011 ). Similar results exist for hostile and benevolent sexism; men’s average level of sexism, both hostile and benevolent, is correlated with gender inequality at the state level in 19 countries (Glick & Fiske, 2001 ). Egalitarian gender role attitudes, compared to traditional gender role attitudes, predicts higher income levels among women in data including individuals from 28 different countries (Stickney & Konrad, 2007 ).

Finally, there is research in political science that looks at support for women in politics but does not include measures of sexism, feminist identity, or gender role attitudes. This research area is vast, and the following discussion is not exhaustive. Some of this research does not find gender differences. According to analysis of GSS data from 1972 , 1974 , and 1978 , there were no consistent gender differences on women’s suitability for politics, while younger people, more educated individuals, and less religious respondents were more likely to view women as suitable for politics (Welch & Sigelman, 1982 ). In 1974 and 1978 GSS data, white women did not significantly differ from white men in their support for a female president (Sigelman & Welch, 1984 ). In the United States, there has been considerable research and polling that finds men are less likely to believe women are suitable for politics, particularly in higher levels of executive office. Men are less likely to report willingness to vote for a woman for president (Dolan, 2004 ; Lawless, 2004 ) and are less likely to report voting for a woman for the House of Representatives (Dolan, 2004 ). Controlling for a number of other demographic and attitudinal variables, men are more likely to believe that men are better suited to handle a military crisis, to punish terrorists, to prevent terrorism, and to bring peace in the Middle East (Lawless, 2004 ). Analysis of 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey data finds that men were less likely than women to be favorable toward a female president (Kenski & Falk, 2004 ). Finally, men were less likely to vote for Hillary Clinton for president (Burden, Crawford, & DeCrescenzo, 2016 ).

Gender Differences in Political Attitudes

As noted in the prior section, gender has an effect on shaping women’s and men’s attitudes on sexism, feminism, and gender roles. Gender also has a strong effect on shaping men’s and women’s attitudes and issue preferences with gender differences in ideology, party identification, vote choice, and public opinion across several issue areas consistently arising. In the following sections is, first, a summary of the literature on how women are more likely to identify as liberal, to identify as Democrat, and to vote for Democratic candidates. Second, there is an overview of gender differences in policy preferences. Third, there is a critical discussion of existing and potential explanations for gender differences in attitudes and policy preferences.

Gender influences political ideology, party identification, and vote choice. The gender gap in ideology is also a modest gap, in which women tend to identify as more liberal than men (Condon & Wichowsky, 2015 ; Norrander & Wilcox, 2008 ). Well-educated and single women are more likely to identify as liberal, and religiosity predicts conservatism for men and women (Norrander & Wilcox, 2008 ). Abortion and gender role attitudes contribute more to women’s ideology, while social welfare issues contribute more to men’s ideology (Norrander & Wilcox, 2008 ). In contrast, other research finds evidence that the gender gap in ideology results from differences in opinion, not differential prioritizing or weighting of issues (Condon & Wichowsky, 2015 ). In other words, men are more ideologically conservative than women because of different policy preferences, not because men and women differ in how they connect issue positions to ideology with positions on social welfare and abortion contributing equally to men’s and women’s ideological constructs (Condon & Wichowsky, 2015 ). Finally, ideological differences exist among partisans. Within the Republican primary electorate, men are more likely to describe themselves as conservative and women are more likely to identify as moderates (Norrander, 2003 ).

Party Identification

Consistent gender differences in party identification exist, with women more likely to identify with the Democratic Party (Huddy, Cassese, & Lizotte, 2008b ). Additionally, there are gender differences in the propensity to identify with a party at all. Men are more likely than women to identify as Independents (Norrander, 1997 ). Women are more likely to identify as weak partisans, while men identify as leaning Independents (Norrander, 1997 , 2003 ). This has consequences for the partisan gap overall. Failing to take into account the leaning Independents makes the gender gap in partisanship appear to be caused by women’s attraction to the Democratic Party; including leaning Independents shows the partisan gap to be equally due to men’s attraction to the Republican Party and women’s attraction to the Democratic Party (Norrander, 1997 ). Other research argues that the evidence suggests the partisan gender gap is mostly the result of white men leaving the Democratic Party (Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999 ; Norrander, 1999 ). The most recent analysis finds that the gender in partisanship appears to be the result of both men’s and women’s response to the symbolic images of the political parties, including the gender make-up of congressional delegations and partisan realignments, not simply men’s movement away from the Democratic Party as earlier work often claimed (Ondercin, 2017 ).

Vote Choice

According to analysis of cumulative ANES data ( 1980–2004 ), women are consistently more likely to vote for the Democratic presidential nominee over the Republican (Huddy et al., 2008b ). The gender gap in vote choice exists across several demographic groups (Clark & Clark, 2009 ; Huddy et al., 2008b ). For example, in the 1980 presidential election, women were more likely than men to vote for Carter across most income categories, among all education levels, regardless of union membership, among all racial/ethnic groups, regardless of parental status, among all ages, and across all regions (Clark & Clark, 2009 ). Similar findings exist for presidential vote choice for the 1996 , 2000 , and 2004 elections (Clark & Clark, 2009 ) as well as the 2016 election, which featured a woman major-party candidate (Burden, Crawford, & DeCrescenzo, 2016 ). Gender gaps even emerge within parties; women and men within the same party primaries tend to support different candidates on average (Norrander, 2003 ). For example, in the 2000 presidential primaries, female Democrats were more likely to vote for Gore in comparison to male Democrats, who were more likely to vote for Bradley, and female Republicans were more likely to vote for George W. Bush compared to male Republicans, who were more likely to vote for McCain (Norrander, 2003 ). This was also true in the 2016 presidential primaries, with female Democrats more likely to vote for Clinton and male Democrats more likely to vote for Sanders and female Republicans being consistently less likely than male Republicans to vote for Trump (Presidential Gender Watch, 2016 ). In Europe, women also tend to vote for left-leaning political parties (Abendschön & Steinmetz, 2014 ; Annesley & Gains, 2014 ; Emmenegger & Manow, 2014 ; Harteveld & Ivarsflaten, 2016 ; Immerzeel, Coffé, & Van der Lippe, 2015 ). 2

Issue Preferences

There are gender gaps on various policy issues, including the domestic and international use of force, compassion issues such as social welfare spending, equal rights, and government spending more broadly. Women are consistently more liberal on all of these policies, but the size of gender differences vary. Gender differences on the use of force, social welfare, equal rights, the environment, and morality have been the gaps most studied in the literature. Gender gaps in policy preferences are politically consequential. These issue gaps contribute to the gender gap in voting (Chaney, Alvarez, & Nagler, 1998 ; Clark & Clark, 2009 ). Moreover, the gender gap in party identification does not completely account for the gender gap in vote choice (Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999 ). In recent elections, women have turned out to vote at consistently higher levels than men, increasing the likelihood that these opinion differences could be politically consequential (CAWP, 2015 ). Hence, a gender gap on a single issue, especially a salient issue, could have significant electoral effects.

Use of Force Attitudes

There are robust gender differences on support for the use of force, with women less likely to support the use of force both internationally and domestically. Women are less likely to support defense spending and the use of the military to solve international crises. The gap on defense spending and use of the military was 10 percentage points and 5 percentage points in 1996 and 10 percentage points and 7 percentage points in 2004 (Clark & Clark, 2009 ). Differences on support for war in the abstract, troops in Afghanistan, and military intervention in Libya also appear to exist outside of the United States but considerably vary in size across Europe and Turkey, ranging from 0 to 23 percentage points (Eichenberg & Read, 2016 ). Gender differences on the use of international force do not always materialize outside of the United States. For example, only women in the United States have greater support for peacekeeping forces in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and greater favorability for the United Nations (Eichenberg & Read, 2016 ). Moreover, the gender gap on the use of military force consistently fails to appear in the Middle East (Ben Shitrit, Elad-Strenger, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2017 ; Tessler, Nachtwey, & Grant, 1999 ). Finally, women are also less likely to support the use of torture to prevent terrorist attacks (Lizotte, 2017a ).

With respect to domestic force issues, women are also more supportive of gun control and less supportive of the death penalty. The gap on gun control was 23 percentage points and the gap on the death penalty was 8 percentage points in the 1996 ANES, and in the 2004 ANES the gaps were 19 percentage points and 9 percentage points, respectively (Clark & Clark, 2009 ). Women are consistently less likely than men to support the death penalty (Stack, 2000 ; Whitehead & Blankenship, 2000 ). Many studies show a robust gender gap on gun control (Filindra & Kaplan, 2016 ; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001 ; Howell & Day, 2000 ), with women being less likely to own a gun and less likely to see owning a gun as a means of self-protection (Kleck, Gertz, & Bratton, 2009 ). There are, however, important differences in terms of party identification and ideology in support for the death penalty and gun control among women—women, who identify as Democrats and liberals, are more likely than Republican and conservative women to oppose the death penalty and to support gun control (Deckman, 2016 ).

Social Welfare Attitudes

Women are generally more supportive of social welfare spending and domestic spending on services. Generally, women are more supportive of a bigger government with a more activist role (Fox & Oxley, 2015 ). Social welfare issues include support for increased government spending on Social Security, the homeless, welfare, food stamps, child care, aid to the poor, and schools as well as government guaranteeing jobs, providing more services, and providing health insurance (Clark & Clark, 1996 , 2008 ; Howell & Day, 2000 ; Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999 ). Women are also more likely than men to support the Affordable Care Act (Lizotte, 2016a ). Recent analysis finds small and consistent gender differences on government provision of services, government-guaranteed jobs, government-guaranteed standard of living, government provision of health insurance, and increased government spending on public schools, child care, social security, welfare aid to the poor, and food stamps (Fox & Oxley, 2015 ). Not all women are supportive of increased government aid to the poor; in particular, Tea Party women and Republican women are less supportive than women nationally (Deckman, 2012 ).

These gaps differ in size across these varied issue areas and are generally robust to the inclusion of control variables. For example, on government-funded health insurance and government-guaranteed jobs, the gap ranges from 4 to 5 percentage points (Clark & Clark, 1996 ). In contrast, on Social Security spending the gap has been much larger at 14 or 15 percentage points (Clark & Clark, 1996 ). Spending on the poor, welfare, food stamps, and the homeless tends to produce gaps of 4 to 7 percentage points (Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999 ). The gap on social welfare spending has recently been the second largest opinion gap at around 10 percentage points (Norrander, 2008 ). These gaps remain significant, controlling for educational attainment, marital status, income, children, age, cohort, occupational status, party identification, religious identification, parental status, and race (Howell & Day, 2000 ; Lizotte, 2017b ). Gender differences on income inequality, however, do not exist in many countries outside of the United States and Western Europe (Jaime-Castillo, Fernández, Valiente, & Mayrl, 2016 ).

Minority Rights Attitudes

There is less consistent evidence of gender differences on racial policy or racial attitudes. In the 1996 ANES and in the 2004 ANES, the gender gap on support for government aid to blacks was only 3 percentage points (Clark & Clark, 2009 ). There appears to be a 4 or 5 percentage point gender gap in support for government spending to help blacks (Clark & Clark, 1996 ; Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999 ). Women are slightly more likely to support affirmative action (Clark & Clark, 2009 ). For support of affirmative action, the gap for jobs is 4 to 6 percentage points, while support for education quotas results in a 9 percentage point difference, both without control variables (Clark & Clark, 1996 ). Much of the research finds that the gender gap no longer exists when control variables and/or party identification are included (Howell & Day, 2000 ; Hughes & Tuch, 2003 ).

Women are more supportive of gay rights than men. Women are more likely to support civil rights for gays (Clark & Clark, 1996 ; Herek, 2002 ). Women are more supportive of consensual sexual relations between same-sex partners being legal, gay adoption rights, the right to serve in the military, and employment protections (Brewer, 2003 ; Clark & Clark, 2009 ; Herek, 2002 ; Stoutenborough, Haider-Markel, & Allen, 2006 ). Women are more likely to support equal rights and to support same-sex marriage controlling for various demographic and religious variables (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2008 ). Of course, not all women are supportive of gay rights; Republican women and Tea Party women are less favorable toward gay rights than women as a whole (Deckman, 2012 ).

Environmental Attitudes

Gender differences often emerge on environmental policy preferences. Women are more likely to support environmental protections even if it reduces the number of jobs (Clark & Clark, 2009 ). Conservative women are less likely compared to women nationally to support environmental protections (Deckman, 2012 ). There is also a gender gap on environmental concern (McCright, 2010 ; Mohai, 1992 ). The gap remains significant when demographic variables, ideology, party identification, knowledge about climate change, and parenthood/motherhood are controlled for in the analysis (McCright, 2010 ; Mohai, 1992 ). This gap is not as big as the gaps on the use of force or some of the social welfare gaps. Women are more likely by 5 percentage points to believe global warming is occurring and are more likely by 8 percentage points to believe that humans are causing it (McCright, 2010 ). Women also express by 6 percentage points greater worry about global warming and are more likely by 9 percentage points to believe that it will threaten their way of life (McCright, 2010 ). Additionally, women are more likely to agree that climate change will cause coastal flooding, drought, and loss of animal and plant species (Blocker & Eckberg, 1997 ).

Religiosity and Morality Attitudes

There are gender differences in religiosity, religious fundamentalism, commitment to religion, and frequency of religious behaviors, with women being more religious than men (Cook & Wilcox, 1991 ; Tolleson-Rinehart & Perkins, 1989 ). Republican women and Tea Party women are more religious than women as a whole (Deckman, 2012 ). This could translate into policy preferences. Women are more supportive of school prayer, more opposed to the legalization of marijuana, and more supportive of legal access restrictions on pornography (Eagly, Diekman, Johannesen-Schmidt, & Koenig, 2004 ). Religious belief does not always influence women to be more conservative on moral issues (e.g., the gender gap on gay rights). Gender differences in religiosity and traditional morality may be due to gender role socialization that promotes traits such as passivity and obedience in women (Thompson, 1991 ) or that prepares women for the role of motherhood in which they have the primary responsibility for the moral development of children (Eagly et al., 2004 ).

Gender differences on reproductive issues, which are often framed as morality issues, tend to be small and inconsistent in comparison to other gender gaps. Gender differences do not always emerge on abortion legality—it appears to depend on how abortion attitudes are modeled. In particular, if religious and religiosity indicators are included, women are more likely to support legality under all circumstances (Lizotte, 2015 ). Women are more likely to believe that abortion is morally wrong (Scott, 1989 ). No gender differences exist on the influence of abortion attitudes on party identification or vote choice (Lizotte, 2016b ). Relatedly, women were more likely to support the birth control mandate included in the Affordable Care Act, but men and women were both likely to have their support influence their 2012 presidential vote choice (Deckman & McTague, 2014 ).

Explanations

There are several explanations for gender differences in political attitudes and behavior, with varying levels of evidence to support each one. Examining the different theories put forth in the literature is integral to understanding how and why gender influences political attitudes. The following theories exist in the literature: Feminist Identity, Economic Circumstances, Social Role Theory and Motherhood, Risk and Threat Perceptions, Personality, and Values. There are varying degrees of support for each of these explanations. These explanations are not mutually exclusive, and it may be that more than one explanation simultaneously contributes to each gap, or that different explanations explain different gaps.

Feminist Identity

First, there is the feminist identity or feminist consciousness explanation. There are several different types of feminism, but commonalities exist across the different forms. Specifically, most types of feminism include the following: a belief in sex/gender equality; the belief that historical gender equality is socially constructed and not natural or intended by God; and the recognition of shared experience among women, which ought to inspire a longing for change (Cott, 1987 ). Evidence exists that feminist identity contributes to gender differences on defense spending, environmental attitudes, social welfare spending, and anti-war attitudes (Conover, 1988 ; Conover & Sapiro, 1993 ; Cook & Wilcox, 1991 ; Feinstein, 2017 ; Somma & Tolleson-Rinehart, 1997 ). Early work investigating this explanation finds a link between feminist consciousness and gender gaps on unemployment spending, child care spending, equal opportunity for African Americans, and foreign policy positions (Conover, 1988 ). Much of this research argues that feminist identity likely has an indirect influence on political attitudes and behavior. This research finds that feminist identity correlates with lower endorsement of traditionalism, individualism, and symbolic racism as well as greater endorsement of egalitarianism (Conover, 1988 ; Cook & Wilcox, 1991 ).

Economic Circumstances

Second, there are two economic explanations in the literature: economically independent women or economically vulnerable women are causing gender differences. Economically independent women are more likely than men to work in the public sector, such as in public schools and as health providers, and consequently would be more likely to support the Democratic Party, which is perceived as wanting to maintain or increase funding for that sector (Huddy et al., 2008b ). There is mixed evidence for this explanation. In 1980–2004 ANES data, professional and high-income women are not significantly more likely to vote or identify as Democrats (Huddy et al., 2008b ). Increases in women’s workforce participation explains the gender gap in presidential vote choice in the ANES 1952–1992 data (Manza & Brooks, 1998 ). Educated women as well as women and men working in the public sector are more likely to support social welfare spending, the men even more than the women (Howell & Day, 2000 ).

Economically vulnerable women may support the Democratic Party and greater government spending on social welfare programs because of the potential for them to benefit from such policies and spending. Additionally, economically vulnerable women may oppose defense spending and military interventions because it could lead to less funding of the welfare state. There is moderate evidence for this explanation in that income level is a predictor but does not fully account for gender differences in the following research. In some years but not all of the ANES 1980–2004 , low-income women are more likely to identify as and vote for Democrats (Huddy et al., 2008b ). Time-series analysis shows an association at the aggregate level between the size of the partisan gap and the proportion of economically vulnerable (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, & Lin, 2004 ). Low income explains some but not all of the gender differences in wanting more government services and spending (Clark & Clark, 2009 ) and in support for the Affordable Care Act (Lizotte, 2016a ). Finally, low-income individuals are less supportive of military interventions (Nincic & Nincic, 2002 ), but equalizing men’s and women’s income would only reduce the gender gap by about 9% (Feinstein, 2017 ).

Social Role Theory and Motherhood

Third, there is the Social Role Theory explanation, which posits that gender gaps result from gender role socialization (Diekman & Schneider, 2010 ; Eagly et al., 2004 ). Social Role Theory argues for an interaction between the physical characteristics and the features of the local environment leading to a particular male–female division of labor in a given society. Consequently, this division of labor brings about certain gender roles and gender socialization of agentic traits among males and communal traits among females (Eagly & Wood, 2012 ). Communal traits include anti-conflict and nurturance, and agentic traits include aggression and assertiveness. Therefore, women’s anti-force and pro-equality attitudes fit with these gendered socialized traits (Eagly et al., 2004 ). It is somewhat difficult to test this explanation because of the assumption that the vast majority of individuals will receive the same gendered socialization within a given society. Motherhood, however, predicts greater support for aid to the poor, government healthcare, child care spending, public school spending, preference for greater government services, and food stamp spending (Elder & Greene, 2007 ; Greenlee, 2014 ; Howell & Day, 2000 ; Lizotte, 2017b ). These findings show that motherhood contributes to these gaps but does not fully explain the gender differences. Motherhood also predicts opposition to the legalization of marijuana (Deckman, 2016 ; Greenlee, 2014 ); in a piece employing 2013 Pew Research Center data, however, motherhood actually does not predict attitudes toward the legalization of marijuana (Elder & Greene, 2019 ). There is no evidence that mothers are causing gender differences on security and foreign policy (Carroll, 2008 ; Elder & Greene, 2007 ).

Relatedly, gender identity, which may vary as a result of differences in gendered socialization, and the salience of gender identity produce even stronger gender differences in public opinion. In a Canadian sample, greater gender identity salience predicts increased support for social programs, welfare spending, marriage equality, and women in the legislature (Bittner & Goodyear-Grant, 2017a ). Similarly, in an Australian twin study sample, gender identity had a greater influence on vote choice than sex (Hatemi, McDermott, Bailey, & Martin, 2012 ). Sex, however, approximates gender identity well for most people except about a quarter (Bittner & Goodyear-Grant, 2017b ).

Risk and Threat Perceptions

Fourth, gender differences in risk and threat perceptions are a promising, potential explanation for the gender gap in force and environmental attitudes. There is a lot of evidence that women and men differ in risk perceptions. Although men and women often perceive the same things as risky, women perceive greater risk than men with regard to the same risky event or behavior (Gustafsod, 1998 ). Women perceive greater risks than do men in four out of five domains and are less likely than men to report engaging in risky behaviors (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002 ). The extant literature provides much evidence of gender differences in risk aversion. Women tend to be more risk averse or avoidant of risky behavior (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999 ); this difference even appears to exist between male and female children (Ginsburg & Miller, 1982 ). Women are more likely to feel anxious in response to terrorism and, therefore, be more risk averse about retaliatory measures (Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2009 ). Increased threat perceptions of future terrorist attacks lead men to be more likely to support the use of torture, while perceived threat does not increase women’s support for torture (Lizotte, 2017a ). In non–gender focused work, threat perceptions and risk orientations influence policy views and vote choice (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005 ; Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2007 ; Kam & Simas, 2010 , 2012 ).

Relatedly in the biopsychology literature, Taylor and colleagues ( 2000 ) provide a compelling theory based on prior research that women are less likely than men to respond to stress in terms of “fight or flight.” They argue that women’s response to stress is better characterized as “tend and befriend.” Evolutionarily, women have been the primary caregivers of offspring. Taylor et al. ( 2000 ) argue that to prevent harm to themselves and offspring, women may have evolved to tend, which they define as keeping offspring quiet in order to hide from threat, and befriend, which they describe as building networks and making effective use of social groups to provide aid and protection during stressful or threatening times. The idea that women do not exhibit the “fight-or-flight” response could explain why they respond differently than men to threat such as force-related issues.

Personality Traits

Fifth, personality traits is for the most part an untested theory for gender differences in political attitudes. The Big Five Personality Traits, including neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, constitute a widely accepted measure (Goldberg, 1993 ). Studies of the Big Five Personality Traits have found significant, though small, average gender differences in self-reported traits. Meta-analysis found gender differences across cultures on subcomponents of neuroticism, agreeableness, extraversion, and openness to experience (Costa, Terracciano, & McCrae, 2001 ). Specifically, women score higher on anxiety, a subcomponent of neuroticism; higher on altruism, a subcomponent of agreeableness; lower on assertiveness/dominance, a subcomponent of extraversion; and higher on the feelings subcomponent of openness to experience (Costa et al., 2001 ). These differences in personality could explain many gaps in political decision making. Ideological differences among men and women appear to exist partially because of women being more open to experience, more agreeable, and more emotionally stable than men (Morton, Tyran, & Wengström, 2016 ). Agreeableness appears to have differing consequences for men and women’s partisanship, with increased agreeableness among men being associated with Democratic Party identification and among women with Republican Party identification (Wang, 2017 ). More research on personality and political attitudes could be informative. For example, anxiety and assertiveness differences may explain women’s lower support for military interventions and their greater concerns about climate change. There is a link between altruism and women’s concern about the environment (Dietz, Kalof, & Stern, 2002 ). Altruism may also explain women’s higher levels of support for social welfare spending and equal rights for African Americans and the LGBTQ+ community.

Sixth, value differences offer another explanation for gender gaps in political attitudes. Values are more abstract than attitudes, making them applicable across different attitude objects, and are evaluative expressions of desired behaviors and goals for individuals and society (Feldman, 2003 ). Prior work provides evidence that values such as egalitarianism, humanitarianism, and militarism influence political attitudes (Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985 ; Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010 ). Schwartz ( 1992 ) developed the study of values through the examination of 10 value types, each of which is a set of values that are closely linked conceptually. According to Schwartz, values such as social justice, equality, tolerance, and peace belong to one of 10 key value types known as universalism. The other 9 types are benevolence, tradition, conformity, security, power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction.

There are modest gender differences in value endorsements (Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001 ; Howell & Day, 2000 ; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005 ). For example, gender differences exist on benevolence, which measures individuals’ concern for the welfare of others; on power, which encompasses a desire for control of others; and all of the other types (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005 ). Benevolence and universalism could explain gender differences on aid to the poor and environmental protections, while power and security could explain differences in support for the use of force. Women also score higher on measures of egalitarianism (Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001 ; Howell & Day, 2000 ). Value differences reduce the gap on social welfare attitudes, gun control attitudes, and support for the Affordable Care Act (Howell & Day, 2000 ; Lizotte, 2016a ).

Future Directions and Conclusions

Gender is an important factor in understanding attitudes toward women, including sexism and feminist identity, and gender differences in political decision making, such as gender differences in ideology, party identification, vote choice, and issue positions. Future work is needed to better understand the sources and effects of attitudes toward women and to further comprehend the origins and consequences of gender differences in political decision making.

There is little known about the political leanings of those with sexist attitudes or traditional gender role attitudes. For example, are those endorsing hostile sexism more likely to identify as Republican compared to those endorsing benevolent sexism? Do women who score higher on sexism measures identify as Republican? Presumably, the answer to both of these questions is yes because of the overlap between the GOP and conservative ideology. Anti-feminist women are more likely to identify as Republican (Huddy & Willmann, 2017 ). There is some evidence that in 2016 and in 2012 , among men, sexism predicts support for Republican presidential candidates (Blair, 2017 ; Bock et al., 2017 ; Cassese & Holman, 2016 ; Simas & Bumgardner, 2017 ; Valentino et al., 2018 ). In addition, men, whites, and Republicans have higher scores on measures of sexism compared to women, non-whites, and Democrats (Simas & Bumgardner, 2017 ). More research in this area should further explore the electoral consequences of sexism and feminist identity. It would also be of value to understand how these attitudes relate to policy preferences. One recent piece finds that support for traditional roles for women is associated with opposition to abortion legality and support for the War in Iraq; modern sexism also predicts opposition to abortion, opposition to job discrimination protections for women, and support for the Iraq War (Burns et al., 2016 ). The Attitudes Toward Women Scale and other sexism measures could also predict positions on a wide range of policies such as child care spending, insurance coverage of birth control, equal pay, sexual harassment, and Title IX. Additionally, it is unclear what the implications of these types of attitudes are for voter decisions, in particular for female candidates. There is some recent work finding that modern sexism and hostile sexism predict greater favorability of and a greater likelihood of voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election (Blair, 2017 ; Bock et al., 2017 ; Cassese & Holman, 2016 ; Valentino et al., 2018 ). More of the work on voter evaluations of female candidates should strive to measure attitudes toward women. In fact, similar items have been included in the 2016 ANES and presumably will provide insight into presidential and congressional vote choice.

With respect to how gender influences political attitudes, there are a number of unanswered questions. First, there is very little research looking at the gender gap in public opinion among African Americans (for exceptions, see Lien, 1998 ; Welch & Sigelman, 1989 ). There is a great deal of research that looks at gender differences in public opinion and controls for race. There is emerging evidence that black women are more likely to turn out to vote than black men, as well as the fact that according to exit polls, black men were more likely than black women to vote for Trump in 2016 (Dittmar & Carr, 2016 ). This suggests that there may be gender differences in policy preferences among African Americans. There is also work showing gender differences among Latinos in public opinion and ideology (Bejarano, 2014 ; Bejarano, Manzano, & Montoya, 2011 ). Lack of existing data is likely one of the most prominent reasons for the lack of research. It would be of interest to better understand how gender intersects with race/ethnicity when it comes to policy preferences.

Second, it is clear that gender differences in political attitudes are not the result of biological factors. The essentialist notion that all women are born more caring or conflict-avoidant is not borne out in the modestly to moderately sized gaps that exist in public opinion. This approach should simply be put to rest. Relatedly, via gendered socialization and/or because of lived experiences, men and women on average differ slightly in their positions on a number of issues. It would be quite beneficial to further investigate to what extent gendered socialization versus lived experiences explains these gaps. Perhaps including measures of each one in future survey collections could provide insight. For example, are women, who support greater government aid to the needy, more likely to have been raised to care and nurture others through playing with dolls? Or are women, who are opposed to military interventions, past victims or observers of violence, making them reluctant to use violent means to solve conflict?

Third, further research is needed to understand the usefulness of the personality and values explanations discussed here. It may be the case that gender differences in altruism lead to greater support for government aid to the poor. Or, that differences in the power value type account for the gap in gun control attitudes. The 2012 ANES data include a short personality inventory. The inclusion of values beyond egalitarianism in nationally representative data sets would make it possible to better investigate the values explanations. Finally, for both of these explanations (but also for the others discussed throughout), more work is needed to understand how multiple explanations may simultaneously contribute. For example, altruism as a personality trait may lead to greater endorsement of humanitarianism, which then contributes to the gender gap on aid to the poor.

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1. Although sexism and gender role attitudes scales focus mainly on women as the central subject, there are also a few different scales measuring attitudes toward men, including two different Attitudes Toward Men scales (Downs & Engleson, 1982 ; Iazzo, 1983 ) and the Ambivalence Toward Men Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1999 ). One of the Attitudes Toward Men scales measures attitudes such as men’s enjoyment of power, men’s greater confidence, and men’s household chores (Downs & Engleson, 1982 ). The other scale measures men’s supposed preoccupation with their sexual desire for women and men’s prioritizing of their career over their family (Iazzo, 1983 ). The Ambivalence Toward Men Scale includes a hostile dimension, measuring the belief that men attempt to have power over women and men try to dupe women into sexual relations, and a benevolent dimension, measuring the belief that men provide financial security, men are more stable in emergencies, and men deserve special care from women at home (Glick & Fiske, 1999 ).

2. There are gender differences in political engagement not discussed in depth here with women more likely than men to vote (CAWP, 2015 ) but less likely to participate in other ways (Burns, Schlozman, & Verba, 1997 ).

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Essay on Politics: Topics, Tips, and Examples for Students

Defining What is Politics Essay

The process of decision-making that applies to members of a group or society is called politics. Arguably, political activities are the backbone of human society, and everything in our daily life is a form of it.

Understanding the essence of politics, reflecting on its internal elements, and critically analyzing them make society more politically aware and let them make more educated decisions. Constantly thinking and analyzing politics is critical for societal evolution.

Political thinkers often write academic papers that explore different political concepts, policies, and events. The essay about politics may examine a wide range of topics such as government systems, political ideologies, social justice, public policies, international relations, etc.

After selecting a specific research topic, a writer should conduct extensive research, gather relevant information, and prepare a logical and well-supported argument. The paper should be clear and organized, complying with academic language and standards. A writer should demonstrate a deep understanding of the subject, an ability to evaluate and remain non-biased to different viewpoints, and a capacity to draw conclusions.

Now that we are on the same page about the question 'what is politics essay' and understand its importance, let's take a deeper dive into how to build a compelling political essay, explore the most relevant political argumentative essay topics, and finally, examine the political essay examples written by the best essay writing service team.

Politics Essay Example for Students

If you are still unsure how to structure your essay or how to present your statement, don't worry. Our team of experts has prepared an excellent essay example for you. Feel free to explore and examine it. Use it to guide you through the writing process and help you understand what a successful essay looks like.

How to Write a Political Essay: Tips + Guide

A well-written essay is easy to read and digest. You probably remember reading papers full of big words and complex ideas that no one bothered to explain. We all agree that such essays are easily forgotten and not influential, even though they might contain a very important message.

If you are writing an essay on politics, acknowledge that you are on a critical mission to easily convey complicated concepts. Hence, what you are trying to say should be your main goal. Our guide on how to write a political essay will help you succeed.

Conduct Research for Your Politics Essay

After choosing a topic for the essay, take enough time for preparation. Even if you are familiar with the matter, conducting thorough research is wiser. Political issues are complex and multifaceted; comprehensive research will help you understand the topic better and offer a more nuanced analysis.

Research can help you identify different viewpoints and arguments around the topic, which can be beneficial for building more impartial and persuasive essays on politics. Sometimes in the hit of the moment, opposing sides are not able to see the common ground; your goal is to remain rational, speak to diverse audiences, and help them see the core of the problem and the ways to solve it.

In political papers, accuracy and credibility are vital. Researching the topic deeply will help you avoid factual errors or misrepresentations from any standpoint. It will allow you to gather reliable sources of information and create a trustworthy foundation for the entire paper.

If you want to stand out from the other students, get inspired by the list of hottest essay ideas and check out our political essay examples.

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Brainstorm Political Essay Topics

The next step to writing a compelling politics essay is to polish your thoughts and find the right angle to the chosen topic.

Before you start writing, generate fresh ideas and organize your thoughts. There are different techniques to systematize the mess going on in your head, such as freewriting, mind mapping, or even as simple as listing ideas. This will open the doors to new angles and approaches to the topic.

When writing an essay about politics, ensure the topic is not too general. It's always better to narrow it down. It will simplify your job and help the audience better understand the core of the problem. Brainstorming can help you identify key points and arguments, which you can use to find a specific angle on the topic.

Brainstorming can also help you detect informational gaps that must be covered before the writing process. Ultimately, the brainstorming phase can bring a lot more clarity and structure to your essay.

We know how exhausting it is to come up with comparative politics essay topics. Let our research paper writing service team do all the hard work for you.

Create Your Politics Essay Thesis Statement

Thesis statements, in general, serve as a starting point of the roadmap for the reader. A political essay thesis statement outlines the main ideas and arguments presented in the body paragraphs and creates a general sense of the content of the paper.

Creating a thesis statement for essays about politics in the initial stages of writing can help you stay focused and on track throughout the working process. You can use it as an aim and constantly check your arguments and evidence against it. The question is whether they are relevant and supportive of the statement.

Get creative when creating a statement. This is the first sentence readers will see, and it should be compelling and clear.

The following is a great example of a clear and persuasive thesis statement:

 'The lack of transparency and accountability has made the World Trade Organization one of the most controversial economic entities. Despite the influence, its effectiveness in promoting free trade and economic growth in developing countries has decreased.'

Provide Facts in Your Essay about Politic

It's a no-brainer that everything you will write in your essay should be supported by strong evidence. The credibility of your argument will be questioned every step of the way, especially when you are writing about sensitive subjects such as essays on government influence on economic troubles. 

Provide facts and use them as supporting evidence in your politics essay. They will help you establish credibility and accuracy and take your paper out of the realm of speculation and mere opinions.

Facts will make your essay on political parties more persuasive, unbiased, and targeted to larger audiences. Remember, the goal is to bring the light to the core of the issue and find a solution, not to bring people even farther apart.

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Structure Your Political Essay

Your main goal is to communicate your ideas to many people. To succeed, you need to write an essay that is easy to read and understand. Creating a structure will help you present your ideas logically and lead the readers in the right direction.

Sometimes when writing about political essay topics, we get carried away. These issues can be very emotional and sensitive, and writers are not protected from becoming victims of their own writings. Having a structure will keep you on track, only focusing on providing supported arguments and relevant information.

Start with introducing the thesis statement and provide background information. Followed by the body paragraphs and discuss all the relevant facts and standpoints. Finish it up with a comprehensive conclusion, and state the main points of your essay once again.

The structure will also save you time. In the beginning, creating an outline for essays on politics will give you a general idea of what should be written, and you can track your progress against it.

Revise and Proofread Your Final Politics Essay

Once every opinion is on the paper and every argument is well-constructed, one final step should be taken. Revision!

We know nothing is better than finishing the homework and quickly submitting it, but we aim for an A+. Our political essay must be reviewed. You need to check if there is any error such as grammatical, spelling, or contextual.

Take some time off, relax, and start proofreading after a few minutes or hours. Having a fresh mind will help you review not only grammar but also the arguments. Check if something is missing from your essays about politics, and if you find gaps, provide additional information.

You had to spend a lot of time on them, don't give up now. Make sure they are in perfect condition.

Effective Political Essay Topics

We would be happy if our guide on how to write political essays helped you, but we are not stopping there. Below you will find a list of advanced and relevant political essay topics. Whether you are interested in global political topics or political science essay topics, we got you covered.

Once you select a topic, don't forget to check out our politics essay example! It will bring even more clarity, and you will be all ready to start writing your own paper.

Political Argumentative Essay Topics

Now that we know how to write a political analysis essay let's explore political argumentative essay topics:

• Should a political party take a stance on food politics and support policies promoting sustainable food systems?
• Should we label Winston Churchill as the most influential political figure of World War II?
• Does the focus on GDP growth in the political economy hinder the human development index?
• Is foreign influence a threat to national security?
• Is foreign aid the best practice for political campaigning?
• Does the electoral college work for an ideal political system?
• Are social movements making a real difference, or are they politically active for temporary change?
• Can global politics effectively address political conflicts in the modern world?
• Are opposing political parties playing positive roles in US international relations?
• To what extent should political influence be allowed in addressing economic concerns?
• Can representative democracy prevent civil wars in ethnically diverse countries?
• Should nuclear weapons be abolished for the sake of global relations?
• Is economic development more important than ethical issues for Caribbean politics?
• What role should neighboring nations play in preventing human rights abuse in totalitarian regimes?
• Should political decisions guide the resolution of conflicts in the South China Sea?

Political Socialization Essay Topics

Knowing how to write a political issue essay is one thing, but have you explored our list of political socialization essay topics?

• To what extent does a political party or an influential political figure shape the beliefs of young people?
• Does political influence shape attitudes toward environmental politics?
• How can individuals use their own learning process to navigate political conflicts in a polarized society?
• How do political strategies shape cultural globalization?
• Is gender bias used as a political instrument in political socialization?
• How can paying attention to rural communities improve political engagement?
• What is the role of Amnesty International in preventing the death penalty?
• What is the role of politically involved citizens in shaping minimum wage policies?
• How does a political party shape attitudes toward global warming?
• How does the federal system influence urban planning and attitudes toward urban development?
• What is the role of public opinion in shaping foreign policy, and how does it affect political decision making
• Did other countries' experiences affect policies on restricting immigration in the US?
• How can note-taking skills and practice tests improve political engagement? 
• How do the cultural values of an independent country shape the attitudes toward national security?
• Does public opinion influence international intervention in helping countries reconcile after conflicts?

Political Science Essay Topics

If you are searching for political science essay topics, check our list below and write the most compelling essay about politic:

• Is environmental education a powerful political instrument? 
• Can anarchist societies provide a viable alternative to traditional forms of governance?
• Pros and cons of deterrence theory in contemporary international relations
• Comparing the impact of the French Revolution and World War II on the political landscape of Europe
• The role of the ruling political party in shaping national policies on nuclear weapons
• Exploring the roots of where politics originate
• The impact of civil wars on the processes of democratization of the third-world countries
• The role of international organizations in promoting global health
• Does using the death penalty in the justice system affect international relations?
• Assessing the role of the World Trade Organization in shaping global trade policies
• The political and environmental implications of conventional agriculture
• The impact of the international court on political decision making
• Is philosophical anarchism relevant to contemporary political discourse?
• The emergence of global citizenship and its relationship with social movements
• The impact of other countries on international relations between the US and China

Final Words

See? Writing an essay about politic seems like a super challenging job, but in reality, all it takes is excellent guidance, a well-structured outline, and an eye for credible information.

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• The 2004 Political Landscape
• Part 5: Social and Political Attitudes about Race

Table of Contents

• Part 1: Party Affiliation
• Part 2: Early Voting Intentions
• Part 3: Foreign Policy, International Threats and Patriotism
• Part 4: Success, Poverty and Government Responsibility
• Part 6: Cynicism, Trust and Participation
• Part 7: Business, Government, Regulation and Labor
• Part 8: Religion in American Life
• Part 9: Other Issues (Civil Liberties, Immigration, Technology, Environment)
• Methodology

The issue of race continues to divide Americans and play an important role in politics, as it has since the nation’s founding. Since 1987, Americans, ­both black and white, ­ have become much more personally tolerant. The idea of blacks and whites dating, once highly divisive, is now broadly accepted. There also has been a steady decline in the number of Americans who say they have little in common with people of other races.

By contrast, there has been little change in the public’s perception of the extent of racial discrimination and how it should be dealt with. And whites and blacks continue to be divided on these questions. While there is overwhelming agreement that society should do everything necessary to ensure equal opportunity for all, most Americans continue to reject giving preferential treatment to blacks and other minorities.

The shift in opinion on interracial dating has been dramatic. In the late 1980s, only about half of the public agreed with the statement: “I think it’s all right for blacks and whites to date each other.” Today, over three-quarters agree (77%), with increases in support coming in all major demographic and political groups. Similarly, in 1988 a quarter of Americans said they had little in common with people of other races; today, just 13% say that.

Yet on questions relating to the pace of progress in civil rights and affirmative action, there has been far less movement in public opinion. By more than two-to-one (67%-30%), Americans reject this statement: “We should make every possible effort to improve the position of blacks and other minorities, even if it means giving them preferential treatment.” Opinion on that value has varied very little since 1987. And more than four-in-ten (43%) believe the nation has gone too far in pushing civil rights. Opinion on that issue has fluctuated in recent years, but a decade ago, the same percentage felt the nation had gone too far in pushing civil rights.

Opinions in Black and White

On most issues relating to race, the gap in opinion between white and black Americans remains substantial. Nearly half of whites (46%) continue to believe that efforts to promote equal rights have gone too far, compared with about a quarter of African Americans (26%). Similarly, far more African Americans than whites say there has been no real improvement in the conditions of blacks in this country (61% vs. 31%).

But there is little difference between the races in the view that discrimination is rare today; both blacks and whites reject this notion. And while roughly nine-in-ten African Americans (93%) say it is all right for blacks and whites to date, nearly three-quarters of whites (73%) agree. In the first years of the Center values surveys (1987-1990), roughly three-quarters of blacks and fewer than half of whites endorsed interracial dating.

The races remain deeply divided over affirmative action. But African Americans have become somewhat less supportive of making every effort to improve the position of blacks and other minorities, if that means according them preferential treatment. A 55% majority of African Americans express that view, down from about two-thirds in the early values surveys. Consequently, the black-white gap over that issue, once as large as 51 points, has decreased to 31 points.

Partisan Differences ­ More Over Policy

Partisan differences in racial attitudes also center on government and societal efforts to promote racial equality. More than twice as many Democrats as Republicans believe every effort should be made to improve the position of blacks and other minorities, even if that means according them preferential treatment (42% vs. 16%).

Similarly, a majority of Republicans (54%) feel the nation has gone too far in pushing equal rights, compared with about a third of Democrats (32%). The gap on both these values, while consistently large, has grown somewhat since the late 1980s. Moreover, these differences are nearly as large among white Democrats and Republicans as they are among all partisans regardless of race.

Today only about a third of white Democrats (34%) say the nation has gone too far in pushing equal rights; 55% of white Republicans believe this. The gap between these groups was as small as 10 points in 1991, but grew throughout the 1990s and is now larger than at any time in the 16-year series of surveys.

And white Democrats are more likely than white Republicans to completely agree that we should do what is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed; this gap is also bigger now than in the 1980s.

Yet on questions of tolerance, the differences between the parties ­ like those between the races ­ are much smaller. Fewer than one-in-five in both parties say they have little in common with people of other races (14% of Democrats, 13% of Republicans). And members of both parties have become far more accepting of interracial dating (79% of Democrats, 72% of Republicans).

Generations Divide Over Race

Age is a major factor in racial attitudes. Not only has there been a persistent generation gap in views of interracial dating, but changing attitudes across generations have resulted in a dramatic shift in overall opinion.

Succeeding generations of young people are moving into adulthood with more tolerant attitudes toward interracial dating than the age cohorts that preceded them. For example, among members of so-called “Generation Y” ­ the successors to Generation X who were born after 1976 ­ there is almost universal acceptance of interracial dating (91%).

A large majority of those in Generation X (85%) ­ born between 1965 and 1976 ­ agree. But 16 years ago, when Generation X was about the same age as Generation Y is today, just 64% of them felt this way. All age cohorts have become more tolerant on this question over time. In surveys conducted in 1987 and 1988, only about a quarter (26%) of the oldest generation (those born prior to 1918) approved of interracial dating. Now solid majorities of all age groups, except those who are now in their late 70s and 80s, agree. And even among this group (born 1913-1927), 49% accept blacks and whites dating.

But a different pattern emerges on questions relating to equal rights and affirmative action. On the issue of whether the nation has gone too far in pushing equal rights, Generation Y holds the same opinion as Generation X did in 1987-1988 ­ 34% of each believe the nation is going too far. Since then, however, a growing percentage in Generation X has come to believe that we are going too far in pushing equal rights (34% then, 42% now).

The youngest Americans stand out for their broad support of racial preferences ­ 48% of those in Generation Y believe every effort should be made to improve the position of blacks and other minorities, even if it means giving them preferential treatment. That is far higher than any other age group, and well more than the percentage of Generation X that expressed this opinion in 1987-1988 (36%). Over the past 16 years, members of Generation X have moved much closer to older generations on this issue. Currently, just three-in-ten in that group believe every effort should be made to improve the lot of minorities, even if it means preferential treatment.

South’s Still Different

The South remains a more conservative region on racial issues, but the differences between the South and rest of the country are narrowing. Over the past generation, a declining percentage of Southern whites view discrimination as rare and fewer say they have little in common with people of other races, decreasing or eliminating the regional gap on these questions.

And there is only a modest, eight-point gap between white Southerners and non-Southerners over whether the nation has gone too far in pushing equal rights (57% vs. 49%). That is far less than the differences between Republicans and Democrats, or blacks and whites, over this issue.

Southern whites also are much more accepting of interracial dating than they were in the late 1980s. Six-in-ten Southern whites are open to this, compared with 78% of whites living in other regions of the country. Because the shift in sentiment has been the same in the South as elsewhere, the gap between the regions has remained unchanged.

On a few values, the regional differences have not been confined to whites only; Southern blacks also have held somewhat more conservative views than blacks elsewhere. As with whites, one of the biggest differences was on approval of interracial dating. In 1987-1988, Southern blacks were 28 percentage points less likely than those living outside the South to approve of blacks and whites dating. Now the gap is only five points (89% Southern blacks vs. 94% of blacks elsewhere).

Majorities of blacks in the South and non-South support racial preferences to improve the position of blacks, though approval has declined among both groups since the 1980s and the gap between them has vanished. In 1987-1988, 69% of blacks outside the South supported preferences, while 62% in the South did so. Now, 55% of both groups are favorable toward racial preferences.

Southern blacks have diverged from African Americans in other parts of the country on one question, however. In the 1980s, only about one-fifth of both groups believed that discrimination against blacks was rare (19% in the South, 21% elsewhere). Now, 31% of Southern blacks but only 20% of blacks outside the South say discrimination is rare.

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Social Media and the Political Engagement of Young Adults: Between Mobilization and Distraction

Scholars have expressed great hopes that social media use can foster the democratic engagement of young adults. However, this research has largely ignored non-political, entertainment-oriented uses of social media. In this essay, I theorize that social media use can significantly dampen political engagement because, by and large, young adults use social media primarily for non-political purposes, which distracts rather than mobilizes.

Design/methodology/approach

I illustrate this argument using aggregate level data from the U.S., Germany, Switzerland, and Japan by comparing relative voter turnout and social media use data of young adults.

Data suggest a so called Social Media Political Participation paradox in those countries: The gap in voter turnout between young adults and older generations has not significantly decreased, despite a skyrocketing rise of social media use on the side of young adults, and the overwhelming research evidence that social media use fosters offline political participation.

Implications

When trying to understand the implications of social media for democracy across the globe, entertainment-oriented content needs to be brought back in.

Originality/value

This essay challenges the dominant research paradigm on social media use and political participation. It urges future research to theoretically develop, describe, and empirically test a comprehensive model of how social media use has the potential to mobilize and to distract.

1 Introduction

Around the globe, social media have become a centerpiece in young adults’ lives. Particularly with their smartphones, young adults can literally be on social media 24/7, permanently connected to the world and their peers ( Vorderer and Kohring 2013 ). In fact, when comparing the current young generation to their older counterparts, there is a fundamental difference in media use behaviors: While young adults, aged 16–25, rely on digital platforms or messenger services, such as Facebook, TikTok, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, or WeChat, to get the news, the older generation is much more likely to be exposed to traditional news sources such as television or newspapers. At the same time, there are dozens of studies around the globe demonstrating that, traditionally, young adults are less interested in traditional politics compared to older generations ( Delli Carpini 2017 ), less likely to vote, and generally less politically sophisticated ( Binder et al. 2021 ). In short, political parties had been, before the emergence of digital media, struggling to reach out to the younger generation. Especially when it comes to traditional institutions, you adults are often described as detached and apathetic (e.g., Binder et al. 2021 ; Loader et al. 2014 ).

Yet with social media, scholars have expressed great hopes regarding young adults’ democratic engagement (see Binder et al. 2021 ; Oser and Boulianne 2020 ): It has been argued that particularly social media can build new relationships between political actors and young adults, enable social interaction about political topics, connect people, enhance political opinion expression, equalize engagement and generally foster participation as well as boost voter turnout or contribute to social cohesion (e.g., Boulianne 2011 , 2015 , 2020 ; Goh et al. 2019 ; Loader et al. 2014 ). So, with digital media, there are grounds to believe that the generational engagement gap may be reduced, and that young citizens could be reengaged into the political world. In fact, scholars working on digital media and political engagement have been fascinated by this idea, largely pointing to democratically welcomed outcomes of social media use, such as learning or participation. For instance, researchers observed a positive relationship between the frequency of social media use and protest participation among the youth ( Valenzuala et al. 2014 ), and more generally, it has been found that political social media use is positively related to various forms of political participation (e.g., Ekström et al. 2014 ; Skoric and Zhu 2016 ). With recent meta-analyses on the topic, the evidence for the democratically positive outcomes of social media use is simply overwhelming, particularly in cross-sectional survey research ( Boulianne 2011 ; Chae et al. 2019 ; Skoric et al. 2016 ) and also with respect to young adults ( Boulianne and Theocharis 2020 ).

However, scholarship on the democratic outcomes of social media frequently seem to overlook the fact that social media are primarily used for entertainment and relational purposes, especially when it comes to young adults ( Dimitrova and Matthes 2018 ; but see Skoric and Zhu 2016 ; Theocharis and Quintelier 2016 ). That is, the social media use of young people is clearly dominated by non-political content ( Binder et al. 2021 ). Yet the vast majority of studies do not take these forms of exposure into account, eventually ignoring a large share of the diversity in content on social media. As a consequence, scholars have turned a blind eye on potentially distractive effects of social media use on political engagement, leading to a skewed overall picture of this research field. In this conceptual paper, I take a different approach by theorizing that social media use can significantly dampen political engagement. The main reason is that social media are primarily used for entertainment and social networking purposes, which has the potential to distract rather than mobilize ( Heiss and Matthes 2021 ).

In what follows, I will briefly summarize the literature on digital media and young adults’ political engagement. Then, using illustrative, aggregate level data from the U.S., Germany, Switzerland, and Japan, I will then describe the so called Social Media Political Participation Paradox , that is, the gap in voter turnout between young adults and older generations has not significantly decreased, despite a skyrocketing rise of social media use, on the side of young adults, and the huge amount of studies suggesting a significant relation between social media use and political participation. Then, I will develop a theoretical argument for why social media use is also likely to disengage, challenging the prevailing academic reading of the literature as well as the existing empirical evidence.

2 Digital Media and Young Adults’ Political Engagement

Political engagement, often also referred to as political participation, is understood as “actions or activities by ordinary citizens that in some way are directed toward influencing political outcomes in society” ( Ekman and Amnå 2012 , p. 287). This entails a diverse repertoire ranging from traditional (e.g., voting) and non-traditional (e.g., political online discussion; see Hopmann et al. 2015 ) forms of engagement to political consumerism ( Skoric et al. 2016 ). Political engagement can be conceptualized along the lines of individual and collective actions ( Adler and Goggin 2005 ). In addition, formal political participation, such as voting or party membership, and activism, which allows for influence in the political decision making process though protests represent distinct dimensions of political engagement ( Ekman and Amnå 2012 ).

Social media has given rise to entirely new forms of action and interaction that can only happen in a digitally networked space, such as online petitions or commenting on politicians’ posts ( Sloam 2014 ). Social networks allow for non-institutionalized and horizontal modes of engagement, which are often favored by young adults ( Sloam 2014 ). Since such forms of political engagement only exist and can be exercised within social media, they also have to be treated as a separate subdimension of political engagement. Overall, the various forms of engagement can be described as either institutionalized (e.g., voting) or non-institutionalized (e.g., protest behavior). This distinction is relevant because “young adults are disproportionately more likely to participate through non-institutionalized means.” ( Weiss 2020 , p. 3), particularly in the online world. This is by no means a new insight. Since decades, scholars have bemoaned a participation gap between younger and older individuals ( Quintelier 2007 ), as “in almost every election young people are the least likely to vote, and these participation rates are continuously declining” ( Quintelier 2007 , p. 165). For instance, in Austria, young people are allowed to vote at the age of 16, but nevertheless, their turnout rates are comparably low ( Binder et al. 2021 ). Findings from other countries also suggest that young people have comparatively negative attitudes toward politics and low trust in the political system ( Quintelier 2007 ; see Binder et al. 2021 ).

But there is also hope. In this research area, “[y]outh’s digital media use is often seen as a partial remedy to the decline of youth participation in political and civic life” ( Boulianne and Theocharis 2020 , p. 112). The argument is that digital media is an important source of information for those not primarily interested in institutional politics. More specifically, it is generally assumed that social media fosters young adults’ political engagement because the networking function of social media helps young citizens to develop skills and psychological dispositions that promote offline participation ( Kahne and Boyer 2018 ). Also, a seminal, cross-sectional study by Gil de Zuniga et al. (2012) suggests that social media indirectly promote participation by fostering opinion expression, which is a key driver of political participation. As another indirect effect of social media on political participation, it has been argued that some forms of social media use, such as news sharing, can strengthen social relationships and increase social cohesion, which in turn, may be the driver for collective action and group engagement (e.g., Goh et al. 2019 ; Hwang and Kim 2015 ). Similarly, social media shapes civic attitudes, and such “civic identity is a central factor that fosters civic engagement because it helps individuals to see society as a construction of human actors with political and moral goals” ( Chen et al. 2015 , p. 445).

In addition, it has been theorized that social media fosters incidental exposure to political information, which leads to learning effects, and ultimately, an increase in traditional forms of political participation ( Matthes et al. 2020 ). Furthermore, as explained by Boukes (2019) , social media increase the opportunities for citizens to learn because “never before has so much information, mostly without extra financial costs, been so close at hand for citizens” (p. 39). In line with this argument, the timeline structure of social networking platforms can lead to a “by-product” learning mechanism through which knowledge gaps are reduced ( Chadwick 2012 ), ultimately leading to political participation. And, more germane to young adults, the Impressionable Years Hypothesis ( Sears and Levy 2003 ) suggests that young people are more susceptible to social media effects compared to adults, as political efficacy and engagement are not fully consolidated during adolescence (e.g., Eckstein et al. 2012 ). That is, when exposed to social media, the notion of efficacy can be strengthened in young adults, leading to participation.

So overall, the dominant argument is that social media use can foster soft—that is, non-institutionalized—forms of engagement in a first step, such as online political expression or low-effort forms of political participation. This, in turn, will then shape classical, institutionalized types of political engagement in a second step. As Bode et al. (2014) have put it, “When adolescents use social networking sites – something many of them do in their daily lives – in a new, politically oriented way, it may actually increase their likelihood of participating in politics in other ways.” (pp. 424–425). In addition, social media can also directly lead to a rise in offline participation among young adults ( Boulianne and Theocharis 2020 ). This theory, in line with the available meta-analyses, leads to the clear prediction that social media use should increase not only non-institutionalized forms of participation, but also—indirectly or directly—traditional forms such as voting. The available “findings offer a strong, conclusive statement that online and offline forms of engagement are highly correlated; youth engage in both environments” ( Boulianne and Theocharis 2020 , p. 123). But how is this observable at the aggregate level when it comes to the institutionalized forms of participation, such as voting in national parliamentary elections?

3 The Generational Political Participation Gap

To reiterate, the previously available literature unequivocally suggests that social media use, particularly political forms of use, can foster online and offline political engagement (e.g., Boulianne and Theocharis 2020 ). With these insights at hand, the traditional generational gap between the young and older generations in terms of institutionalized participation needs to be revisited. One could argue that, over the past decades, social media use of young adults, unlike older generations, increased from basically zero to very high levels. That is, assuming there is a significant small to medium effect size for the relationship between political social media use on online participation, and a medium to large effect size for the relationship between online and offline participation ( Boulianne and Theocharis 2020 ), we would expect that, in the past decades, the generational gap should have decreased.

3.1 The Social Media Political Participation Paradox

To test this idea, I draw on official voter data (i.e., not self-report survey data) from the National Parliamentary Elections in Germany. As can be seen in Figure 1 , as can be expected, social media use of young individuals has increased from zero in the early 2000s to more than 80% at the time of the last election in 2017. So, in terms of the meta-analyses reported above and although such aggregate level analyses do not allow causal conclusions, one of the theorized drivers of engagement has witnessed a skyrocketing increase. But paradoxically, as visible in Figure 1 , there were no significant increases in voter turnout for individuals aged 18–24 over the years. By contrast, in 1983, young individuals showed a turnout of 84.30 (18–20 year old) and 81.50 (21–24 year old)% in the national election. In 2017, these numbers were significantly and substantially lower (69.90% and 67.00% respectively). That is, if anything changed, the numbers are more suggestive of an increase in the generational gap, rather than a decrease. Although these are only aggregate level data, they do not suggest that social media use—emerging in the last two decades—has completely changed the picture.

Voter Turnout in National Elections and Young Adults Social Media Use over Time, Germany.

Source for social media data: Koch and Frees (2007) , source for election data: Bundeswahlleiter (2017) .

Data from the United States suggest a similar, albeit not identical picture. As can be seen in Figure 2 , the generational gap in voter turnout is clearly visible over time, although young individuals slightly increased in turnout (e.g., from 44.30% in 2008 to 48% in 2020), whereas turnout for older generations remained largely at the same level. However, a fundamental shift in turnout when it comes to young adults is clearly not visible in the data, the generational gap is still evident. In Switzerland ( Selects 2019 ), 28% of young adults aged 18–24 participated in the national parliamentary election in 1999 (35% in 2003), 33% did so in the last election in 2019. By contrast, 57% of adults aged 65–74 participated in the election in 1999 (54% in 2003), and 62% did so in the last election in 2019. Again, a clear generational gap that has been consistent over time. Finally, looking at data from Japan, the turnout of people aged 20–24 was 35.3% in 2012 and 30.69% in 2017. These numbers, however, were significantly higher for individuals aged 65–69 (77.15% in 2012 and 73.35% in 2017), 70–74 (76.47% in 2012 and 74.13% in 2017), and 75–79 (71.02% in 2012 and 70.26% in 2017). This suggests a huge generational gap when it comes to participation in national elections in those countries, and there is no clear indication the gap has decreased over the years.

Voter Turnout in National Elections and Young Adults Social Media Use over Time, USA.

Source for voting: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Source for social media use: Pew Research Center, 2021.

So overall, these aggregate data deliver a clear message for these four countries, none of which has witnessed huge protest movements outside traditional party politics. Young adults are significantly less likely to vote in national elections compared to older generations, and it seems this gap has not decreased over the past decades, as one would expect from the enthusiastic voices in research on social media use and political participation.

In fact, the findings appear somewhat paradox: The social media use has increased from zero to almost 100% in the last two decades, which should, considering the effect sizes observed in previous research, also become visible at the aggregate level. So, on the one hand, we learn from previous research that social media significantly fosters political participation, online and offline (e.g., Boulianne and Theocharis 2020 ), on the other hand, we don’t see a higher turnout compared to older generations, who are much less likely to use social media compared to their younger counterparts. And even if they did, we would expect an increase in turnout for this group as well, which has not been the case. This phenomenon can be called the Social Media Political Participation Paradox . In short, at the aggregate level, it appears as if social media has not changed a thing, although social science research suggests quite the opposite.

3.2 Explaining the Paradox

Of course, on the methodological the most obvious explanation is ecological fallacy. We can’t derive any assumptions on individual level effects when looking at aggregate level data. Ultimately, no causal claims can be made, nor can we say anything about intraindividual change or processes. There may also be simultaneous, competing processes, and third variables cannot be controlled at all. Yet what we learn is that there is a generational gap in participation at the aggregate level which is, by and large, rather substantial. So at best, the data reported above can be understood as anecdotal evidence . Yet on theoretical grounds, the findings could inspire us to elaborate on why social media use may not automatically lead to strong shifts in institutionalized forms of political participation.

Several reasons can be found for this in the literature. On the theoretical side, the recent Social Media Political Participation model ( Knoll et al. 2020 ) holds that social media can foster participation only when a chain of subsequent conditions are met. According to this model, young adults have to be (intentionally or incidentally) exposed to political content on social media, they need to appraise political content on social media as relevant (as compared to other content that is simultaneously present), there needs to be a discrepancy between a current state and a future, desired state, they need to believe that a participation goal is attainable, and this goal must then be dominant in a real behavioral situation, in which other behavioral goals may be present as well (see Knoll et al. 2020 ). If one of the conditions is not met, social media use may not increase offline forms of political participation, according to the model. This model can explain why participation efforts of young adults are often short-lived, they can rise to substantial amounts during times of protest, but remain low in times of national elections. It would suffice if one of the appraisals is negative, as for instance, when other goals appear to be more important in an behavioral situation. Obviously, typical self-report survey studies cannot fully grasp the process described in the model because the behavioral situation is hardly taken into account in the typical research designs and the processes can hardly be measured in retrospect.

Second, it has been argued that social media is more likely to impact non-institutionalized forms of participation, rather than institutionalized ones ( Sloam 2014 ). That is, social media may engage young people politically, but that doesn’t necessarily make them more likely to participate in elections. In other words, social media can have the potential to engage, but such engagement may be short-lived, conditional, and bound to specific topics such as environmental engagement, animal rights, or social protest.

Third, and more importantly, when looking at the democratically relevant effects of social media use, scholars rarely consider (or control) non-political, entertainment-oriented content ( Boulianne and Theocharis 2020 ). Non-political, entertainment-oriented content can be information on lifestyles, products, leisure, sports, or social relationships on social media (see Hanitzsch and Vos 2018 ). Yet when we estimate the effects of political social media use without at least controlling non-political forms, we may end up with erroneous conclusions about the mobilizing potential of social media. Political contents and entertainment-oriented contents are simultaneously present on social media. A typical newsfeed completely mixes both.

As expressed by Boulianne and Theocharis (2020) , “purely social-, entertainment-, and leisure-oriented activities carried out on digital media do not necessarily mobilize individuals for civic or political action.” (p. 114) Entertainment-oriented use of social media may serve the purpose to create an “emotional relief generated by temporarily recreating or recessing from daily routines” ( Buzeta et al. 2020 , p. 81). When compared to political social media use, entertainment-oriented use accounts for a large proportion of everyday Internet use, especially among adolescents ( Büchi et al. 2016 ). For instance, in a recent over time experiment using behavioral browsing data, Wojcieszak et al. (2021) found that news websites comprised only 3.54% of the browsing behavior. The authors conclude that “news content is nearly unnoticeable in the context of overall information and communication ecology of most individuals” (p. 8).

Despite the relevance of non-political content on social media, scholars have hardly looked at the relationship of entertainment-oriented use of social media and political participation ( Skoric et al. 2016 ). As one rare exception, Kahne and Bowyer (2018) , observed that non-political content can serve as a gateway to various forms of civic and political participation. Yet other studies found no such gateway effects. In a cross-sectional study conducted in the Netherlands, Bakker and de Vreese (2011) observed non-political social media use had negative consequences for political participation. Additionally, data collected by Chan et al. (2012) suggest that the effect of Weibo use on the willingness to express one’s political views was weakened when entertainment motives prevailed. An experiment by Theocharis and Lowe (2016) even suggests negative consequences of Facebook use for participation because it can distract from politics. So taken together, only a few studies looked into the effects of non-political social media use on participation, some suggest that entertainment activities on social media may serve as a gateway to participation ( Kahne and Bowyer 2018 ), others speak of distraction from politics ( Bakker and de Vreese 2011 ; Boukes 2019 ; Chan et al. 2012 ; Theocharis and Lowe 2016 ).

Besides adding entertainment-oriented exposure as a predictor, it is also important to understand how entertainment-oriented and political uses of social media interact. If we accept both types of uses as separate dimensions, we arrive at four different types of audience members: “the Avoiders” (political use: low and entertainment-oriented use: high), “the Inactive” (political use: low and entertainment-oriented use: low), “the Distracted” (political use: high and entertainment-oriented use: high), and “the Focused” (political use: high and entertainment-oriented use: low). This typology of ideal groups is depicted in Figure 3 (see Matthes et al. 2021 ).

A typology of users based on the two dimensions entertainment-oriented use and political use of social media.

For the purposes of the present paper, the theoretically most relevant group are “the Distracted”. I use this term because I theorize that high loads of entertainment content may potentially distract the processing of political content. There are several theoretical reasons for that. As suggested by the priming literature ( Higgins 1996 ), the accessibility of concepts can drive cognitions and behaviors. Thus, when young adults evaluate the importance of concepts, they do not use all of the information they have available in memory. Instead, they often rely highly accessible information ( Iyengar and Kinder 1987 ). Here, accessibility refers to the ease or speed with which available information can be retrieved from memory. Information that is recently and frequency activated, is more likely to be temporary accessible ( Arendt and Matthes 2014 ). At the same time, of course, individuals’ cognitions are also driven by their basic political and social orientations which are be chronically accessible. But the influence of chronically accessible concepts can be weakened when individuals are frequently and recently exposed to other considerations. When, for instance, people are exposed to entertainment-oriented content, these non-political considerations become cognitively accessible. That is, when young adults are permanently confronted with non-political content, as for instance, about friends, family, movies, or sports, this content gets situated at the top of the head, making it more cognitively accessible when making judgments about political matters, including engagement.

That means, non-political content on social media competes with (and may even impede) the accessibility of political content. The Social Media Political Participation model ( Knoll et al. 2020 ) holds that political content on social media can only affect offline political participation when the content is appraised as relevant. However, when young adults are primarily exposed to non-political content, this may shift the perceived relevance of political considerations. In other words, when there is an abundance of entertaining, non-political news, the current political issues may appear less severe, and therefore, also less personally relevant. As a consequence, young adults may engage less with political content, which is a prerequisite to political participation. By the same token, the model holds that the goal to vote needs to be dominant in a real behavioral situation. When other goals are present as well, such as visiting friends or going shopping, then young adults will only cast their vote when this goal is dominant, that is, more important than other goals. So again, the argument is that non-political content on social media can shift the appraisal of goals.

What is more, we know from entertainment research that particularly hedonic entertainment content has a high absorption potential, and based on that, it can interfere with the cognitive elaboration of political content, “because it absorbs attentional resources to a degree that interferes with further elaboration” ( Bartsch and Schneider 2014 , p. 376). Also, on a perceptual level, non-political content is often perceived as more eye-catching as compared to political content. The reason is that the former typically relates to close ties such as friends and family and it is often associated with immediate positive gratifications.

Moreover, not all individuals may be exposed to political and non-political content on social media simultaneously. “The Avoiders”, albeit high in general social media use, may try to bypass exposure to political content, as for instance when an “individual exposes him- or herself to a limited amount of news because other content has more appeal to him or her, many algorithms will make future content decisions in favor of other content, e.g., entertainment, and give news stories a lower priority” ( Skovsgaard and Andersen 2020 , p. 466). Young adults interested in non-political contents may curate their newsfeed on SNS platforms in ways which exposes them to high degrees of entertainment-oriented content with low likelihood of exposure to political contents. This may lead to low-effort, feel-good types of engagement at best, making high-effort, offline political participation less likely.

But still, but even for news avoiders, scholars have argued that social media has the potential to foster participation because people can be accidentally exposed to political information in their newsfeeds. So even though young adults may not want to see political information, they may see it based on their social environments and networks ( Matthes et al. 2020 ). This exposure to political information may then lead to learning, and ultimately, participation. While scholars agree on the importance of incidental exposure for participatory outcomes, they have, at the same time, entirely ignored the opposite logic: Social media also exposed individuals accidentally to non-political information. Such incidental exposure to non-political content “can have important effects on political outcomes such as learning or participation. The more people are confronted with non-political content (without actively looking for it), the more they are potentially distracted from their primary political processing goal” ( Matthes et al. 2020 , pp. 1137–1038). So as much as incidental exposure to political content can engage, so can incidental exposure to non-political content distract and disengage. Unfortunately, while there are dozens of studies on the former phenomenon, we lack studies on the latter.

3.3 Testing the Paradox

The paradox described here is situated at the aggregate level. However, additional evidence is needed to explain why this paradox occurs. For this, it is therefore important to look at the outcomes of entertainment-oriented content at the individual level. That is, we should not only model political media use as a predictor of participatory outcomes, but simultaneously access (or at least control) exposure to non-political content. These two dimensions can then not only be used as focal predictors, they may also interact in a regression model (see Figure 3 ). High levels of entertainment-oriented non-political content on social media may have a “vampire” effect, when young adults are simultaneously exposed to political content on social media as well. Some young adults, those with high levels of political interest and sophistication, may primarily be exposed to political content on social media, which in fact, can be theorized to increase levels of online and offline political participation ( Knoll et al. 2020 ). These conjectures suggest that social media use, as a generic category, is of limited use in global research on digital media.

A similar argument can be made for the measurement of political participation. Oftentimes, scholars create participation indices by averaging several, distinct acts, such as wearing buttons of a party, sharing personal political experiences on social media, signing a petition, or voting in an election (see for a discussion, Theocharis and van Deth 2018 ). These measures blur the differences between institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of participation. Differentiating between these forms beyond the classic online versus offline notion, however, is crucial to understand the political consequences of social media use.

In addition to that, it is important to note that the typical survey approach used in political communication scholarship has its limitations as well. The reason is that self-report measures of social media use are largely biased ( Scharkow 2019 ). Also, typical experiments use forced-exposure settings, which cannot be compared to news reception situations in the real world ( Wojcieszak et al. 2021 ) Thus, to empirically examine the paradox, future studies need to rely on more naturalistic settings, such as web-tracking data or mobile experience sampling. With such measures, we can more precisely estimate the amount of exposure to political and non-political content.

4 Conclusion

With the emergence of social media, great hopes have been expressed across the globe that young adults may reengage into traditional politics, directly due to the various activities happening on social media, and indirectly by shaping low-effort forms of online-engagement in the first place, which is then assumed to shape offline participation in a second step. In fact, the available evidence clearly suggests that social media use, particularly political one, has an impact on offline forms of participation ( Boulianne and Theocharis 2020 ). However, aggregate level data from Germany, the U.S., Switzerland, and Japan indicate that generational gaps between younger and older adults have not or only marginally decreased. Although there was an unprecedented up rise of social media use over the past decades (including an increase in political uses), voter turnout did not change significantly, and was substantially lower as compared to the older generation. At the same time, the entire body of research on social media and political participation would suggest an increase in participatory activities of young adults. In explaining this paradox, this paper pointed to the potentially distracting functions of social media, mainly due to non-political, entertainment-oriented content. Such content can make non-political information more accessible, ultimately impeding the processing and salience of political considerations, dampening the activation and execution of participatory goals. In order to test these conjectures, future research needs to carefully distinguish several types of content on social media, on several platforms and channels, and access motivations, gratifications of usage as well as contents. This may lead to a more nuanced picture about the social media based political engagement of young adults, particularly when it comes to the democratically most relevant outcome: voting in an election.

Article Note: This article underwent single-blind peer review.

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Identifying and describing attitudes to immigration , let alone explaining them and their effects, is not a simple matter. In this chapter, we first outline the major scholarly works explaining attitudes to immigration. We identify six broad theoretical categories: economic interests, socialisation, psychological explanations, cueing, contact and context, and finally ’attitudinal embeddedness’. For each of these we present the key findings and consider the strengths and shortcomings of the literature, where applicable. We also sketch out existing research on the politics of immigration and the effects of attitudes to immigration on democratic politics, which we categorise as research on policy responsiveness, effects on party family support (notably the radical right), party competition, and polarisation. We end by considering future avenues for research.

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1 what are public attitudes towards and the politics of immigration.

Identifying and describing attitudes to immigration , let alone explaining them, is not a simple matter. First, human attitudes in general are abstract and so any measurement of them is bound to be highly qualified and contingent on theoretical assumptions and methodological approaches. Second, immigration is a broad topic. Attitudes to immigration alone can be divided into attitudes towards immigrants, towards immigration policy, the perceived effects of immigration, or towards how important immigration is as an issue. Each of these can be divided by immigrant group as the most obvious qualifier. In this chapter we follow the political science literature in conceptualising attitudes as “people’s orientations toward objects” (Druckman & Lupia, 2000 , p. 4). Below, we outline the major scholarly works explaining attitudes to immigration. We also sketch out existing research on the politics of immigration and the effects of attitudes to immigration on democratic politics.

2 Key Theories Explaining Attitudes to Immigration

A vast literature has been devoted to explaining variation in attitudes to immigration, particularly between individuals in host populations in developed western countries. Here we outline six strands: economics, socialisation, psychology, attitudinal embeddedness, cueing, and context and contact (for other useful reviews see Berg, 2015 ; Dennison & Dražanová, 2018 ; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014 ).

2.1 Economic Interests

Reflecting broader trends in scholarly work on political attitudes and behaviour, the use of economic factors to explain variation in attitudes to immigration is one of the longest standing, most developed and—currently—increasingly contested theoretical strands. In particular, evidence of the causal effect of actual economic indicators, such as income or employment, at the individual level is mixed; for example, Espenshade and Calhoun ( 1993 ) find no evidence to support this hypothesis, though recent studies have found evidence that labour market competition does affect attitudes (Huber & Oberdabernig, 2015 ; Pardos-Prado & Xena, 2019 ; Polavieja, 2016 ). The effect of psychological perceptions of economic threat has received greater support; Burns and Gimpel ( 2000 ) and Espenshade and Hempstead ( 1996 ) find that a pessimistic personal economic outlook leads to greater negativity.

At the national level, however, it has been shown repeatedly that economic downturns and rising unemployment rates increase anti-immigration sentiment (Ruist, 2016 ). Furthermore, Magni ( 2020 ) shows that inequality leads to decreasing support for access to welfare for immigrants. It seems that any negative effect of economic downturns on attitudes to immigration is primarily in sociotropic rather than pocketbook terms, i.e. individuals are more concerned about the potential effect on their fellow citizens than themselves, and when they are concerned about themselves it is in terms of perceived economics rather than actual economics. Somewhat tautologically, many works have shown that belief that immigration is bad for the economy or that immigrants take finite resources lead to opposition to immigration, though this may simply be a post facto justification (Fussell, 2014 ). However, there is evidence that some immigrant groups are seen as likely to contribute and are thus more likely to receive public support (Alba et al., 2005 ).

2.2 Socialisation

Other studies have suggested that attitudes to immigration are the result of one’s socialising experiences early in life. Importantly, McLaren et al. ( 2020 ; see also García-Faroldi, 2017 ; Kauff et al., 2013 ) show that being socialised in a more heterogenous society creates more pro-immigration attitudes. Individuals socialised in countries with strong ethnic, rather than civic or multicultural, identities have been shown to be less supportive of immigration (Van Assche et al., 2017 ; Levanon & Lewin-Epstein, 2010 ; Hiers et al., 2017 ; at the individual level, see McAllister, 2018 ), as have those in which there is a strong collective rather than individualist culture (Meeusen & Kern, 2016 ; Shin & Dovidio, 2016 ).

Education has been repeatedly shown to be positively associated with attitudes to immigration, particularly tertiary education, and to explain shifts in generational patterns (McLaren & Paterson, 2020 ). Jackman and Muha ( 1984 ) and Janus ( 2010 ) argue that education has an indoctrinating effect which leads individuals to support certain normative ideologies, in this case leading to pro-immigration views while attending university, with its focus on a ‘universal’, rather than national, outlook. Inversely, Hainmueller and Hiscox ( 2007 ) and Mayda ( 2006 ) argue that less education leads to less tolerance for diversity which leads to anti-immigration attitudes.

Other important socialising experiences include living or being born abroad, white collar-work or belonging to an ethnic minority, which lead to a cosmopolitan worldview and, thus, pro-immigration attitudes (Haubert & Fussell, 2006 ). Interestingly, less integrated Latinos have been shown to be more pro-immigration (Branton, 2007 ). Finally, being religious and taking part in religious activities have been argued to increase empathy or induce universalistic values and thus lead to support for immigration (Knoll, 2009 ; however, see Helbling & Traunmüller, 2016 ).

2.3 Psychological

Other studies have suggested that attitudes to immigration result from fundamental psychological predispositions, such as personality types, values and identities. The “Big Five Personality Types” have been shown to predict different types of attitudes to immigration (Dinesen et al., 2016 ). Individuals that value (defined as their long-term and deep-seated motivational goals) tradition, conformity, and security oppose immigration whereas those who value universalism are supportive (e.g. Davidov et al., 2008 ). Values shared by conservatives and progressives—such as benevolence—are not likely to divide individuals. Similarly, so-called “right wing authoritarian” predispositions—valuing order and unambiguity above all—have been shown to increase anti-immigration attitudes (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010 ). Consciousness of in-group and out-group social identities are often shown to be associated with immigration attitudes (Fussell, 2014 ). Brewer ( 1999 ) showed that in-group favouritism was more important than out-group prejudice, with the former leading to a desire to see one’s group’s interests furthered. Lower societal trust is associated with anti-immigration attitudes (MacDonald, 2020 ).

A common finding in the public opinion research is that individuals tend to take cues from trusted sources of information, such as political elites, in order to form opinions on a wide range of issues (e.g. Zaller, 1992 ). While individuals’ views may to some extent be influenced by cues from the overall elite stance (Sanders & Toka, 2013 ), much of the literature explores the extent to which individuals take cues from the party they identify most closely with (e.g. Brader & Tucker, 2012 ). Several studies find this to be the case with respect to the immigration issue too, the impact of party cues being larger among the more highly educated individuals (Hellwig & Kweon, 2016 ; Vrânceanu & Lachat, 2021 ). There is, however, variation in the strength of cueing effects. Harteveld et al. ( 2017 ) suggest that political parties at the extremes of the political spectrum have a higher capacity to cue their supporters. Since parties at the extremes are likely to adopt very distant positions from one another, the authors suggest that the cueing effect may contribute to mass polarisation. Along similar lines, Arndt ( 2016 ) corroborates that the Danish public opinion polarisation on cultural issues, including immigration, occurred in response to elite polarisation.

2.5 Contact and Context

Both contact theory and group threat theory predict that greater interaction with immigrants will affect attitudes to immigration, but with opposite theorised effects. Similarly, both, though particularly the former, have been studied extensively (Gravelle, 2016 ; Wilson-Daily et al., 2018 ). Contact theory theorises that individuals hold misconceptions about immigrants and that contact lessens those misconceptions and thus makes individuals more pro-immigration, as first outlined by Allport ( 1954 ; see also, e.g. Ha, 2010 ; Berg, 2009 ). Nevertheless, these findings suffer from two methodological weaknesses: contact tends to be either measured through the ethnic composition of the individual’s neighbourhood, which fails to actually measure contact and more pro-immigration individuals are likely to be more willing to have contact with immigrants to start with. These weaknesses have to some extent been overcome by experimental studies (Hewstone et al., 2005 ), which support contact theory’s supposed mechanisms of improved knowledge, greater empathy, and especially, a reduction in intergroup anxiety (Barlow et al., 2012 ; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006 ).

By contrast, group threat theory expects contact with immigrants to increase the sense of threat felt by non-immigrants, who then become more opposed to immigration, with the effect sometimes contingent on the size of the majority group (e.g. Berg, 2014 ; McLaren, 2003 ). Two syntheses have been put forward, first, regarding the level of intimacy of the contact (Fetzer, 2000 ; Kaufmann, 2014 ) and, second, regarding who the immigrants are (Ha, 2010 ). Moreover, despite the vast literature, the effect sizes in either direction are usually considerably smaller than those related to socialisation and psychology and, theoretically, should be less persistent.

In policy terms, Schlueter and Davidov ( 2013 ) show that European countries that actively pursue immigrant integration policies foster lower levels of feelings of group threat amongst their citizens. Messing and Ságvári ( 2018 ) argue that perceptions of state capacity in general affect attitudes to immigration. Terrorist attacks had been shown to affect attitudes to immigration (Legewie, 2013 ), but more recent evidence suggests that attitudes to immigration have become sufficiently embedded in Europe that short term events and attacks are unlikely to affect them further (Brouard et al., 2018 ).

At the personal level, Jackson et al. ( 2001 ) show that having a family and children leads to greater anti-immigration views, as individuals become more concerned and cautious about major societal changes. A lack of feeling of safety in one’s neighbourhood has also been shown to lead to anti-immigration views (Chandler & Tsai, 2001 ).

2.6 Attitudinal Embeddedness

One of the reasons for the high interest in contact theory and group threat theory is that they are intuitively only applicable to attitudes to immigration. However, attitudes to immigration are to a large extent formed by similar forces that determine attitudes to other prevalent political issues, which, as a result, they correlate strongly with and together determine placements within broader attitudinal sets such as ‘left-right’ or ‘authoritarian-libertarian’ (de Vries et al., 2013 ). Owing to cognitive dissonance, this embeddedness limits the flexibility that individuals might have over such attitudes. Indeed, the correlation between immigration attitudes and broader political attitudes has increased over time (Semyonov et al., 2006 ).

3 Politics of Immigration

Having reviewed various theoretical accounts for attitudes to immigration, it is relevant to ask to what extent political parties articulate and respond to public preferences. Moreover, which political entrepreneurs mobilise public views on immigration and what are the main patterns of party competition around this issue? We review below several findings from research focusing mostly on European countries.

3.1 Responsiveness

Political representation is the cornerstone of democratic functioning and political parties have a key role in this process (e.g. Dalton, 2017 , p. 610). The immigration issue has gained growing political attention in European countries in recent decades (Green-Pedersen & Otjes, 2019 ) and it has been highly salient in recent national elections and referenda (e.g. Aardal & Bergh, 2018 ; Hobolt, 2016 ). There is thus increasing scholarly attention to how responsive political parties are to voters’ preferences on this issue. O’Grady and Abou-Chadi ( 2019 ) find at best limited evidence of party responsiveness to short-term changes in the general public opinion. By contrast, Dalton ( 2017 ) suggests that political parties tend to be responsive to their own supporters’ views on cultural issues (including immigration), although he identifies a representation gap illustrated by lower congruence between parties’ and citizens’ policy positions, notably among leftist parties (see also Brady et al., 2020 ; Costello et al., 2012 ). In a recent study covering 17 European countries, Vrânceanu ( 2019 ) finds that mainstream parties tend to be more responsive to the average voter when they face competition from strong radical right competitors. This highlights the role of ‘issue entrepreneurs’ (De Vries & Hobolt, 2012 ) in enhancing the responsiveness of mainstream parties to the general electorate.

3.2 Support for Radical Right and Other Party Families

Radical right parties (RRPs hereafter) represent the party family that has arguably benefitted most from mobilising public anti-immigrant sentiment (Kriesi et al., 2006 ). As Ivarsflaten ( 2008 , p. 3) argues, “only the appeal on the immigration issue unites all successful populist right parties”. Research consistently shows that holding anti-immigration views increases the likelihood of voting for an RRP (Kriesi & Schulte-Cloos, 2020 ; Lubbers et al., 2002 ; Rydgren, 2008 ). This is especially so when anti-immigrant parties are evaluated by voters on policy considerations (van der Brug et al., 2005 ). A string of recent studies focusing on single countries confirm the importance of anti-immigration attitudes for the success of RRPs and extreme-right parties. Focusing on Greece, Dinas et al. ( 2019 ) document that exposure to refugees in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis increased the support for the extreme right party Golden Dawn. Similarly, in Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) shifted radically in an anti-immigration direction by 2017, increasingly attracting voters with strong anti-immigrant views (Arzheimer & Berning, 2019 ). With reference to the same country, Neuner and Wratil ( 2020 ) suggest that the combination of anti-immigration and people-centric appeals is particularly attractive to voters. Dennison and Geddes ( 2019 ; see also Dennison, 2019 ; Mendes & Dennison, 2020 ) also show that the vote share of RRPs in Western Europe increases as the public issue salience of immigration rises.

However, several studies dispute the idea that immigration is mobilised by RRPs alone (e.g. Alonso & da Fonseca, 2011 ). There is cross-country variation in the extent to which centre-right and centre-left parties used the immigration issue for purposes of electoral competition (Odmalm & Super, 2014 ). Pardos-Pardo ( 2015 ) suggests that centre-parties can benefit from mobilising anti-immigrant sentiment when party competition occurs in a unidimensional space, i.e. when the economic and cultural dimensions of party competition overlap. Moreover, Downes and Loveless ( 2018 ) show that in the period following the 2008 economic crisis non-incumbent centre-right parties gained electorally from emphasising the immigration issue. By contrast, more recent studies suggest that Social Democratic parties fail to attract votes when they adopt tough positions on immigration, as this strategy is especially likely to alienate highly educated voters and socio-cultural and self-employed professionals (Abou-Chadi & Wagner, 2020 ). Instead, mainstream left parties may win votes by combining liberal sociocultural positions (on immigration, among other issues) with investment-oriented economic positions (Abou-Chadi & Wagner, 2019 ).

In line with the issue voting literature, which examines how voting decisions are based on voters’ issue preferences (e.g. Hobolt & Rodon, 2020 , p. 228), the empirical evidence indicates that proximity between voters’ positions on immigration and parties’ stances on this issue matters for vote choice, including when examining mainstream parties only or countries without RRPs at the time of the study (Pardos-Pardo, 2012 ; Brady et al., 2020 ). The effect of issue proximity on party support seems to be moderated by voter polarisation (Han, 2018 ), or by issue constraint and how immigration fits underlying cleavages (Pardos-Pardo, 2012 ). Note that perceptions of proximity may be endogenous to party affect (Dinas et al., 2016 ). Finally, the political supply may be scarce for voters who are economically left-wing but hold anti-immigration attitudes (Van der Brug & van Spanje, 2009 ). The vote choice of citizens in this group should thus be influenced by the relative personal importance of the two issues, economy and immigration (Lefkofridi et al., 2014 ).

3.3 Party Competition

Research on party competition documents how RRPs can benefit from the strategies that mainstream parties adopt on their main issue dimension, immigration (e.g. Meguid, 2005 ). On the one hand, studies exploring how the adoption by mainstream parties of accommodative strategies, that is, convergence toward the hard-line policy positions of RRPs, affects the electoral success of RRPs come with mixed findings. Arzheimer ( 2009 ) finds no effect, although RRPs do benefit when their competitors talk more about immigration. By contrast, Arzheimer and Carter ( 2006 ) find that the probability to vote for an RRP increases when the mainstream right competitor adopts tough positions on RRP’s core issues, which is in line with a legitimisation effect. Down and Han ( 2019 ) find a similar effect, but only among voters that did not consider RRPs to be the most competent on immigration. On the other hand, Meguid ( 2005 ) suggests that niche parties, such as RRPs, lose electoral support when both mainstream-left and right competitors ignore the immigration issue or converge toward the position of the RRP (see also Dahlström and Sundell ( 2012 ) who also show that the behaviour of the mainstream left matters to a higher extent), and win votes when at least one of their competitors adopts an adversarial strategy.

There is also vast research on the extent to which mainstream parties adopt accommodative strategies in response to RRPs’ electoral success, which would be indicative of a contagion effect. Van Spanje ( 2010 ) finds that electoral pressures exerted by anti-immigration parties generate incentives for other parties to adopt restrictive positions on immigration (see also Abou-Chadi, 2016 ; Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2018 ). Han ( 2015 ) documents that, while contagion affects mainstream right parties unconditionally, mainstream left parties are affected only when their supporters become more negative about multiculturalism or immigration, or when they had suffered electoral losses in the previous election. RRPs’ welfare chauvinistic stances may impact as well, although differentially, the positions of mainstream competitors on multiculturalism and welfare (Schumacher & van Kersbergen, 2016 ). Finally, large parties tend to adopt more restrictive stances also when issue saliency at the party-system level increases (Abou-Chadi et al., 2020 ). Interestingly, whereas issue attention tends to increase in countries with stronger RRPs and higher shares of foreign-born population, the potential to become a top issue on the political agenda depends on the coalition incentives facing centre-right parties (Green-Pedersen & Otjes, 2019 ).

However, other studies suggest that the effect of RRPs on mainstream parties’ issue saliency and position-taking may have been exaggerated (e.g. Dancygier & Margalit, 2019 ). In terms of position-taking, these parties have at times adopted restrictive immigration stances before being challenged by radical right competitors (Alonso & da Fonseca, 2011 ; see also Mudde, 2013 ). Furthermore, according to Bale et al. ( 2010 ), the response of centre-left (social democratic) parties to the RRP challenge depends on additional factors such as the strategic behaviour of centre-right and left-wing parties. Moreover, parties’ strategies can also be affected by the extent to which the immigration issue aligns with the dominant societal fault line in a given country (Odmalm & Super, 2014 ). Finally, political parties may actually decide to blur their issue stances, particularly when it comes to issues that they do not primarily mobilise on and in a context of voter polarisation or divided partisan base (Han, 2018 ).

3.4 Politicisation

Grande et al. ( 2019 ) define issue politicisation as a combination of issue salience and polarisation. Focusing on six Western European countries, the authors document growing politicisation of the immigration issue after the 2000s, mostly due to growing party polarisation and issue entrepreneurial strategies on the part of RRPs. This resonates with Dancygier and Margalit’s ( 2019 , p. 28) claim that “if polarisation around immigration has occurred, it has likely been driven by parties located on the farther ends of the ideological spectrum” (but see Alonso & da Fonseca, 2011 , p. 880). Researchers have also analysed contexts where party polarisation is driven by the first-time entry into Parliament of RRPs, to assess how this affects voter polarisation. Bischof and Wagner ( 2019 ) employ a range of methods to show that the first-time entry into Parliament of a RRP generates voter polarisation on the left-right dimension (see also Castanho Silva, 2018 ). The mechanisms responsible for this effect are legitimation among supporters of radical right parties and backlash among citizens considering that RRPs violate social norms. Issue politicisation may also depend on the coalition incentives of mainstream right parties (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008 ).

4 Future Avenues for Research

As already made clear in this review, there remain considerable debates and shortcomings in the literature related to attitudes to immigration. In terms of explanations for attitudes, there are relatively few comprehensive models that seek to explain variation in toto , with a strong preference instead for the testing of singular causal mechanisms. As such, we know relatively little about the respective importance of factors, their causal relationships to each other, or their respective positions in the ‘funnel of causality’. The vast majority of studies consider ‘western advanced democracies’ despite immigration being an important political issue in every region of the world. Also typical, though decreasingly so, is the reliance on relatively naïve methods. Moreover, while existing research sheds some light on the political representation of the average voter’s, or of partisan constituencies’ preferences, future research should explore in greater detail the potential contextual influences such as the dimensionality of the political space or the degree of public polarisation (e.g. Ezrow et al., 2014 ). Future studies should also seek to explore potential drivers and political consequences of mass polarisation specifically on the immigration issue.

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ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

A qualitative study on the attitudes of women politicians toward their roles in politics: a case of northern cyprus.

• 1 Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, European University of Lefke, Lefke, Türkiye
• 2 Department of International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, European University of Lefke, Lefke, Türkiye

Introduction: Politics is a mechanism of cooperation for the common interest of society. In this mechanism, each individual is expected to participate equally in the leadership and decision-making mechanisms. Women's participation in politics is essential for the spread of good governance and democracy. Globally, political participation is disaggregated by gender, with men's participation greater than women's. A lower representation of women in politics is also observed in Northern Cyprus. The attitudes or views of society and politicians may determine the political participation of women in leadership positions. This study examines the obstacles and determining factors that make it difficult for women to reach leadership positions even though their political role is increasing.

Methods: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 21 female participants for this research. Eleven of them are female ministers in parliament and represent the three main political parties in the country. The remaining 10 female participants are also members of the central executive body of the three parties and the National Assembly.

Results and discussion: Women politicians believe that problems related to gender equality in politics prevent women from entering active politics and rising to leadership positions. Although there was no gender discrimination in Northern Cyprus means that women have gained equal rights with men in many areas, it was concluded that the traditional political culture keeps women out of politics.

1 Introduction

It is well-known that gender discrimination is one of the most important debates in almost every culture. Depending on ideology, region, and period, women have limited rights, less experience in public life, and limited access to positions of power ( Masad, 2020 ). The truth is still that although women are recognized as equal to men in many areas, they have not reached the same authoritative status as men in politics ( Schrupp, 2017 ). However, the free and equal participation of all elements that make up society in the administrative process and their representation through the protection of their interests are among the most important concerns of a democratic society. It is one of the main elements of democracy that women have the same place as men in every aspect of political life, especially in the decision-making mechanisms ( Kenworthy and Malami, 1999 ). When political participation is broken down by gender, it is found that women's participation is lower than men's everywhere in the world. Several factors prevent women from participating in politics. In Northern Cyprus, some attitudes are consistent with this situation. Political leaders and members of society generally have biased views about how well women can participate in politics and govern the country. This originated from the attained roles for women in their society due to patriarchal structures in society and male-dominated politics ( Hadjipavlou and Mertan, 2010 ). This study was conducted using a semi-structured interview structure with women politicians in the Republican Assembly of Northern Cyprus, the party councils, and central administrative councils of the three largest political parties in Northern Cyprus: Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (CTP), Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP) and Halkin Partisi (HP). This research addresses the difficulties women politicians face in entering political life and the impact of gender inequality on their political life.

2 Literature review

2.1 feminism.

In this article, it is highlighted that it is usually difficult for women to rise to leadership positions even though they are active in political life by understanding the unequal gender dynamics through feminist theory. Feminism focuses on promoting women's position in society in terms of politics, economics, or legal rights ( Tong, 2009 ). The important feminist theorists Bell Hooks and Estelle Freedman fought against the traditional norms and values as well as the sexist policies of male supremacy. They defined feminism as a movement to end gender inequality and devised solutions to women's problems. They argued that men and women are inherently equal and that both genders should work together to end gender discrimination ( Hooks, 2000 ; Freedman, 2002 ). Feminism aims to protect women from oppression, exploitation, and discrimination regardless of race, language, religion, and nationality. In terms of gender, the distinction between public and private has emerged according to physiological characteristics. The core of this distinction is that women become pregnant, give birth to children, and care for and raise them. Men, on the other hand, use more physical strength to perform tasks that require power and endurance. Thus, the men became hunters, shepherds, or warriors; the women stayed at home, took care of the children, and did the housework. Over time, this division of roles has extended to all aspects of life. This is because while men are generally brave, strong, and independent, women are seen as passive, quiet, and caring ( Vatandaş, 2007 ).

2.2 Differentiation in the role of women in public-private spheres

Feminism is generally considered to be an approach that opposes the prevailing patriarchal order in society and fights for women's rights to eliminate the problems women face in the private or public spheres ( Kramer et al., 2019 ). This is because women's actions or experiences in the public sphere-work spheres/politics-are not seen as valuable to policymakers because of their status in the private sphere–domestic responsibilities. The dilemma between public and private spheres reinforces gender inequality and results in the man who owns the public sphere dominating the women who are in the private sphere. Female representation, which came to the fore in the first wave of feminism, is an important touchstone. Under the influence of this wind, women in many countries have gained legal advantages such as the right to vote, the right to be elected, the right to education, and the right to work. These gains are important, but insufficient based on traditional relationships. Even though egalitarian laws have been enacted today, women's political participation has not yet reached the same level as men's ( Wischermann, 2004 ).

Understanding the concept of leadership is also important for this study because it primarily examines the reasons why women in Northern Cyprus do not achieve the desired level of leadership. Although women and men have many of the same rights in society, they do not have the same power as men in the political system of society ( Duner, 1999 ). Although women have participated in the Republican Assembly of Northern Cyprus, they have made little progress in gaining real political power and leadership positions. For this reason, in light of feminist theory, women throughout the world are kept in the private sphere and cannot benefit from the opportunities that the public sphere offers ( Holmes, 2022 ). When political participation is broken down by gender, it becomes clear that women's participation is lower than men's everywhere in the world. In democracies, individuals with equal rights are expected to participate equally in administrative and decision-making mechanisms ( Hunt, 2007 ). In the context of equality, representation, and participation, women are found to be a more disadvantaged group than men around the world ( De Nicola, 2017 ). However, in various societies, political leadership positions are assumed to be suited for men. By recognizing gender as an issue, the aim is to reduce the prejudice about women's “unsuitability” for leadership roles. Women have struggled to attain leadership positions in positions of influence. According to feminist theory, gender equality should be achieved by society to influence all institutions. Leaders not only influence other people but at the same time help shape the entire society and institutions. They also promote gender equality when they perform their duties ( Chin et al., 2007 ). Therefore, strong leadership can contribute to the success of government and weak leadership can lead to failures in government. Leadership is a process of agreeing on what to do and how to do it, and encouraging individual and collective efforts to achieve common goals ( Yukl, 2006 ).

2.3 Women's representation in politics

According to the concept of leadership, leaders can inspire citizens in their societies and shape the political structure. Leaders should be confident, willing to make difficult decisions, and compassionate toward those in need. Women's equal representation and engagement in politics and public life are critical components of a democracy. A more resilient, stronger, and inclusive world can result from empowering women as agents of change and decision-makers in the processes that shape their lives. Therefore, women's effective political participation is critical to contributing to improved human rights and sustainable development. For peace, democracy, and equality, women's perspectives and experiences must be considered on an equal footing with men's at all stages of the decision-making process ( Mindzie, 2015 ). More women in political leadership positions benefit both women and society as a whole. Progress in policy areas is essential for economic growth and development when there are more women in political leadership positions. The case for women's empowerment is unassailable even without these findings. To address the problem of women's participation in political life, the “quota system” has been developed since the late 1980s ( Galligan, 2006 ). Several governments around the world have afforded to increase women's political participation in policy-making mechanisms through legislative measures. Gender quota is a way to increase women's political participation by having a certain number of women in the decision-making mechanisms of political parties, local councils, and parliaments ( Hughes et al., 2019 ). Not only do quotas promote demand for women's political participation, but they can also lead to changes in traditional norms, cultures, and behaviors in legislative assemblies and political parties ( O'Brien and Rickne, 2016 ). These changes in political culture can reduce prejudice against women leaders, as people generally have a distrust of women's abilities in politics ( Franceschet et al., 2012 ).

2.4 Historical overview of women's political rights in Northern Cyprus

The social structure of the Turkish Cypriot community is constantly and rapidly changing. Turkish Cypriot women are influenced by both Eastern and Western cultures ( Mallinson, 2009 ). Women in Cyprus received the right to vote and stand for election many years after women in Turkey on December 5, 1934. The Turkish Family Law and the Turkish Family Court Law were considered the first steps toward equality for the Turkish Cypriot community. On May 28, 1951, the Turkish Family Law (Chapter 339) and the Turkish Family Court Law (Chapter 338) were passed in the Turkish Cypriot community and marked the beginning of the movement toward equality ( Solsten, 1993 ). Following this first step, women received the right to equal education in 1952 and the right to vote and hold elective office in 1960, after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus ( Lisaniler, 2006 ). With the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in 1960, women were given the right to vote and hold elective office, received education, and established organizations to protect women's rights. These developments accelerated the fact that women were more visible in the public sphere than in the private sphere ( Mertan, 2000 ). The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was declared on February 7, 1996 by the Republican Assembly of Northern Cyprus as a fundamental human rights convention and regulation for the protection of women's rights at the United Nations level. Through this convention, it would commit to provide equal economic, cultural, and political rights to men and women ( Hadjipavlou and Mertan, 2019 ). International resolutions, conventions, and documents provide an important sanctioning framework for public institutions and nation-states to take steps toward gender equality. The Government of Northern Cyprus has made these commitments under United Nations and European Union documents. Another international convention on gender equality, the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, was opened for signature in Istanbul on May 11, 2011 to combat violence against women and domestic violence. With the ratification of this Convention, called the Istanbul Convention for short, by the Republican Assembly of Northern Cyprus on December 5, 2011, the Assembly declared that it would take responsibility for preventing violence, protecting victims, and bringing perpetrators of violence to justice and that all members of society, especially men and boys, must change their attitudes ( Mertan, 2000 ). Turkish Cypriot women in the northern part of Cyprus work outside the home, as is the case in other parts of the world. Although starting a business is good for women's self-confidence, financial independence and the opportunity to contribute to the production process can also bring some challenges. One of the biggest problems for working women is taking on domestic responsibilities at the same time. This burden is exacerbated, especially for working mothers. As a result, it becomes extremely difficult or sometimes impossible for women to participate in the social and political environment ( Onuş, 2018 ). Based on the feminist perspective, human activities are divided into private and public spheres. For example, women are responsible for productive and domestic work such as housework and child-rearing, while men dominate public life, which includes a wide range of activities from paid work to politics. While the activities associated with women are seen as women's natural duties rather than work, those performed by men are seen as relatively more valuable. This has led to the exploitation of women's work in the private sector and their exclusion from the public sector, or even if they are represented there, they play a subordinate role ( Tombak and Topdal, 2014 ). The exclusion of women from the public sphere, especially politics, underscores male domination in Northern Cyprus. Although women have gained equal rights with men in various fields, they have not been able to achieve leadership positions in the political structure of society ( Yirmibeşoglu, 2008 ).

2.5 Current situation of women's participation in political life

Attempts have been made to actively shape the role of women in Northern Cyprus, but the number of female deputies in parliament is still lower than that of men. The number of female MPs is 11, while the number of male MPs is 39 ( KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi, 2022 ). Northern Cyprus has had neither a female president nor a female prime minister. Following the assemblies of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus from 1975 to 1983, and the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on November 15, 1983, there have been a total of 22 female deputies during the 50 years of these three periods. Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, two female deputies have served in the Ministry of the Assembly of the Republic. There was no female minister in the Council of Ministers formed in 2014. From 2018 to 2022, the Council of the Republican Assembly of Northern Cyprus could have only one female member. Another important debate in Northern Cyprus concerns the office of mayor in twenty-eight municipalities, which has been reduced to eighteen by 2022, but there is still no female mayor in Northern Cyprus. The number of male politicians in each election from 2014 to 2022 is higher than the number of female politicians for the membership of the municipality associated with the local administration. The number of male and female members of the municipality is one hundred and eighty-eight and ninety-two, respectively. The last important position is the mukhtar, which is the head of a village or district, and as with other political positions, the number of female mukhtars is less than the number of male mukhtars, with a large difference in numbers. From 2014 to 2022, the number of female and male heads is sixteen and two hundred and twenty-six, respectively. With the amendment of the Law on Political Parties in 2015, the 30% quota for nominated candidates came into force. Although the parties draw up the lists according to the legal regulations, this quota is not reflected in the election results ( Tüccaroǧlu, 2012 ). From 1990 to 2013, there was not much difference in the number of female deputies. In 1990 and 1993, the number of female deputies was only two. In 1998 and 2003, the number increased to four female MPs. In 2005, however, there were only three. In 2009 and 2013, the number rose again to four female deputies. In 2018, it peaked with nine female politicians entering parliament. For many years, there was criticism that the number of female deputies in parliament was low. Even though the number of female deputies in the 50-seat Parliament of the Republican Assembly of Northern Cyprus in 2022 is eleven, it is still an unexpected figure ( Orakcioǧlu, 2022 ).

3 Materials and methods

3.1 research design and participants.

The focus of this study was on qualitative research to gain in-depth knowledge and collect primary data on the political role of women in Northern Cyprus. To obtain open-ended responses from the participants and to capture their attitudes, feelings, and behaviors, semi-structured interviews were conducted with female members of the parliamentary executive bodies and assemblies of the three political parties, CTP, UBP, and HP, as well as with ministers of the Republican Assembly of Northern Cyprus. A total of twenty-one female politicians participated in the interviews. Eleven of them are female ministers in the Republican Assembly of Northern Cyprus as members of their parties CTP, UBP, and HP. Ten participants are female members of the central executive body and the National Assembly in CTP, UBP, and HP. Two participants are members of the party council of CTP and the other two participants are members of the central executive committee of the same party. While one participant is a member of the central executive committee of UBP, two participants are members of the party council of the same parties. While one participant is a member of the central executive committee of HP, two participants are members of the party council of the same party. Before starting the semi-structured interviews, it is important to note that the Ethics Committee of the European University of Lefke approved that the interview questions are impartial and formulated. Based on this approval, research data collection began on December 9, 2021, and ended on April 13, 2022. Due to the intensity of their work pace, participants were interviewed in person at a time and place convenient to them, and meetings were even held with some MPs in Parliament. The length of the interviews varied depending on the participants' responses. With the consent of the interviewees, a voice recorder was used and notes were taken to create a transcript. The data from the conducted interviews were categorized according to the questions collected under the headings related to the topic and analyzed by the researchers.

The demographics of the participants were included in the study based on their educational background and work history. One participant is a high school graduate, six participants have a doctoral degree, seven participants have a master's degree, and the other seven participants have undergraduate degrees. They come from different professional backgrounds. The professions of most of them, e.g., teachers or lecturers, doctors, and lawyers, belong to professional groups due to the reduction of the gender gap in education in Northern Cyprus. One participant is a civil servant in the field of agriculture and currently works in the Ministry of Agriculture in a managerial position. The agricultural field is mostly known as a male domain, but this suggests that working in these fields does not cause women to neglect or postpone their household duties, hinder their children's education, or disrupt daily family life. In February 2002, a law transformed the Department of Women and Family Affairs into the Department of Women's Studies. This law guarantees that women receive and improve their rights in terms of equality from the government ( Lisaniler, 2006 ). Business owners are also generally perceived as men, but five participants run their businesses, both in their fields and started by their families. The other demographic information relates to the age of the participants. One participant is between 25 and 34 years old. Eight participants are between 35 and 44 years old and the other eight participants are between 45 and 54 years old. There are only four participants in the 55–64 age group. This shows that the participants are young women who can stand on their own feet after reaching a certain age after obtaining their profession. In terms of marital status, the majority of participants, sixteen, are married and have household responsibilities.

3.2 Data analysis

This study is based on a thematic analysis ( Lochmiller, 2021 ) involving four steps: First, the entire transcription is reviewed to get an overall impression of what the female politicians said. The second step consists of rereading the statements to identify the units of meaning, taking into account the phenomena of interest. In this stage, common themes and codes were also identified and categorized by recurring key terms. In the third step, all meaning units are reviewed to gain deeper insight into the phenomena of interest, and in the final step, the transformed meaning units are synthesized into a consistent statement about the experiences of female politicians ( Eysenbach and Köhler, 2002 ). The themes are distinct from each other and have the property of explaining the data by forming an inherently meaningful whole. The themes were chosen to be organized originally and not to contain the personal opinions of the authors while specifying the themes to increase the subjectivity of the study. Since it was decided to keep the identity of the participants anonymous and confidential for ethical reasons, the participants were coded in the transmission of the results as P1, P2,..., and P21 in the transmission of the results.

The purpose of this study is to examine why the country's traditional political culture keeps women out of the political arena and away from leadership positions, even though there is no visible gender discrimination in Northern Cyprus. This study is mainly about women's political participation, and it aims to show why female representatives still cannot reach leadership positions in politics, although it is not difficult for women to participate in social life in Northern Cyprus. This article is useful and interesting, especially given the challenges women face and their underrepresented status in the political sphere. This study contributes to the literature and policy by providing new empirical evidence of gender inequality in politics in the context of Turkish Cypriot women politicians. It also critically and comprehensively examines the difficulties, struggles, and experiences of women politicians living on the island as they attempt to enter politics. One of the limitations of the study is that male politicians could also be included in the survey to provide more comprehensive information and compare the responses of female representatives. However, the study intends to be based on the opinions of female politicians. Considering the data collection method and reliability of coding, there is another limitation of the study. Reliability is related to the repeatability of research results and to the question of if the study can be conducted once again after the first one, and whether it would yield the same results. The consistency with coding segments placed in the same category is referred to as reliability. In addition, the reliability of the coding criterion means that the findings and interpretations of the research are the product of a consistent process by which the findings obtained would be as clear and reproducible as possible ( Compton et al., 2012 ). This study contains controversial questions due to the semi-structured data collection method. This has led to the collection of subjective data that is prone to bias. Even if the same work is repeated with the same people, the responses will vary because there are questions that can be raised for discussion. At the same time, there are two types of reliability of coding: inter-coder reliability refers to consistency between different coders, while intercoder reliability refers to consistency in how the single researcher codes data at multiple points ( O'Connor and Joffe, 2020 ). In this study, intra-coder reliability is used that represents code entered by a single coder and this reduces the reliability of the study. Since the analysis may need some subjective judgment to be shared between researchers. As a recommendation and for further studies, the inter-coder reliability can be endeavored for other relevant cases to contribute to the literature.

4 Results and discussions

4.1 the reasons for difficulties faced by women politicians.

The interview questions are divided into two groups, which are asked to the participants using the semi-structured interview technique. The reasons for the difficulties faced by female politicians in participating in politics and the possible solutions proposed are the focus of consideration of the content of the questions. However, since focusing on the entire set of questions is beyond the scope of this article, it will mainly focus on the causes of the problems faced by female MPs when participating in politics. Among the questions in the first group, one of the most important questions, in particular, is “What are the opportunities and challenges for women's political participation in Northern Cyprus?” As shown in Table 1 , there are five codes under the theme of “opportunities”: “self-improvement,” “self-confidence,” “modern structure of our society,” “access to education and economic independence,” and “gender quota.” One participant elaborates on the self-improvement of individuals through participation in politics. She (P1) asserts: “ Self-development is an opportunity by taking on a social duty” . Based on her statement, women's desire to improve themselves is an opportunity. Women and men are at the same level of self-development in Northern Cyprus. Women can make their own educational and professional decisions just like men. In other words, they have the opportunity and access to education to better themselves. Self-development is an opportunity to take on a social task and improve oneself in certain subjects, in a profession, or career. This means that women and men in North Cyprus are at the same level of self-development. The same participant also addresses women's self-confidence as an opportunity. She points out women's domestic duties, but this can be seen as an opportunity, as it represents women's ability to manage work, domestic duties, and politics together. Women's participation in politics and fulfilling domestic duties at the same time can cause anxiety, but this can also be an opportunity because it shows that women can manage all these tasks and increase their self-confidence. The codes “modern structure of Turkish Cypriot society” and “access to education and economic independence” show that women and men in Northern Cyprus have equal opportunities when it comes to participating in education and employment. Three participants identify respectively: “ No one can say to the person who will join the politics you cannot join” (P6), “ Women can have professional life by support of their family members for their domestic responsibilities” (P9), and “ The social and cultural structure of Turkish Cypriot society as an opportunity and this structure does not cause any problems to women” (P12). According to these participants, young girls or women can participate in educational life and achieve their economic freedom without any problems, just like men. Family members are supportive due to the democratic family structure in Northern Cyprus. Women's access to educational and business life is also quite good, which enables women to participate more in public life. The democratic structure of the Turkish Cypriot community does not make it difficult for young girls and women to participate in public life. No one tells someone who wants to be involved professionally or politically that they cannot. Young girls and women have the freedom to decide on their profession or get involved politically. Finally, most respondents (eleven participants) agree with the idea that gender quotas are the most important and only opportunity for women in North Cyprus. Gender quotas have been instrumental in increasing the number of women in politics and in the decision-making mechanisms of political parties, local councils, and parliaments. The higher number of women can lead to greater representation of women and give them more acceptance in society. Increasing the number of women in politics can also help promote other women in society. Participants also emphasize that gender quotas are not intended to meet quotas, but to raise society's awareness that women should participate in politics with their thoughts, principles, and attitudes.

Table 1 . Existing opportunities and challenges for women's political participation.

In the second part of the question, participants mainly indicate that the challenges to women's participation in politics are greater than their opportunities. There are four codes related to “challenges” as indicated in Table 1 . These are “lack of encouragement from political parties,” “no opportunity for women's political participation in North Cyprus,” “traditional state perspective and male dominance” and “family and work commitments.” The first two codes, “lack of encouragement” and “no opportunity for women's political participation in Northern Cyprus,” originate from the political difficulties faced by women representatives, both within their parties and in government in general. According to the participants, the active position of women in political parties should be strengthened first and foremost, and girls should be educated in political parties from a young age to gain knowledge about politics. Women should not only be used to fill gender quotas in the two political parties or other political bodies of Northern Cyprus. The third code is that the government in Northern Cyprus has a traditional state perspective, namely a patriarchal structure that makes it difficult for women to participate in politics. Turkish Cypriot society lives in a democratic country, but in the practice of the democratic government of Northern Cyprus, the representation of women in politics is not easy which shows there is a male dominance structure in the participatory decision-making mechanisms in politics. This is also due to the aforementioned separation of public and private spheres in society. The roles that women occupy in society, such as domestic responsibilities, make it difficult for them to be more involved in politics. Therefore, the male-dominated political structure leads to the exclusion of women in this environment. Participants also cite that the public's expectations of a woman entering politics are higher than a man, for example, because more qualifications are required. There is prejudice against women being able to be active in politics as men, and women are expected to be more educated and qualified than their male counterparts. The participants are primarily convinced that this problem is due to the traditional political culture in Northern Cyprus, as shown in the fourth code. Although women have the same rights as men in many areas, they do not have the same authoritarian status as men in the political structure of society. The sociocultural structure of their society prevents women from actively participating in political life. Political discussions are also held in male-dominated areas such as village cafés or sports clubs, and women have always assumed the role of wife or mother in their homes.

In the context of male dominance in the political structure, the study of Erbilen et al. (2021) focuses mainly on the dilemma between the private and public spheres, which has been at the center of two centuries of feminist literature and political struggle. The dichotomy of public and private is often used to construct, control, limit, exclude, and oppress gender and sexual differences to preserve traditional patriarchal power structures. This dichotomy also forces both genders to assume certain roles within the patriarchally defined boundaries of the public sphere. Although women emerge as important actors in social life, they are rarely considered political leaders. The main problem with this distinction is that while women have the same rights as men in many areas, they do not have the same authoritarian status as men in the political or economic structures of society. Although they were allowed to participate in the Republican Assembly in Northern Cyprus, they have made little progress in gaining real political power in many countries because participants support the notion that there is a male-dominated structure to politics in participatory decision-making mechanisms. When women's household and childcare responsibilities are added, women's representation in politics becomes more difficult ( Bedioǧlu and Batman, 2014 ; Maguire, 2018 ). Some participants specify in their statement: “ We are living in a democratic country. but when it comes to practice in terms of representation of women in politics, women face difficulties in decision-making mechanisms due to traditional male dominance structure in society and in politics” (P9), “ Women's home, family, and child responsibilities are main difficulties that need more effort. the state has nothing to do with this situation” (P12), and “ If women have family responsibilities, it is much more difficult to be active in politics because it takes time and there is no private life. This is not a problem for men but it is for women because women undertake these responsibilities due to male-dominant structure” (P16). Politics is therefore seen as a male preserve, and even when women do vote, they inevitably make their electoral decisions along the lines of their fathers, husbands, and brothers. The consideration that the places where politics is made are suitable for men entails the idea that politics is men's business. Because of the dilemma between the private and public spheres, women are constrained by domestic duties. They are expected to marry, fulfill their domestic duties, and raise their children. With these duties, women are removed from the public sphere ( Fraser, 1990 ).

As mentioned in the study by Erbilen et al. and Seltzer et al. (1997) also point out the difficulties for women who want to participate in politics. They address the male-dominated state perspective and women's domestic responsibilities. Based on the male-dominated state perspective, women should work harder to create a negative perception in the media or to convince those who do not want to vote for them. In Northern Cyprus, however, sports clubs, pubs, and coffee houses are the preferred venues for direct contact with voters. These places cause difficulties for both voters and women candidates, as propaganda activities in these places are carried out either in the evenings or on weekends. The physical inadequacies of the preferred places and the male perspective of the users of the space are effective. Based on the feminist perspective, the division of the public and private spheres in society can also cause this difficulty ( Altindal, 2009 ). The participants indicate that the traditional division of labor between men and women has an impact on women's political life. In the private sphere, domestic duties are women's tasks, and managing the house is men's task. The social division of labor keeps women trapped in the private sphere and pushes them into a passive position. It leads to the man becoming the subject in the public sphere. Even when women are politically engaged in the public sphere, they still bear the responsibility for their homes. Looking at the political history of the country, it is clear that women are very rarely represented in the political scene as mukhtars, mayors, party leaders, and members of parliament, and are not perceived as doing only men's work.

One of the most important questions is about the role of women in key executive and local government positions in Northern Cyprus. The first part of the question discusses the reasons why women do not occupy key leadership positions in political parties, although there are women in parliament. As shown in Table 2 , the topic of the first part of the question is “reasons for the absence of women in key leadership positions” and the code is “male dominance in key leadership positions.” Participants emphasize that the number of female MPs increased from nine to eleven in the last election in 2022 in Northern Cyprus. This is a welcome situation, even if the desired number is not reached. However, even though women are represented in parliament, it is still difficult for women to obtain important leadership positions in political parties. All participants agree that this is due to the patriarchal structure (male dominance) of society and politics in Northern Cyprus. The second part of the question is about why there is no female mayor in local government in North Cyprus. All participants agree that the lack of female representatives in the local government is a major problem because women have more detailed-thinking personalities than men. As mentioned in Holman's (2017) study, women can be more successful in key leadership positions and local governments. Participants explain this by the recognition of politics as a man's job, the masculine structure of the places where political work is done, the traditional division of labor between women and men in the Turkish Cypriot community, and the greater commitment of women to politics. Although women and men seem to have equal rights in society, the number of female local representatives in Northern Cyprus is very low compared to men, and to date, there has been no female mayor.

Table 2 . Key executive and local government positions of women in TRNC.

4.2 Impact of traditional values and social/cultural norms on political participation of women

The impact of traditional values played an important role in discussing the difficulties women face in participating in politics. For this reason, participants were asked the question, “Do traditional customs, social and cultural norms affect the role of women in politics?” As can be seen in Table 3 , culture and traditional values have a great influence on the role of women politicians. According to the participants' responses, the theme is: “Impact of cultural norms on women's political participation.” Only one participant believes that cultural norms are decreasing. According to this participant, traditional norms are decreasing compared to the past, and taboos about the role of women in society are gradually being broken. Young girls and women today can do what they want more easily than in the past. However, the remaining majority of participants agree with the great influence of traditional values and cultural customs on politics. As also mentioned in Thanikodi and Sugirtha's (2007) study, women's political participation is limited due to traditional values. Domestic responsibilities are placed on women's shoulders, making it difficult for them to participate in politics. Therefore, most participants emphasize that the patriarchal structure of society in Northern Cyprus hinders women's political role. Some of them argue: “ There are conservative values in political parties due to male-dominated structure… According to the male-dominated political structure, domestic responsibilities are accepted as a main obstacle for women to be elected as a mayor” (P3), “ Turkish Cypriot Community has a male hegemony in politics and this does not allow women to have managerial positions… I believe women are more successful in local governments due to their detailed thinking structure but male dominance political structure hinders this” (P6), and “ Women do not have key executive positions in political parties and local governments due to the male-dominance structure of politics” (P10). To emphasize the masculine structure of politics, they point to the acceptance of politics as men's work and the places where political work is done, such as coffee houses, sports clubs, or taverns. The consideration that these places are suitable for men brings the idea that politics is men's work. Because parties are male-dominated, women are often excluded from men's decision-making processes.

Table 3 . Impacts of traditional customs, social and cultural norms on the role of women in politics.

One of the most crucial questions to capture society's image of women as politicians is whether or not they feel social pressure. As shown in Table 4 , nine participants respond “yes, social pressure” on the topic of social pressure as a female politician. They state that they feel pressure because of the patriarchal structure of society. The roles assigned to women, such as domestic duties, mean that they do not have time for politics. Similar to the study by Paxton et al. (2007) , participants show that politics is a male profession and women cannot adequately represent the public like men. The participants relate this issue to the patriarchal structure of society to explain the pressure they feel. The remaining twelve female participants confirm that they do not feel social pressure. In their opinion, the reason they do not feel pressure may be that they live in a democratic family and country or that they are free to work in the same way as men.

Table 4 . Feeling social pressure as a female politician.

The next question refers to whether the participants have politicians in their family members to discuss the traditional structure of politics in Northern Cyprus. As shown in Table 5 , one participant did not indicate whether she has a politician in her family. Ten participants indicated that they have a politician in their family, and the remaining ten people do not. The second part of the question asks whether the presence of a politician in the family increases the visibility of women. There are three codes under the theme “the role of family members of politicians on women's political participation”. These codes are: “visibility in the family depends on the individual,” “biases about skills come from family members,” and “easier visibility for women who have politicians in their family.” Four participating representatives emphasize that women's visibility depends on the individual. According to these four participants, women may have politicians in their families, but that does not mean they will be visible and successful no matter what. Being visible, they argue, is related to the person. The person should be visible in politics because it is related to their education, knowledge, attitude, and public appearance. The next code is “Prejudices about abilities come from family members.” While two participants mention the code “family visibility depends on the person,” they also emphasize that this situation can lead to prejudice against women who are politicians among their family members. Participants state that if there are women politicians in their family, they may have evolved because of their family members, but at the same time, this may lead to prejudice that they can be more easily recognized because of their family members. Participants disagree with this situation. If people have attained a position, it is because of their efforts and abilities, not because of their family members. Even the participants who argue that getting to a place because of family ties does not bring lasting success point out that this prejudice is unfounded. Finally, according to most participants, recognition and visibility are easier when one of their family members is a politician. These participants indicate that this is beneficial for both recognition and being a role model in politics at home. Thus, a new member who comes from a family with a political background has more political experience. In a small community, it is easier for people who have politicians in their family to make their mark because people know each other best.

Table 5 . Having politician family members.

4.3 Improvement of the position of women in politics

So far, the study has discussed the perceived reason for women's participation in politics in Northern Cyprus based on their views and thoughts of them in interviews. To conclude, the participants were also asked about possible solutions to the problems of women in politics. One of the most important questions is: “How can the role/position of women in politics be improved? What have you personally done to achieve this?” As can be seen in Table 6 , the theme for the first part of the question is “ways to improve the role of women in politics,” based on participants' responses. There are five codes for this theme: “the party's attitude improves the role of women in politics,” “support from society,” “laws on women's rights should be improved,” “self-confidence,” and “women should be motivated in politics.” One participant emphasizes the importance of the party's attitude toward the role/position of women in politics. If the necessary arrangements are made within the party, the role of women in politics will be strengthened so that women's chances of being elected can increase. She also points to the importance of gender quotas, which can increase the number of women in political parties, which in turn can encourage other women to become involved in political parties as well. The other participant emphasizes public support to improve the role of women in politics, but this is not enough, and women in general need to be properly motivated to be active in politics. If society encourages women and wants to see more women in politics, women may become more enthusiastic about politics. As mentioned in the study by Hooks (1986) , the participant in question points out the importance of society's solidarity against male domination. With solidarity, any problem that affects women in society can be addressed more sensitively. This will also help to strengthen women's power and they can overcome problems more easily. The other three participants believe that the role of women in politics can be strengthened by passing laws on women's rights. The state should create new legal regulations to facilitate women's social, economic, and political life. With these laws, women's position in society and politics can be strengthened, and women can increase their positions in politics in the long run. Participants assert: “ Executive authorities, ministers, etc. should be trained to prepare efficient laws for women's rights” (P4) and “ To increase political participation of women, more laws related to women or social issues should be passed” (P14). According to the participants, women's rights can be protected through various laws, and women can prove themselves in politics and increase their credibility by appearing less vulnerable in the eyes of society. In addition, women can be very independent and take care of their family members, but they may face problems at certain times due to their household duties. If the necessary laws are enacted, the problems against women can also be ended and women can consolidate their place in politics. For example, the state should provide a kindergarten for women with children and nursing homes to care for the elderly. The necessary legal regulations should be made to solve the problems of women with such tasks ( Dubler, 2003 ).

Table 6 . Ways to overcome the challenges to women's political participation.

As shown in Table 6 , seven participants mentioned the importance of having “self-confidence” to prove themselves in politics. However, from a feminist perspective, a male-dominated society has weakened women's self-confidence. Self-confidence, which is seen as a promise of liberation, is essential for feminist political empowerment because it conveys the courage to stand up to oppressive structures and change them. The feminist concept of self-awareness consists of the idea of respect for the individual “I” ( Dillon, 1992 ). Therefore, participants believe that if a woman continues to improve herself in all circumstances, no matter what her profession, that success will continue when she enters politics, and that this may lead her to perform more easily in politics. For example, women are in many different professions, such as surgeon, property manager, or engineer, meaning women can succeed in all areas of society in terms of education and careers. Politics is also one of the areas in which women can be successful. Political parties can pave the way for women by providing them with a suitable environment for decision-making mechanisms to boost their self-confidence. This can also prevent women from lagging behind men. Finally, on the topic of “ways to improve the role or position of women in politics,” the code formulated by eleven participants is “women should be motivated in politics.” Some of the participants specify: “ As women in the party, we are constantly fighting for the establishment of various mechanisms within the party” (P3), “ Political parties should organize different events for women to increase awareness on the role of women in political” (P8), “ Women's organizations in parties should be raised. Men and women should be programmed the same” (P12), and “ Hardworking and social awareness in political parties can improve the role of women in politics… Struggles in political parties for the development of women's freedom can increase their position in politics” (P16). According to most participants, women need to be motivated to be more active in politics. Women should be encouraged to join a political party at a young age to learn about political structures and gain experience in politics. They also stress the importance of raising public awareness through training on gender issues. Educating people about gender awareness at a young age can develop a mindset based on gender sensitivity that can change perspectives. Because the only way to give shape to cultural values is through public education and awareness. Participants mainly agree our society needs gender studies for both genders men and women together. Gender studies can bring up many issues related to women's difficult situations or problems to increase awareness. They also argue education should be started from a young age because the mentality of the male-dominated political system is only changed by education. If children can have awareness and sensitivity about disadvantaged groups of people, especially women, from a young age, the risk of society's gender inequalities can be reduced ( Atchison, 2016 ).

The second part of the question asks participants about the things they personally do to improve the role or position of women in politics. As can be seen in Table 6 , the theme is “things done personally” based on the participants' responses. There are three codes for this theme, namely: “have personally done nothing,” “have personally encouraged women to improve the role of women in politics,” and “have personally participated in gender training and activities to encourage others.” Seven participants emphasized encouraging women to participate in politics above all else. They have tried to verbally encourage women to participate in politics. This is because when women in politics share their experiences with other women, they can be encouraged and accelerate their participation in politics. Finally, the majority of participants personally encourage other people, especially women, to participate in gender education and activities. According to these participants, it is easier to set an example for future generations who have more experience with women's rights or the importance of women in politics. They make great efforts to raise awareness in their respective political parties by organizing various activities about gender studies and the development of women's role in politics. They also focus on the importance of public awareness, which can be raised through projects, seminars, or especially training on gender awareness. The mentality of society regarding gender roles needs to change to increase the visibility of women in the public sphere. Above all, participants emphasize the importance of educating children about gender equality at a young age. In the school system, boys are still encouraged to play soccer and girls with dolls. In their opinion, it is very difficult to solve this problem with this type of education system. According to the participants, it is easier to set an example for future generations who have more experience with women's rights or the importance of women in politics. They try very hard to raise awareness about their respective political parties by organizing them differently.

5 Conclusion

The main purpose of this article is to highlight the low representation of women in the political arena in Northern Cyprus and to examine the main limitations of Turkish Cypriot female representatives. Based on semi-structured interviews, the views of female MPs on the impact of gender inequality on their political life were explored by overcoming all factors that exclude them from politics. The patriarchal system was highlighted to explain the power interactions between men and women based on the feminist perspective. Women were kept out of public life by maintaining the public and private spheres. In general, it was found that there are various limitations due to the specific conditions in Northern Cyprus. The result of this research is that traditional values related to gender are the biggest obstacles to women's political participation. Women who want to actively participate in politics are faced with certain expectations that are never required of male candidates. First of all, a woman is required to prove herself to all voters in terms of education, social status, and economic income level. Based on the public and private dilemma, the pressure to manage domestic duties and politics together leads to problems for women. In politics, there are no fixed working hours, such as participating in propaganda activities, traveling, and lengthy meetings. Therefore, women have little time for their personal lives, and they rely on the support of other women in their immediate environment. If they feel they do not receive adequate support, they stay away from active politics and wait until their children are grown to relinquish some of their responsibilities. The times and places where politics is done are also not suitable for women and pose problems for them. In this context, women try to exist as assistants who address male politicians instead of making policies themselves. Women need to free themselves from these positions and meet in an environment where they can share their ideas about the country's problems, engage in qualified active politics, and conduct self-confident and awareness-raising activities. These meetings will motivate women to participate in politics. Women's participation in politics is absolutely necessary to change traditional gender roles and make women more visible in the public sphere. In this way, it will be easy to speak of a true democracy in which all parts of society are equally represented.

Data availability statement

The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/supplementary material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.

Ethics statement

The studies involving humans were approved by European University of Lefke Ethics Committee with the number ÜEK/65/01/09/2122/01. The studies were conducted in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. The participants provided their written informed consent to participate in this study. Written informed consent was obtained from the individual(s) for the publication of any potentially identifiable images or data included in this article.

Author contributions

NA: Writing – original draft. EO: Writing – original draft.

The author(s) declare that no financial support was received for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the participants for participating in the semi-structured interview questions. We would like to express our gratitude for their support and productive answers that enabled us to reach the results.

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Publisher's note

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

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Keywords: barriers to political participation, feminism, leadership, political participation, female MPs

Citation: Artaç NH and Oğurlu E (2024) A qualitative study on the attitudes of women politicians toward their roles in politics: a case of Northern Cyprus. Front. Psychol. 14:1304905. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1304905

Received: 30 September 2023; Accepted: 18 December 2023; Published: 08 January 2024.

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Copyright © 2024 Artaç and Oğurlu. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Niyper Hayal Artaç, nh.artac@gmail.com

Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

Having the Correct Attitude towards Politics (Singapore) Essay (Critical Writing)

Introduction, research questions, generation gap, literature review, methodology, findings and discussion.

The mainstream media in Singapore during the National Day Rally in September 2013 observed the country as one that has undergone radical changes. The day was a defining moment and a mark of how significantly the administration had reformed. The change was observed as the result of the government listening to its people. The Premier has stated that the country is in a new political dispensation.

The younger generation has recently been actively participating in politics since the entry of Lee Hsien Loong. The succession of his father was a milestone for the entire country as the older generation had been shaped to submit to the authoritarian rule of Lee Kuan Yew.

The retirement of the patriarch significantly changed the political arena augmented by the improvement of e-Governance that is given high priority by the current administration, which values the contribution of the younger generation in propelling the country’s economy and politics forward.

The younger generation’s aspiration for better governance has pushed youthful activists to take advantage of Loong’s reluctance towards freedom of expression to consolidate support and urge other youths to participate in politics.

The overwhelming presence of the internet has made the efforts by press censors futile. The attitude of the older generation in the ruling party called PAP has been a force that pushed the younger generation to other political parties.

• Does the younger generation actively participate in political processes in Singapore?
• What has shaped the attitude of the younger generation towards politics?
• Is the attitude of younger Singaporeans towards politics globally universal?

Whenever one inquires from a youth about what they think regarding the older generation, the most likely answer to receive is the phrase ‘generation gap’ (Thang 2012). The generational breach has enlarged on account of scientific progression within the last two decades and transformation in political perceptions among individuals.

Democratization of politics has significantly increased the participation of the young generation in determining the destiny of their countries, social welfare, economic endowment and governance. Unlike during the older generation’s years, individuals are able to participate in politics from the comfort of their houses and offices using technology, including the internet.

In fact, the internet has changed the view of the younger generation regarding politics. By exploiting social media platforms, youthful aspirants are able to reach out to the younger generation with the aim of influencing policies.

In Singapore, the inauguration of the incumbent Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong saw a new dawn for the country’s politics. During the opening speech, Loong conceded that the government should evolve in line with the society and in accordance with the spirit of the times, ambitions and the expectations of the people (Tan 2012).

In this regard, the Premier was addressing the older generation in view of the younger generation. Loong recognized the desire of the younger people to be involved in active politics.

This desire was evident during the 2011 general election that marked a radical approach of past politics, given that it was influenced by the younger generation. This political development is expected to bring forth new forces, dynamics and approaches to governance.

There is evident aspiration among Singapore citizens, particularly the younger generation for a more democratic, open and lively political system due to the growing political awareness among the youth (Tan 2012).

The youthful aspirations were reflected during the appointment of the cabinet after the 2011 general election. The government refrained from the previous populist style of administration by reflecting the aspirations of the youth in appointments.

Ellen Quintelier (2007) highlighted the point that people always whine regarding the perceived indolent and clumsiness of the Y-generation. They are demonized for lack of reverence to customs and seniority of the older generation. These perceptions are not novel. Individuals such as Plato and political researchers hold the same view. They feel that the younger generation does not adequately engage in politics.

Quintelier supports this view by stating that younger people are the least likely to cast their ballot. The younger generation’s participation levels are diminishing with youthful political membership taking a nosedive. The Y-generation is less bothered by politics, have little or no knowledge of politics, are apathetic and do not participate in political activities (Quintelier 2007).

The author points a finger at the media as a contributor to the development of negative discourse for youths to participate in politics. The author admits that youths are likely to engage in other political activities instead of queuing to cast a ballot. Although the author does not explicitly state that the younger generation was at the time of writing the article engaging in politics through social media and the internet.

The Singaporean younger generation found it challenging to participate in traditional political styles given the tight grip and intolerance inherent in the Yew’s administration. The patriarch’s administration did not tolerate opposing opinions, which is often the driving force for youths to participate in politics to introduce changes.

Additionally, the Y-generation held the position that Yew’s conventional political style carried problematic image for the Y-generation to associate with either in the end or short run. In the Singapore context, the Y-generation was disproportionally attracted to other forms of politics such as ‘cause-oriented’ styles.

Quintelier asserts that particular forms of political participation are on the increase among the Y-generation. These alternatives include youth parliaments, political consumerism, youth campaigns, disruption, single-issue politics and peer group support. These informal types of political participation are more attractive to the younger generation in the Singapore context and almost all global locations.

These forms of political engagement are popular amongst Singaporean youths, albeit more informal than casting a ballot. If the younger generations were able to talk about politics in their terms, political analysts would see more evidence of an active young generation citizenry and increasing levels of the entire political engagement.

There is emerging a middle-class Singaporean youths with increasing political awareness according to Chengju Huang (2012). This class includes the educated, more technologically oriented and western-influenced Y-generation. In the Singaporean context, the younger generation refers to the individuals born after the country attained independence in 1965.

Huang argues that unlike the less literate and more conventional older Singaporean generation, the Y-generation is apparently more decisive and independent in view of politics.

Unlike the older generation that had lived under the leadership of Yew, the younger generation does not consign similar faith in Yew’s authoritarian politics. However, the older generation was more susceptible to Yew’s authoritarian heritage (Huang 2012).

According to Huang, the younger generation of Singaporeans is likely to have a significant impact on local politics as they increasingly become eligible to vote. This is bound to become a reality, according to this article if the past trend is anything to go by. During the 2001 general election, only one-fifth of the electorate was born after independence.

During the 2006 election, the same age group accounted for more than fifty percent of the voters (Chin 2007). In the last days of Yew’s administration before handing over to his son, the opposite was alive to this realization and had ever since been making vigorous efforts to win the younger generation to its side. This realization has not escaped the attention of the current Prime Minister Loong.

His administration has been making significant effort to wipe away the perception of the younger generation that his administration holds onto older generation politics. However, bureaucrats of the older generation politics in his government curtail his effort to incorporate the younger generation in his administration.

Most of the information used in this report has been collected from published journals, research reports, the internet and mainstream press. The research method employed in the study is qualitative. It involves the evaluation of findings by academicians and political analysts and placing the findings in context.

The relevance of the claims in these articles is analyzed to investigate whether they reflect on the contemporary political attitudes of both the younger and the older generations.

The analysis of newspapers and internet sources of information has contributed to the development of the report. By using the interpretive model of the qualitative method, the research was able to distinguish facts from fiction regarding the actual situation of attitudes towards Singaporean politics by the two generations.

The researcher’s knowledge of the current state of Singapore politics has also been a contributing factor to developing a well-researched report.

The argument that the media negatively contribute to the participation of the younger generation in politics is contemporary obsolete. This view may have been true before the last five years.

In fact, during the last five years, there have been immense changes in politics globally contributed to by the participation of the youth, the departure of the older generation due to age and the desire by society to have youthful leadership with new vibrant ideas for the prosperity of the society.

For the older generation, engaging in politics was mostly determined by the social and economic status of the individual. The individuals who participated in politics were often the affluent. They had the means to engage with people across the wide geographic locations, as they would easily move across counties and towns. Prior to Y-generation, few youths would afford to spend money on pursuing political interests.

Instead, they would direct their resources in establishing a lifestyle, including building a house and have stable residence. They usually did not have much left to move around and meet the electorate. Additionally, most of their time was dedicated to seeking a livelihood working for the older wealthy generation.

The youth in those communities were also required to submit to the preferences of the elders, including the candidate or party membership. This would discourage the youth who saw no essence in participating in a process that they would not have any substantial significance in determining the outcome. The older generation would hence be left to determine the political future of the society.

The unavailability of the communication and interaction network and platforms was another challenge that shaped the views of the older generation in politics. They would largely depend on a controlled source of information that was designed by those in authority. The population would be fed with information no matter how misleading.

The way the older generation political mentality was molded is still evident in some global locations, especially where democracy is inexistent or is in its early stages. The older generation had been converted into political sycophants. They believed that youths should never participate in active politics.

The Y-generation has not been substantially exposed to the factors that shape the political mentality. Besides, technology has played a central role in presenting the younger generation with the opportunity to be exposed to political activities and information. The internet has played a central role in places such as the Arab countries in the recent years. The Arab Spring experienced in Africa and the Gulf region reinforce this argument.

The mistrust of political processes by the older generation has resulted in the young generation coming up with novel strategies for new political dispensation. The youth do not meet in public rallies but contemporary meet on social media platforms where political activities are organized. Singapore has not been left behind.

The youths in Singapore born between 1977 and 1997 have had the opportunity to observe political activities in the authoritarian administration. This generation has had the opportunity to grow up in an omnipresent digital technology environment. The generation displays a universal mindset founded on shared set of experiences in the political arena (Smith 2009).

The available technologies have become the natural fundamental tools for communication. The technologies were initially meant to improve the delivery of services by the Singaporean government. The use of technology by the Y-generation in the country has influenced their views on local and global politics.

According to a survey carried out by Renee Smith (2009), Singaporean Y-generation use e-services to look for information, update themselves on politics and communicate with friends and like-minded youths across the country. A survey conducted by World Value in Singapore indicates that 44 percent of Y-generation finds politics important in life. This is only 1 percent less than the older generation (Smith 2009).

It is unlike the assertion by previous researchers whose information may have been overtaken by events. This is a clear demonstration that the Y-generation is actively interested in politics. However, casting ballots during elections is substantially lower among the Y-generation.

The research concluded that the youth generation participates in politics through social media and the internet to influence others to participate in other means of political engagement instead of casting ballots.

The Y-generation pushes political discussions on the internet. The technologies offer the younger generation the new internet applications that promote novel types of civic roles by using technological tools as a medium of interactions. The highest percentage of younger generation is conversant with the internet, particularly Facebook and Twitter.

These are the most popular platforms that the younger generation uses to communicate political ideas. In fact, Loong’s administration reckons this reality. Despite the previous effort by the government to regulate the internet, little has been achieved, as the younger generation is able to circumvent these restrictions and express their ideas to the rest of the younger generation.

The upwardly mobile Singaporean younger generation voters a big number of whom have received education overseas claim that, the leading party sidelines the aspirations of the younger generation. These upcoming younger generation politicians are rapidly encouraging the younger generation to change the political attitude and participate in bringing the new and vibrant political leadership they desire.

This political awareness has been at the center of debates in the country’s political communication. In one of the controversial writings by Hao (1996), he warned that the younger well educated with increasing critical audience might question the credibility of the government control of the press. Current, this seems to have happened. The younger generation has become more outspoken.

In 2010, 24-year old Bernard Chen openly organized events and attended meetings in several locations across the country. He is part of the generation that is contemporary agitating for the People’s Action Party (PAP) to relinquish the country’s leadership (Mauzy & Milne 2002). The party has held power for 54 years and currently under Premier Loong.

Before the 2012 general elections, the participation of Singaporean younger generation was evident through active public rallies and presence on social media. The attitude of the Singaporean younger generation has changed rapidly with the majority of youths on social media, including Twitter and Facebook coming together on the social platforms to discuss politics.

There is increasing participation by the younger generation in criticizing PAP. This is done by the younger generation despite occasionally getting in trouble with the authorities and media censors (AFP 2010).

The opposition has realized the potential in the Singaporean younger generation to alter their political fortunes. The opposition has strived to keep up with the speed of the youths to use the internet and social media to realize political aspirations. In this regard, the opposition continuously ramps its presence on the internet.

The younger population in the country has indicated strong interest in opposition politics requiring the government to loosen its rule on media censoring and wooing the youth to register with PAP. The PAP overshadows the opposition and youth groups with resources.

However, the youths do not seem to be wooed by the party’s financial endowment. The leadership of the party has acknowledged that the younger generation is actively being involved in other political parties.

The ruling party has led the country for decades. It has managed to create wealth making the country one of the globe’s wealthiest societies. However, the youths argue that the country lags behind in terms of egalitarian freedom. This appears to be the driving force behind the participation of younger generation in the city-state. In fact, Jeyaretnam founded the Reform Party.

By the year 2010, the party membership composed of over forty percent of the younger generation aged below thirty years. The older generation members in PAP have contributed significantly to the youths’ urge to join the opposition parties.

The members do not give the younger generation an opportunity to be in leadership positions. Their attitude is founded on the fact that the founders and top echelon of the party are believers that the youth do not have much to contribute towards the improvement of the party performance.

There are countries that have entirely embraced technology, particularly the internet, to push political agenda, reach the public and influence policies. The United States under the Obama administration fully utilizes technology for political gains. The country sought to engage the Y-generation in politics through technology at the dusk of the Bush administration.

The social media was flurry of political activities during the campaigns with Y-generation noted to have influenced the voting trend in a number of states. Currently, President Obama makes his speech and uploads them on YouTube when addressing the nation. This offers the Y-generation an opportunity to contribute through commentaries, sharing and rating the content of his speech.

In the United States, there is little if any difference in how the older and the younger generations participate in politics. Majority of the population has access to computers and technology. The main differences in political attitude amongst the American population are on policies as opposed to generational gap.

The Y-generation is engrossed in computers, digital media, mobile phones, the internet and social media for most of their time. The constant contact with technologies, particularly computers and the internet has promoted their reliance on the technologies for communication, collection of information and making decisions.

This creates new demands for the politicians who recognize that the younger generation is in constant contact discussing political issues. This has led the incumbent to change the style of politics to reach out to the Y-generation through technologies.

The older generation is, however, still held up the old political styles that significantly differ from that of the young generation. The older generation holds the view that the young generation is naive, lazy and unreliable when it comes to the issues of politics.

However, the last few years have seen a radical shift in the youth’s participation in politics. The young generation does not necessarily participate in the field of politics but are busy influencing policies through technologies. This is often achieved by youths influencing others to join a particular course with a premeditated outcome such as the Arab Spring in Africa and the Gulf region.

AFP, 2010, Young generation turning more political in Singapore . Web.

Chin, J 2007, ‘The general election in Singapore, May 2006’, Electoral Studies , vol. 26 no. 2, pp. 699-724.

Huang, C 2012, ‘Young, educated and pragmatic: a case study of the younger generation’s democratic consciousness in Singapore’, Young, Educated and Pragmatic, vol. 2 no. 2, pp.1-17.

Mauzy, D & Milne, R 2002, Singapore politics under the people’s action party , Routledge, London, New York.

Quintelier, E 2007, ‘Differences in political participation between young and old people’, Contemporary Politics , vol.13 no. 2, pp.165-180.

Tan, E 2012, ‘Singapore transition to a ‘new normal’ in a post-Lee Kuan Yew era’, Southeast Asia Affairs , vol.1 no.1, pp. 265-282.

Thang, L 2012, ‘Promoting intergenerational understanding between the young and old: the case of Singapore’, Journal of Politics , vol.2 no.3, pp.1-12.

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IvyPanda. (2020, January 16). Having the Correct Attitude towards Politics (Singapore). https://ivypanda.com/essays/having-the-correct-attitude-towards-politics-singapore/

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IvyPanda . 2020. "Having the Correct Attitude towards Politics (Singapore)." January 16, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/having-the-correct-attitude-towards-politics-singapore/.

1. IvyPanda . "Having the Correct Attitude towards Politics (Singapore)." January 16, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/having-the-correct-attitude-towards-politics-singapore/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Having the Correct Attitude towards Politics (Singapore)." January 16, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/having-the-correct-attitude-towards-politics-singapore/.

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